If there was a common characteristic among tank crew training of any army it was the recognition of the absolute necessity of developing teamwork and speed. A well-coordinated, smoothly functioning crew was essential for survival and the ability to defeat enemy tanks and antitank guns. A crew required a multitude of skills in gunnery, communications, maintenance, repairs, rough terrain driving, observation, detecting targets, land navigation, and route selection, among others.
Another obviously staged photograph of an armed M3 crew dismounting. Note the early issued 50-round drum for the Thomspon. These expensive and easy to jam magazines were soon replaced by a 20-round box magazine. One of the crewmen carries a dismounted bow .30cal machine gun.
Inducted American soldiers were given aptitude tests to determine their technical abilities and other skills. Those who demonstrated or were assessed to possess mechanical skills were sent into one of the many mechanic training courses. Such skills were also necessary for tankers. Unlike many less industrialized nations, American boys often had some degree of exposure to driving cars or at least farm tractors, and it was not uncommon for boys to tinker with the family car or even their own. Boys were also exposed to books and magazines that provided plans for hobby projects ranging from building radios to building simple mechanical devices. After induction, classification clerks reviewed the recruit’s records and test results and often personally interviewed them.
Basic training may have taken place on any of numerous posts across the country, and future tankers were sent to Ft Knox, Kentucky, the Armor School south of Louisville. The new Armored Force was established in July 1940 along with the 1st Armored Division. The Armored Force School and Armored Force Replacement Training Center were organized in October. At that time, the Armored Force was not a formal branch of service like the infantry and artillery. It did have its own “branch of service” insignia, displaying a World War I Mk VIII tank. Its branch colors were green and white. Armored Force units were more readily identified by their triangular shoulder patch displaying the blue, yellow, and red of the infantry, cavalry, and artillery.
Tank crews in training in England in 1942 prior to their deployment to North Africa the following year. (CORBIS HU 047915)
A typical Panzer III crew in tropical shirts and shorts though the pith helmet would have been captured from some South African forces.
Individuals undertook specialty training and were then assigned to units, or specialty training may have been undertaken in the unit. Ideally basic was 13 weeks, but this was sometimes cut short. The initial basic training phase covered common skills to include dismounted drill, guard duty, small arms firing and qualification, bayonet, customs and courtesies, map reading, chemical defense, first aid, and field sanitation, among other skills taught to any other soldier. Often they were allowed to select their specific crew position on the tank. Gunners and assistants/loaders were assigned the specialty code “616,” drivers “736,” radio tender/gunners “776,” and tank commanders “532” while platoon sergeants were “651.” Once assigned to a unit and crews were formed, the soldiers received cross-training in one another’s skills. This capitalized on the American qualities of initiative, teamwork, and the desire to get the job done with a minimum of interference from higher up.
The tank commander was responsible for everything his crew did or did not do. He oversaw its operation and maintenance and was responsible for the crew’s discipline and well being. His station was in the cupola in the left side of the 37mm turret. The commander selected the tank’s route, observed for enemy threats and obstacles, guided the driver, directed both gunners as to what targets to engage with what types of ammunition, gave the gunners firing orders, kept an eye on other tanks in the formation, ensured his tank maintained its position and ordered speed changes, and watched the platoon leader’s tank to respond to its actions. All crewmen were interlinked by the intercom system.
The 75mm gunner and his assistant operated the main weapon, observed for targets, and followed the commander’s firing orders. The 75mm gunner was second-in-command. The 37mm gunner and loader were stationed in the turret and also operated the coaxial machine gun. All gunners were responsible for the care and maintenance of all guns and ammunition. The driver or radio operator ran and maintained the radio and intercom system. The US used only voice radios and did not have Morse code capability, it being thought unnecessary for high-speed operations. The platoon commander’s tank was equipped with an SCR (Signal Corps Radio)-528, a two-way FM radio with a range of 10–15 miles under ideal conditions, although a 5 mile-range was more realistic. The other four tanks had an SCR-538, which was a receiver only. The frequency range of both radios was 20–28 MHz, preventing them from netting with infantry radios. In a defensive position, wire was laid between the tanks for telephone communications. The driver steered the vehicle and had to be highly responsive to the commander’s orders. Because the 75mm gun had only a limited traverse, the driver had to be alert to orient the tank, enabling targets to be engaged. This might have required sudden, major course changes and pivot turns to keep a moving target in the gun’s limited field of fire. The driver also operated the fixed machine gun beside his station and was usually the third ranking crew member.
