Aristotle opens the chapter by arguing that policies for securing the stability of a constitution may be drawn from observing and avoiding all those that make for instability. Already (V xi) he had suggested that the best way to preserve a tyranny is to make it as little like a tyranny as possible. Here, in this chapter and the next, the same is said of democracy and oligarchy: whatever is untypical is a source of strength, because too strict an adherence to doctrine is likely to undermine the regime. These two chapters present another aspect of Aristotle’s desire for a mixed constitution, which he generally calls a ‘polity’, in preference to a ‘pure’ one. See e.g. II vi (ad fin.), II ix (introduction), IV ix, and Kurt von Fritz, The Theory of the Mixed Constitution in Antiquity (New York, 1954), pp. 81–2.
The policy of ‘welfare relief’ recommended in the final three paragraphs is remarkable, but not new: Peisistratus had paved the way (see Aristotle’s Constitution of Athens, ch. 16), and Aristotle cites a couple of precedents at Carthage and Tarentum. Two points may be made. (1) The policy is prudential rather than philanthropic or humanitarian: it is in the interests of the rich themselves to finance it. (2) Aristotle realizes that it is of limited use merely to hand out money for the destitute to live on: the money should be applied positively, to enable them to become independent for the future.
1319b33 The task confronting the lawgiver, and all who seek to set up a constitution of such a kind, is not only, or even mainly, to establish it, but rather to ensure that it is preserved intact. (Any constitution can be made to last for a day or two.) We should therefore turn back to our previous inquiries1 into the factors which make for the continued preservation of a constitution and those which make for its dissolution. On this basis we shall try to provide for stability; we shall be on our guard against those features which we find to be destructive, and we shall lay down those laws, written and unwritten, which shall embrace the greatest number of features that pre serve constitutions. We shall know not to regard as a democratic (or oligarchic) measure any measure which will make the whole as democratic (or oligarchic) as it is possible to be, but only that measure which will make it last as a democracy (or oligarchy) for as long as possible.
1320a4 Present-day popular leaders, in their endeavour to win the favour of their peoples, make use of the law-courts for frequent confiscations.2 Those who have the interests of the constitution at heart ought to resist these activities, by passing a law that everything taken from those found guilty should be used for sacred purposes and not be confiscated for the public exchequer. This will not make wrongdoers any less careful (the fines will be exacted just the same); but the common crowd will be less prone to condemn a man on trial if they are not going to get anything out of it. Besides, the number of public3 cases that happen ought always to be reduced to a minimum, ill-considered litigation being restrained by high penalties.4 For it is not their fellow-democrats that they are accustomed to bring into court, but the notables. The constitution ought, if possible, to command the support of all citizens; short of that, at least those who exercise sovereign power should not be regarded as enemies by them.
1320a17 In the extreme democracies populations are large and attendance at meetings of the assembly is difficult unless one is paid; and this, if money is not forthcoming from the revenues, militates against the notables, for the money has then to be raised by taxation and confiscation and depraved courts – things which before now have caused many democracies to fall. Whenever therefore the necessary revenue is not to be had, the number of meetings of the assembly must be few, and the courts, though consisting of many persons, should meet on few days. This helps to make the rich unafraid of the expenses which they have to meet if the wealthy receive no fee for attendance at court, but the poor do. It also helps to improve the trials of suits at law, through the presence of the wealthy, who are willing to spend a short time, but not long periods, away from their own affairs. On the other hand if revenues are available, one should not do what popular leaders today do – make a free distribution of the surplus. (When people get it, they want the same again: this sort of assistance to the poor is like the proverbial jug with a hole in it.)5 For the duty of the true democrat is to see that the population is not destitute; for destitution is a cause of a corrupt democracy.
1320a35 Every effort therefore must be made to perpetuate prosperity. And, since that is to the advantage of the rich as well as the poor, all that accrues from the revenues should be collected into a single fund and distributed in block grants to those in need, if possible in lump sums large enough for the acquisition of a small piece of land, but if not, enough to start a business, or work in agriculture. And if that cannot be done for all, the distribution might be by tribes or some other division each in turn. The rich meanwhile will contribute funds sufficient to provide pay for the necessary meetings, being themselves relieved of all frivolous public services.6 It has been by running their constitution on some such lines that the Carthaginians have secured the goodwill of their people. From time to time they send some of them to live in the outlying districts and turn them into men of substance. When the notables are wise and considerate, they also split up the poor into groups and make it their business to provide them with a start in some occupation.
1320b9 What is done in Tarentum is also well worth copying; there they allow communal use of their property by those who have none of their own, thus ensuring the support of the populace. They also divide all the offices into two groups, filling one by election, the other by lot – the latter so that the people may participate in holding the offices, the former so that affairs of state are more efficiently administered. It is also possible to apply this to one and the same office, dividing it into two, so that some holders are appointed by lot, others by election. So much for the right way to organize a democracy.