COMBAT

The night of February 13, 1943, was cold, with the Sidi Bou Zid plain bathed in bright moonlight. General Eisenhower visited the 1st Armored Division CP outside of Sbeïtla over 20 miles northwest of Sidi Bou Zid. He then went on to Sidi Bou Zid, arriving at 0100hrs. Even though warnings had been issued to expect only diversionary attacks from Faïd Pass or the passes to the north and south, it was apparent to the troops that an attack was imminent. Regardless, the troops displayed little motivation, and defensive preparations were poor. German activity had been increasing, and there was a great deal of troop and vehicle movement. It was pointed out that the US infantry defending the high ground were extremely exposed. While they occupied good observation positions, they could be easily cut off and become unable to contribute to the battle on the plain. The 3d Battalion, 1st Armored Regiment in Sidi Bou Zid, reinforced by a dozen halftrack tank destroyers, was down to 40 M4 tanks. A battalion of self-propelled 105mm howitzers and another of towed 155mm howitzers were positioned to the rear. The trains had withdrawn for the night. CCC, serving as a mobile reserve, was located near Hadjeb-el-Aïoun 12 miles north of Djebel Lessouda. Task Force Kern was 40 miles away near Sbeïtla as the division reserve. The Germans were expected to have air superiority, and they had good observation of the area from the higher ground they held to the east.

The American tankers just to the west of Sidi Bou Zid were coiled up in a laager for all-around defense. They were to be on full alert, although crewmen took turns dozing. The infantrymen in the hills were also on full alert in their slit trenches and sangars. The infantry were nonmotorized, being attached from the 34th Infantry Division. They hadn’t erected any barbed wire nor laid any minefields other than a small one off the east end of Djebel Ksaira. The stiff wind blew up an early morning sandstorm and carried the sounds of tank engines and tracks, but the distance and direction could not be determined.

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The battle of Sid Bou Zid, February 14–15, 1943

Both 10. and 21. Panzer-Divisionen had recently been brought up to strength and was well equipped with PzKpfw IIIs with long 5cm guns and PzKpfw IVs with the long 7.5cm. The 10th fielded 110 and the 21st 91 tanks, about two-thirds being PzKpfw IIIs. There was also a company of 12 new 8.8cm gun-armed PzKpfw V Tiger tanks. The tankers were a mix of long-term African veterans, veterans transferred from other theaters, and fresh replacements from training units.

The 1st Armored Division fielded 202 M4 and M3 medium tanks and 92 M3 and M5 light tanks plus considerably more halftracks, tank destroyers, self-propelled artillery, and scout cars than the Germans. The numerical superiority was negated owing to the tanks’ and halftracks’ lighter armor, lighter- and shorter-ranged guns, inexperience, and widely scattered deployment.

PANZEROBERSCHÜTZE BALDUR KÖHLER (1923-)

Baldur Köhler was born in Offenbách near Frankfurt. His father had a shop in which he sold small electrical appliances, and he trained his son to make repairs. When conscripted in March 1942, Baldur undertook training in a signals replacement unit as a radio repairman. He was posted to Panzer-Regiment 25, 7. Panzer-Division in June 1942. The division had just arrived from the Eastern Front and was rebuilding in France, the Butterfront, where food was plentiful and life easy. Upon arrival, much to his surprise, he was issued a black uniform and was given radio operator and Morse code training with a small group of men within the regiment. Köhler was unenthusiastic at first and had difficulties with the code, but when the men underwent machine gun training, he began to warm up to the idea. Once assigned to a tank crew he and the others undertook a great deal of crew and unit training. In November they participated in the occupation of southern France, but in December he was assigned to a march battalion for transport to North Africa. He did not realize it at the time, but he was already assigned to 10. Panzer-Division, itself in France, which was being sent to Africa. They traveled by rail to Italy where they were issued tropical uniforms and equipment. The next step was a trip to Sicily by ferry and then by landing barge to Tripoli in a frightening night run. Tank crews were formed from the arriving replacements to man repaired and recently delivered tanks. Their tank commander, who had just been released from convalescence leave, was a long-time veteran of Africa and taught them immeasurably valuable lessons. Their gunner had served on the Eastern Front, and they felt gifted to have his experience. The driver and loader had served only in the 7. Panzer-Division as had Köhler. They participated in a number of engagements in January prior to the Kasserine Pass battles. They had virtually no opportunities for unit training, but their commander seemed to know instinctively what to do. When asked if he had ever seen Rommel, Köhler said the highest ranking officer he ever saw was his regimental commander. Köhler has never made any effort to locate his former crew, and he has no idea what became of them. Kasserine was an exciting adventure for him, but he does not see himself as being part of an important historical event. It was just a place and situation to which fate had sent him. In the 1950s he became a civilian service group employee of the US Army and repaired radios for 26 years. (Pictured are the shoulder strap with the Panzertruppe pink branch of service color, the Panzeroberschütze insignia worn on the upper left sleeve, and the Panzertruppe death’s head insignia worn on the lapels of tropical uniforms.)