Prior to and early in the war, every German soldier undertook 16 weeks of infantry training. They could volunteer for the Panzerwaffe (Armor Force) and would be assigned if possessing a mechanical aptitude. In the new German Army the Panzertruppen were considered an elite arm and were provided with some of the most qualified and motivated young soldiers. The Panzersoldaten considered themselves bearers of the traditions of the Hussar, the old heavy cavalry. Training at the Panzertruppenschule at Wünsdorf south of Berlin was comprehensive and thorough. In January 1941 it was redesignated the Panzertruppenschule (Schule für Schnelle Truppen “Wünsdorf”). With the expansion of the Panzer-Divisionen, a second school was established in June 1941 from the old Cavalry School at Potsdam-Krampnitz southwest of Berlin as Schule für Schnelle Truppen “Krampnitz.” In four months of instruction, all students were taught driver and maintenance skills as well as the basics of all crew functions. Many future Panzermänner had undertaken training in the National Socialist Motorized Corps (Nationalsozialistisches Kraftfahrerkorps, the NSKK) where young men learned vehicle driving and maintenance skills. Many also served in the National Labor Service (Reichsarbeitsdienst), receiving premilitary training. Private ownership of automobiles was not widespread, and the NSKK served to familiarize members with motorized vehicles for employment in industry and the military. Gunnery was an important skill, and small unit tactics were incorporated into field exercises.
A Panzer III shown flying the Panzerwaffe’s death’s head insignia. This was common practice for command vehicles as displaying pennants eased identification on the battlefield. (Carlo Pecchi Collection)
Enjoying a smoke alongside their PzKpfw III, this photo clearly illustrates the AfrikaKorps’ relaxed attitude towards uniforms. (Carlo Pecchi Collection)
Prospective Panzertruppen officers and junior NCOs undertook special courses of instruction in which they also learned leadership, tactical and administrative skills, and political indoctrination. The highest qualities sought among Panzermänner were speed of action, resourcefulness, and cunning.
The Panzerwaffe had been established in July 1938 from the Kraftfahrkamptruppen (Motorized Battle Troops) and inherited that branch’s pink arm of service color. They were better known by their black uniforms and the Totenkopf (death’s head) collar insignia. The black wool uniform was replaced by reed-green tropical twill, but the Hussar death head insignia was retained. In September 1939 all armor, antitank, armor reconnaissance, motorized rifle, and motorcycle rifle units assigned to Panzer-Divisionen were consolidated with cavalry units to become the Schnelle Truppen (Mobile Troops). They would not be redesignated the Panzertruppen until March 1943.
Tank crewmen were selected for training in specific duty positions according to their demonstrated abilities early in training. Cross-training was not neglected. A German pamphlet captured in Libya outlines the duties of a Panzeresatzung (five-man tank crew):
The tank commander is an officer (platoon leader) or an NCO and is responsible for the vehicle and its crew. He indicates targets to the gunner, gives fire orders, and observes the effects. He keeps a constant watch for the enemy, observes the zone for which he is responsible, and watches for any orders from the commander’s tank. In action he gives his orders by intercom to the driver and the radio operator and by speaking tube and touch signals to the gunner and loader. He receives orders by radio or flag, and reports to his commander by radio, signal pistol, or flags.
The gunner, a junior NCO, is the assistant tank commander. He fires the main gun, coaxial machine gun, or the submachine gun [for close-in defense] as ordered by the tank commander. He assists the tank commander with observation.
The loader loads and maintains the turret armament under the orders of the gunner. He is also responsible for the care of ammunition, and when the cupola is closed, gives any necessary flag signals. He replaces the radio operator if he becomes a casualty.
The driver operates the vehicle under the orders of the tank commander or in accordance with orders received by radio from the commander’s vehicle. He assists with observation, reporting the presence of the enemy or obstacles. He watches gasoline consumption, reporting as it drops to specified levels, and is responsible to the tank commander for the care and maintenance of the vehicle.
