Chapter 3

LBJ and the Great Society

In This Chapter

Paying dues: Life in the House and Senate

Watching the presidency land in Johnson’s lap

Securing a victory through a successful campaign

Promoting a Great Society at home

Making a mess in Vietnam

Following Kennedy’s assassination, Vice President Lyndon Baines Johnson (LBJ) was immediately sworn in as president aboard the presidential plane, Air Force One, as it winged its way out of Dallas heading for Washington, D.C. Though this moment represented the pinnacle of Johnson’s long and illustrious political career, he didn’t reach his goal in the way he’d dreamed.

Extremely different in style from Kennedy, Johnson brought his own style and political savvy to the office (see Figure 3-1 for a portrait of LBJ). Though not the smooth, handsome, polished politician that Kennedy was, Johnson was a fierce competitor, a tireless worker, a skillful negotiator, and a genuinely amicable man. When, in 1964, he ran as a presidential candidate in his own right, his political skills proved effective, and he won the highest office in the land in the manner in which he’d always dreamed — in a landslide vote.

When Johnson became president, the United States received a bold and ambitious leader. As a self-made man from a poor background, he saw his father rise in power and status through Texas politics. And he never forgot his roots, working to make the government responsive to the needs of the American people. A tremendously driven man, Johnson used his energy, strength, and unique ability to negotiate compromise to fulfill Kennedy’s New Frontier idea of energizing the nation to embrace the new challenges of the age, and go beyond it to create his own legacy with the Great Society program, aimed at ending poverty and racial inequality.

In many ways Johnson’s Great Society was an outgrowth of Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal legislation. Johnson admired Roosevelt and consciously worked to model himself as a similar reformer. Just as he’d hoped, his Great Society changed America as legalized segregation disappeared. And the myriad federal funding projects, though often criticized for being too much or too little, have provided Americans with significant opportunities that only became possible with the new funding.

However, Johnson’s administration was imperfect, failing to live up to the promises of the Great Society. Perhaps such great strides to reform the nation were destined to fall short of their promise. The growing war in Vietnam clearly undermined Johnson’s lofty goals, gobbling up the funds that could’ve been put to good use at home. The president saw the funds being whittled away but felt he couldn’t stop it amidst his fears of becoming the first U.S. president to lose a war. For Johnson, the thought of losing the Great Society was nearly unthinkable. Yet the thought of losing the war to the Communists was totally unimaginable. Ultimately, he was forced to bear the former to avoid the latter. And had the Vietnam War not proved to be Johnson’s undoing, one wonders just how much he could’ve accomplished.

Figure 3-1: President Lyndon B. Johnson.

Courtesy of the Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division

Learning the Game: Early Service in the House and Senate

Though Johnson came from the South (Stonewall, Texas, to be exact), he wasn’t a stereotypical conservative southern politician. Born in 1908 and raised in much humbler circumstances than Kennedy, Johnson attended public schools and went to Southwest Texas State Teachers College in San Marco. After graduating in 1930 with a Bachelor of Science degree, Johnson taught grade school for a year in Cotulla, Texas. There, he worked closely with disadvantaged Hispanic children and saw firsthand the problems of the poor.

In 1931, following his father’s interest in politics, Johnson became secretary to Texas Democratic congressman Richard Kleberg and moved to Washington, D.C. Over the next four years, he found his true calling in politics, as he worked to build political alliances and contacts. Drawn to the backroom struggles that are prominent in democratic governments, Johnson began to learn the fine art of building consensus. He had a natural ability to find the political mainstream — a trait that would serve him well in his years of public service.

On November 17, 1934, Johnson married Claudia Alta Taylor in Austin, Texas, while traveling there on business. After a whirlwind romance spanning between Washington, D.C., and Austin, Johnson married Taylor who became affectionately known as Lady Bird Johnson. They later had two children, Lynda Bird and Luci Baines.

Lady Bird Johnson

Born Claudia Alta Taylor in Karnack, Texas, in 1912, the future wife of LBJ received the nickname Lady Bird as a baby after her nursemaid stated, “She’s pretty as a lady bird” — the nickname just stuck. After her mother died in 1917, she was raised by her father, Thomas Jefferson Taylor, an aunt, and the household servants. As a child she developed a deep love of nature — later, as first lady, she channeled her energies into preserving the country’s natural beauty. As Lady Bird grew up, her father taught her a great deal about running a business, and she went on to earn a Bachelor of Arts from the University of Texas. In 1934, she met Lyndon Johnson in Austin. Though he was living in Washington, D.C., at the time, Johnson courted Lady Bird with telegrams, letters, and phone calls. On his next trip to Texas, Johnson proposed, and Lady Bird accepted, stating, “Sometimes Lyndon simply takes your breath away.”

Married on November 17, 1934, Lady Bird became Johnson’s confidante, assistant, and political cohort. When Johnson went off to serve in the navy during World War II, his wife helped to keep his congressional office running. She did the same thing in 1955, when Johnson was recovering from his heart attack.

