Aristotle now returns to the general theme of these three introductory chapters – the good life. Is the happy life for the individual one of philosophy and reflection, or one of action and contribution to public affairs? In effect, the chapter seeks to rid their respective partisans of certain misconceptions. A partisan of the philosophic life might object to the active life by arguing that since happiness (eudaimonia) is prosperity or ‘doing well’ (eu prattein), unlimited power, used ‘despotically’ as a slave-master (despotēs) uses his over his slaves, is needed to ensure maximum prosperity. Aristotle points out in reply that a slave-master’s rule is a fairly humdrum thing, and no model for a ‘statesman’ to emulate, whose ruling of his peers and being ruled by them in turn is just as effective in achieving prosperity. Besides, unlimited power to do good is rarely used to do only good; it needs to be conjoined with virtue (aretē). On the other hand, Aristotle is anxious to assert, as against partisans of the active life who (pardonably, perhaps) suppose that the philosophic life is not active (and therefore presumably not happy either), that reflection can lead to action, and that (a very subtle argument this – see note 3) thought is ‘active’ in a special sense. The final paragraph argues that a state living an ‘isolated’ life need not be ‘inactive’, since its internal ‘parts’ may relate to each other in an active way (indeed how could they not?).
Underlying the entire argumentation of these first three chapters is Aristotle’s fundamental teleological conviction that ‘happiness’ is a form of activity: activity is obviously what man, as an animal, is made for, and he cannot be happy if he is not active. Successful action depends on virtue (see introduction to VII i, and its fourth paragraph).
1325a16 We must now deal with those who, while agreeing that the life which is conjoined with virtue is the most desirable, differ as to how it is to be followed. Some reject altogether the holding of state-offices, regarding the life of a free man as different from that of a statesman, and as the most desirable of all lives. Others say that the statesman’s life is best, on the grounds that a man who does nothing cannot be doing well, and happiness and doing well are the same thing.1 To both parties we may say in reply, ‘You are both of you partly right and partly wrong. Certainly it is true, as some of you maintain, that the life of a free man is better than the life like that of a master of slaves: there is no dignity in using a slave, qua slave, for issuing instructions to do this or that routine job is no part of noble activity. But not all rule is rule by a master, and those who think it is are mistaken. The difference between ruling over free men and ruling over slaves is as great as the difference between the naturally free and the natural slave, a distinction which has been sufficiently defined in an earlier passage.2 And we cannot agree that it is right to value doing nothing more than doing something. For happiness is action; and the actions of just and restrained men represent the consummation of many fine things.’
1325a34 But perhaps someone will suppose that if we define things in this way, it means that absolute sovereignty is best, because then one is in a sovereign position to perform the greatest number of fine actions; and so anyone who is in a position to rule ought not to yield that position to his neighbour, but take and keep it for himself without any regard for the claims of his parents or his children or friends in general, sacrificing everything to the principle that the best is most to be desired and nothing could be better than to do well.1 Perhaps there is some truth in this, but only if we suppose that this most desirable of things is in fact going to accrue to those who use robbery and violence. But maybe this is impossible and the supposition is false. For a man who does not show as much superiority over his fellows as husband over wife, or father over children, or master over slave – how can his actions be fine actions? So he who departs from the path of virtue will never be able to go sufficiently straight to make up entirely for his previous errors. As between similar people, the fine and just thing is to take turns, which satisfies the demands of equality and similarity. Non-equality given to equals, dissimilar positions given to similar persons – these are contrary to nature and nothing that is contrary to nature is fine. Hence it is only when one man is superior in virtue, and in ability to perform the best actions, that it becomes fine to serve him and just to obey him. But it should be remembered that virtue in itself is not enough; there must also be the power to translate it into action.
1325b14 If all this is true and if happiness is to be equated with doing well,1 then the active life will be the best both for any state as a whole community and for the individual. But the active life need not, as some suppose, be always concerned with our relations with other people, nor is intelligence ‘active’ only when it is directed towards results that flow from action. On the contrary, thinking and speculation that are their own end and are done for their own sake are more ‘active’, because the aim in such thinking is to do well, and therefore also, in a sense, action.3 Master-craftsmen in particular, even though the actions they direct by their intellect are external to them, are nevertheless said to ‘act’, in a sovereign sense.
1325b23 As for states that are set up away from others and have chosen to live thus in isolation, there is nothing in that to oblige them to lead a life of inaction. Activity too may take place as among parts: the parts of a state provide numerous associations that enter into relations with each other. The same is true of any individual person; for otherwise God himself and the whole universe would scarcely be in a fine condition, for they have no external activities, only those proper to themselves. It is therefore clear that the same life must inevitably be the best both for individuals and collectively for states and mankind.