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The white-painted village of Sidi Bou Zid looking northeast. On the left edge of the plain is the area in which so many American tanks were destroyed on February 14–15, 1943.

The Panzertruppen of four Kampfgruppen had been briefed the night before, fuel was topped off, and all tanks carried extra ammunition that was stacked on the floor. The men were given a hot meal, and after dark, once the danger of air attack had passed, they formed up in assembly areas ready to quickly move into columns for the 10. Panzer-Division advance through Faïd village and the 21. Panzer-Division elements through Maïzila Pass from the south.

The American routine was to pull back into tight defensive positions at night and an hour before dawn, about 0500hrs, would fan out toward Faïd Pass with patrols sent out during the night. Once in position the Americans would breakfast on cold K-rations. At 0630hrs columns of Panzers emerged from Faïd Pass, advancing toward the American positions on Djebel Lessouda. The blowing sand made it impossible for American observers to accurately determine numbers.

When moving on roads, on which the initial advance was conducted, Panzer companies drove reihe (single file) or in a doppelreihe (double file). If attacking on a narrow front, they would form into a keil (wedge) with one platoon in the lead and two back on line. The platoons themselves were either in a keil with the Zugführer at the point or in a doppelreihe. On a wider front two platoons would be forward and one to the rear, an inverted or broad wedge (breitkeil), allowing the rear platoon to move to either flank. Commanders led from the front. The advance was slow, and once the sandstorm abated, the Germans continued at a slow speed. This prevented exact tank locations from being detected, raised less dust to obscure the vision of other tanks, made less noise, allowed accurate fire on the move, and conserved fuel. The Germans sometimes moved at such a slow pace that from a distance it appeared they were not moving and could only be determined to be doing so by comparing their locations to terrain features.

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Shown during the initial stages of the fighting, a halftrack-mounted 105mm T19 howitzer moves forward at the western end of Kasserine Pass in an attempt to reinforce the exits from the valley. (NARA)

As the German formation advanced along the Faïd–Sbeïtla road running between the defended hills on either side, it deployed across wider frontages and split into smaller formations. Kampfgruppe Gerhardt swung to the north to loop around Djebel Lessouda. Kumpfgruppe Reimann split into two formations and turned southwest off the road and followed along a road to the southwest. Tanks of Company G, 3d Battalion, 1st Armored Regiment were in screening positions on the plain and were knocked out, including the command tank in communication with Lessouda Force. Visibility was such that the force on Djebel Lessouda could not see what was occurring on the plain. CCA dispatched Companies H and I, 1st Armored and part of Company A, 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion up the road from Sidi Bou Zid “to clear up the situation.” The first of several German air attacks arrived at this time. While en route the force was warned from Lessouda that at least 20 Mk IVs were at Poste de Lessouda. The Americans were taken under 8.8cm or 7.5cm antitank gun fire and possibly by four Tigers. The long-range fire drove off the Americans, preventing them from assessing enemy strength and dispositions. No reports were received from Company G screening the plain, but the troops on Lessouda reported 80 AFVs and trucks moving to the hill from the north and that there were 39 Mk IVs and some Tigers on the west side. Most of the “Mk IVs” were in actuality probably PzKpfw IIIs. The enemy force was slowly moving south toward the main road and firing at US hill positions. A general withdrawal to the southwest was ordered at 1100hrs. Enemy forces were approaching Sidi Bou Zid from the northwest and southeast and were supported by air attacks from 1000 to 1100hrs.