When Johnson became president, Lady Bird assumed her duties as first lady without feeling a need to compete with the glamour that Jackie Kennedy had brought to the White House. Instead, she established her own style of Texas hospitality in White House social affairs. As first lady, she created the “First Lady’s Committee for a More Beautiful Capital,” which she later expanded to a national focus. She also participated in Johnson’s Great Society programs, with a special interest in the Head Start Program for disadvantaged children.

In 1968, after Johnson retired from political life, he and Lady Bird returned to Texas, where the former president later died in 1973. Lady Bird went on supporting her husband through his legacy. Since retirement, she has returned to her early love of nature, serving as an active supporter of The Lady Bird Johnson Wildflower Research Center, which she founded in 1982, trustee of the National Geographic Society, and the matriarch of the Johnson business interests that she and her husband established.

Congressman Johnson

Developing a reputation as a young, promising star, 27-year-old Johnson was appointed by President Franklin Roosevelt in 1933 to head the Texas National Youth Administration. During his two years in this position, Johnson participated in the New Deal programs, helping young people find opportunities for work and schooling in the Depression era. He also worked to build support for launching his political career in Texas, which paid off in 1937 when he successfully ran for a Texas seat in Congress. As a congressman, Johnson backed Roosevelt’s New Deal legislation, championing public works projects, social aid, and public power programs. When World War II broke out, Johnson became the first congressman to enlist, entering the U.S. Navy, and serving in the war in the Pacific in 1941. When Roosevelt recalled members of Congress from active duty in the same year, Johnson returned to continue his support of Roosevelt’s foreign and domestic policies.

The senator from Texas

Johnson set his sights higher than Congress in 1948, running for a Senate seat against one of the most popular former governors in Texas history. In a bitterly contested race, Johnson won by a mere 87 votes. Though his opponent cried fraud and sued in court, Johnson prevailed, jokingly referring to himself as “Landslide Lyndon.”

Using his skills of negotiation, conciliation, and intimidation, Johnson thrived in the Senate. In 1951, at the age of 44, he became the youngest Senate minority leader in Democratic Party history. When he was reelected in 1954, the shift in political power in the Senate made him the majority leader. In his years in the Senate, Johnson kept his position by supporting the Texas oil and natural gas interests, participating in the redbaiting of the era (accusing and attacking people for being Communists or having Communist sympathies), and consistently opposing civil rights legislation. Johnson created strong ties to his southern counterparts by opposing all civil rights issues up until 1957, when he began to have higher aspirations once again.

Presidential desires and vice-presidential opportunities

In the late 1950s Johnson began to plan his presidential bid. Realizing that his Senate record was highly conservative, Johnson sought to broaden his appeal to increase his chances for a bid. The answer to the question of whether Johnson’s shift in 1957 was because he desired to soften his image or because he was going back to his roots within the New Deal ideology is unclear. Whatever his motivations, that year Johnson began to support civil rights legislation playing a crucial role in the passage of the 1957 Civil Rights Act. Though this change was a savvy attempt to widen his support, many Northern Democrats still saw him as a small-time southern politician. Johnson didn’t campaign actively for the presidency before the American people, instead seeking brokered deals for support, as he had done so successfully as a senator. At the Democratic National Convention in 1960, John F. Kennedy was chosen as the Democratic candidate for president on the first ballot.

For Johnson the vice presidency was a tragedy, for he never liked to be anything less than the best. He’d spent 23 years in Congress and had become one of its most powerful and skillful leaders, yet he was forced to accept the second seat on the party’s ticket. Despite his personal feelings, Johnson campaigned for Kennedy with his usual gusto and commitment, bringing in the southern states that Kennedy needed to win.

When Kennedy presented his new, youthful administration, Johnson felt more akin to Dwight Eisenhower than to the new wunderkind that made up Kennedy’s “best and brightest.” Kennedy worked hard to keep Johnson satisfied without letting Johnson overshadow him as president, because Kennedy was younger and less experienced. Keeping the powerful vice president in check without losing his valuable help assuring Southern support in the next presidential election was a delicate balancing act. Kennedy, recognizing that Johnson had been the legislative father of the space program, gave him an important role as chairman of the National Aeronautics and Space Council. Johnson was also given travel assignments as vice president helping him hone his diplomatic skills. His trip to Vietnam as vice president proved useful to him later when he was making his policy decisions. Kennedy also made Johnson the chair of the new Committee on Equal Employment Opportunities.

The Unexpected Promotion: The Death of JFK

The tragedy of John F. Kennedy’s assassination only 36 months after his election catapulted Johnson to the position he’d aspired to attain. Amidst national grief, Johnson stepped up and provided a calming model of leadership. On the day of the assassination, Johnson stated simply, “I will lead, and I will do the best I can.” (Figure 3-2 shows Johnson taking the oath of office.)

Though Johnson couldn’t match the energy and passion that Kennedy had created, his experience and professional yet fatherly demeanor soothed a nation that was traumatized by the events in Dallas (head back to Chapter 2 for more information on the assassination of JFK).

