A German officer later recalled: “There are three battles I can never forget: Stonne, Stalingrad, and Monte Cassino.” While the latter two battles are well known in English-language histories of World War II, Stonne remains obscure. Most German accounts call it “the Verdun of 1940”; the town changed hands 17 times in two days of intense fighting on May 15–16. Stonne sat on the crest of the Mont-Dieu (God’s Mountain) plateau about 15km (nine miles) south of Sedan. Its highpoint, on the eastern side of the town, was called Pain de Sucre (Sugar Loaf). The Germans wanted control of Stonne to shield the Sedan bridgeheads and the French Army needed it as the springboard to attack the Meuse bridgeheads. Fighting in the foreground of Stonne took place on May 14 when the 55e Division d’Infanterie attempted to counterattack the German bridgehead with the support of the FCM-36 light tanks of the 4e and 7e BCC. These attacks were crushed and the French reservists were routed.
The first French counterattack against the Sedan bridgehead was conducted by the reservist 55e DI. Its 213e Régiment d’Infanterie was supported by the 7e BCL equipped with the FCM-36 infantry tank, with one tank company assigned to each infantry battalion. Although the FCM-36 proved very resistant to German 37mm anti-tank guns, by the afternoon of May 14, the 7e BCL had lost 29 of its 39 FCM tanks around Bulson. This is “Le Mistral” with the village of Maisoncelle evident in the background. (NARA)
Guderian selected the 10.Panzer Division to seize Mont-Dieu because it had been the last of the three panzer divisions in Panzergruppe Kliest to arrive at the Meuse. Since the mission was primarily defensive, Infanterie-Regiment Großdeutschland (IRGD) was added to provide a firmer defensive base. In the meantime, the commander of the French 2e Armée, Gen. Charles Hutzinger, had assigned the task of counterattacking the Sedan bridgehead to Gen. J. Flavigny’s 21e Corps d’Armée. Flavigny was one of the French Army’s tank experts. When he went forward that afternoon, he encountered officers from the routed 213e Régiment d’Infanterie who had been part of the first Sedan counterattack. This panic-stricken officers warned of hundreds of German tanks swarming across the Meuse. Flavigny’s orders from Huntzinger were to establish a defensive reserve position to block the roads from Mont-Dieu southwest towards Paris and to attack “with the most brutal energy and with complete disregard of casualties” towards Sedan. He was allotted the 3e DCr and the 3e DIM (Division d’Infanterie Motorisée), but they were still on the road and did not begin arriving until May 14. Huntzinger’s orders were ambiguous. What was the priority? The defensive mission to block any German advance southwards or the counteroffensive to smash the German bridgehead at Sedan? Were the two missions to be staged concurrently, or were they be staged successively?
The standard French infantry anti-tank gun was the Hotchkiss 25mm modèle 1934, and there were 4,400 in service in May 1940. It was capable of penetrating the thin armor of German panzers at normal combat ranges. (Author’s collection)
Billotte’s Rampage in Stonne, May 16, 1940.
The 3e DCr had been ordered forward from Reims starting on the afternoon of May 12 and arrived at Le Chesne on the Ardennes canal, 10km southwest of Stonne, early on the morning of May 14. The divisional commander originally thought they merely were being moved to another training ground. The 60–90km trip had been slowed by extensive bomb damage in the towns enroute as well as by roads clogged with fleeing refugees. The two Char B1 bis battalions, the 41e and 49e BCC, had a combined total of 63 tanks at Reims, instead of the usual 69, and departed with 62 tanks. The two light tank battalions were also understrength as one company of Hotchkiss H-39 tanks had been sent off to Norway to support the Allied expeditionary force there. The division lacked refueling vehicles, divisional engineer and anti-tank units.
When the 3e DCr finally reached the Mont-Dieu area, the division’s Char B1 bis force was depleted and had only 53 Char B1 bis in operational condition at the end of May 14, mainly due to mechanical breakdowns connected with the Naeder steering system. The division began the laborious task of refueling its tanks after the road-march and so was not ready until the afternoon of May 14. The 3e DIM was behind the tank columns and began to arrive late on May 14.