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A view of a Panzer III (probably Ausf N) abandoned in the El Guettar Valley in 1943. (Getty)

As the attacks from Faïd were being launched, 21. Panzer-Division elements in the south rumbled through Maïzila Pass at 0600hrs. They experienced difficulties going on the soft sand road. American fighters strafed one column, and patrols screening to the south reported 20 unidentified vehicles with ten heading north and ten turning west. The lead elements of Kampfgruppe Schuette moving north to Djebel Garet Hadid were engaged by the hill’s defenders, and skirmishing took place through the afternoon. The battle group’s main body arrived in the late afternoon to join the battle. Kampfgruppe Stenkhoff was experiencing difficulties moving cross-country westward to Bir el Hafey with vehicles mired in mud areas and experiencing mechanical breakdowns. It finally reached the town before 1600hrs, turned onto the road, and headed for Sidi Bou Zid, 18 miles to the northeast.

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Defense of Sbeïtla, February 17, 1943.

The 1st Armored Division’s CP was receiving conflicting and incomplete reports. It was impossible to sort out the enemy situation because so many different groups of German vehicles were being reported in so many areas. Reports of Tigers resulted in most of an additional tank destroyer company being deployed along with a battery of self-propelled artillery. Concerns were heightened by noon when half of 3d Battalion, 1st Armored was reported destroyed, more accurate reports of the size of the German force south of Sidi Bou Zid were received, and it was realized that the forces on Djebel Lessouda and Djebel Ksaira were surrounded. Permission was granted in the early afternoon for the forces around Sidi Bou Zid to evacuate. Remaining American tanks were attempting to cover the withdrawal of CCA. Counterattacks were planned for the next morning to relieve the infantry stranded on the hills. Any daylight attempt for the foot-mobile hill forces to break out through German armor across the plain would have resulted in ground and air attack and heavy losses. Rommel said of the battle, “The Americans had as yet no practical battle experience, and it was now up to us to instill in them from the outset an inferiority complex of no mean order.”

TECHNICIAN 5TH GRADE PAUL KIRBY (1921–)*

When the draft notice came in September 1941 Paul Kirby was more relieved than anything else. He knew it was only a matter of time before he was called, and now the suspense was over. Born in a small farming community west of St Louis, Missouri, he had no idea what he would be doing in the army. He was sent to Ft Knox, Kentucky, and assigned to the Armored Force Replacement Training Center where he underwent basic. He was then assigned to 2d Battalion, 13th Armored Regiment, 1st Armored Division. Kirby thinks he was assigned to armor because he had done a lot of tractor and dump truck driving. When thousands of American boys volunteered for service following the Pearl Harbor attack, Kirby felt like an old veteran. He was trained as a 75mm gun loader in an M3 medium tank because of his size, remarking, “Hay bales were a lot heavier than a seventy-five round.” He had not participated in the prewar maneuvers, but within two months after assignment to the division, it was shipped by rail to Ft Dix, New Jersey, and then sea lifted to Northern Ireland. There he was reassigned as the 75mm gunner when an ejected cartridge case broke the gunner’s wrist. After extensive training they staged to England then landed near Oran, Algeria, on November 8, 1942. Action was relatively light, but his group did a lot of driving to reach Tunisia. It was wearing on the tanks and crews. The food was poor, and the changing, harsh weather conditions wore them out further. Their training had not prepared them for the conditions they faced. As a gunner Kirby credits himself for firing on and hitting four German tanks, all Mk IIIs, knocking out one. This was prior to the Kasserine battles. He thinks he hit an Italian light tank, but at least two other tanks or tank destroyers were firing on it so he is not certain if he even hit it, much less killed it. He had a great deal of respect for the Germans and knew they had considerably more experience than his unit, a fact that kept nagging at him though the campaign. “I frankly was afraid of them. They had been fighting the British for so long, and we were the new kids on the block.” Kirby’s only regret was that he could not return to farming in full capacity owing to a knee injury he sustained in battle. Instead he sold farm implements. One of his sons served in the army as an M48 Patton tank gunner in West Germany in the late 1960s. (Pictured are the Tech 5 rank insignia and the Armor Force collar insignia.)