Figure 3-2: Johnson takes the oath of office aboard Air Force One, with Jackie Kennedy looking on.

©Bettmann/CORBIS

Carrying forth the torch

Based upon Johnson’s years leading the Senate, domestic policies quickly became his prime focus. He announced that Kennedy’s cabinet would remain as his cabinet and that the legislative initiatives Kennedy had started, which were currently stagnating in congressional committees, would now be passed. Johnson made good on his promises. Managing the political infighting associated with the passing of Kennedy’s legislative program was one of his greatest strengths.

Although Kennedy hated political wrestling and wrangling, Johnson was in his element. He summoned reluctant or obstructive senators and congressmen to the White House to give them what was known as the “Johnson treatment,” from his days in the Senate: He sought to overpower and intimidate them into accepting his will. Johnson was a master of this aggressive tactic of both speech and body language and was able to force most men to demur under his relentless onslaught of analogies, facts, threats, and promises. His long and distinguished service in Congress gave him the tools he needed to jump-start Kennedy’s legislative programs, and they soon began to pass under his aggressive leadership.

Finding an agenda: The unconditional War on Poverty

By the end of 1963, the year before Johnson’s election, Congress passed a foreign aid bill along with a plan to sell wheat to the Soviet Union. Yet, looking at foreign aid packages raised questions about the needs of American citizens. In 1964, the Council of Economic Advisers issued a report stating that about 20 percent of the American population was living below the poverty line — this estimate amounted to 9.3 million families living on less than $3,000 per year for a family of four.

In his first State of the Union address in 1964, Johnson explained, “Unfortunately, many Americans live on the outskirts of hope, some because of their poverty and some because of their color, and all too many because of both.”

Johnson made tax reduction and civil rights legislation his top priorities, yet as he mulled over them, he had an epiphany. He decided to declare unconditional war on poverty in America. The timing of this move was brilliant; much the same as in the Progressive Era at the turn of the century, when a rising middle class began to show compassion for the plight of the poor, the middle class in the postwar world had prospered and was ready to begin to address some of society’s problems.

Searching for a theme for the upcoming elections, Johnson put together the Economic Opportunity Bill as his vehicle for the War on Poverty. It included a wide range of programs, such as

The Work Study Program to help poorer college students

The Job Corps Program for troubled inner-city youths

The Government Loan Program to help businesses willing to employ the chronically unemployed

The Government Grant Program for farmers and rural businesses

The Community Action Program, designed to give the poor a say in how the War on Poverty would be conducted in their neighborhoods

A domestic Peace Corps program called Volunteers In Service To America (VISTA)

Taking over Kennedy’s unfinished agenda, Johnson was now forging ahead, going much further in his bold plans for revitalizing America. Johnson told his advisors he wanted a plan that was big and bold and would make a real impact on the nation. He planned to fund his program through revenues from corporate taxes, which were surging following Kennedy’s $10 billion tax reduction that Johnson signed into law in 1964. The tax cuts put money back into the economy in the form of investment and consumer demand. As a result, America entered a long, sustained economic boom.

Applying a label: The Great Society

Johnson continued to search for the great theme for his presidential run in 1964. In March, when asked whether he’d chosen a slogan such as the New Deal or the New Frontier, Johnson replied that he hadn’t had a chance to work on that yet but noted that everyone likes the idea of a better deal. Though Johnson didn’t like to label himself, he did describe himself on several occasions as a prudent progressive.

The truth was that Johnson was wracking his own brain and pressing his advisors to find a theme that would go beyond Kennedy’s vision and define his own ideology. He needed a vision that was bold, daring, and aggressive — one that would establish the Johnson legacy for future generations. The idea was to identify the era in which the United States transitioned from a prosperous nation to one that focused on quality of life as well as quantity of money and possessions for all American citizens. Eric Goldman, a Princeton historian and part of the LBJ brain trust, suggested using the title of a Walter Lippmann book, The Good Society. Richard Goodwin, a Johnson speechwriter, changed the idea to the Great Society and drafted a speech with the new theme. The goal of the Great Society was to promote greater opportunities for prosperity and happiness for all Americans.

Johnson was immediately taken with it, seeing it as a way for him to fulfill the promise of Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal, which had focused on reorganizing society to create greater equity and fairness. In a graduation address in Ann Arbor, Michigan, Johnson tried out the rhetoric for the first time. The crowd interrupted his speech with applause 29 times. Johnson was euphoric; he’d found his theme and his legacy.

The 1964 Presidential Race

In the 1964 presidential election, Johnson was established as the Democratic candidate from the very beginning. He chose Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota as his running mate. The Republican Party was shifting to the right, driven by a perceived need to distinguish the party from the positions of the Democrats. The Republicans’ choice of Barry Goldwater created a situation in which voters would choose between the consensus-building politics of Johnson or the much more extreme calls for action of Goldwater. Following the upset and disorientation created by the assassination of Kennedy, the country desired peace and continuity.

