VI vii
(1321a5–1321b3)
THE PRESERVATION OF OLIGARCHIES (2)

The mention of ‘good order’ at the end of VI vi apparently prompts Aristotle to consider the role of the military in an oligarchy: no doubt the narrower the oligarchy, the greater the need of a strong army. But just as the quality of democracy was related earlier in this book (especially in Chapter iv) to the kind of population and to geographical and economic conditions, so now these factors are shown to be important in determining the composition of the military forces too. Once again Aristotle stresses the notion of ‘blending’ – in this case by the enrolment, in the democratically inclined light infantry and naval troops, of a number of the sons of the oligarchs.

The second paragraph indicates briefly how an oligarchy may judiciously admit some of the populace to the politeuma, the citizen-body, and so to the right to hold office. Aristotle’s suggestion that the people may be led to acquiesce in exclusion from such privileges by displays of generosity financed by oligarchical office-bearers may strike us as cynical; it is at least a little naïve, for, as Newman notes (IV 546), there would be a temptation for them to ‘recoup expenditure by illicit practices’.

1321a5 A population consists of roughly four main elements: the farmers, the mechanics, the traders, and those employed on hire by others. Personnel for use in war are likewise four: cavalry, heavy-armed infantry,1 light-armed infantry, and naval forces. Wherever the territory happens to be suitable for deploying horses, the natural conditions are favourable for making the oligarchy strong. This is because the safety of the inhabitants of such a territory depends on the strength of the cavalry, and horse-breeding is an occupation confined to those who have large resources. The next form of oligarchy will flourish where the territory is suitable for heavy infantry, an arm of the service more within the means of the well-to-do than the poor. But the light-armed infantry force, and the naval, are essentially democratic. And so in practice, wherever these form a large population, the oligarchs, if there is faction, often fight at a disadvantage. To remedy this, one must follow the practice of the military commanders who to their force of cavalry and heavy-armed soldiers add the appropriate force of light-armed troops. It is by the use, of light infantry in faction that peoples get the better of the rich: their light equipment gives them an advantage in fighting over cavalry and the heavy-armed. So to establish this force of these people is to establish a force against themselves.2 But since there is already a difference of two age-groups (one older, the other younger), the oligarchs’ own sons, while still in the younger, should be trained in light and unarmed infantry work and then, separated from the boys, themselves become fit for such service in the field.

1321a26 As to giving the populace a place in the citizen-body, this may be done (a), as previously stated,3 in favour of those who possess a certain property-qualification, or (b) as at Thebes, after the lapse of a period of time spent away from mechanical occupations, or (c) as at Massalia, by making a selection of the most deserving both from those within the citizen-body and from those outside it. Again, the most supreme offices, which must be held by those who are members of the constitution, should have public services4 associated with them. This will reconcile people to having no share in office, and make them think the more kindly of officials who pay heavily for their position. It is appropriate, too, that newcomers to office should offer magnificent sacrificial banquets and execute some public work. The object is that the people, when they share in the banquets and see their city being adorned with votive offerings and with buildings, may be satisfied to see the constitution continue. There is the further result that these will remain as memorials to the notables’ expenditure. But nowadays those who are connected with an oligarchy do not do this, but rather the reverse, for it is the gains they are after, no less than the honour. Such oligarchies are well named ‘democracies in miniature’.5

These then are the ways in which the various democracies and oligarchies ought to be constructed.