The seesaw war in North Africa had been tottering back and forth since September 1940 when Italian forces in Libya attempted a reluctant and cautious advance into Egypt. The numerically inferior defending Commonwealth Western Desert Force quickly stalled the attack. The British launched an offensive in December 1940, driving back the surprised Italians into Libya and shattering much of the Italian force. The Italian route was not able to be vigorously exploited owing to insufficient reserves, but the British gained a foothold in Libya. Commonwealth forces were reinforced in January 1941, and the offensive resumed. The Italians were routed, and there was no doubt of their inability to wage modern warfare. Axis attacks subsequently commenced on British-held Malta. The Axis failure to take Malta aided in their eventual defeat in the Mediterranean as Allied air and naval operations launched from there greatly hampered Axis resupply and reinforcement efforts. Tobruk soon fell to the British, and by early February the Italians had been driven from Cyrenaica (northeast Libya) and largely destroyed.
The Desert Fox himself – a classic photo of Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel, Commander Panzerarmee Afrika. (IWM GER 1281)
Mussolini, totally humiliated by the easy defeat of his forces and the loss of his African territory, asked Hitler for assistance. On February 12 General Rommel arrived in Tripoli as German forces prepared to deploy there. Tripoli in French Algeria had become the main Axis logistics base after the loss of Tobruk when the British moved into Libya. The 5. leichte Division began arriving equipped with PzKpfw I, II, III, and IV tanks. On February 24 German and British patrols made their first contact, just six days before the Deutsches Afrikakorps was established. In late March Rommel made his first advance against understrength and poorly equipped Commonwealth forces. Rommel had been directed to hold, but he attacked, even though told he knew full well that he would not receive any supplies. In less than two weeks, the German and Italian forces had pushed back the British and isolated Tobruk. Libya was reclaimed, and German patrols probed into Egypt. The supply situation prevented further advances, and the tottering Commonwealth forces were reinforced. The 15. Panzer-Division began arriving between April and June. The British began to gradually reinforce their forces in mid-May, but at the end of the month, the Germans took Halfaya Pass, establishing a foothold in Egypt. A lull followed as both forces built up supplies. At the beginning of June, the Vichy French allowed the Germans to use Bizerta just inside Algeria to deliver “nonmilitary” supplies. In mid-June the British launched a major offensive to relieve Tobruk, but within a few days they lost the initiative and Rommel retained Halfaya Pass. A long stalemate ensured, and both sides built up forces and supplies in preparation for the next battle. In September the British Eighth Army was activated to control Commonwealth forces in the Western Desert. The 5. leichte Division was redesignated 21. Panzer-Division on October 1, and the 90. leiche Afrika-Division arrived. However, it was not until November that the British offensive was launched, foiling Rommel’s planned attack on Tobruk. Both sides battered themselves severely, and the Tobruk breakout attempt failed. Fighting continued into December with Tobruk almost reached. It was at this point that the United States entered the war. After suffering heavy losses Rommel began an orderly withdrawal.
In early January 1942 the Germans received replacement tanks, including many PzKpfw IIIs, and the British began withdrawing forces to redeploy to the Far East. The British advance continued with pockets of Axis troops surrendering. Rommel secretly planned a counteroffensive without informing higher commands, and he reversed direction, counterattacking on January 21, 1942. Within three weeks he had recovered most lost ground and shattered Commonwealth forces, which were in retreat, but dug in at Galzala west of Tobruk. Another lengthy stalemate ensued. Then in late May Rommel launched a new offensive. The British positions were well fortified, but the German–Italian armor attempted to outflank them. The British armor was deployed for such an eventuality but was too widely dispersed and was outmaneuvered. However, within three days the Axis armor was out of fuel. Rommel was forced to pull back and form a “cauldron” to beat off British attacks. The Germans managed to keep their supply lines open, and the fighting went on into June with the British suffering heavy armor losses. After fighting off superior Commonwealth forces in a defensive battle, the now superior in armor Germans pursued the fleeing remnants. Tobruk fell to the Germans on June 21, giving them huge stocks of fuel and rations. Two days later German troops crossed the Egyptian frontier. It was here in the Galzala Line battle that the Germans first confronted the M3 Grant. The Eighth Army began establishing a defensive line at El Alamein. By July 4 Rommel had finally been halted and had few tanks remaining. Aware of severe German shortages, the British launched local attacks to keep the Germans, and especially the Italians, off balance, forcing them to expend more resources. The fighting went into July when both sides regrouped. The Germans continued to experience great difficulty in receiving supplies owing to attacks from British-held Malta.