Shifting to the right: Republicans react

Johnson’s Great Society program provoked a strong reaction among the conservative Republicans, who felt that their party had moved too far toward the center, making them a mere echo of the Democrats. Thus, as a reaction to the perceived liberal drift in the party, many conservatives began to pull for dogmatic varieties of conservatism, such as the aristocratic intellectual new conservatism of the National Review magazine as articulated by William F. Buckley, or the more extreme views of the John Birch Society (see Chapter 13).

Barry M. Goldwater: Extremist on the right

Ultimately, the struggle between moderate and conservative factions in the Republican Party resulted in the party’s shift to the right. By 1960, an extreme conservative named Barry Goldwater had emerged as the leader of the Republican Right. Goldwater, a millionaire department-store owner and senator from Arizona, had been preparing for the 1964 election by building his extreme right-wing agenda. He placed his agenda in his 1960 book, The Conscience of a Conservative. Running for president in 1964, Goldwater called for

An abolition of the graduated income tax

The sale of Roosevelt’s Tennessee Valley Authority

A change in Social Security to make it voluntary

An end to government interference in the economy

An end to federal aid to education

An aggressive bombing campaign against North Vietnam

Federal opposition to forcing civil rights issues

Goldwater was a blunt man who was interested in promoting a right-wing ideology but lacked the subtleties of successful politicians — he came across as harsh and authoritarian. On record, he stated that he favored withdrawing U.S. recognition of the Soviet Union. He also stated his belief that local military commanders should be given the authority to use their atomic weapons against the Soviet Union, stating, “Let’s lob one into the men’s room of the Kremlin.” As if that insensitive remark wasn’t enough, he called welfare recipients people with “low intelligence and little ambition.” He also expressed his strong opposition to civil rights legislation.

The melee at the Republican National Convention

In June, at the Republican National Convention in San Francisco’s Cow Palace, Goldwater’s biggest rival was fellow Republican Nelson Rockefeller. Though a poll on the eve of the convention showed that, on eight out of ten issues, Americans felt sharp disagreement with Goldwater, the candidate’s conservative supporters dominated the convention. When Rockefeller addressed the convention, he was heckled by Goldwater supporters who yelled and jeered, shaking cowbells and blowing horns. When Rockefeller criticized the crowd for using “Communist and Nazi methods,” they just increased their savage attacks. When Goldwater took the floor, he felt no need to hold back, saying that his opponents saw the nation in fundamentally wrong ways. He accused them of promoting collectivist thinking and undermining the American way of life. He expressed his commitment to freedom, explaining that the goals of the extreme right that he represented couldn’t be compromised.

In his speech at the Republican National Convention, Goldwater went on to say, “Extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice! . . . Moderation in the pursuit of justice is no virtue!”

Holding onto the left: Johnson campaigns

Prior to the June Republican National Convention, Johnson had deeply worried about his election chances. An insecure man, he excessively worried about his weaknesses. He feared that in the event of a strong run from Nixon, Rockefeller, or Goldwater, he’d be seen as a Texas-style backroom brawler, unlike the suave man Kennedy had been. To counter this image, his promoters had pictures taken of Johnson strolling in the White House gardens holding his wife’s hand, quietly reading books, and bowling with his daughter. The images were designed to promote the image of an intelligent, thoughtful family man. And as he dealt with President Kennedy’s memory, he was also forced to deal with Robert Kennedy’s vice presidential ambitions.

Drinking, driving, belching, and abusing

As Johnson’s promoters strove to create a nationally appealing image of their candidate, Johnson often undermined their best efforts. In one incident, he treated reporters to some Texas hospitality, including taking four reporters on a tour of his ranch in his Cadillac, beer in hand, at speeds over 90 miles per hour. When Time magazine published the account, it showed a reckless Texas cowboy playing fast and loose with the rules — not a good image for a presidential hopeful. The second incident occurred less than two weeks later, while the White House was still denying the speeding incident. Johnson was photographed and described in the press as lifting up his two pet beagles by the ears, making him appear crude and heartless.

Johnson’s fears of being outclassed had some truth to them; the fact that he often displayed behavior unbecoming of a president was an open secret in Washington. Johnson was well known for shouting at his aides in public and calling them into the bathroom while he was “on the throne.” Further, he surprised reporters who were visiting him at his ranch by candidly discussing the sex life of bulls, urinating in public, and belching while gulping down highballs.

Although Johnson’s behavior gave his supporters much to worry about, opinion polls still predicted that he’d have a comfortable win in November. After the Republicans chose Goldwater for their candidate, Johnson’s aides worried less, yet Johnson still fretted.

Handling the Bobby problem

As Johnson considered his options for a running mate, one obvious choice was Bobby Kennedy. He had a solid reputation and wouldn’t overshadow the presidential candidate. Yet the problem was that Johnson and Kennedy simply didn’t like each other. Johnson was also concerned that a victory with Kennedy as his running mate might bring speculation that Johnson couldn’t have won re-election without riding on Kennedy coattails. For Bobby, although he disliked Johnson, he knew that serving as vice president was a likely path for him to ascend to the presidency following Johnson.