This is a view from inside Stonne looking east along the road where the initial German tank attack took place. Two of the tank wrecks are evident in the background, but this photo was taken on July 19, over a month after the battle, and the tanks had presumably been moved off the road. (NARA)
When pressed by Flavigny about when his division would be ready to attack Sedan, the 3e DCr commander, Gén. Antoine Brocard, suggested May 15 would be best since after the refueling was complete, it would take two to three hours to move his units the 15km from Le Chesne to the Bois-de-Mont-Dieu, and then another two to three hours to refuel again in order to reach Sedan, meaning that the 3e DCr would not be ready to attack Sedan until that evening. As mentioned earlier, Flavigny had witnessed the poor performance of the better-trained 2e DCr a week before on exercise, and was even more skeptical of the ability of the incomplete 3e DCr to carry out an offensive mission. As a result, Flavigny followed the defensive intent of Huntzinger’s orders and ignored its offensive mission. He ordered the 3e DCr to set up bouchons (corks) composed of a Char B1 bis and H-39 light tanks at the crossings over the Ardennes canal south of Mont-Dieu.
The first combat unit to deploy into the village of Stonne was from the 6e GRDI (Groupe de reconnaissance d’Infanterie) which was the divisional reconnaissance element of the 3e DIM. The unit had split into smaller sections to conduct its mission along a wide front; Groupe Est (East Group) entered Stonne early on May 14 and included a pair of Panhard 178 armored cars. One its main tasks was to discover what was happening with the first wave of the attack being staged by the 55e DI. The armored cavalry scouts ran into fleeing soldiers from the 55e DI and it was soon apparent that the initial counterattack had failed. The 6e GRDI scouts were followed by the I/67e RI (1re Battalion, 67e Régiment d’Infanterie of the 3e DIM) which took up defensive positions in the town. They were supported by a pair of 25mm antitank guns, and a single 47mm anti-tank gun from the divisional anti-tank company.
On the German side, the lead element of the advance on Stonne was the Großdeutschland Regiment which had headed south of the Meuse bridgehead in advance of the 10.Panzer Division. In the early morning hours of May 15, the Großdeutschland Regiment was advancing on a broad front with I./IRGD moving directly towards Stonne with II./IRGD to the east near Pain de Sucre and the Sturmpioniere-Batallion.43 to the west of the town. A lead tank column from II./Pz.Rgt.8, consisting of six PzKpfw IV tanks and five light tanks, moved up the narrow hair-pin road on the north side of the town. After a short artillery preparation, the German attack on the town began around 0500 hours on May 15, with the five PzKpfw IV leading the attack by swinging around the hair-pin turn on the east side of the town, moving towards the town’s main street.
The nearest French 25mm gun was commanded by a veteran of the International Brigades in the Spanish Civil War, Sgt. Durand, and he waited until the lead PzKpfw IV was only a few dozen meters away before opening fire. At the head of the column was the PzKpfw IV, number 700, of Hptm. Ottens, the company commander of 7./Pz.Rgt.8. At such a close range, the 25mm had no difficulty penetrating the PzKpfw IV’s frontal armor, and after the first hit, Durand’s crew fired several more shots to make sure the tank had been knocked out. They next turned to the second PzKpfw IV in the column, number 711, and the round struck the side driver’s visor, decapitating the driver and stunning the radioman. The devastation in the driver’s compartment prompted the turret crew to abandon the tank, and when they later returned, they found that the radioman had later been killed by rifle fire when attempting to escape the tank. The third PzKpfw IV by now was blocked by the other two and hit by the 25mm gun; an internal fire erupted and the tank exploded in a catastrophic detonation which set off the ammunition and fuel and blew the tank apart. Durand’s crew then hitched up the gun to their Renault UE tractor and repositioned further west. By this stage, the German infantry had entered the village and a few PzKpfw II light tanks passed the disabled PzKpfw IV and attempted to fight their way into the town. A mêlée broke out with three of the PzKpfw II being hit by the 25mm guns, but both Panhard 178 armored cars were disabled during the fighting. One of the PzKpfw II managed to fight its way through the town and exit on the west side, only to be hit by the other 25mm gun of Lt. Salaberry of the 6e GRDI. Nevertheless, the vigorous attack by the light tanks had thrown the balance in favor of the German attacks, and the I/67e RI withdrew south out of the town. By this stage, the surviving three PzKpfw IV had fought their way through town to the south and took up positions there.