The only battalion of the 1st Armored Division to be deployed into combat with the older M3 medium tank was the 2/13th Armored with one of its tanks pictured here in December 1942 in the race for Tunis. The rest of the 1st Armored Division had already been re-supplied with M4A1 Shermans by this stage of the war. (NARA)
June 1942: the crew of a Panzer III watch a column of vehicles advancing towards the El Alamein. The subsequent year they would be fighting the Americans in Tunisia. (Bundesarchiv 1011-782-0016-32A)
In August it was decided to place General Eisenhower in command of the planned northwest Africa invasion, Operation Torch, at the same time Montgomery took command of Eighth Army. At the end of August Rommel launched an attack to drive the British from Egypt, but British preparations were well underway, their artillery was more effectively organized, and the RAF dominated the sky. Rommel, still short of supplies, was counting on promised shipments. Within four days the German attack stalled, and they were forced to withdraw to their original positions. Montgomery, still armor poor, wisely decided not to pursue, husbanding his resources for his future offensive. Discovering the British were sending massive reinforcements, Rommel prepared elaborate defenses. However, on September 23 Rommel was forced to fly to Germany for medical treatment, and General Stumme assumed temporary command. To replace the large officer losses suffered by the Afrikakorps, officers were transferred from the Eastern Front, but many did not fit in with the freewheeling desert veterans and the ways of the desert, lacking the chivalrous attitude of the alte Afrikaner soldaten.
Lt Gen George Patton (1885–1945) sits on the sand and watches his armoured units in the desert during the fighting between US and German forces in the El Guettar Valley, Tunisia, 1943. (Getty)
In October 1942 the Operation Torch convoys departed the United States and the United Kingdom bound for northwest Africa. Negotiations were undertaken with Vichy French officers and officials in Algeria in an effort to prevent resistance, but they were not successful and British participation was minimal owing to extreme French animosity. On October 23 Montgomery attacked at El Alamein with a 2-1 superiority, creating a great deal of confusion and it was here that the M4 Sherman made its combat debut. General Stumme died of a heart attack, and Rommel was ordered back to Africa but did not arrive until December 3. The British continued the fight, and the Germans were forced to commence withdrawing on November 3. Although Hitler ordered a halt, the Germans, after suffering huge losses, had no choice but to continue their withdrawal. In the western Mediterranean, German and Italian submarines were concentrated owing to the arrival of Allied shipping at Gibraltar. This was assessed as a buildup for a Malta reinforcement attempt. On November 8 the Allies landed at multiple points near Casablanca on the Atlantic coast of Morocco and on the Mediterranean coast of Algeria around Oran and Algiers. Tunisia was over 400 miles to the east of the latter. After token resistance the French signed an armistice on the 11th, and that same day Hitler ordered Vichy France occupied. The day after the landing, German reinforcements began pouring into Tunisia from Sicily to face this new front behind Rommel. The British began their westward advance through Libya and recaptured Tobruk on the 12th. French troops in Tunisia began withdrawing from the coastal towns to join the Allies as British and US troops entered the country on the 15th. On the 18th British units in Tunisia made their first contact with Germans. Allied forces in Tunisia made limited, cautious progress and by the 27th were only 15 miles from Tunis. But the German defenses proved to be strong, and they managed limited counterattacks as they built up their forces flowing in from Europe. Some of these German counterattacks were successful, but others were beaten back. The 10. Panzer-Division began arriving in Tunisia in late November. On December 11 the Eighth Army again began to advance into Libya. The Germans soon retreated to avoid being outflanked. In western Tunisia V British Corps in the north continued its attacks while the II US Corps in the south broke off its own. By late December 1942 rain and poor visibility were hampering both sides’ operations.
The first week of February 1943 found the Allies in control of a little over half of northern Tunisia arrayed from north to south. The 139th Infantry Brigade, 78th Infantry Division; the 6th Armoured Division under V British Corps; Combat Command B, 34th Infantry Division (-); and the 1st Armored Division’s Command Commands A, C, and D under II US Corps were thinly spread to the north shore of the Chott el Djerid, a dry salt lake. The Germans misidentified the 1st Armored Division as the 2d due to poor intelligence when, in fact, the 2d Armored Division was still in Morocco. The XIX French Corps was in reserve west of the 34th US Infantry Division. The 1st US Infantry Division was broken up among different commands to augment their infantry. The number of Allied units at the front was limited by the transportation available to move supplies forward.