* Tech 5 was equivalent to a corporal, but had no leadership responsibilities. “Paul Kirby” wishes to remain anonymous and has used the names of two former buddies.

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The 1st Battalion, 6th Armored Infantry and a light tank company were dispatched from the division reserve to a crossroads 11 miles northwest of the embattled town. This feature would become known as Kern’s Crossroads, named after Commander Col William Kern, 6th Armored Infantry. Withdrawing CCA elements would reassemble behind this screen. Fleeing vehicles mired in soft sand and those that broke down were being abandoned as units withdrew under long-range artillery and tank fire. Surviving units would attempt to defend the route to Sbeïtla.

In the meantime the Germans continued to press in. Kampfgruppe Stenkhoff from the south linked up with 10. Panzer-Division elements west of Sidi Bou Zid at 1705hrs. Nightfall was fast approaching. General Ziegler determined at 1530hrs that the day’s mission had been accomplished. The 10. Panzer-Division was directed to reconnoiter north to Hadjeb-el-Aïoun 25 miles to the north while 21. Panzer was ordered to assemble and be prepared by 1200hrs the next day for operations directed against Gafsa. There were still resolute American defenders on the bypassed hills, and no doubt an American counterattack was being planned. In order to meet this possibility, Ziegler did not disperse his forces too widely.

Panzeroberschütze Baldur Köhler was a Funker für gepanzert Kraftwagen (radio operator) of a PzKpfw III. Interestingly, he knew his tank only as a “Panzer drei lang” (Panzer three long), and he had no idea which variant it was. With a 5cm long gun it may have been an Ausf J, L, or M, but he was not familiar with the Ausführung term. He was assigned to Kompanie 5, Abteilung II, Panzer-Regiment 7, 10. Panzer-Division. On the morning of February 14, 1943, the troops were awake and manning their tanks hours before dawn. The evening before, they had cleaned the air filters and guns. Breakfast was preserved bread, marmalade, and ersatz coffee or tea. Knowing this was a major action, they were keyed up and confident not only in their years of experience, but also knowing that the Americans were inexperienced, slow to respond, and thinly spread. Their confidence was increased by their many recent small victories, and their commanders were plainly disdainful of the Amis (Americans). It was not without a sense of excitement that the Panzermanner sparked the electric primer igniters in their guns to test them, adjusted engine chokes, and pressed starter buttons. They started off at 0400hrs with a strong sandstorm blowing from the northwest – an excellent condition.

Moving slowly the Germans advanced along the Faïd–Sidi Bou Zid road. They had been briefed that there were some American tanks blocking the road between the hills on either side. The hills were held by American infantry. Köhler, manning his machine gun in the tank’s bow, was surprised to see they were turning off the road and starting north on what appeared a route to attack Djebel Lessouda. He was concerned because tanks did not attack hills. He knew they were being followed by trucks of Panzergrenadier-Regiment 86. His tank commander reported other tanks were swinging to the south toward the town. It made sense now that they were going to cut off the enemy on the hill. The sandstorm abated, but a thick haze hung low of the plain. Slowly crawling across the broken ground, their turret traversed to the left and began cracking off occasional rounds at the hill. In return they received sporadic mortar rounds and inaccurate antitank fire. Even though the platoon leader occasionally sent instructions to fire on hillside targets over the radio he was manning, Köhler was no more aware of what was going on than anyone else in the tank. When German aircraft came over they would throw orange smoke signals out of the tank to identify themselves. Eventually they rounded the hill and found abandoned artillery positions, some still containing artillery pieces – even trucks and equipment had been left behind. The area appeared to have been heavily blasted by their artillery and bombs.

Reaching the road behind the hill again late in the morning they could see many columns of black smoke and clouds of dust in the direction of Sidi Bou Zid and to the south. Their force split yet again with part moving toward Sidi Bou Zid. They turned right on to the road and continued for several kilometers before turning on to a southbound road at which time they spread out into a broad wedge. They soon halted in a wadi with engines idling. They were in a Beobachtungsstellung – an observation position in which the commander’s cupola was exposed over the lip of the wadi. The radio suddenly crackled a warning that American tanks were approaching from the northwest and that large clouds of dust were visible. The crew concluded that it must be a massive force to raise so much dust.

