v viii
(1307b26–1309a32)
HOW CONSTITUTIONS MAY BE PRESERVED (l)

Chapters viii and ix describe methods of ensuring the stability of the three constitutions (democracy, oligarchy and aristocracy) whose dissolutions have been examined in v–vii. Both chapters are remarkable for their total lack of reference to historical examples: it is as though Aristotle, while able earlier to display plenty of historical instances of the collapse of constitutions, could now find none of their successful maintenance. That is difficult to believe, for some Greek states kept the same constitution for long periods. What he seems to have done, as he practically admits in the first paragraph, is to write these two chapters largely by advising measures which are implicit in, and may be deduced from, the disastrous policies described in v–vii, in the sense that the former reverse the latter and so correct their mistakes. We may feel he would have been wise to strengthen his counsel by pointing to actual examples of its successful application. It is a curiously disembodied way of giving practical advice, however good the advice itself is – as indeed it is good, embracing many prudent and sensible adjustments designed to prevent any one ‘part’ of the constitution from becoming predominant and so distorting its balance. These adjustments are evidently to be continuous: Aristotle is very far from suggesting that it is possible to set up a constitution and then expect it to function without attention.

Aristotle must ‘have been well aware (cf. IV vi) of the difference between receiving payment from public funds and stealing from them; yet in this chapter he seems to describe the former in terms of the latter; cf. II xi.

1307b26 Our next topic is the preservation of constitutions both in general and in particular cases. The first and obvious point to make is that if indeed we do understand the causes of their destruction, then we understand also the causes of their preservation. For opposites are productive of opposites, and destruction is the opposite of preservation.

1307b30 Now in constitutions that are well-blended it is essential to take many precautions, and certainly against anything being done contrary to the laws; and it is essential in particular to guard against the insignificant breach. Illegality creeps in unobserved; it is like small items of expenditure which when oft-repeated make away with a man’s possessions. The spending goes unnoticed because the money is not spent all at once, and this is just what leads the mind astray. It is like the sophistic argument which says ‘If each is small, all is small’, which is true and not true: the whole or the all may be made up of small amounts without being small itself. One precaution to be taken, then, is in regard to the beginning;1 and equally we must not trust those arguments of sophistry that are designed to delude the multitude, for the facts prove them false. The sort of constitutional sophistries I mean have already been explained.2

1308a3 We must next observe that some aristocracies (and oligarchies too) remain stable, not because their constitutions are secure, but because those who hold office give proper treatment both to the members of the citizen-body and to those outside the constitution; that is to say, they do not treat the latter unjustly, but allow their leaders to participate in the constitution; they do not treat the ambitious unjustly by dishonouring them, nor the mass of the people in the matter of profit; and among themselves and the rest of those who share in the constitution they treat each other in a democratic spirit, that is to say, on an equal footing, since the equality over the whole populace which is a democrat’s aim is not only just but advantageous as between persons who are alike. Hence if the size of the citizen-body is large, there is advantage in having many of the democratic rules such as tenure of office for only six months, so as to give all, being similar, a share in it; their similarity makes them, as it were, into a dēmos, which is why, as we have observed, very often demagogues arise even among them.3 Also, since it is not as easy to do wrong in a short as in a long tenure of office, these oligarchies and aristocracies are less likely to fall into the hands of power-groups; for tyrannies arise in oligarchies and democracies for precisely that reason: either the greatest men in each case – demagogues in the one, power-group leaders in the other – aim at tyranny for themselves, or else those who hold the highest offices do so, if they hold them for a long period.

1308a24 Constitutions enjoy stability not only when any possible destroyers are at a distance, but sometimes just because they are close by; for through fear of them men keep a firm hold on their own constitution. So it becomes the duty of those who have the interests of the constitution at heart to create terrors so that all may be on the lookout and, like sentries at night, not allow their watch on the constitution to relax; the distant fear must be brought home. They must also take further precautions, by means of legislation, against the rivalries and factions of the notables, and restrain those not involved before they too make the rivalry their own; it is not every man but only a statesman who can discern in its early stages the harm that is being done.

