1. https://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/793561/general-election-2017-theresa-may-strengthen-britain-negotiating-hand-brexit-eu.
2. Position paper on ‘Essential Principles on Citizens’ Rights’, 12 June 2017, available at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/essential-principles-citizens-rights_en_3.pdf.
3. ‘The United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union: safeguarding the position of EU citizens living in the UK and UK nationals living in the EU’, 26 June 2017, available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/safeguarding-the-position-of-eu-citizens-in-the-uk-and-uk-nationals-in-the-eu.
4. This fear proved unfounded.
5. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2004:158:0077:0123:EN:PDF.
6. The speech is available at https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pms-florence-speech-a-new-era-of-cooperation-and-partnership-between-the-uk-and-the-eu.
7. ‘Joint technical note on citizens’ rights’, 8 December 2017, available at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/publications/joint-technical-note-expressing-detailed-consensus-uk-and-eu-positions-respect-citizens-rights_fr. It is important to note that although it proved relatively easy to reach an agreement on the issue of citizens’ rights, this does not mean that the citizens concerned will conserve all of their existing rights under the agreement.
8. Communication from the Commission to the European Council (Article 50), 8 December 2017, available at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/1_en_act_communication.pdf.
9. ‘Heading into troubled waters’, Financial Times, 13 October 2017, available at https://www.ft.com/content/c3f464ac-b006-11e7-beba-5521c713abf4.
10. ‘“Now they have to pay”: Juncker says UK stance on Brexit bill untenable’, Guardian, 13 October 2017, available at https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/oct/13/brexit-wrangle-over-citizens-rights-is-nonsense-says-juncker.
11. ‘UK bows to EU demands with breakthrough offer on Brexit bill’, Financial Times, 29 November 2017, available at https://www.ft.com/content/cabf22e2-d462-11e7-8c9a-d9c0a5c8d5c9.
12. This was certainly how I saw it in July 2017: see http://www.irisheconomy.ie/index.php/2017/07/30/using-ireland/. And Tony Connelly (2018, p. 74) reports that European Commission officials feared precisely the same thing.
13. ‘Business leaders feel the heat during Chevening Brexit talks’, Financial Times, 7 July 2017, available at https://www.ft.com/content/7def4e2a-6314-11e7-91a7-502f7ee26895.
14. ‘Conservative–DUP agreement due “next week”’, 15 June, 2017, available at https://news.sky.com/story/conservative-dup-agreement-due-next-week-10916703.
15. See https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-41232991.
16. Shipman (2018), p. 524.
17. https://www.politico.eu/article/uk-faces-e2-billion-eu-payment-for-china-fraud-trade.
18. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/future-customs-arrangements-a-future-partnership-paper.
19. https://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/coveney-ireland-will-not-be-used-as-pawn-in-eu-uk-talks-1.3188523. The UK’s Northern Ireland position paper is available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/northern-ireland-and-ireland-a-position-paper.
20. https://www.dw.com/en/eu-worries-that-uk-wants-to-use-ireland-as-customs-test-case/a-40412996.
21. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/publications/guiding-principles-dialogue-ireland-northern-ireland_en.
22. See https://www.standard.co.uk/news/politics/ireland-warns-theresa-may-increased-40-billion-brexit-deal-cant-buy-you-trade-talks-a3697201.html.
23. Connelly (2018), p. 359.
24. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/nov/17/irish-pm-brexit-backing-politicians-did-not-think-things-through.
25. On 8 November 2017 a working paper circulated by Commission officials contained the following bullet point: ‘It consequently seems essential for the UK to commit to ensuring that a hard border on the island of Ireland is avoided, including by ensuring no emergence of regulatory divergence from those rules of the internal market and the Customs Union which are (or may be in the future) necessary for meaningful North-South cooperation, the all-island economy and the protection of the Good Friday Agreement.’ According to both Tony Connelly and Tim Shipman this was the backstop’s first appearance in written form: Connelly’s account of how it was born is available at https://www.rte.ie/news/brexit/2018/1019/1005373-backstop-tony-connelly/. Apparently Ollie Robbins was not pleased (Shipman 2018, p. 524).
26. https://www.dfa.ie/news-and-media/speeches/speeches-archive/2017/november/eurofound-foundation-forum-2017/.
27. Connelly (2018), ch. 17.
28. The mapping exercise was deemed to be too sensitive to publish while the negotiations were ongoing. The British government published the list of areas where there was ongoing North-South cooperation in December 2018, once the negotiations had concluded. It is available at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/762820/Technical_note-_North-South_cooperation_mapping_exercise__2_.pdf.
29. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/12/01/remarks-by-president-donald-tusk-after-his-meeting-with-taoiseach-leo-varadkar/.
