Analysis

Ultimately, there seems little to choose between the Anglo-Saxons and the Vikings on the battlefield. Although the two sides have developed very different reputations in later history, they fought with very similar weapons and armour, borrowing developments from each other over time, most notably the large double-handed axe used by both sides in 1066, but apparently adopted by the Anglo-Saxons under Viking influence around the beginning of the 11th century. What little evidence we have for battle tactics also suggests a similar approach, with the shield-wall as the only major battlefield formation on either side, and with various tactics adopted by either side to break the cohesion of the shield-wall.

Conical helmet, made of four separate plates. The helmet appears to be of early medieval date, and when it first came to academic attention had an old label with it stating that it had been found in the River Derwent near Stamford Bridge. Further investigations have been unable to confirm or refute this provenance. (Nicholas Reeves)

The events of 871 show how easily victory could swing from one side to the other, with two recorded victories for the West Saxons and four for the Vikings, together with three more major battles for which no details or outcome are recorded, but none of these battles were truly decisive, despite the glowing terms in which the Anglo-Saxon victory at Ashdown was recorded. It was only when the West Saxons ‘made peace with the Vikings on condition that they would leave them’ (Keynes & Lapidge 1983: 81), almost certainly a euphemism for paying the Vikings to go away, that matters were settled, at least temporarily. Even then, the Vikings were able to return five years later, forcing Alfred into hiding before his more decisive victory at Edington in 878, and following that victory it was only a diplomatic solution which left Alfred in control of his own territories and the Viking leader Guthrum in control of East Anglia that brought peace between the two sides. In the same way, repeated battles between the Anglo-Saxon Edmund II Ironside and the Danish Cnut in 1016 failed to produce a decisive outcome. The two kings subsequently agreed to divide England between them rather than continue fighting, and it was only Edmund’s death shortly afterwards that led to Cnut’s uncontested recognition as king of England.

Similarly, the Anglo-Saxon victory at Stamford Bridge in 1066 immediately followed the Viking victory at Fulford. If the Vikings had not been caught almost completely by surprise, Stamford Bridge might have been as indecisive as the battles of 871 or 1016, and if the Norman invasion had not been prevented by bad weather from arriving a few weeks earlier as planned, it is by no means implausible that either William II of Normandy or Harold II of England would have reached an accommodation with Harald Hard-Counsel that left the latter in control of Northumbria.

The decisive factors in battle seem to have been a combination of circumstances, leadership, and a strong element of luck. One of the interesting aspects about many of the battles and campaigns mentioned in this book is the youth and relative inexperience of the leaders involved. Alfred was only 21 years old when he played a decisive part in the battle of Ashdown in 871, and his brother and commander Æthelred I was only a few years older. The success of Alfred’s tactic of attacking uphill against superior numbers, combined with the knowledge of his later victories, makes it very easy to view this with hindsight as the first of Alfred’s great victories; and his charisma as a leader may well have contributed to the success of that manoeuvre. If the attack had failed, however, history’s view of such a risky tactic would probably be more damning. If Olaf Tryggvasson was indeed one of the Viking leaders at Maldon in 991, he was also relatively young and inexperienced, yet he secured the victory despite the enemy apparently holding a stronger position at the beginning of the battle. Cnut may still have been a teenager at the time of his conquest of England in 1016, and the knowledge that such youthful successes were possible may have inspired the young and inexperienced Edwin of Mercia and his brother Morcar of Northumbria at Fulford in 1066.

At the same time, age and experience did not guarantee victory. Ealdorman Byrhtnoth was an experienced leader at the time of the battle of Maldon, although his seniority in Anglo-Saxon politics at the time does not necessarily indicate significant military experience. His decision to allow the Vikings uncontested access to the mainland at Maldon may have been the right one for the strategic defence of the Essex coast and the Thames Estuary, but it sacrificed tactical control of the battlefield. There is no doubt that Harald Hard-Counsel was an experienced military leader, and a warrior of great personal repute, but both English and Scandinavian sources suggest that he failed to exercise even a basic level of caution in the extent to which he was caught by surprise at Stamford Bridge and insisted on fighting under such negative conditions rather than retreating. For all his reputation in saga literature as a great warrior, Harald had come to England having failed to assert his authority in Denmark in a campaign lasting many years, although his nephew Magnus had enjoyed rather greater success there.

A 10th-century sword from Dybäck, Sweden. This is one of the finest surviving swords from the Viking Age, but opinion remains divided as to whether it is Anglo-Saxon or Viking workmanship. The shape of the pommel and upper and lower guards is typical of late Anglo-Saxon swords, but appears also to have been copied by the Vikings. On this example the decoration of the hilt and scabbard fittings is also either English or heavily influenced by English art styles. (Photo by CM Dixon/Print Collector/Getty Images)

The death of Byrhtnoth at Maldon, and of both Harald Hard-Counsel and his ally Tostig at Stamford Bridge may also have been decisive factors in those battles, as may have been the deaths of one Viking king and five Viking jarls at Ashdown in 871. A lack of flexibility and adaptability on the battlefield meant that the death or flight of a leader in battle usually resulted in defeat for the relevant side.