The 5. Panzer-Armee under General der Panzertruppen Hans-Jügen von Arnim, Hitler’s new favorite after Rommel’s defeat at El Alamein, was deployed in the north with Korpsgruppe Fischer comprised of 10. Panzer-Division, 334. Infanterie-Division, and Division von Broich. The Italian XXX Corpo had only one infantry division and a couple of regimental-sized units. The 21. Panzer-Division was directly under the Panzer-Armee. Rommel commanded the Deutsche-Italienische Panzerarmee in the south with the Afrikakorps now under Generaleutnant Hans Cramer. It contained 15. Panzer-Division, an Italian armored division, and a Luftwaffe infantry brigade. There were also two Italian corps, XX and XXI Corpo, each with two Italian infantry divisions and a German light Africa division to stiffen them. The 90. was with XX Corpo, and the 164. was with XXI Corpo. Most of this army was defending the old French defensive line at Mareth, holding off Eighth Army. However, 10. and 21. Panzer-Divisionen were positioning themselves to test the Americans who were defending Faïd Pass. Both divisions relied on the PzKpfw III.
Damaged and abandoned Panzer IIIs. Possession of the field at the end of battle was critical giving the victor the chance not only to recover and repair equipment but also the opportunity to examine the enemy’s tanks and vehicles.
The battle for Kasserine Pass was actually a series of engagements that lasted from the end of January through February 1943, cumlinating in the battle of El Guettar on March 23, 1943, the first significant US victory over German armor.
The Germans and Italians in northeast Tunisia were holding back the British who were less than 40 miles from Tunis, the vital Axis supply port and potential evacuation point. The Axis had little operational depth. Their western defensive line ran along the low Eastern Dorsal Mountains, roughly paralleling Tunisia’s east coast. The Germans would have preferred to add depth to the defense by holding the higher Western Dorsal Mountains somewhat further inland, but lacked the necessary forces. Far to the south Italian infantry and the Afrikakorps were dug in on the narrow frontage of the Mareth Line. There the Eighth Army was unable to resume the offensive because of its overstretched supply lines. Only 60 miles to the northwest were thinly stretched elements of the 1st US Armored Division on an 80-mile front. It was relying on its mobility and the generally moderate terrain to respond to attacks.
At the end of January 1943 a series of skirmishes, raids, and spoiling attacks were undertaken by both sides around Faïd and points south. Both were attempting to keep their opponents off balance as they built up their forces and tried to seize terrain to give them a tactical advantage and from which to launch future advances. The first move was for the Germans to launch a spoiling attack at Faïd Pass, which was weakly held by the French. Just prior to the attack the Americans to the southwest executed a raid on Sened Station, driving off the Italian defenders. On January 30 two 21. Panzer-Division battle groups attacked Faïd Pass and Rebaou Pass, 4 miles to the south. The American response was confused with senior American commanders too far to the rear to appraise the situation and lacking sufficient forces to support the French who were now caught between two Kampfgruppen (battle groups). The Americans only sent patrols to report on the situations at Faïd and Rebaou. Finding them occupied, Task Forces Stark and Kern were dispatched from the west to attack Faïd and Rebaou. Combat Command C (CCC) to the southwest was directed to head northeast to Sidi Bou Zid to the west of the two passes as a backup. The two task forces were too small to deal with the prepared German defenses and suffered losses from dug-in 8.8cm guns, and the January 30 and February 1 attacks were repulsed. In the meantime, CCC, on its way to Sidi Bou Zid, was ordered to turn south and attack Maknassy. Yet it too was repulsed by Germans dug in north of its objective. The Germans had by now determined that the Americans were thinly spread, suffered from poor control, and were still inexperienced. Axis commanders saw the situation as an opportunity to execute larger-scale attacks and to further exploit the green American and French troops, keep them off balance to gain time, and deal with the more pressing threat of the British to the north. This led to a flurry of competing Axis plans.