Johnson hoped that Bobby would decline without incident, but Bobby didn’t. However, after Goldwater became the Republican candidate, Johnson learned, through the polls, that his choice of running mate probably wouldn’t make a difference, so he invited Bobby in for a chat. In this meeting Johnson clearly told Kennedy that he saw him as a liability because of his work on civil rights legislation, and that he wouldn’t choose him as a running mate. He went on to tell Kennedy that his time would come and that he should work to promote him in the election. Johnson ended up choosing Minnesota senator Hubert Humphrey as his running mate, though he worried that Hubert talked too much and was too exuberant.

Emerging victorious

Though polls showed Johnson with a very comfortable two-to-one margin over Goldwater, he still believed that he had to attack his opponent. When Goldwater came out with the slogan, “In your heart, you know he’s right,” Johnson’s public relations team responded, “In your guts, you know he’s nuts.” The Democratic candidate created a strong anti-Goldwater campaign that hounded his opponent on a daily basis.

Probably Johnson’s most decisive move was to hire the ad agency Doyle, Dane, Bernbach (DDB) to prepare television and radio spots, which finally destroyed what little chance Goldwater may have had. In perhaps the most significant attack ever made, DDB came up with the Daisy Ad, in which a little girl is in a field picking petals off of a daisy and counting to ten. In the background, the voiceover is a man counting down from ten to one. When the man gets to one, you see a startled look on the girl’s face and then a closeup of her eye, in which you see the mushroom cloud of a nuclear explosion. The announcer’s voice cuts back in and states, “These are the stakes — to make a world in which all of God’s children can live, or to go into the dark. Vote for President Johnson on November 3. The stakes are too high for you to stay home.” DDB ran a series of other attack ads — some of them variations on the daisy ad, and others attacking Goldwater for his threats to Social Security.

By late September, the ads began to really pay off, as Johnson surged forward to take a three-to-one margin over Goldwater. The Republicans fought back with a smear campaign of their own, suggesting that Johnson had participated in corrupt business practices. Late in the campaign, the Republicans felt they’d found a weakness in the Johnson administration when a moral scandal erupted over presidential aide Walter Jenkins, who was arrested and charged with indecent sexual behavior at a YMCA. The Republicans pressed the case as a sign of moral failure in the Johnson administration. Johnson, however, deftly handled the potentially damaging situation. Jenkins immediately resigned, and Lady Bird discussed her concern over him in an interview in which she noted the tremendous strains he’d been under since the assassination of JFK. The Jenkins situation created no lasting effects, and on November 3, Johnson thoroughly trounced Goldwater to win reelection.

Goldwater carried only his home state of Arizona and five states of the Deep South. Johnson won the electoral vote 486 to 52, and the popular vote 43,129,484 to 27,178,188.

Back to the Great Society and the War on Poverty

Johnson’s strong presidential victory gave him his mandate for the Great Society program. Because the Democrats had also won clear majorities in both the House and Senate, Johnson was ready to push forward. He was a pragmatic man who wanted more than the liberal dream of doing good; he wanted solid legislative measures that would directly address issues of education, housing, public transportation, and health. So he set up 14 separate task forces, each staffed with experts whose jobs were to identify the nation’s problems and then to suggest concrete measures to solve each one. The groups were to do their work in secrecy, because Johnson believed that leaks about social policies during the Kennedy administration had fostered public debate, making it more difficult to pass such legislation.

As Johnson geared up to pass his Great Society reforms, many of which form the social programs that people readily recognize today, he cautioned his staff to press on at every occasion, without creating an image of massive reform for fear of creating a backlash. In manipulating Congress, Johnson was in his element. He began his legislative push by honoring Congress and the individual lawmakers as great Americans who worked and sacrificed for the good of the nation. Though his program of flattery didn’t work on all his critics, it did have the desired effect of setting the tone for his legislative thrust. Further, he instructed his staff to do everything possible to bolster congressional egos, including knowing all the legislators and returning their calls within ten minutes whenever feasible. These measures all helped groom Congress members to be receptive to new ideas.

Pushing Kennedy’s Civil Rights Act

Following Kennedy’s assassination, Johnson felt a compelling need to drive the former president’s Civil Rights Act through Congress without letting it be diluted in any way. He recognized that the civil rights movement was becoming more militant and being met with more violence, particularly after the fierce battles over the Freedom Rides and the violence in Birmingham. Johnson felt that he needed to act before violence and unrest intensified, and he also felt that he owed it to Kennedy’s memory to get the bill passed. Within weeks of his inauguration, Johnson decided to get it passed before the end of summer. Though civil rights advocates were suspicious of this southerner wanting to push their legislation through, over time, many learned to trust his intentions.