This was the lead tank of the German column, number 700, the company command tank of Hptm. Ottens which was knocked out by 25mm fire. (NARA)
Capt. Billotte’s Char B1 bis “Eure” swung to the left flank of the 1e Compagnie, 41e BCC attack and entered the town of Stonne on the main street near the village church. A column of Pz.Rgt.8 tanks was lined up preparing for a counterattack, and were taking shelter along the buildings on the street. The column consisted mainly of PzKpfw II light tanks, escorted by a few PzKpfw III and PzKpfw IV tanks for support. Billotte instructed his driver, Sgt. Durupt, to engage the lead tank at point-blank range with the 75mm gun while he fired at the trailing tank. The panzer column was so closely bunched together that once the first and last tanks were hit, the others tanks could not move. Billotte proceeded down the street, systematically engaging and knocking out every tank in the column. After exiting the village, Billotte encountered a trailing column of tanks advancing down the road and destroyed these as well. The Germans fought back, but their guns could not penetrate the heavy frontal armor of the Char B1 bis; Billotte’s tank was struck 140 times in a few minutes of combat. Exiting the town, Billotte directed his tank down the hairpin turn towards the valley below, destroying two 37mm anti-tank guns in the process. He finally turned back and returned back through the village. In total, Billotte claimed 13 German tanks, though the number may be a bit high due to the presence of several wrecked tanks including Koch’s PzKpfw IV from the previous day’s fighting.
This is the PzKpfw IV Ausf. D number 711, which was the second tank in the German column and was knocked out by 25mm fire. Tank number 700 can be seen to the west closer to the village. This photo was taken on July 19, 1940, and presumably 711 had been pushed off the road during the clean-up. (NARA)
Senior French commanders had expected Flavigny to attack the Sedan bridgehead and instead learned that his corps was trapped in a defensive battle short of the objective. The Commander-in-Chief of the northeast front, Gen. Alphonse Georges, blasted Huntzinger. The previous day, May 14, Huntzinger’s HQ was distracted while moving, and it took until 0800 on May 15 before he telephoned Flavigny and ordered him to stage the counterattack on the Sedan bridgehead with the 3e DCr and 3e DIM that day. Flavigny’s two divisional commanders arrived at his command post at 1000, and he instructed them to start the attack by 1400. It became apparent that it was much easier to scatter the 3e DCr tanks all over the countryside than to reform them into coherent units. Brocard reported that he had only 41 Char B1 bis for the attack due to problems bringing the others back from the Ardennes canal defenses; by noon the total had been reduced to 34 due to combat losses in Stonne. Flavigny was so dismayed by Brocard’s lack of enthusiasm that he assigned the 3e DIM commander, Gen. Paul Bertin-Boussu, to take overall command of both divisions. Instead of a coordinated attack, Flavigny’s corps would spend most of the day trying to concentrate their forces for the counterattack, while at the same time being distracted by the need to keep dispatching troops and tanks to prevent the Germans from breaking out of Stonne.