It was soon realized that the American M4 tanks were charging in a “V” formation across the plain toward Sidi Bou Zid. Their formation was scattered, and the dust they were raising was blinding the following tanks. German antitank guns concealed in an olive grove opened fire on the lead tanks. Word came over the radio to hold fire until ordered, then not to advance until ordered. The antitank guns continued to fire on the charging Americans. The Germans could admire their courage, but the tank commander, the only long-time African veteran among the crew, kept yelling how foolish they were. Shortly the platoon leader ordered his tanks to assume a Feurerstellung – a fire position in a Halbverdeckte or Randstellung (hull defilade). They knew they would soon be in action and that a Panzerwarte (armor ambush) was about to be executed against the exposed American flank.

With green flares arcing into the sky and the radio command “Feuer!” Köhler and the crew opened up at a rapid rate. The tank bucked slightly and dust leaped off the ground as rounds were pumped out and cartridge cases clanged in the turret. Seated in the hull with the tank squatting in a wadi, Köhler could see little and he felt helpless, that he was not even contributing to the fight. “Anfahren!” crackled over the radio, and the Panzers crawled out of the wadi, creeping slowly toward burning tanks. The Americans were running. Tanks and halftracks were pulling back. Some tanks were moving in reverse, attempting to cover others. Burning vehicles were scattered all about, some in clusters with their rear ends facing them. The gunner later said he had not seen anything like this since Russia.

The Germans pursued the Americans, threading their way through burning tanks and scattered bodies. They did not see any knocked-out Panzers. It was difficult to detect targets through the smoke and dust, and the Panzers crawled even slower. There were shouts over the radio that the Amis were getting away. It was then that the radio went dead, as did the intercom. The commander ducked down and yelled at Köhler, ordering him to fix it as though it was his fault. Köhler pulled out the radio from its case. It was so hot he could barely touch it. Nothing else was obviously wrong. They pulled up beside another tank so that it could be relayed to the platoon leader that they had lost their radio. In frustration Köhler began machine-gunning abandoned American trucks, resulting in the commander yelling “Feuerpause!” (“Cease fire!”). The Ami trucks would be recovered for their own use.7 Feeling worthless Köhler spotted movement behind a pile of rocks, and through drifting smoke he made out an antitank gun. He swung his machine gun and pressed on the trigger, hammering out a long thread of white tracers that ricocheted in all directions but peppering the gun shield. The commander yelled at him again, but then realized what Köhler’s target was. The coaxial machine gun opened up, smothering the target in a shower of tracers as other Panzers joined in.

Köhler lost all track of time. His tank had halted, moved, halted again. At dusk they were ordered into a wadi to laager. It was not long before word spread that over 30 Ami tanks had been knocked out along with many halftracks and trucks. Their own losses were light. They did not expect a counterattack that night, and none materialized in the morning.

An American counterattack failed on the 15th, and during the night of the 16–17th, the infantry cut off on Djebel Ksaira and Garet Hadid were ordered to exfiltrate. Destroying heavy weapons and equipment, they struck across the plain 15 miles to Djebel Hamra. They were caught in the open at dawn by motorized units and 1,400 were captured. The Germans paused, and the 10. and 21. Panzer-Divisionen assembled in the Sidi Bou Zid area.

PZKPFW III GUNNER’S VIEW

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Range 200m: The 5dm gun has been fired and the tracer is en route to the halftrack driver’s compartment

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The round passes through the driver’s compartment and explodes in the rear, igniting ammunition.

The 2d Battalion, 13th Armored Regiment, the most battle-experienced battalion in the 1st Armored Division, was not committed until the afternoon of February 17. The renewed German effort was directed at the south side of Sbeïtla held by CCB. The 2/13th Armor was at less than 50-percent strength, and while originally equipped solely with M3 mediums, now had some M4s and M4A1s in addition to over 20 M3s. The tanks were in serious need of maintenance, as the rubber track pads and bogie wheel and return roller rubber linings were severely chewed up after many miles of travel. The battalion was in defiladed positions some 4 miles southeast of the town. The 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion was outposted to the east, the 27th Armored Field Artillery Battalion backed the tankers, and two companies of 2d Battalion, 6th Armored Infantry were dug in on hills on either side of the road.