The radio operator is under the orders of the tank commander. In action and when not actually transmitting, he always keeps his radio set to “receive.” He operates the intercom system and records any important messages he may receive. He fires the bow machine gun. If the loader becomes a casualty he takes over his duties. [Tank radio operators were taught not to just operate the radio, but to make minor repairs and send and receive Morse code, though this was seldom used. The radio operator also carried a backup battery in case the tank lost its electrical power.]
All crewmen shared in maintenance and repair duties as well as servicing equipment and cleaning the tank’s weapons.
Communications between tanks, subunits, higher units, and supporting arms was considered most critical by the Panzertruppen. While most armies installed only two-way radios in platoon commander’s and higher echelon tanks, the Germans so equipped all tanks in this fashion. Other armies held to the concept that tanks in the platoons were only to follow orders. It was thought that by eliminating two-way communications, response time would be sped up. However, in reality this concept prevented subordinate tanks from achieving numerous tasks that included confirming the receipt of orders (or even that their radio was even operational), requesting a retransmission of orders drowned out by static or garbled transmissions, reporting they had successfully completed an action or were unable to, reporting detected threats to other tanks, adjusting supporting fires, reporting their fuel and ammunition status, or reporting they had mechanical problems. By allowing all tanks to transmit, the Germans were more responsive and able to pass information up the chain-of-command, which surely enhanced German combined arms tactics.
Handrauchzeichen were small colored smoke cartridges thrown by hand onto the ground after igniting by a pull-cord friction igniter. They were mainly used to signal actions and events to supporting aircraft. They burned for 30–40 seconds and were distinguishable from 6,000ft (1,800m).
| Color | Meaning |
| Orange | German troops here |
| Orange-red | We are isolated, cut-off, the enemy is behind us |
| Orange-green | Repeat your attack |
| Green | Increase range of action as we are advancing, we are attacking, or we are making contact |
| Red | The enemy is attacking [infiltrating, penetrating] |
| Red-green | The enemy is attacking [encircling] on our right |
| Red-white | The enemy is attacking [encircling] on our left |
| Violet | Enemy tanks ahead |
| Violet-red | Enemy tanks to our rear |
| Violet-green | Enemy tanks to our right |
| Violet-white | Enemy tanks to our left |
| Violet-orange | German tanks are going into action (to ensure aircraft did not attack them) |
The veterans of the Afrikakorps were noted for the effectiveness of its armor ambush (Panzerwarte). While Commonwealth forces had learned the hard way, the green Americans were vulnerable. There was no prescribed layout, it being dependent on available forces and weapons, the enemy formation and size, and, more than anything else, the terrain. Antitank guns would be positioned to achieve flank and rear shots after the enemy armor passed. The Panzers would not always remain in stationary positions but would engage from a hull delifade position (referred to as Halbverdeckte or Randstellung), opening fire from an unexpected direction and then maneuver to finish off or pursue the surviving enemy.
The Germans also considered two other means of communications: external (radio, flags, hand signals, flare pistol, flashlight, and hand smoke signals) and internal (intercommunication telephone, speaking tube, and touch signals).
Voice radio range between two moving tanks was about 6km (3.75 miles) in the desert and 10km (6.25 miles) using continuous wave (Morse code).
Flags were used for very short-range signaling and might not have been usable owing to dust, smoke, or fog. Signal flags were carried in holder tubes on the left of the driver’s seat. When the cupola was open flag signals were given by the commander; when it was closed the loader raised the circular flap in the left of the turret roof and signaled through the port. Flag signals were given in accordance with a code, the meaning of any signal depending on the color of the flag (yellow, green, and red; US forces used the same colors) and whether the flag was held still or moved in a particular manner. Flags were soon discarded as being too conspicuous and were replaced by hand signals.
The 2.6cm flare pistol was used mainly to signal to accompanying infantry and artillery using colored smoke (during the day) and flares (at night).
The radio set, in conjunction with the intercom, provided the commander, radio operator, and driver with a means for external and internal voice communications.