The 67e RI set up anti-tank positions south of the town and 13 Hotchkiss H-39 tanks of the 1/45e BCC arrived to stage an immediate counterattack. While advancing towards the town, they were taken under fire from PzKpfw IV, number 711; after having been disabled by 25mm fire during the initial attack, the surviving turret crew of number 711 re-boarded the tank and took the French tanks under fire at a range of 600 meters. They struck two of the H-39, putting them out of action. A platoon under Lt. Chambert continued the attack into the town, coming under fire from the 37mm anti-tank guns of Panzer-Jäger Kompanie.14, but they managed to knock out two German tanks in a close-range duel. Although they managed to push into the town, the light tanks lacked infantry support and were eventually forced to withdraw. The next French unit to attack was the 3/49e BCC with three Char B1 bis tanks under Lt. Paul Caravéo, which began moving towards the town around 0730 hours. The appearance of the three monstrous tanks on the southern edge of the town prompted the German infantry to temporarily withdraw, but once again, with no infantry support, the three tanks couldn’t possibly hold the town so they took up positions on the southwest outskirts. Around 0940 hours, Caravéo’s tanks noticed Oberfeldwebel Hans Hindeland’s anti-tank section trying to deploy three 37mm anti-tank guns at the western entrance to the town. The Char B1 bis company began to move forward, firing machine guns. The German gunners opened fire at close range but were horrified to see the tracers at the base of their anti-tank projectiles bounce upward when they failed to penetrate. One of the guns was destroyed at a range of only 100 meters and a second gun had several of its crew wounded. The intact gun, commanded by Feldwebel Giesemann, noticed a ribbed surface on the left side of a Char B1 bis – S/Lt. Yves Rohou’s Char B1 bis “Chinon” – and hoped it might be a vulnerable point. A single hit on the grill caused fire to spurt out of the side of the tank. The Char B1 bis further to the east were taken under fire by PzKpfw IV, No. 711. The tank’s gunner, Feldwebel Karl Koch, later recalled: “Between engagements, we were looking for ammunition from the (knocked out) panzers in front of us. After a while, a fourth tank appeared through the orchard. It was a real monster and we had no idea that France had tanks like that. We fired 20 shots at it without success. However, after a few more shots, we managed to knock off its track. After a while, a fifth tank appears, another B1 firing all its weapons. But it had not spotted us. We fired, but could not knock it out until a ricochet hit the turret. The next shot hit it in the rear. Calm returned and we abandoned our tank again because we had exhausted the ammunition.” Koch had hit “Hautvillers”, jamming the turret and knocking off the tracks on one side. The crew abandoned the tank and were captured. His other victim was “Gaillac” which eventually exploded, killing the whole crew.
This close-up of number 711 shows numerous hits and gouges from 25mm gun fire and other sources, including the direct hit on the driver’s visor that killed the driver and stunned the radio operator. (NARA)
The next French action was the first coordinated tank-infantry attack involving a few H-39 from the 45e BCC, a few FCM-36 from the 4e BCC, three remaining Char B1 bis of Caravéo’s 3/49e BCC, the I/67e RI and a company from the newly arrived I/51e RI. The German infantry took a heavy pounding from French 155mm artillery fire in advance of the infantry attack which started around 1040. The I/51e RI company attacked on the western side of town, and the remainder of the force attacked towards the northeast. About 500 meters from Stonne, the Char B1 bis tanks halted to provide over-watch, firing their 75mm guns in support while the smaller Hotchkiss and FCM tanks accompanied the infantry into the town. The French infantry, with tank support, again regained the town and around 1100 the surviving Großdeutschland infantrymen were authorized to withdraw back towards the original start point near the regimental HQ. By this stage, Panzer-Jäger Kompagnie.14 had suffered 28 casualties, and lost 12 vehicles and six 37mm anti-tank guns. French losses to this point were three Char B1 bis plus at least five damaged, and two H-39 lost and three damaged. Four Char B1 bis had their 47mm turret guns disabled when high-explosive projectiles prematurely detonated in the gun tube.
The third PzKpfw IV in the column suffered a catastrophic ammunition and fuel fire that blew the tank apart. The turret can be seen some distance away towards the village. (NARA)
Another view of Stonne taken on June 13, 1940, somewhat earlier than the other photos shown. The tank in the foreground is number 711 on which Karl Koch served as gunner while Ottens’ 700 can be seen in the background. The mass of debris on the PzKpfw IV was due to the extensive artillery bombardment of the village during the fighting. (NARA)
After the French infantry took up positions in Stonne, the tanks pulled off the hill to replenish and repair. The Luftwaffe staged a Ju-87 Stuka attack on the town and this was followed by a heavy artillery bombardment. The artillery fire was so heavy that the French infantry pulled out of the village again, but the Germans were in no position to re-occupy the ruins. Around 1530, once the fire had died down, the French infantry returned to the town, accompanied by Caravéo’s Char B1 bis tanks.