30. The Joint Report is available at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/joint_report.pdf.
31. A potential complicating factor was that the Northern Ireland Executive had been dissolved in January 2017 following a scandal involving renewable heat incentives. As of December 2018 there was still no Executive in Northern Ireland.
32. http://www.irisheconomy.ie/index.php/2017/12/09/who-is-fudging-answer-not-the-eu/.
33. Both documents are available on the European Council’s website, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-uk-after-referendum/.
34. In this manner they implicitly recognized that the UK had not been a vassal state when it was an EU member.
35. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-42298971.
36. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P8-TA-2017-0490+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN.
37. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/publications/draft-agreement-withdrawal-united-kingdom-great-britain-and-northern-ireland-european-union-and-european-atomic-energy-community-0_en.
38. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-43224785.
39. https://www.daera-ni.gov.uk/articles/introduction-importing-animals-and-animal-products.
40. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/33458/23-euco-art50-guidelines.pdf.
41. See the superb article by Tony Connelly available at https://www.rte.ie/news/analysis-and-comment/2018/1207/1015924-brexit-backstop-uk/.
42. The proposal is available here: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/714656/Technical_note_temporary_customs_arrangement.pdf.
43. And VAT area, I should have added: http://www.irisheconomy.ie/index.php/2017/10/07/what-if-it-was-the-europeans-picking-the-cherries/. See also https://www.cer.eu/node/6563, and https://www.ft.com/content/5f6fedcc-db3e-11e7-a039-c64b1c09b482.
44. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/723460/CHEQUERS_STATEMENT_-_FINAL.PDF. Mind you, the statement doesn’t tell us what form of backstop the government had in mind.
45. In a nod to those opposed to following EU regulations, the statement said that the UK would do so voluntarily, realizing that if it chose not to do so ‘this would have consequences’. In other words there was no legal obligation on it to do so!
46. Tony Connelly’s analysis of the events is outstanding: see https://www.rte.ie/news/analysis-and-comment/2018/0721/980069-brexit-tony-connelly/.
47. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/sep/02/michel-barnier-strongly-opposes-may-brexit-trade-proposals.
48. The evidence of both Weyand and Barnier is available at https://t.co/65yAG3VKmt.
49. https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-6146853/BORIS-JOHNSON-JEREMY-HUNT-debate-Chequers-deal.html.
50. The article is available at https://www.welt.de/debatte/kommentare/article181579426/Theresa-May-May-warns-EU-not-to-treat-UK-unfairly-in-Brexit-talks.html.
51. The report in question is available at http://uk.businessinsider.com/liam-fox-trade-deal-scrap-european-union-food-standards-after-brexit-2018-9. Good analyses of the Salzburg summit can be found inter alia at https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/sep/20/macron-puts-the-boot-in-after-mays-brexit-breakfast-blunder, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/21/world/europe/eu-theresa-may-brexit-salzburg.html, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-eu-salzburg/may-has-only-self-to-blame-for-salzburg-sandbagging-europeans-say-idUSKCN1M129D, and https://www.rte.ie/news/analysis-and-comment/2018/0921/995292-salzburg-chronic-misreading/.
52. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/09/20/remarks-by-president-donald-tusk-after-the-salzburg-informal-summit/.
53. https://news.sky.com/story/pm-attacks-disrespectful-eu-the-angriest-quotes-from-her-brexit-speech-11504324.
54. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/09/21/statement-by-president-donald-tusk-on-the-brexit-negotiations/.
55. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/sep/21/humiliation-and-disaster-how-uk-press-covered-theresa-may-salzburg-ordeal; https://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/1021145/brexit-news-dup-leader-arlene-foster-theresa-may-eu-chequers-salzburg-summit. Hunt’s speech is available at https://www.conservativehome.com/parliament/2018/09/never-mistake-british-politeness-for-british-weakness-hunts-conference-speech-full-text.html.
56. See however note 68 and the associated discussion in the text.
57. Future historians with access to more information may end up disputing the use of the definite pronoun here, but from the vantage point of 2018 it seems merited. According to a May adviser speaking in 2016, ‘The vote for Brexit was about controlling immigration. Everything else flows from there’ (Shipman (2018, p. 14). And it also seems that Mrs May intervened personally to ensure that the words ‘ending of free movement of people’ be added to the first page of the Political Declaration agreed by both sides in November 2018: see https://www.buzzfeed.com/albertonardelli/theresa-may-ending-free-movement-first-page-brexit.
58. For an early discussion of this option, see for example https://www.ft.com/content/350519e2-8a91-11e8-b18d-0181731a0340.
