It is difficult to know what to make of this chapter. It may be merely an alternative draft of the programme of inquiry outlined in IV i, to which its final paragraph is fairly similar. If however it was meant to be taken as a confirmation and development of it, then the train of thought would seem to be: ‘We envisage an inquiry into constitutions, and we have previously distinguished six. But by virtue of having already discussed the “best” constitution, we have in effect dealt with two of the three “correct” ones. (Implication: there is an order of merit among these.) Now the three “perverted” constitutions also may be graded; but in order not of merit, but demerit. But leaving questions of grading aside, we must, before discussing the various constitutions, distinguish the sub-varieties of each’ (cf. IV i ad fin.) The programme of inquiry is therefore now restated with variations of emphasis, to prepare afresh for IV iii ff.; in this revision, greater emphasis is given to the relevance of the sub-varieties, and one further and final item (e) is added to the list of topics to be investigated. But even if this reconstruction is correct, the programme of inquiry of IV i and ii is followed only approximately in the subsequent chapters and books: it refers primarily to IV iii–xiii, but topics (d) and (e) at the end of the chapter appear to look ahead to V and VI (see notes to text). On the significance of this for the composition and structure of the Politics, see the Select Bibliographies (esp. commentaries).
1289a26 In our first inquiry1 into constitutions we analysed them as follows: the right constitutions, three in number – kingship, aristocracy, and polity – and the deviations from these, likewise three in number – tyranny from kingship, oligarchy from aristocracy, democracy from polity. Aristocracy and kingship have been discussed already2 (because the inquiry into the best constitution is identical with discussion of these two words, as both have the same aim, that is virtue endowed with material goods), and the distinctions between them have been drawn;3 we have also determined when it is that kingship is to be adopted.4 It therefore remains to discuss polity,5 which is called by the name which is common to them all, and then the other three: oligarchy, democracy and tyranny.
1289a38 As to these three deviations, which is worst and which second worst – this is obvious, for the deviation from the first and most divine must be the worst. Now kingship, unless it is receiving a name to which it is not entitled, must exist in virtue of the great superiority of the person who reigns. Accordingly, tyranny is the worst, and is farthest away from polity; oligarchy comes second, for aristocracy is very different from this kind of constitution; while democracy is the most moderate of the deviations. One of my predecessors6 has expressed such views on these matters, but he takes a different standpoint from mine. He thinks that where all are reasonable enough (when oligarchy, for instance, and the rest are of a serviceable standard), then democracy is the worst of them; but when all are bad. democracy is the best. My view is simply that these constitutions are erroneous; and it is therefore improper to speak of one oligarchy as better than another, but only as less bad.
1289b11 But let us leave such estimates aside and go on to analyse: (a) How many varieties of constitutions there are, on the assumption that there is more than one form of oligarchy and democracy. (b) Which is the most universal7 constitution, and which is the most preferable constitution after the best; and which other, if any, though aristocratic and well-constructed, is even so suitable for most states – what constitution will answer to that description? (c) Among other constitutions too. which is preferable for whom, since probably for some democracy is essential, rather than oligarchy, for others oligarchy rather than democracy. (d) In what manner one who wishes to set up these constitutions should go to work in each several case, I mean each particular form both of democracy and of oligarchy.8 And lastly (e), when we have given as good and succinct an account of all these as we can, we must tackle the question which are those processes that destroy constitutions, and which are those that keep them stable, both in general and in each particular case; and also what causes most naturally give rise to these processes.9