As a southerner, Johnson knew that segregation had done more than just separate whites and blacks in the South; it had also separated the South from the rest of the nation. Johnson believed that this bill would help heal the wounds of Kennedy’s assassination and benefit the South by allowing it to better integrate with the rest of the United States. Getting the legislation passed was a challenge that tested Johnson’s powers of compromise and persuasion. Though there were fears that the Republicans would make this a partisan issue, they overwhelmingly supported the legislation, and in fact, Republican Senate Minority Leader Everett Dirksen helped push the bill through Congress. The real resistance was more of a regional division than a partisan issue. Pressing House members, he guided the bill to passage by a margin of 290 to 110 on February 10. He then turned his efforts to the Senate, where he expected greater opposition. A determined filibuster by southern senators delayed the bill until June 10, when Johnson’s relentless pressure on everyone he could reach paid off, with the Senate passing the bill 71 to 29. Johnson signed the bill into law on July 2, 1964.

The law was a landmark in American race relations. Among the myriad other details, the bill outlawed racial, sexual, or national origin discrimination in employment and public accommodations. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 ultimately resulted in the desegregation of schools and public facilities throughout the South. (For more details on the provisions of the act, see Chapter 6.)

Establishing the Voting Rights Act

Although the 15th Amendment was supposed to have guaranteed voting rights for blacks, the efforts by civil rights organizations to register black voters under the Freedom Summer project of 1964 had led to violent confrontations in the South (see Chapter 6 for the details).

Martin Luther King Jr. and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference chose Selma, Alabama, as the ideal place to make their stand, because it had a reputation as one of the most oppressive cities of the South. A series of televised brutal police attacks on demonstrators, which culminated with the events of “Bloody Sunday” during a planned march from Selma to Montgomery, horrified much of America (for a complete account of the Selma protests, see Chapter 7). The national reaction to the event was what Johnson had been waiting for; he sent the Voting Rights Act to Congress two days later.

When Johnson took his bill to Capitol Hill, he made one of his finest speeches, declaring

What happened in Selma is part of a far larger movement, which reaches into every section and state of America. It is the effort of American Negroes to secure for themselves the full blessings of American life. Their cause must be our cause, too. Because it is not just Negroes, but really it is all of us, who must overcome the crippling legacy of bigotry and injustice. And we shall overcome.

After a moment of stunned silence, contemplating the fact that the president had just quoted the unofficial anthem of blacks and civil rights groups, almost every member of Congress responded with a standing ovation. In the Senate, southern senators organized a filibuster that delayed the bill, yet on May 26, it passed by an impressive 77-to-19 vote. In the House, conservatives worked to water down the bill, but Johnson supporters were able to keep it in its original form, passing the House 333 to 85 on July 9. Johnson signed the Voting Rights Act into law on August 6, 1965.

The impact of the Voting Rights Act was almost immediate, as southern states were forced to register black voters. Increased black votes resulted in a greater black representation in state legislatures, as well as in Congress. This act became the most influential piece of civil rights legislation since Reconstruction. (For more details on the impact, see Chapter 7.)

Ensuring educational opportunities

When it came to establishing priorities, Johnson saw the expansion of educational opportunities as one of his administration’s top priorities. He was convinced that education was the ticket to raising people out of poverty, an idea that was largely based upon his own history. In turn, he believed that federal funding of education would solve the problems of overcrowded schools and underqualified teachers.

Providing more money for schools

On January 12, Johnson sent a message to Congress, calling on them to create a national goal of “full educational opportunity.” In his message, he laid out his plans to double federal spending on education from $4 billion to $8 billion. He reminded Congress that America spent seven times more on welfare, prison, and reform on students who had dropped out and gone bad than it did on youths who remained in school and completed their educations.

Johnson guided his bill, called the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), through Congress in a masterful way. He wisely avoided the religious issues by making funding available to both public and private schools. To rally support, Johnson met with National Education Association leaders and paid a symbolic visit to the Office of Education. He and his aides kept a daily count on congressional votes, and he pressured noncompliant House and Senate leaders with multiple phone calls, administering the Johnson treatment wherever needed (see the “Carrying forth the torch” section for the details on Johnson’s persuasive tactics). His work paid off on March 26, with the House voting for the bill 263 to 153.

With this victory in hand, Johnson pressured the Senate to pass the same bill without modifications in order to avoid the need for a conference committee that could undermine or change the bill. Though some Republicans complained that the president’s pressures were undermining the congressional prerogative in legislation, the Senate passed the bill on April 9 by a vote of 73 to 18. In just 87 days, Johnson had successfully shepherded a multibillion-dollar piece of legislation dealing with fundamental issues of education through both houses of Congress. The real victory was that such a bill would’ve been blocked over the issue of segregation, yet this issue had been settled with the earlier passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Another major component of Johnson’s Great Society had fallen into place.

Making college more accessible

Johnson also sought to take his ideas regarding the value of education to the college level. In November 1965, Johnson signed the Higher Education Act (HEA) at his alma mater, Southwest Texas State University. This bill provided federal funding for library acquisitions and more library specialists. This bill also provided federal funding for scholarships, loans, and work-study programs for students. The tremendous effects of this legislation were obvious within five years, as the nation saw a dramatic rise in the number of students seeking college degrees. In 1950, only 15 percent of 18- to 21-year-olds were attending college. By 1970, this number rose to 34 percent, and by 1990 the number reached 52 percent. Much of this increase is due to the HEA.