Technician 5th Grade Paul Kirby was his M3 tank’s 75mm gunner. He should have been rated a corporal, but he was slotted as a driver on paper. It made no difference to him: both ranks drew the same pay. The crew had been together for over one year and rank meant nothing, so long as everyone knew Sergeant Henry was the man in charge. Henry ran a tight ship, but every man knew his job. It was seldom that Henry had to tell anyone what to do or when to do it.

The Americans had been rushed to the front amid wild rumors of a compete rout. The enemy was heading straight at them, and nothing had been able to stop the Germans. There were rumors of just about every tank being knocked out and huge numbers of Americans taken prisoner. There was talk of Tiger tanks as well. During the march their tank had thrown a tread on a rough stretch of road, and it took hours to reinstall.

FEBRUARY 18, 1943

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A round is fired at the rear of the M3 detonating the engine compartment and blowing off the engine covers.

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The gunner switches to the machine gun range scale to fire on any crewmen abandoning the M3.

In darkness their tanks had maneuvered into a wadi. Ground guides walked ahead to ensure no stray troops were driven over or the tanks fell into a ravine. The Americans first found a position that allowed them to bring the 75mm gun to bear and then backed down the slope until only the 37mm turret peeked over the edge. The Germans owned the sky and camouflage was essential, but the Americans had difficulty erecting the camouflage net in the dark, which kept hanging up on the antenna, projections, and brush. They were good on ammunition and rations, but had little water. Sergeant Henry detailed sentries, an air guard to be posted at dawn, and two men for a water detail, if it was available from the company supply point. The men cleaned the guns and double-checked the troublesome turret control boxes. The Germans were expected to attack at dawn. No one got much sleep, and every man would be alert an hour before sunrise. No one had much appetite. Kirby could not even finish a 4oz D-ration bar.

The Germans did not attack at dawn but instead conducted probes to find passable terrain and to test the Americans. Just after noon, Jerry tanks and aircraft finally came in strength from the south and the infantry from the east. The Americans stowed the camouflage net in anticipation of having to move out. The tank destroyers bore the brunt of the attack, and many were knocked out. Others withdrew to alternate firing positions after firing smoke shells. The American defense was in-depth and well disposed in the wadis and dunes.

On the south flank the 2/13th Armor was well hidden. For once the Americans had an advantage. The main attack struck at 1315hrs with the Germans having to cross broken ground. Reports were of Mk IV tanks in superior numbers, but most were actually Mk IIIs.

Kirby could see the Panzers coming through his periscope, which was just high enough to see over the wadi’s edge. His gun could not be brought to bear … yet. Jerry fighters streaked over, and the Panzers crawled in clear view toward the Americans. The firing order blared over the radio, and US guns began to crack, including their own 37mm, for what it was worth. The engine gunned and the tank jerked up the slope, bringing the “seventy-five” to bear. Kirby centered the statia lines on the bow of a Mk III and was about to punch the trigger when a tracer streaked into the German, kicking dust off it. The Panzer jerked to a stop. Kirby immediately traversed the gun to the right and aimed at another Panzer. It dropped into a wadi, and he anxiously waited for it to emerge. The knocked-out Panzer to the left suddenly began moving forward, traversing its long gun toward them.8 Kirby shouted a warning over the intercom and was aware that the 37mm turret was turning. He fired at the second Panzer as it bounded out of the wadi and saw the tracer wang off the gun mantlet. The 37mm fired at the same time the German did. Kirby heard and felt two thumps. He guessed both German tanks had fired on them. There was a horrid clanging noise above and behind him. Countless sparks showered and bounced out from under the turret shield, and Kirby immediately smelled smoke. The driver yelled to bail out, and Kirby struggled to climb over his seat. His loader dropped the round he held ready and ducked under the gun. Kirby saw a booted leg of one of the turret crew beneath the turret shield amid popping sparks. The fighting compartment was filling with thick, gray smoke. He slapped the side escape hatch lever and pushed it open. Air gushed in, and he heard a woof sound behind him and felt a heat blast. Kirby lost any sense of gallantry about letting the loader out first. He thrust himself through the hatch and fell face first on the rocks. The loader landed on him, knocking the breath out of both of them. The loader pulled Kirby to his feet, and they ran. Kirby remembered tank guns firing and artillery landing all around them. He did not know if it was American or German fire. Looking back he saw black smoke boiling out of the escape hatch. Then the turret blew off in an orange fireball.