Verbal orders were transmitted from the commander to the gunner by means of speaking tube and touch signals. The latter was also used for messages from the commander to the loader and between the gunner and loader.
Most German Panzermänner in Tunisia were battle-hardened veterans with many having been in Africa fighting capable Commonwealth forces for almost two years. Many had previously fought in Poland, the Low Countries, and France. The 10. Panzer-Division, while arriving in Tunisia only three months before Kasserine Pass, was a well-blooded division having fought in Poland, France, and Russia. They possessed what was called kampfgeist (battle spirit), demonstrating high morale, a sense of absolute duty, and obedience. These veterans diffidently rated the informal title of Panzerfuchs (armor fox), an experienced tanker.
An M3 crew in North Africa prepares for the day’s operations. Maps can be seen on spread on the ground. Dress is rather informal. The shoulder guard of the 75mm gun can be seen though the side escape hatch.
Only half of the 1st US Armored Division, Combat Command B (CCB), was initially deployed to North Africa. The rest of the Division arrived on December 22, 1942. These units did not fight as pure battalions but were instead organized into combined arms task forces. At this time, 1st Armored Division task forces were called “combat commands” designated CCA though CCD.6 An armored regiment consisted of two medium (2d and 3d) and one light (1st) tank battalions with headquarters, reconnaissance, maintenance, and service companies plus a medical detachment. A medium tank battalion was organized into a headquarters company and three tank companies. Of the 1st Armored Division’s four medium tank battalions three were equipped with M4s and M4A1s. The 2d Battalion, 13th Armored Regiment was equipped with M3 mediums. By the time of the Kasserine battles, many M3s had been destroyed, disabled, or broken down and were replaced by M4/M4A1s, although some M3s remained. The battalion suffered such high losses at Kasserine that M3 reserve stocks replaced its losses, and it had more M3s after the battles than before, and the 3d Battalion had even more. The 751st Tank Battalion attached to the 34th Infantry Division also used M3s in Tunisia.
Water in the desert was critical commodity. A binocular case is seen under this man’s right arm.
The full strength medium tank company contained five officers and 144 enlisted men. The company headquarters section (one captain, 24 enlisted) had a ¼-ton radio jeep, an M2 command halftrack, and two M3 medium tanks, one for the CO and the other in reserve. The 18-man administrative, mess, and supply section had three 2½-ton cargo trucks to haul supplies, unit equipment, and kitchen gear. It also had an M6 tank destroyer (a ¾-ton truck mounting a 37mm antitank gun) for rear echelon defense. The maintenance section was headed by a lieutenant executive officer (XO, the second-in-command) with 15 enlisted men with two M3 halftracks and a jeep. The 1st–3d Tank Platoons were manned by a lieutenant and 29 enlisted. Platoons operated in two sections, one of three tanks under the platoon commander in No. 1 tank and the other two under the platoon sergeant, a staff sergeant, in the No. 4 tank.
A seven-man crew consisted of the tank commander, a sergeant (unless the platoon commander or sergeant); a 75mm gunner (corporal), a driver (technician 4 or 5), a radio tender/gunner (commonly called a “radio operator,” a technician 4 or 5), a 37mm gunner (pfc), and two assistant gunners (pfc). The later six-man crew lost the radio operator, whose duties were assumed by the driver. All crewmen were armed with Colt .45cal M1911A1 pistols, and a Thompson .45cal M1928A1 submachine gun was also carried.
The one Panzer-Regiment of a Panzer-Division had two battalions, Panzer-Abteilung I and II, organized into a Stabs-Kompanie (staff company), two or three PzKpfw III and one PzKpfw IV Panzer-Kompanien (armor companies), and a Panzer-Werkstatt-Kompanie (armor workshop company). Until reinforcements began arriving after Operation Torch, the legendary armor units of the Afrikakorps consisted of only four tank battalions: two in each of Panzer-Regimenter 8 and 5 of the 15. and 21. Panzer-Divisionen. In the 10. Panzer-Division’s Panzer-Regiment 7, the Kompanie 1 and 5 were the medium companies. Prior to Kasserine Pass the regiment fielded about 100 PzKpfw IIIs and 20 each IIs and IVs. The Germans formed Kampfgruppen of battalion and regimental size consisting of various mixes of tank, motorized rifle, motorcycle rifle, reconnaissance, antitank, and pioneer units tailored for specific missions and usually bearing the name of the commander.