1308a35 Changes in oligarchies and polities may be due to the property-qualifications remaining fixed while the money in circulation is greatly increasing.4 When this situation occurs the best thing to do is to assess the total communal valuation and compare the new total with the old. In some states people are assessed every year, in which case the calculation must be based on that period; but in the larger states it should be done every second or every fourth year. And if the value is then found to be much greater or much smaller than it was when the level qualifying5 for the constitution was laid down, it should be lawful to increase the property-qualifications or lower them; if the value has gone up, they are increased in proportion to the rise, whereas if the value has fallen, they are decreased to a lowel level. If the situation is not met in this way and no adjustments are made in oligarchies and polities, then in the latter case6 change is liable to take place from polity to oligarchy, or from oligarchy to power-group; in the former,7 the changes will be from polity to democracy and from oligarchy to polity or democracy.

1308b10 It is a practice common to democracy, oligarchy, monarchy and every constitution not to augment the power of any one man out of proportion, but to try to bestow on him either minor honours tenable for long periods or major ones tenable only for a short time; for men become corrupt, and not everyone can master the intoxication of success. Or if that is not possible, at any rate they avoid heaping honours on a man all in a bunch and then removing them in a bunch; the process should be gradual. And they try especially to manage matters by laws in such a way that no person becomes pre-eminent through the power either of his wealth or of his friends; or if that cannot be done, to require such men to remove themselves, and out of the country at that. But since men introduce innovations for reasons connected with their private lives too, an authority ought to be set up to exercise supervision over those whose activities are not in keeping with the interests of the constitution – of oligarchy in an oligarchy and of democracy in a democracy, and likewise in each of the rest.

1308b24 For the same reasons exceptional prosperity in one section of the state is to be guarded against. The danger can be remedied by entrusting offices and the conduct of affairs to the opposing sections.8 (By ‘opposing’ I mean the respectable sort as contrasted with the generality, and the wealthy as contrasted with the indigent.) An endeavour should be made either to merge the poor population with the rich or to augment the middle; this dissolves the factions that are due to the inequality.

1308b31 It is most important in every constitution that the legal and other administrative arrangements9 should be such that holding office is not a source of profit. This point needs to be particularly watched in constitutions that are oligarchically framed. For the many do not so much resent being debarred from office, indeed they are glad to be allowed time to attend to their own affairs, but they do not like to think that officials are stealing public money. Their resentment then becomes twofold: they are deprived of both honours and profit. Also, it is only by observing this principle that it ever becomes possible for democracy and aristocracy to coexist, because it will then be possible for both the notables and the multitude to get what they want; for it is democratic that holding offices should be open to all, aristocratic that the notables should fill them, and this is exactly what will happen when there is no profit to be made out of the offices. For those who are not well-off will not want office unless there is profit in it, preferring to look after their own affairs, while the rich will be able to accept office, as they need no supplement from public funds. The effect of this will be that the poor will become better off through spending their time at their work, and the notables will not be ruled by anybody and everybody. In order to prevent theft from public funds, the handing over of them to a successor should take place in the presence of all the citizens, and duplicates of the lists should be made available to brotherhoods, companies, and tribes. And in order to encourage the holding of offices without profit, there should be honours laid down by law for those who win a distinguished reputation in them.

1309a14 In democracies the rich ought to be treated with restraint: there should be no redistribution of property, nor of income, such as goes on unnoticed in some constitutions. It is better, even if they want to, not to let the rich undertake costly but useless public services10 – for instance financing a torch-race or the training of a chorus, or the like. In an oligarchy, on the other hand, special attention must be paid to the welfare of those who are not well-off: to them should be assigned those offices which yield some gain; ill-treatment of them by one of the rich should carry a severer penalty than one committed among the poor themselves; there should be no right of free testamentary disposition, but only kin should inherit; and the same person should not be permitted to inherit more than one estate. In this way disparity of possessions will be less, and a greater number of the poor will join the ranks of the well-to-do.

1309a27 It always pays, whether in a democracy or an oligarchy, to give equality or even preference in other matters to those whose participation in the constitution is less, to the rich in a democracy, to the poor in an oligarchy. This does not mean that they should be given sovereign offices; these should be reserved exclusively, or at any rate mostly, for participants in the constitution.