The initial blast of American surprise fire knocked out at least five Panzers. American tank destroyers, pulling back to a rally point from which they were to reorganize and counterattack, came under heavy artillery fire, delaying their counterattack. Other vehicles were withdrawing, and many of the tank destroyers were caught up in the flow back to Kasserine. The Germans were quick to reorganize and again attacked the south flank. Battalion sent down the order to begin a phased withdrawal. Units began falling back to Kasserine, and defenses were established to the south and east.

Kirby and his loader were picked up by a tank destroyer. They said nothing about the rest of their crew. The two were dropped off at a fuel dump north of the road and detailed to help gas up tanks that started rolling in after nightfall (1900hrs). Word spread that at least nine tanks of the understrength unit had been lost. They stacked 5gal jerry cans on tanks and halftracks and caught another lift through Kasserine, ending up in a bivouac area for the night. There they found their driver who had been hit by spalling when a 5cm round struck beside his hatch. The driver was given to another tank to replace a wounded man, and they were assigned to a scratch crew for a previously mine-damaged M3.

All units were ordered to pull back to Tébessa and take up positions to the southeast along with retreating French colonial troops. Sbeïtla was under Allied air and artillery fire, key structures had been demolished, the water system destroyed, and mines were laid to hamper the Germans. US losses had been high, and morale was at an all-time low. But replacement troops, tanks, and vehicles were available, and most of the trains and support units had escaped to play a vital role in reconstituting battered units. The 21. Panzer-Division secured Sbeïtla, but 10. Panzer-Division was held back owing to a miscalculation of Allied strength, and thus the offensive tempo slowed. The fighting continued, and Rommel took Kasserine Pass on February 20.

Tech 5 Kirby and Panzeroberschütze Köhler were wounded within a day of one another, Kirby on February 21 and Köhler on the 22nd. All they know is that they were somewhere around Kasserine. Within days US morale improved as replacements and reinforcements arrived. Kirby recalls that word was spreading they thought they could stop the Germans and indeed, on February 22 Rommel began pulling back. Köhler recalls they were low on fuel and ammunition by that time. While there was concern about the Tigers, Kirby never saw one, but he heard that several had been knocked out by rear attack and fighter-bombers. The real duel was between M3s and Panzer IIIs and IVs.

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A victorious PzKpfw III passes a knocked-out and still burning M3 medium tank and M3 tank destroyer.

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Its 50mm gun clearly visible, this PzKpfw III Ausf L served with the 6th Company, Panzer Regiment 7 of the 10th Panzer Division at Kasserine Pass.

Kirby thinks his tank was hit by a 75mm antitank gun on the left side. The driver was killed, and Kirby and his loader were sprayed by fragments, mostly in the legs. They experienced difficulties getting out, but the unwounded turret crew helped extract them. The tank caught fire as Kirby was carried to the rear. A serious knee injury saw Kirby being evacuated first to Britain by ship; the loader remained in Tunisia as far as he knows. After a month he sailed for the States where he was discharged before the year’s end. He still limps from the injuries he sustained that day.

Köhler’s unit was hit by artillery while moving to counterattack position to cover the withdrawal. He was atop the turret when five fragments struck him in the back, and he almost tumbled off the tank. An aid station was nearby, and he was driven to it. Köhler was placed on a litter, unloaded, and treated on the spot. He recalls that his tank went on into action and that the Sanitäter (medics) were keen on sending him to the rear before more casualties began coming in. The fragments were small but penetrated deeply, resulting in severe muscle damage. He lost his full range of right arm movement. About a week later he was flown to Sicily, shipped to Italy, and then to Germany by train for further surgery. Eventually he was assigned to a Panzer replacement training unit and instructed radio operators until the war’s end.

7   So many captured and recaptured trucks, British, American, German, Italian, and French (shipped from the Continent or bartered from the Vichy French), were used that tank columns approaching supply convoys could only identify them by their reaction, i.e., whether they continued on their course or scattered to evade.

8   It was a common German practice to halt and play dead when hit after a nonpenetrating shot and then return to “life.”