Funding the arts

In addition to his push for educational funding, Johnson was successful in creating the National Endowment for the Arts and the National Endowment for the Humanities. Though Johnson seemed an unlikely champion of the arts, he believed that scholars and artists “are the creators and keepers of our vision,” and that “the creative and performing arts constitute a real national treasure.” As such they played an important part in the project to create the Great Society. These programs provided funding for artists and scholars for work that helped expand, define, and interpret the nation’s cultural heritage. The National Endowment for the Arts has funded many public art projects, including bringing Shakespearean productions to smaller communities and supporting a variety of performers and musicians to make their work and talents more accessible to the American people. The National Endowment for the Humanities has funded scholars and students, making educational opportunities available to a variety of people through research grants and scholarships.

Addressing medical problems with Medicare

During Johnson’s first months in office, he sent a message to Congress calling on its members to make modern medical practices available to all Americans. He called for four reforms:

Health insurance for the elderly

Better and more hospitals

Greater funding for mental health

Funding research to find cures for cancer, heart disease, and strokes

Johnson’s own heart attack at the age of 46 made the issue of health very important to him. The commission that he’d created to study the health issues reported that a $2.8 billion program would bring victory over diseases such as cancer, heart disease, and strokes, which accounted for nearly three-fourths of the country’s deaths in 1962.

Buoyed by this information, Johnson asked Congress to fund a Regional Medical Program (RMP) to deliver federal funding to research hospitals. His request was met with fierce opposition, particularly from the American Medical Association (AMA), which feared that government-operated hospitals would threaten the existing system of private healthcare. Congress buckled to pressures from the AMA and passed a significantly watered-down version of the RMP that was no threat to the AMA. Johnson’s attempts to gain more and better hospitals were also opposed by the insurance lobby and the AMA who feared that state-owned hospitals would lead the country down the path toward socialized medicine. Though some funding for mental health was included in the Medicare/Medicaid bill, this too was limited.

In 1965, Johnson made his Medicare proposal to provide health insurance for the elderly his top priority. He was intent on getting it passed while he still enjoyed such a strong position with Congress. Though he did everything he could to press the issue forward, the president quickly ran into opposition from conservative Republicans and the AMA, each of whom came up with alternate plans to address the need. Republican senator John Byrnes hatched an idea called “Bettercare”; the AMA produced its own, dubbed “Eldercare.” Though both plans covered fewer American seniors, they did provide more comprehensive coverage. Johnson outmaneuvered the opposition by incorporating the strong features of both competing plans into his Medicare plan. Medicare was to have three levels:

Hospital insurance under Social Security

A voluntary insurance program for doctors’ bills

A medical welfare program for the poor seniors, administered by the states, to be called Medicaid

Johnson lobbied heavily for the new legislation to pass, and though it ran into heavy resistance in the Senate and took over 500 minor amendments, Congress passed the Medicare Act on July 28. Though Johnson believed that the AMA couldn’t resist the new law without damaging the organization’s reputation with the American public, he left little to chance and met with AMA leaders to be sure that they’d be on board with the program. Over the next ten years, Medicare became a highly popular entitlement that no politician dared oppose.

Fighting poverty and making changes on multiple fronts

In early 1965, many of Johnson’s Great Society programs were already up and running. The Office of Economic Opportunity was the centerpiece of the “War on Poverty,” administering a number of programs including the Job Corps, the Volunteers in Service to America (VISTA), the Neighborhood Youth Corps, Community Health Centers, the Foster Grandparents program, the Legal Services program, Senior Centers, Summer Youth programs, and the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program, (AFDC), all of which were operating as part of the Great Society. The central idea was to push programs that could end American poverty by addressing the unmet needs of many of the nation’s poor. By February, 44 states had local antipoverty programs in place, with plans for the last 6 states to open by June. VISTA had over 8,000 volunteers, and over 4 million people were receiving government aid from AFDC.

Yet for Johnson, this progress was only the beginning. In February he asked Congress for an additional $1.5 billion to expand the programs to ensure that poor children received good educational opportunities and that the poor had access to good legal counsel. In response, Congress passed the Head Start Program, aimed at giving disadvantaged children the opportunity to enter schools on an equal level as the more fortunate children. Congress also funded the Upward Bound Program, which helped poorer children prepare for college.

Johnson also pushed a new immigration bill through Congress in 1965. This new immigration policy abandoned the quota system. The president signed the bill into law on Liberty Island in New York Harbor, with Ellis Island visible in the background. The new law was designed to treat all nationalities and races equally by creating hemispheric ceilings stipulating that no more than 20,000 could come from each country each year. The new act also gave priority to family members of American residents.

To boost economic growth, Congress passed the Public Works and Economic Development Act, which was aimed at revitalizing areas of the country where industry had faded away and urban blight had set in. For the larger urban areas, Johnson saw a need for a government office that could deal with the variety of problems facing the community. Johnson backed a plan to create the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), which would coordinate construction, community services, and social benefits. HUD’s goal was to beautify American cities, eliminate slums, and facilitate the growth of services, ranging from parks to sewers to water supplies.

