Discussion of ‘stratagems’ in the preceding chapter now evidently prompts Aristotle to deal in the remainder of this book with various patterns of constitutional machinery that may be found ‘expedient’ in different constitutions – a topic which follows on here naturally enough, since there is practical value in it, and the book began with a reminder of the need to be practical as well as theoretical. Whatever be the form of government, it must provide for three things: (a) discussion and decision about what is to be done, (b) officers of state of all grades to carry out the policy, and (c) a judicial system. The combinations and permutations of the appointment of, and relationships between, the personnel of the deliberative, administrative and judicial functions of government are extremely complex and defy summary. On the assumption that Aristotle is not inventing them, or not all of them, out of his head as an academic exercise, they may serve to point up the immense variety of constitutional procedure evolved by the ancient Greek city-states, which we tend to forget through our customary concentration on some of the better-known examples (Athens in particular) of the major forms of constitution (democracy, oligarchy, etc.). As Aristotle often remarks, and as is abundantly clear from the Politics as a whole, none of these forms was monolithic.
We should beware of supposing that Aristotle’s threefold division of powers corresponds more than very roughly to the fairly sharp modern ‘separation of powers’ as between legislature, executive and judiciary: he evidently envisages considerable overlapping of functions. Here again he reflects ancient Greek practice.
1297b35 In dealing with our next topic we must speak again about the constitutions, both in general terms applicable to all and also severally, using the appropriate starting point. There are three elements in each constitution in respect of which every serious lawgiver must look for what is advantageous to it; if these are well arranged, the constitution is bound to be well arranged, and the differences in constitutions are bound to correspond to the differences between each of these elements. The three are, first, the deliberative, which discusses everything of common importance; second, the officials (here we ask what they ought to be, the limits of their sovereign powers, and the methods by which they are selected); and third, the judicial element.
1298a3 The sovereign powers of the deliberative element cover decisions as to war and peace, the making and dissolving of alliances, legislation, the penalties of death, exile and confiscation of goods, the choosing of officials, and the scrutiny of their conduct on expiry of tenure. The right to decide on all these matters must either be given to all the citizens, or all to some (e.g. to one or more officials, or some to some officials, others to others), or some of them to all, others to some. To allow everyone to decide, and on all matters, is democratic;1 for such equality is what the common people seek.1
1298a11 The principle that everyone should deliberate may be applied in various ways: first, they may all perform the work but by turns rather than collectively (as in the constitution of Telecles2 the Milesian): and in others there is an arrangement whereby the boards of officials deliberate jointly, but everyone enters upon office in turn, from the tribes and the smallest parts until the whole process is complete, coming together only for legislation and for constitutional matters, and to hear pronouncements from the officials. A second method involves the collective action of everyone; but they come together only for the purposes of electing officials, making laws, deciding on war and peace, and holding scrutinies, the remaining matters being deliberated on by officials appointed for the purpose in each case, these officials being appointed either by lot or by election from among all. A third method is for the citizens to meet about offices and scrutinies, and to deliberate on wars and alliances, but for the other matters to be managed by the officials, as many of them as possible elected; and for such officials expert knowledge is an essential prerequisite. Under the fourth method all come together to deliberate about everything, and the officials take no decisions but only carry out preliminary investigations. This is the way a modern extreme democracy works, which we maintain corresponds to an oligarchy that is run by a power-group, and to a monarchy that is a tyranny.3
1298a33 All these four methods are democratic; but where only some deliberate about all matters, the principle is oligarchic. This principle likewise can be applied in several different ways: first, when those eligible to participate in deliberation are elected on the basis of a property-qualification that is not too high, and are on that account fairly numerous, when they obey the law and do not change what it forbids them to change, and when the attainment of the required property level permits one to participate – then, though an oligarchy, such a constitution by reason of its moderation is like a polity. Next, when not all participate in deliberation but only those elected, and they rule according to law no less than in the previous case, then that is oligarchic. When again those who control the deliberating themselves choose their own members, and son succeeds father, and they control the laws, that arrangement is necessarily and in the most extreme degree oligarchical. Finally, when certain persons have control of certain matters, such as when all control war and peace and scrutinies, and the remaining business is controlled by the officials who are appointed by election and not by lot, the constitution is an aristocracy. When some matters are under the control of elected persons, others of those chosen by lot, and these latter are taken either from all or from a pre-elected few, or the elected and the lot-chosen function together, then some of these features are characteristic of an aristocratic constitution,4 others of polity itself.
1298b11 We have now distinguished in this manner the deliberative element in relation to the constitutions, and the administration of each constitution is as indicated by our analysis. But for what is nowadays reckoned to be a democracy in the fullest sense (I mean one in which the people is sovereign even over the laws) it is advantageous to adopt, in order to encourage better deliberation, a procedure used by oligarchies for their courts. I am referring to their practice of prescribing fines for failure to serve as jurymen as a means of making sure that those whom they want to serve really do appear in court (while democrats provide pay for the poor). To do this in relation to the assembly would, as I say, be beneficial, as it will ensure the presence of the notables as well as of the people, and they will deliberate the better when each side does so with the other. It is a good thing also that the membership of the deliberative element should be determined either by election or lot, and, if by lot, then an equal number from the sections of the population; and also, whenever the democrats among the citizens are numerically much superior, it is a good thing either not to provide pay for them all for their attendance, but to pay only a number equal to the number of notables, or to eliminate the excess5 by lot.
1298b26 In oligarchies, on the other hand, it will be found expedient to pick certain extra members from the mass of the people, or else, as is done in some constitutions, to set up a committee (pre-councillors, law-guardians, are the names given), and then to deal only with such business as has already been pre-deliberated by them. In this way the people will participate in deliberation without being able to set aside any of the provisions of the constitution. Alternatively, they should pass resolutions that are identical to, or at any rate not inconsistent with, the recommendations.6 A further alternative is to bestow only advisory powers on everyone, reserving full deliberative powers for the officials. One should in fact do just the opposite of what is done in constitutions:7 one should make the people sovereign when it rejects, not sovereign when it comes to approval, in which case there must be a reference back to the officials. In constitutions’ they act in the reverse manner: the small body is sovereign in rejection, but not in approval, in which case the matter is always referred back to the larger body. This then is the way in which an analysis should be given of the deliberative and sovereign element in the constitution.