The 10.Panzer Division commander, Generalleutnant Ferdinand Schaal, ordered another attack on the town at 1500, but the Großdeutschland commander pointed out that his unit had been on the march for days, had been fighting continuously over the past few days, and were thoroughly exhausted. The German attack was delayed until 1800 and was conducted with fresh infantry from I./Schützen-Regiment.69. The evening attack pushed the French out of the center of town but the French infantry continued to cling to the southern edge of town at nightfall and the center of town remained a no-man’s land for most of the night.
Flavigny had planned to conduct the counterattack towards Sedan by 1400 hours, but Brocard reported that he could only have eight Char B1 bis ready by 1500 hours, as the others were either caught up in the fighting in Stonne, not yet fueled, or hadn’t arrived. Flavigny then postponed the attack towards Sedan until 1730, and he ordered Brocard to lead with the available Hotchkiss H-39 tanks. One of the Char B1 bis companies did not learn of the postponement and headed off on its own, only to run into German anti-tank gun positions where it lost two tanks. By early evening, the 3e DCr only had only 29 Char B1 bis tanks available and the plans for a major counterattack on the Sedan bridgehead simply petered out.
Gen. Bertin-Bossu decided to stage an early morning attack to secure Stonne. During the night of May 15–16, the fresh 41e BCC moved two of its companies near the town to prepare for an early morning counterattack. This consisted of the seven Char B1 bis tanks under Capt. Billotte of 1/41e BCC and seven Char B1 bis tanks under Capt. Delepierre of 3/41e BCC. The attacking infantry force was the III/51e RI and they were directly supported by H-39 light tanks of the 45e BCC. The attack began around 0430 hours on May 16 with a 45-minute artillery bombardment. The first wave of Char B1 bis tanks arrived outside Stonne at around 0515 and advanced to within 100 meters of the western side of town while engaging several anti-tank guns and tanks. Billotte headed directly into the town, shooting up a column of 13 panzers, as is recounted in more detail here with the associated illustration.
One of Koch’s victims during the fighting was Char B1 bis No. 416 “Hautvillers” of 3/49e BCC which took several hits through the engine grating. The crew, led by Sous lieutenant Jacques Klein, escaped the tank before it blew up and they were captured. (NARA)
This close-up of the radiator air intake grill on “Hautvillers” shows how two rounds from Koch’s 75mm gun managed to penetrate into the engine compartment, setting the tank on fire. (NARA)
During the attack, one Char B1 bis overturned in a gully, two more Char B1 bis broke down, and one was missing in action. In the meantime, the III/51e RI had closed on the town under the cover of the Hotchkiss light tanks and after nearly an hour of skirmishing, controlled Stonne again by 0700 hours. The Germans contested the latest attack with a heavy artillery bombardment at around 1000 hours, followed by a Stuka attack and another round of artillery shelling. German attacks on either side of Stonne in the morning and early afternoon were broken up by the French infantry. By late afternoon, the 51e RI had taken so many casualties as a result of continuous artillery fire that they pulled back to the edge of town. When the German infantry tried to reoccupy the town around 1430 hours, the French counterattacked and threw them out again; the Germans counterattacked around 1630 hours, but within a half-hour had been pushed out again by the 51e RI. The Germans attempted to reinforce Stonne with troops from Schützen-Regiment.64, but one platoon was spotted by Lt. Doumercq’s Char B1 bis “Riquewihr” which charged them, running over some of the infantry in the process. Doumercq was dubbed “the butcher of Stonne” after this horrifying attack. The final German attack around 1745 hours pushed the French out for the last time.
The tank fighting for Stonne petered out after the evening of May 16. The 10.Panzer Division was pulled out and replaced by two infantry divisions; likewise the Char B1 bis battalions were withdrawn for actions in other sectors. Casualties in the Großdeutschland Regiment alone for the two days of fighting were 570 including 103 killed, more than half its casualties during the whole France campaign. French casualties were equally severe, particularly in the two infantry regiments taking part. Tank casualties were about 25 panzers and 33 French tanks. The fighting continued around Stonne for more than a week, but both sides substituted infantry forces for this brutal slogging match. The fighting for Stonne was often called the “Verdun of 1940”, more for the later stages of the battle when entrenched infantry were subjected to relentless artillery barrages. The two Char B1 bis battalions of the 3e DCr continued in action in the ensuing weeks of the campaign, but in a piecemeal fashion.
