Aristotle now fulfils the promise of the preceding chapter, to give a list of the various kinds of oligarchy, and appends a brief but valuable reminder that constitutions are not static, and do not always lend themselves to tidy classification: a democracy, for instance, may be a democracy in law, but an oligarchy in temper and operation; and these ‘mixed’ situations are produced particularly by changes of constitution. There is an important political truth here: a given formal or legal constitution may, in sufficiently determined hands, be ‘manipulated’ for ends radically different from its ostensible aims; this is indeed a danger inherent in the discretion allowed to officials under almost any constitution. Aristotle however barely begins to discuss this possibility, though the last sentence of the chapter suggests that he was aware of it.
1292a39 Of oligarchy there are four types. In (a), access to office is restricted by a property-qualification such that the not so well-off, though more numerous, have no share in the constitution, but a share is open to him who acquires property. In (b), there is a very high property-qualification, and they themselves1 choose those who are without.2 (If this choice is made from among all these,2 the practice is considered to be aristocratic, if from a limited group only, oligarchical.) (c) This is hereditary, son succeeding father in office, (d) This also is hereditary, but the officials rule, not the law. This type of oligarchy holds among oligarchies a position analogous to that of tyranny among monarchies, and among democracies to that extreme democracy of which we have just been speaking. An oligarchy of this type is in fact called a ‘power-group’.
1292b11 This completes our list of types of oligarchy and democracy; but it should not be forgotten that things often turn out differently in practice. There are plenty of instances of a constitution which according to its law is not democratic, but which owing to custom and training is democratic in its workings; conversely, there are in other places constitutions which according to law incline towards democracy, but by reason of their customs and training operate more like oligarchies. This is especially apt to happen after a change of constitution. The citizens do not at once discard their old ways, but are at first content to gain only moderate advantages from their victory over the opposing side, whichever that may be. The result is that the existing laws continue to be valid, but power is in the hands of those who have brought about the change in the constitution.