The leichte Panzerkompanie (light armor company) consisted of four officers, 63 NCOs, and 91 enlisted men. The Kompanietrupp (company troop) was assigned two officers, six NCOs, and 21 enlisted men. Integral to this headquarters was a light tank platoon with five PzKpfw IIs for reconnaissance and two PzKpfw IIIs as a command tank and a spare. The Kompanieführer (company leader) was a Hauptmann (captain), but more typically an Oberleutnant (senior lieutenant). The second officer, a Leutnant, was the Führer des Kompanies Trupps overseeing the headquarters and trains. Three motorcycles were used by couriers, and a medium field car was used for headquarters equipment. The 1. to 3. Zügen (platoons; Zug singular) was manned by a Leutnant Zugführer, more often an NCO, 14 NCOs, and ten enlisted with five PzKpfw IIIs.
A five-man Panzerbesatzung included the Panzerführer (tank commander), Richtschütze (gun layer), Kraftwagenfahrer für gepanzert Kraftwagen (driver), Funker für gepanzert Kraftwagen (radio operator), and Panzerschütze (loader). The first three typically held the rank of Unteroffizier (corporal) or Unterfeldwebel (junior sergeant), with one per platoon being a Feldwebel (sergeant). The radio operator and loader were rated Panzerschütze, Panzeroberschütze, or one of the higher Gefreiter grades. All tankers were armed with a 9mm pistol, either a P.08 Luger or P.38 Walther. Each tank was provided a 9mm MP.40 machine pistol and a 2.6cm flare pistol.
The company was supported by a robust service organization of four elements, which in combat were placed under battalion control. The Kraftfahrzeug Instandsetzungsgruppe (motor vehicle maintenance squad) with three NCOs and 14 enlisted was transported by a light maintenance car, medium cargo truck, two SdKfz 10 light halftracks, and two motorcycles with sidecars. Gefechtstroß I (combat train I) was the supply and equipment repair element with seven NCOs and ten enlisted. This element had a Volkswagen field car and three medium cargo trucks, two for transporting fuel cans. Gefechtstroß II had four NCOs and 13 enlisted, 14 of whom were Wechselbesatzung (relief tank crewmen) with two medium trucks. The Gepäcktroß (baggage train) had one NCO and three enlisted with a medium cargo truck responsible for hauling individual clothing bags. Convalescing soldiers were often detailed to the Troß for light duty, the Troßfrank (train sick).
An M3 crewman takes care of a daily chore, swabbing out the main gun. A 4gal tin of oil is seen beside the 75mm M3 gun.
In Africa company organization was greatly streamlined. There were no spare tank crewmen, few trucks, and tanks were in short supply. The company troop’s reconnaissance tanks were unavailable and tank platoons might have only three or four tanks, often of mixed models or even captured British tanks, including an occasional M3 medium.
The routine duties of a tank crew, whether American or German, were similar. The crew dedicated a great deal of time to their tank. Oil, fuel, and air filters had to be constantly cleaned, especially important owing to the smothering dust. A clogged filter could quickly overheat and kill an engine. Track tension had to be checked and adjusted to prevent throwing a track at a critical moment. The radio operator spent a great deal of time cleaning and tinkering with the temperamental, fragile set. Heat and dust were its enemies, to say nothing of the rough ride and what this did to vacuum tubes (valves), condensers, soldered connections, and the delicate tuning.
Care of the armament was crucial. The main gun and machine guns demanded frequent cleaning, even without being fired. This also applied to optical sights and ammunition. Dusty ammunition coupled with oil and carbon buildup in machine guns jammed them. Dusty main gun cartridges might fail to extract. After repeated firing or cross-country travel, the main gun’s recoil system had to be checked to ensure there was sufficient fluid in the recoil buffer, and the recuperator springs, which returned the gun to battery, had to be readjusted. Live firing of all weapons prior to combat was critical to zero them, that is, to ensure the sights were adjusted to coincide with the actual point of impact at set ranges. A good tank commander ran dry fire drills at every opportunity under varied conditions, including nighttime. Pistols and submachine guns had to be cleaned along with other crew kit, and a spare barrel for each machine gun had to be maintained.