The combat fate of the other Char B1 bis battalions were depressingly similar. All three of the divisions were inexperienced which was very evident from the problems they had in simply moving to the battle-zone and remaining ready for combat. The road-marches invariably left some Char B1 bis behind with mechanical problems, and the units were often tied up for hours trying to get the support vehicles to join the tanks to begin the laborious refueling process.
Gén. Marie Bruneau’s 1e DCr was intended to take part in the original lunge into Belgium, but remained behind as a potential counterattack reserve. Movement was delayed by refugees on the roads and disrupted by the usual dithering in the French high command over its mission. In a parallel of the mission of the 3e DCr, it was dispatched to the 9e Armée to deal with the threat posed by the other German Meuse bridgehead near Dinant by Hoth’s XV.AK which included Rommel’s 7.Panzer Division and the 5.Panzer Division. In the early morning hours of May 15, the 28e and 37e BCC had reached Flavion, but their Char B1 bis tanks were nearly out of fuel and the divisional fuel trucks were stuck in traffic jams; lack of fuel meant that the engines were off and low battery power impeded radio communication. In this impaired state, the 1e DCR was repeatedly engaged by elements of both of Hoth’s panzer divisions in a swirling series of close-range tank battles. After violent initial contact, Rommel’s 7.Panzer Division was ordered to skirt around the French tank concentrations and head deep behind French lines towards Philippeville. The 28e BCC was caught during refueling and through the course of the day lost 23 tanks despite exacting a heavy price on the 5.Panzer Division. The 37e BCC staged a number of counterattacks but lost 21 tanks, most often in engagements with German 105mm field guns. German losses were around 60 panzers, mainly in 5.Panzer Division. The 1e DCr was decimated in the battle of Flavion by superior tactics rather than superior equipment. The 5.Panzer Division had only 32 PzKpfw IV compared to more than double that number of Char B1 bis, but the German battalion commanders skillfully used their radios to maneuver their out-gunned companies and destroy the French tank companies in a piecemeal fashion. The panzer crews were shocked to see their 37mm and 75mm rounds bounce off the Char B1 bis, but by the afternoon the division had moved its artillery forward for improvised use in the direct fire role, successfully beating back a number of attacks by the 37e BCC. The 1e DCr was no longer combat effective after the battle at Flavion, and was gradually annihilated in a series of small skirmishes over the next few weeks; Gen. Bruneau, and part of the headquarters, was captured on May 18.
While the 1e DCr fought valiantly but ineffectively at Flavion, the 2e DCr was frittered away. The division was ordered to move towards Charleroi behind the 1e DCr, but the rail movement was disrupted by German air attacks and the chaos in Belgium. When finally de-trained and assigned to establish a defensive line, the division was scattered over a 70km front-line with little central control. Part of its division artillery was overrun and the division split in half by the German panzer advances; it was eventually given orders to cork up the Oise river crossings, scattering its tank battalions in small-scale engagements. The division’s Char B1 bis saw numerous engagements during this period, but seldom larger than platoon-sized actions. On May 19, attempts were made to consolidate its scattered elements, but by this stage only about 20 Char B1 bis were still under divisional control. The reconstituted division was squandered again in a series of futile maneuvers south of Amiens, finally taking part in the battle at Abbeville in early June with a number of other armored units including elements of de Gaulle’s improvised 4e DCr.
In contrast to the immature DCr, the cavalry’s DLM proved much more combat-effective, most notably in the battles fought by Prioux’s cavalry corps at Hannut and the subsequent skirmishing on the approaches to the Gembloux gap on May 11–16. While this might be attributed in part to a better organization structure, these divisions enjoyed a longer period of development and training as well as a clearer doctrinal mission that more closely matched their actual combat assignment.
The 1e DCR was shot up in a series of battles around Flavion on May 15. This is “Poitou II” (no. 451), of Capt. Jacques Lehoux who commanded 3/37e BCC. This tank, along with “Nivernais II,” attacked the advancing 8.Infanterie Division near Denée but were taken under fire by 105mm field guns and 88mm Flak. This tank took a direct hit on the turret leading to an ammunition fire which killed the entire crew. (NARA)