59. See https://www.lemonde.fr/referendum-sur-le-brexit/article/2018/10/13/brexit-dernier-tunnel-de-negociations-avant-un-accord-ou-pas_5368982_4872498.html, and https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/nov/14/how-the-draft-brexit-agreement-emerged-from-the-tunnel.
60. The statement is available at https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-statement-on-brexit-15-october-2018. See also, inter alia, https://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/brexit-deal-within-theresa-may-s-grasp-but-party-backing-elusive-1.3664561.
61. Ibid.
62. See https://twitter.com/tconnellyRTE/status/1062373393046167552. For an account of how the deal came about, see https://www.rte.ie/news/analysis-and-comment/2018/1117/1011485-brexit/.
63. https://www.thetimes.co.uk/edition/news/may-accused-of-betrayal-as-she-unveils-brexit-deal-ks9frvbwz; Emmanuel Macron later offered similar reassurances to French fishermen (see https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/nov/25/eu-leaders-back-theresa-mays-brexit-deal-in-brussels).
64. The Withdrawal Agreement is available at https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/37099/draft_withdrawal_agreement_incl_art132.pdf. A summary of the backstop is available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-18-6423_en.htm.
65. The code is set out here: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32013R0952.
66. The Directive is available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32009L0048.
67. See https://www.rte.ie/news/analysis-and-comment/2018/1207/1015924-brexit-backstop-uk/.
68. However, as Sam Lowe of the Centre for European Reform pointed out, ‘Being in such a customs union would place no constraints on the UK’s ability to negotiate in the areas of services, intellectual property, public procurement, data and regulatory barriers to trade in goods’. See https://www.cer.eu/publications/archive/bulletin-article/2018/effective-uk-trade-policy-and-customs-union-are.
69. https://www.rte.ie/news/brexit/2018/1010/1002349-brexit-border/.
70. See for example https://www.rte.ie/news/analysis-and-comment/2018/1123/1012997-brexit-and-dup/.
71. The British government had in fact drawn up plans for a termination clause to be inserted into the Withdrawal Agreement, that would have allowed the UK to unilaterally exit the backstop even in the absence of a mutually agreed-upon alternative for achieving that objective. This had not been made a formal demand, since the Irish government had made it clear that such an approach would never fly. See Times Brexit Briefing, November 29, 2018; https://www.thetimes.co.uk/my-articles/irish-leader-lays-down-red-lines-on-brexit-border-deal-5c89bqrg2.
72. The resignation letter is available, inter alia, at https://www.metro.news/seven-members-of-government-who-said-they-could-not-support-the-pms-brexit-deal/1312216/. It emerged later that Raab had also been unhappy about the backstop being used as the basis for the future relationship. See https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/dominic-raab-exclusive-brexit-interview-i-was-hoodwinked-x02m350kx. The British Attorney General, Geoffrey Cox, later confirmed that the backstop had indeed been solidly constructed by the EU negotiators: his advice to the UK government is available at https://static.rasset.ie/documents/news/2018/12/05-december-eu-exit-attorney-general-s-legal-advice-to-cabinet-on-the-withdrawal-agreement-and-the-protocol-on-ireland-northern-ireland.pdf.
73. See https://medium.com/@JoJohnsonUK/why-i-cannot-support-the-governments-proposed-brexit-deal-3d289f95f2bc.
74. The proposal was primarily associated with the Conservative MP Nick Boles, and the case for it can be found at http://betterbrexit.org.uk.
75. The judgement is available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=208636&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1087903.
76. Mrs May’s statement is available at https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pms-statement-on-exiting-the-european-union-10-december-2018.
77. See https://www.rte.ie/news/brexit/2018/1214/1017288-tony-connelly-brexit/, on which much of what follows draws.
78. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-12-14/eu-leaders-just-aren-t-sure-they-can-trust-theresa-may-anymore.
79. https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/uk/may-s-promise-to-dup-could-make-brexit-deal-impossible-1.3729389.
80. https://www.rte.ie/news/brexit/2018/1212/1016666-brexit-uk/.
81. EU suspicion of British intentions emerges strongly from the afore-mentioned report by Tony Connelly available at https://www.rte.ie/news/brexit/2018/1214/1017288-tony-connelly-brexit/.
82. https://www.irishexaminer.com/breakingnews/ireland/theresa-mays-post-brexit-trade-deal-suggestion-dismissed-by-taoiseach-892179.html.
83. The European Council’s conclusions on Brexit are available at https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/12/13/european-council-art-50-conclusions-13-december-2018/.
84. Taking the draft conclusions of the summit as the basis of the outcome, before these had been discussed either by COREPER or at the summit itself, and spinning accordingly, was an unforced error on the part of the British government, heightening the impression back in the UK that the summit had been a ‘failure’.