Keeping the tank fed was an endless job. With an operating range of 120–200 miles, during high-tempo operations a tank had to be refueled every day or two, not so much because it actually traveled that distance, but because of the time it spent idling. Fueling was done by hand, and it was heavy work to boost 5-gal (20-liter) jerry cans up onto the hot engine deck and empty each into the filler tube. A full jerry can or Benzinkanister (fuel container) weighed 47–49lb. An M3 required 35 cans and a PzKpfw III required 16 to fill up. Fine cloth was placed over the filler hole to filter out dust and had to be cleaned between each can going in. Oil and transmission fluid had to be topped off and dozens of grease points, joints, and bearings squirted. Canteens and the water cask were filled regularly.
To restock a tank with ammunition was heavy work requiring the entire crew. The crated ammunition had to be unloaded from a truck, and the wooden boxes (metal in the case of the Germans) had to be opened, rounds had to be removed from sealed shipping tubes, and all of the packing materials had to be reloaded on trucks. Only in action were the packing materials discarded. Each round had to be passed up through the side escape hatches and individually stowed in cramped quarters. This might have to be accomplished during lulls in combat in order to cross-level ammunition between tanks. The Americans were fortunate in that machine gun ammunition was issued belted and tracers inserted. The 36 metal ammunition cans only had to be unpacked from wooden crates and stowed. The Germans received their ammunition loose in 1,500-round wooden boxes. The rounds had to be belted by hand in the nonexpendable belts, a tracer inserted every seventh round, the 150-round belts then correctly coiled into 25 canvas bags, and finally stowed.
Worn-out and damaged tracks had to be replaced, and this was a lengthy, labor-intensive job requiring all hands, as was replacing worn-out rubber-clad bogie wheels and return rollers. Spare sections of track links and bogie wheels were stowed on the hull as spares and for additional protection. As one tanker remarked, “Everything was so dang heavy.”
A time held back in reserves allowed a crew to do all the vital maintenance to keep a tank running. Here the crew of an M3 prepare their tank for future combat in February 1943. (NARA)
Periodically, platoon and company commanders inspected the crews and machines. All work done on the tank had to be recorded in a log book (in German, Fristenheft). All necessary tools, crew and individual equipment, and spare parts were accounted for. Equipment included shovels, picks, axes, pry bars, jack, wire cutter, track tension tool, normal mechanic’s tools, tow cable, fire extinguishers, camouflage net, first aid kit, flashlights, binoculars, and compass.
The infantry may have been jealous of tankers riding into battle, but it was hot, heavy, demanding work to keep their machines going. Spare parts shortages were common on both sides. As a result, it was critical to recover conked-out or damaged tanks and to place them back in action or cannibalize them for parts. More often than not a knocked-out tank, what the Germans called a Panzerleiche (armor corpse), could be returned to action in short time.
Tankers may have ridden, but they did not ride in comfort. Even on sand roads, much less cross-country, it was a jolting experience riding on seats with minimal padding. Gun sight rubber eye and forehead protectors produced black eyes and bruises. The desert heat, easily in excess of 110°F (43°C), was one thing, but the inside of a tank frequently reached 120°F (49°C), and that was with all hatches open and the tank moving. Dust flooded through hatches, and the crew members who could, sat in the hatches. The driver though was confined inside, and with his hatch open he faced a full blast of dust from leading vehicles. As one American tanker recorded, “The dust was the worst part of it; that and the flies.” The PzKpfw III was even driven with the break service hatches open to ventilate the front compartment. Going into combat, a tank had to shut all hatches, although the commander normally only closed his when absolutely necessary in order to effectively observe and be aware of the developing situation and terrain. A buttoned-up tank could heat up to over 130°F (38°C) with little air circulation. The engine and transmission generated more heat as did weapons firing. Propellant fumes from the main gun when it ejected cases and from the machine guns flooded the interior, already ripe with the smell of gasoline fumes, oil, sweat, and urine. Owing to the high-powered engine, the running gear, and grinding treads, the ride was incredibly noisy, whether the hatches were open or not. Intercom or speaking tubes had to be used to communicate with the man at one’s shoulder.