Modern reconstruction of the Dybäck sword. The reconstruction shows more clearly than the original the relationship between the sword hilt and the top-mount of the scabbard. The scabbard is made of wood, lined with cloth or wool, and covered with leather, but these organic materials rarely survive in the ground, meaning that only the metal top-mounts and chapes tend to survive. (Author’s Collection)

If the Vikings lacked outstanding success on the battlefield, they deserve more credit than they have normally been given for their grasp of strategy and logistics. Their ability to campaign for years on end in hostile territory was unmatched in western Europe at the time, while the combination of fleets for carrying capacity and horses for speed meant that they were exceptionally mobile. The use of both fortified camps and natural features to defend their forces was key to their long-term campaigning, as it allowed them a focus for gathering and protecting supplies, while also providing a defence when overmatched in the field. That combination of strategic mobility and effective development of bases and supply lines was key to their success in 871, when the West Saxons were unable to dislodge them from their base at Reading, allowing them to regroup at least twice after defeats, and eventually to penetrate deep into Wessex and to extract a peace agreement. The Maldon campaign was similar, striking in quick succession at a number of points in south-east England before any effective defence could be mounted, and using the natural defences of Northey Island as an improvised fortification when they met resistance at Maldon. Both at Reading and at Northey Island, the Vikings emerged from those defences only on their own terms, even if events did not always go as they planned, as at Ashdown. Harald Hard-Counsel’s decision to bring his ships up the River Ouse in 1066 offered a similar potential to support his campaign against York, but his decision to move off in a different direction after his victory at Fulford, and not to retreat to the ships when faced with a superior force at Stamford Bridge, meant that the potential advantages offered by this strategy would be wasted by poor decisions.

The Anglo-Saxon army was also well organized in many ways. The fact that Æthelred I and Alfred were repeatedly able to muster forces to oppose the micel here in 871 speaks highly of both the power of the king in Wessex, and the underlying structures of recruitment and mobilization, and these were strengthened further by Alfred later in his reign. Although the fact that Alfred was forced to ‘make peace’ with the micel here is on one level an anti-climax after the celebrated victory at Ashdown, it was a significantly greater achievement than any of his contemporaries in Northumbria, East Anglia and Mercia, all of which were conquered by the micel here in the course of the 860s and 870s. Alfred’s reforms laid the foundations of military organization in late Anglo-Saxon England, and although that was unable to function at its best under the weak kingship of Æthelred II, it showed what it could do under strong leadership in 1066. Harold II’s ability to move an army from the south of England to Yorkshire, fight a major battle, return to the south coast and fight another major battle was a major achievement, irrespective of the final outcome, and leaving aside the much debated question of whether he was in fact correct to offer battle to William when he did. Unfortunately, in terms of the reputation of both Harold and the Anglo-Saxon army, the ultimate legacy of their achievements in 1066 was their defeat at Hastings rather than their victory at Stamford Bridge.

An iron axe-head of the 10th–11th centuries. It is a widespread type, from Normandy to Finland, and appears to be of the type featured in the Bayeux Tapestry. An axe, whether single-handed or double-handed, required space to use effectively, although even a large double-handed axe could be used to make a vertical cut from the rear rank of a shield-wall. Axes were apparently relatively rare in late Anglo-Saxon warfare, but from the late 10th or early 11th centuries double-handed axes with large heads were used as a result of Viking influence. These are shown on the Bayeux Tapestry as being used at Hastings in 1066, so there is no reason to doubt that some members of the English army at Stamford Bridge would also have had them. (© The Trustees of the British Museum)

In many ways this fits into a wider perception of the Anglo-Saxons as consistently second-best in warfare. They were unable to prevent the Viking conquest of much of England in the late 9th century, nor the taking of gelds and the subsequent Danish conquest of the whole kingdom in the late 10th and early 11th centuries, nor ultimately were they able to prevent the Norman Conquest of 1066. Such a perception is slightly but not completely unfair. Alfred defeated repeated waves of Viking attacks on Wessex, and his military reforms laid the foundations for his successors to conquer the other former Anglo-Saxon kingdoms and create a unified kingdom of England. Under his great-grandson Edgar, this was a strong and wealthy kingdom, and it was only the fact that he was succeeded by two successive children that caused it to collapse so dramatically. Even the reign of Edward the Confessor, not himself a strong king, saw military success against the Welsh and the Scots, while Stamford Bridge was a resounding victory. Even Hastings was a close-run battle, and might easily have gone the other way had William rather than Harold been killed in the fighting.

If perceptions of Anglo-Saxon warfare are sometimes unduly negative, the Vikings by contrast enjoy an exaggerated reputation for success on the battlefield. Their skill, ferocity and capacity for atrocities in battle have all been overplayed in comparison to their contemporaries. It is true that they saw repeated periods of success against the Anglo-Saxons in the late 9th century, in the immediate aftermath of the death of Æthelstan in 939, during the reign of Æthelred II, and at Fulford in 1066. Nevertheless, these successes owe less to the wild warriors of romantic imagination, and more to careful strategies and logistical planning, a skilful combination of warfare and diplomacy, and good underlying organization.