A view of the rugged terrain around Kasserine Pass. This perspective shows the view from the west looking towards the narrowest part of the pass. However, during the 1943 battle this dry riverbed would have been in full flood. (Patton Museum)
Generaloberst Jürgen von Armin, commanding 5. Panzer-Armee, proposed Operation Kuckuchsei (Cuckoo’s Egg), an attack against the British right flank in an effort to separate them from the Americans and French. Rommel thought this plan was too limiting. Understanding the Allied weaknesses and the Mareth Line being stable for the moment, he wished to use the Eastern Dorsals position to attack toward the western mountains and Kasserine Pass. Once seizing the pass, he could continue to the American forward supply base at Tébessa or threaten the British right flank, a goal he was keen on achieving, believing it would slow their advance. To conduct such an operation, Rommel would need additional mobile forces from 5. Panzer-Armee. General von Armin argued against what he thought was Rommel’s overly ambitious plan. The Italian chief of staff, General Ambrosio, reviewed the plans and was inclined toward Rommel’s, realizing that Mussolini’s image needed a boost after the loss of Libya. However, he did not believe sufficient mobile forces were available to accomplish Rommel’s plan. Ambrosio proposed a more limited alternative. Rather than Rommel controlling both armies’ mobile forces for a deep attack, he proposed two separate but coordinated attacks. General von Armin would exploit his seizure of Faïd Pass and take Sidi Bou Zid to destroy Combat Command A (CCA) and then seize Kasserine. This would be Operation Frühlingswind (Spring Wind). Rommel would make a more limited attack aimed at Gafsa 60 miles southwest of Faïd and defended by Combat Command D (CCD). He would then continue northwest to link up with Armin’s force near Thelepte south of Kasserine. This was Operation Morgenluft (Morning Breeze). The launch date was left up to von Arnim who was keeping an eye on the rainy weather, which would hamper his air support.
Terrain had much to do with the conduct of the battle. The area around Sidi Bou Zid was mostly flat with few restrictions to cross-country movement. It was a different matter on the terrain immediately around Djebel el Kebar and Djebel Lessouda to the southwest and the north, respectively, of Sidi Bou Zid and Djebel Ksaira to the east. These were low hills, and the gently sloping ground around their bases was cut by countless radiating gullies and rocks. Other low hills lay to the northeast and northwest. The ground was rocky, gravelly, and almost impossible to dig in. Large wadis were few and troops were forced to construct rock sangars for fighting positions. The few roads in the area (Sidi Bou Zid was a crossroads) were single- or “one-and-a-half” lane hard-packed earth. Vegetation was low patches of thorny camel brush, clump grass, and occasional cactus, offering little concealment. The weather was mild in the low 70°F (20°C) range in the day, dropping into the 50°F (10–15°C) range at night. Humidity was about 10–40 percent and it rained sporadically, and although the ground immediately soaked it up, there were some marsh and mud areas.
Tunisia’s hills caused problems for the German Western Desert veterans as they tended to underscore their importance. The Americans positioned artillery observers in the hills, and the Germans failed to secure the hills with infantry, of which they were severely short.
The Americans emplaced defensive positions on the plains between the Dorsals and prepared for the spring offensive. By now the Allies had become reliant on Enigma intelligence, especially since it had proved so accurate during El Alamein. However, the intercepted German traffic came from different commands and was sometimes incomplete. Its meaning was often misinterpreted, and therefore imprecise directives were issued to defending units. Most assessments believed the main German attacks would be aimed at the British First Army’s southern flank, and the scattered Americans might experience only divisionary attacks. Eisenhower found that various headquarters were too far to the rear, and forward units had not deployed to more favorable positions. To make matters worse, in the immediate Sidi Bou Zid area the infantry were dug in on Djebel Lessouda to the north of the crossroads and on Djebel Ksaira and Garet Hadid to the southeast. These two positions were 7 miles from each other, too far apart for mutual support.
To execute Operation Frühlingswind, 10. Panzer-Division moved by a series of night marches from Fairouan to assemble east of Faïd Pass. They were to clear the pass before sunrise. The division’s nonmotorized units would take part in the assault on Sidi Bou Zid. Kampfgruppe Gerhardt would be the first through the pass and would swing northwest around Djebel Lessouda to neutralize it and then block any American advances. Kampfgruppe Reimann would advance along the Faïd–Sbeïtla road and swing southwest in two elements to seize Sidi Bou Zid. The division reserve was Kampfgruppe Lang, a motorcycle rifle battalion. Both Panzer divisions’ artillery would be massed in the hills east of Faïd. The 21. Panzer-Division to the south would conduct a two-pronged attack with both emerging from Maïzila Pass. Kampfgruppe Schuette would attack north on the Maïzila–Sidi Bou Zid road as a supporting attack and drive defenders into the village. The stronger Kampfgruppe Stenkhoff would emerge from the pass and strike 25 miles cross-country toward Bir el Hafey. From there it would turn northeast toward Sidi Bou Zid. These two battle groups would be reinforced by nonmotorized units coming out of Aïn Rebaou Pass just south of Faïd to encircle the remaining Americans.