A buttoned-up tank offered only very limited observation through vision slits, ports, periscopes, and gun sights, all with narrow fields of observation. There were many blind areas around tanks; obstacles and attacking infantry could not be seen if near the tank. Dust and smoke all but blinded a buttoned-up tank. The low silhouette PzKpfw III offered foreshortened observation, but the high-topped M3, with the commander’s head 10ft above the ground when buttoned up, provided a good, though conspicuous vantage point. Yet he was so much higher than the driver and gunner that he had a different perspective of the action that they could not see.
In combat, crewmen relieved themselves into a can, bottle, or empty main gun cartridge case to be emptied out of the escape hatch, although spilled contents were a regular and unfortunate occurrence. American tankers had the advantage of being able to urinate or defecate into a machine gun ammunition can, which had an airtight sealable lid. It was tossed out, possibly to be recovered by an infantryman thinking he had found discarded ammunition.
A tank crew could carry a couple of days’ rations along with cooking gear. By punching a hole in a ration tin, it could be heated on an exhaust manifold. An American crew carried a small M1941 one-burner gasoline stove. The Germans had similar stoves but more often used their little esbit cookers heated by fuel tablets. Another means of cooking was to fill a large ration tin half full of sand and soak it with gasoline. The sand prolonged the burn while an open ration can or mess kit was heated over it. And yes, an egg, when purchased from an Arab, could be fired on the engine deck with a dash of cooking oil.
The Americans were issued the infamous K-rations – three one-meal packets with small tins of mixed meat and vegetables, cheese spread, and crackers. An equally unpopular C-ration carton contained three larger tins of meat and vegetables and three more with crackers, spread, and instant coffee, providing three meals. They were also issued British “combo” (composite) ration packs with enough prepared and tinned foods for 14 men for one day. Emergency rations were the D-ration, a 4oz enriched chocolate bar intentionally made to taste like boiled potatoes to discourage snacking.
The Germans issued few prepackaged rations, but rather tinned sausage, meat spread, or sardines; compressed dried beans and peas; black bread from field bakeries or packaged preserved bread; tubes of cheese; ersatz coffee; and Italian tinned meat and hardtack, neither of which was popular. Rations were issued on a daily basis, and crews cooked them collectively, although an effort was made to serve a hot soup or stew meal once a day from the battalion kitchen. Fresh foods were seldom issued, but some were procured from Italian sources such as onions, olive oil, and marmalade. A 100-gram (3.5oz) chocolate disc (Scho-ka-kola) in a tin or fiberboard container was issued as emergency rations and was quite tasty. Captured British and American rations were highly valued.
Sleeping arrangements on both sides were similar. The Americans used shelter-halves, of which two were buttoned together to form two-man pup tents. The Germans used triangular-shaped shelter-quarters also worn as rain capes. Four could be buttoned together to make a pyramid-shaped, four-man tent. Often the shelter-halves or shelter-quarters were pitched as an awning, tied along the downwind side of the tank’s track guard and the lower edge stacked to the ground. This was also done when sleep could be caught during the day, although the awning was pitched on the shady side. When shelter was unnecessary, tankers often bedded down at the rear of the tank to capture radiating engine heat. Desert nights were extremely cold. Troops bundled up in overcoats and wool blankets with two often used for insulation from the cold ground. The gasoline-rich Americans were known to splash fuel on the ground, light it, and wait for it to burn out before throwing their bedrolls over the warmed ground. Near the front, slit trenches were dug in which to sleep. In some instances a shallow pit was dug to the length and inside width of the tracks and the tank parked over it, providing the crew overhead cover. In bivouacs or laagers in forward areas, tanks and other AFVs parked facing outward in an all-around perimeter. If the ground was broken or wadis were present, the tanks positioned themselves in hull defilade. One crewman manned the turret, usually pulling one- or two-hour shifts. During lulls in action crews simply slept the best they could in their stations; again, at least one man remained awake.
