This chapter describes the operation of the influences listed at the end of V ii (the enumeration – i, ii etc. – is the same in both chapters). Aristotle gives fairly extended treatment to the last of them, ‘dissimilarity’, by which he apparently means dissimilarity of family or lineage or state. The conflicts he describes under this head do not seem to have been inspired by ideological or religious beliefs in the essential superiority or inferiority of certain races – at least so far as one can tell from his account; and in this respect modern racial conflicts are often more complicated than those he mentions here (but cf. VII vii, in it.,). In the paragraph devoted to ‘disproportionate increase’ we again notice one of Aristotle’s favourite analogies, that between body and state (cf. introduction to I i, and references there). Of the final four influences (viii–xi), Aristotle notes that three lead to revolution without faction. Finally, he discusses (xii) the influence of geography.
1302b5 What effect (iii) ill-treatment and (i) profit have, and how they operate as causes, hardly needs to be pointed out. When those in office ill-treat others and get larger shares for themselves, men form factions both against each other and against the constitution to which they1 owe their power to act; and these greater shares are won sometimes at the expense of individuals, sometimes at the expense of the common interest. Obvious also is the effect of (ii) honour, and how it can operate as a cause of faction: those who see others honoured, and are themselves not honoured, turn to faction; and the situation is certainly unjust whenever either the honour or the lack of it is contrary to deserts, but it is just whenever it is in accordance with them. Next, (v) preponderance: this is to be seen in any case where one or more men exercise power out of all proportion to the state or to the power of the citizen-body. Monarchy and a power-group commonly emerge, one or other of them, from these conditions. That is why the practice of ostracism is followed in some places, Argos and Athens for example. But it is much better to look ahead and prevent the rise of such excessive predominance than to let it appear and look for a remedy afterwards.
1302b21 As for (iv) fear, it operates in two ways: those who have committed a crime turn to faction because they fear punishment; and those who expect to be wronged by others want to forestall it, like the notables at Rhodes, who conspired against the people on account of lawsuits that were being brought against them.2 (vi) Contemptuous attitudes too lead to faction and revolt. In oligarchies, for instance, when those who have no share in the constitution are more numerous, they deem themselves more powerful. This attitude is also found in democracies, when the wealthy show their contempt of disorder and lack of government. At Thebes the state was so badly managed after the battle of Oenophyta3 that the democracy was wrecked; so too was that of Megara, because of a defeat produced by disorder and lack of government, and similarly in Syracuse before the tyranny of Gelon,4 and in the case of the democracy at Rhodes before the uprising.
1302b33 How (vii) disproportionate increase may become a cause of constitutional change may be illustrated by a comparison with our bodies. The body consists of parts, and all increase must be in proportion, so that the proper balance of the whole may remain intact, since otherwise the body becomes useless,5 as would happen if feet four cubits long grew on a body two spans high, or if the body were to change into the shape of some other animal, because of disproportion in the kind of growth, not only in the amount. So too a state consists of parts, one of which may increase without being noticed. For example, in democracies and polities there is apt to be an increase in the number of those who are not well-off. Sometimes this is due simply to chance events. Thus at Tarentum many of the notables were defeated and slain by the Iapygians; then, soon after the Persian wars, a democracy took the place of a polity. So too at Argos, when as a result of the slaying by Cleomenes the Spartan of the ‘seventh-day people’6 they were obliged to bring in some of the peripheral populations. At Athens, losses in land-battles reduced the numbers of notables because during the war against Sparta it was from a list of their names that the soldiery was drawn. This kind of thing7 may occur, though more rarely, in democracies too, for when the number of the notables grows, or their possessions increase, changes to oligarchies or power-groups result.
1303a13 Changes of constitution can take place even without faction, because of (viii) soliciting of votes, (ix) lack of vigilance, and (x) change so gradual as to be imperceptible. (viii) At Heraea they changed from holding elections to drawing lots, simply because they found that the successful candidates were those who solicited votes. (ix) It is owing to lack of vigilance that those who are not friendly to the constitution are sometimes allowed to get into the supreme offices. This is what happened at Oreus, where Heracleodorus became one of the officials and set up a polity,8 or rather a democracy, in place of the oligarchy, which was overthrown, (x) Then there is extreme gradualness: it very often happens that a considerable change in a country’s customs takes place imperceptibly, each little change slipping by unnoticed. Thus in Ambracia the property-qualification for office was small, but it was gradually reduced and became so low that it might as well have been abolished altogether.
1303a25 Then there is (xi) difference of stock, which remains a stimulus to faction until such time as the two groups learn to live together; for just as a state cannot be made out of any and every collection of people, so neither can it be made in any space of time at will. Hence faction has been exceedingly common when the population has included an extraneous element, whether these have joined in the founding or have been taken on later. Thus Achaeans were associated with Troezenians in the founding of Sybaris,9 then, becoming more numerous, they cast out the Troezenians. (This was the origin of the curse of the Sybarites.) In Thurii too Sybarites quarrelled with the rest of the founders, claiming greater shares on the grounds that the land belonged to them, and they were expelled. At Byzantium the fresh colonists hatched a plot, but were found out and expelled after a fight. The people of Antissa after receiving Chian exiles fought with them and threw them out. The people of Zancle accepted a number of Samians, but they themselves were forced to leave. The people of Apollonia on the Euxine Sea brought in additional settlers, and then turned to faction. At Syracuse after the period of tyranny they made citizens of the foreigners, the mercenary soldiers, and then formed factions and turned to fighting. Most of the Amphipolitans were expelled by the Chalcidic settlers whom they had brought in.
1303b4 10In oligarchies the many rebel on the ground of not being justly dealt with, on the ground that although they are equal they are not getting equal treament, as I said earlier. In democracies it is the notables who rebel, because, though not equal,11 they get merely equal treatment.
1303b7 Sometimes there are (xii) geographical reasons for faction: the lie of the land may not be conducive to the unity of the state. Thus at Clazomenae those on the Mole were at variance with those on the Island, likewise the Colophonians and Notians. At Athens there is a difference between the dwellers in the city itself and those in Piraeus; the latter are more emphatically democratic in outlook. We know how in warfare the crossing of watercourses, even of quite small ones, tends to cause troops to split up. So it seems that every distinction leads to division. Perhaps the greatest division is between virtue and vice, after that the distinction between wealth and poverty, and the rest after that in varying degrees. In this final group comes the one we have mentioned.12