In this chapter Aristotle is probably indebted to the ‘Airs, Waters, Places’ of Hippocrates, a work dealing with the effect of the climate of a country on the health and character of the inhabitants (translated in Hippocratic Writings, ed. G. E. R. Lloyd, Pelican Classics, 1978; cf. VII xi and Plato, Laws 747de).
It may seem unfortunate that Aristotle does not develop the theme, casually suggested in the first paragraph, of a unification of Hellas as a world-ruling power; but perhaps he intended it only as a formal and theoretical possibility, not to be taken seriously.
In the second paragraph Aristotle discusses one of the desirable qualities possessed by some Greeks: thumos, ‘spirit’, treated by Plato in the Republic as the self-assertive part of the soul, the seat of ambition, enterprise and righteous indignation. Aristotle makes the interesting but (on the face of it) somewhat implausible suggestion that thumos must be responsible for friendly feelings, because we are more indignant when ill-treated by our friends than we are when ill-treated by others. And as in II i–vi, he is not at his best when commenting on Plato, who, while requiring a combination of friendliness and aggression in his Guardians, did not actually require them to be aggressive towards strangers as such, in spite of Aristotle’s querulous suggestio falsi.
1327b18 We have already spoken1 about limiting the number of citizens; we must now ask what kind of natural qualities they should have. We could form a fair notion of the answer if we glanced first at the most famous Greek states, and then at the divisions between nations in the whole inhabited world. The nations that live in cold regions and those of Europe are full of spirit, but somewhat lacking in skill and intellect; for this reason, while remaining relatively free, they lack political cohesion2 and the ability to rule over their neighbours. On the other hand the Asiatic nations have in their souls both intellect and skill, but are lacking in spirit; so they remain enslaved and subject. The Hellenic race, occupying a mid-position geographically, has a measure of both, being both spirited and intelligent. Hence it continues to be free, to live under the best constitutions, and, given a single constitution, to be capable of ruling all other people. But we observe the same differences among the Greek nations themselves when we compare one with another: some are by nature one-sided, in others both these natural faculties, of intellect and courage, are well combined. Clearly both are needed if men are to be easily guided by a lawgiver towards virtue.
1327b38 Some say that to feel friendly at the sight of familiar faces and fierce at the approach of strangers is a requirement for the Guardians.3 Now friendliness springs from spirit, from the power in our souls whereby we love. We see this from the fact that our spirit is aroused more if it thinks that our intimates and friends neglect us than by the conduct of those whom we do not know. (Hence the lines of Archilochus, reproaching his friends but addressed to his own spirit, are aptly spoken: ‘About your friends you choke.’)4 The urge we all have to be free and in command springs from this faculty, spirit, because spirit is something imperious and unsubdued. But what he says about harshness to strangers is, I think, quite wrong; one ought not to behave thus to anyone, and fierceness is not a mark of natural greatness of mind except towards wrongdoers. As we have said, it is aroused the more strongly with respect to intimates, when we believe ourselves to be wrongly used by them. And this is understandable: where men expect to receive kindness as their due, they reckon that they are actually deprived of it, quite apart from the harm they suffer. Hence the proverbial sayings, ‘Grievous is fraternal strife’ and ‘Excessive love turns to excessive hate’.5
1328a17 So much for the members of the state, their proper number and natural character, and so much for the right size and kind of territory; we need say no more, because one cannot expect the same attention to detail in theoretical discussions as one would in the case of data perceived by the senses.