Panzer III crewmen relax outside their tank while one crew member receives a battlefield haircut. (Private collection)
The Germans issued Benzedrine, also known as Pervitin or Isophan, a methamphetamine and known today as “speed,” to keep them alert and awake during prolonged combat. The bottles were marked only as “Stimulant” and with the directions “1 or 2 [5mg] only as needed to maintain sleeplessness.” In 1941 German reports were enthusiastic of its use, but by the year’s end they were more cautious, and in early 1942, warnings were issued. While reducing the desire for sleep, the resulting fatigue led to loss of efficiency and difficulty in accomplishing complicated tasks. It was directed that the drug’s use would be confined to emergencies and not taken routinely. It was to be given only if there was a reasonable expectation that the crisis would end within 12 hours. Pervitin would not be given indiscriminately to large bodies of troops nor given to those whose duties required difficult decisions. It was to be administered under the control of a medical officer. Nonetheless there were soldiers who became addicted to Stimulant.
Lack of water was also a constant problem. There was seldom enough for drinking, much less for washing and shaving. Fortunately, tanks used air-cooled engines. The long-term result of doing with less water was gradual dehydration, headaches, lightheadedness, muscle and joint aches, weight loss, and high blood pressure. The worst effect of water deprivation is that blood volume is reduced and one’s blood thickens. When wounded and succumbing to shock, blood vessels contract and the thickened blood aggravates the effects of shock.
Combat was unnerving, fast paced, confusing, and highly stressful. Sleep was infrequent and meals irregular. While comparatively immune to small arms and mortar fire and all but a direct artillery hit, there were many lethal threats to the tankers and their tanks. More tanks were lost to antitank mines than any other single cause. Antitank guns, tank destroyers, and other tanks were deadly. The 37mm and smaller caliber weapons caused little damage, but larger weapons could be fatal. The Germans feared the Matilda: even though it had only a 2-pdr (40mm) gun; it was nonetheless lethal. This resulted in add-on armor on the bow and gun mantlet. The American 75mm gun on the M3 medium tank and the M3 halftrack tank destroyer was lethal to every German tank in the theater, except the few late-arriving Tigers. For the Americans the short 5cm was dangerous, but the long 5cm was especially deadly. The Germans also mounted their own 7.5cm and captured Russian 76mm antitank guns on self-propelled mounts, and these were extremely lethal.
The driver’s compartment inside the British M3 Grant. The interior of the M3 Lee would have been virtually identical. It was remarkably spacious due to the atypical hull design. Note in particular the large open front visor. However, this let in blowing sand when on the move and would have to be closed. Thus when the tank was in action the driver’s only view would be through the tiny slit to his left. (Tank Museum 2729/E2)
One of the hardest-working crewmen was the loader. In heavily gunned tanks hefting the rounds was indeed strenuous work. It was not so difficult for the light 37mm/3.7cm and 5cm guns, but still he had to work in cramped quarters retrieving rounds from difficult-to-access locations about the tank. He also had to avoid the gun’s recoil and watch out for ejected cases. Loaders also re-stowed spent cartridges or tossed them from an escape hatch and shifted rounds from less accessible stowage to more rapidly accessed racks.
The driver was another hard worker. He steered using two hand-operated breaking/steering levers plus had to manually shift gears with a hand lever and clutch pedal. Additionally, there was the usual strain of driving, observing, and paying attention to the commander’s “backseat driving.” Good drivers steered their own course, seeking cover and clear routes. During motor marches to the front and even during combat, other crewmen might relieve the driver. Often drivers were spared watch duty to ensure their rest.
The radio operator, because of his relatively easy job, often accepted other duties such as preparing meals and looking after the quarters. The Germans called him a Stullenmax (untranslatable, but equating to “gofer”).
Tank crews developed close bonds owing to the shared experiences of intense training and combat. They learned one another’s strengths and weaknesses, who would cheer them up in bad times, and who pulled through no matter what the circumstances. The Americans simply called this teamwork; the Germans called it Kameradschaft (comradeship), having a deeply serious meaning when strong bonds developed between men who fought together.
6 These were temporary task forces unlike the later “command commands” incorporated into the armored division organization.