In the preceding chapters Aristotle has dwelt on the importance to a constitution of gaining the adherence of the majority (cf. introduction to II x), and in closing IV xii he had mentioned how this may be achieved by trickery. A list of such tricks is now given. Oligarchy can be made to appear less objectionable to the people in five ways, which may even strengthen its position. It is evidently less easy for democracies to delude oligarchs, and the question becomes merged in the general question of mixing the two into a moderate constitution. But it is by no means clear in this chapter when Aristotle is using politeia in the general sense of constitution and when he means ‘polity’.
In the third paragraph Aristotle recommends a legitimate device, of allowing only arms-bearers to ‘share in the constitution’; since Greek soldiers commonly had to supply their own equipment, this is in effect to fix a property-qualification that will exclude the poor but still ensure that supporters of the constitution are in a majority. (The recommendation does not spring from any particular admiration for soldiers as such.) After a brief historical review of the role of the armed forces as it affected constitutions, Aristotle rounds off his present set of topics by a summary that only partly corresponds to the first three items in the ‘table of contents’ given in IV i–ii.
1297a14 There are five devices which are employed against the people in order to give a constitution a more attractive appearance. They concern the Assembly, the offices of power, the law-courts, the carrying of arms, and physical training. Thus first, membership of the Assembly may be open to all, fines for non-attendance being imposed only on the rich (or much larger fines on them than on others). Next the offices: those with a certain property-qualification are not allowed to decline office by oath,1 but the poor are. Thirdly the law-courts: fines are imposed on the rich if they do not serve as jurymen, but the poor are exempt (or else, as in Charondas’2 laws, there are small fines in the latter case, large in the other). Sometimes membership both of Assembly and of juries is thrown open to any persons who have their names put on the roll; but if, being thus enrolled, they fail to serve in the Assembly or the court, they incur large fines. It is the deliberate intention that the threat of a fine should cause people to avoid enrolment, and that non-enrolment should lead to their serving neither in law-court nor in Assembly. Similar regulations are made about carrying arms and gymnastic training: it is lawful for the poor not to possess arms, whereas the rich are fined if they do not have them. And if they fail to attend gymnasia, there is a penalty for the rich but none for the poor, so that the possibility of a penalty may cause the rich to attend; while the poor, having no penalty to fear, may absent themselves.
1297a34 These are oligarchical devices in the framing of laws; in democracies they are made in the opposite sense. They provide pay for the poor who serve in assembly or law-court, and impose no fine on the rich for non-attendance. That is why, if it is desired to make a just mixture of oligarchy and democracy, obviously the thing to do is to draw upon both sides and include both the payment for the one and the fine for the other. In this way all would have a share; otherwise the resultant constitution will be in the hands of one set or the other.
1297b1 Citizenship ought to be reserved for those who carry arms.3 This means imposing a property-qualification, whose amount cannot be settled absolutely and once and for all. The level must be fixed no lower than is absolutely necessary to ensure that the number of those who share in the constitution is larger than those who do not. For the poor are generally content enough, even if they do not share in honours, provided only that they are not liable to be ill-treated or deprived of any of their possessions. (That, however, is far from easy to achieve: members of a citizen-body do not always behave considerately.) And in time of war those who have no resources of their own are reluctant to serve as soldiers unless they are fed, but are quite ready to fight if rations are provided.
1297b12 In some places the constitution includes those who have served as hoplites4 as well as those serving currently; this was the case in Malis, but only those on active service were elected to hold office. The earliest constitution (after the kingships) among the Greeks was in fact composed of warriors, of the cavalry in the first place, because it was in them that strength and superiority in war were to be found (for without organized formations a hoplite force is useless, and the ancients had no fund of experience of such things and no tactical procedures5 for them, so that their strength rested with their cavalry). Then when states became larger and those with arms became stronger, the number of sharers in the constitution became larger. For this reason what we nowadays call ‘polities’ were formerly called democracies. But the constitutions of those early times were, understandably enough, oligarchical or royal; for owing to the smallness of the population their middle element was not large, and so, being neither numerous nor well organized, they were content to allow others to rule.
1297b28 We have now stated why constitutions are several in number, why there are others besides those commonly mentioned (there is not one kind only of democracy, and the same applies to the rest), and further what the differences are and the causes of them; and in addition which, speaking generally, is the best of the constitutions, and which kind among the others suits which kind of person.