In 1965 Johnson also pushed for legislation for stricter controls on pollution, along with a Highway Beautification Act that would limit billboards and highway eyesores such as junkyards. In these matters, Johnson ran into real opposition from the chemical, automobile, and billboard lobbies, who feared that such laws would impinge on their business practices and their bottom lines. With much political arm-twisting, Johnson was able to get these laws passed, though in significantly watered-down versions. Nevertheless, he accepted the limitations, noting that these new laws would be a good start.

Johnson also passed the Highway Safety Act and the Traffic Safety Act, creating safety standards for automakers and highway design. He pushed to create a new department to oversee the work of numerous smaller entities with the field of transportation. The Department of Transportation (DOT) was to oversee the Federal Aviation Authority (FAA), the Commerce Department’s transportation division, the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), the Maritime Administration, and the Transportation Safety Board of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Though industry and labor objections kept the Maritime Administration out of the DOT, the bill was signed into law on October 15, 1966. Johnson complained that leaving the Maritime Administration out of the DOT was a mistake, but there was little he could do about it. Fifteen years later, Congress came to agree with Johnson and reorganized the department accordingly.

Guns or Butter? The Tragedy of Vietnam

As Johnson was building his Great Society, the Vietnam War grew rapidly in terms of the number of troops and the cost of the war. When Johnson took over after Kennedy’s assassination, 1,600 U.S. advisory personnel were in South Vietnam. Each U.S. president since Harry Truman had tried to spend as little as possible on South Vietnam, yet just enough to keep it from falling into the hands of the Communists. At first, Johnson had hoped to continue this trend in order to promote the Great Society programs, but beginning with his decisions to escalate the war in 1965, the situation overseas began to slide out of his control.

The war expenditures for 1965 were controllable but showed a growing trend toward becoming an unmanageable burden. By 1966, the U.S. government was spending over $22 billion on the Vietnam War and only $1.2 billion on the War on Poverty. This harsh reality created Johnson’s terrible dilemma of whether the U.S. should invest in “guns or butter.” In assessing the war, Johnson later explained to his biographer, Doris Kearns Goodwin, that creating the Great Society was his true love, but it was the Vietnam War that undermined his greatest dreams for America.

Escalating the war

In his attempts to not lose South Vietnam, Johnson was forced to engage and eventually escalate the conflict. His legal justification for fighting the war lay in the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, passed by Congress in 1964. (See Chapter 8 for greater detail.) Though Congress had never formally declared war, the resolution itself gave Johnson full authority to “take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.” Armed with this sweeping power, Johnson and his staff began a long series of escalations in South Vietnam in 1965.

Although Johnson’s desire to fulfill the dream of the Great Society was still his primary focus, he felt that the U.S. couldn’t afford to lose in the cold war struggle. In retrospect, Johnson’s decision to Americanize the war seems curious given his domestic agenda, yet it was consistent with his predecessors’ foreign policy positions. Containment theory, initiated under Harry Truman, had been embraced by Eisenhower and reiterated by Kennedy in his famous “bear any burden” speech. Johnson had little choice but to follow these precedents and be sure that he wasn’t the one to lose to the forces of Communism. Though he had to keep the U.S. in the cold war game, he also knew that he must not press forward so fast that he’d provoke the Chinese or the Soviets into direct confrontation.

Looking shady: Johnson’s credibility gap

While Johnson was well aware of the “guns or butter” dilemma of the Vietnam War versus the Great Society, the lack of a clear way out of the problem caused him to continue his balancing act while looking for a solution. By 1966, the strategy was still working, with his domestic policies still moving forward, albeit at a much slower pace than in 1965. Polls showed American public support for Johnson’s handling of the war, with two-thirds of Americans viewing the stand in Vietnam as essential. As General William Westmoreland and the Joint Chiefs of Staff pressed Johnson for more troops and broader latitude in the bombing campaign, Johnson repeatedly resisted their requests, oftentimes in violent outbursts in which he accused them of trying to trigger World War III. Then, after the heat of the moment passed, Johnson felt compelled to grant the next escalation.

Because the war in Vietnam was the nation’s first televised war, Johnson remained keenly aware of public perceptions and was careful to manage the war before the American people. Though the Tet Offensive of January 1968 is seen as the turning point of American public opinion about the war (see the “Smothering the dream: The Tet Offensive and LBJ’s decline” section, later in this chapter), this belief is only understandable in the context of the Johnson credibility gap, which had developed over the previous two years.

As the war escalated, the Johnson administration and the U.S. military had been careful to show the American public that the war was progressing and that the U.S. was taking great measures to fight the insurgents while minimizing civilian casualties and human suffering. U.S. airpower pounded military targets of concrete and steel, thereby defeating the aggressors while preserving the idea that the U.S. was winning the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese people. As for the greater cold war issues fueling the conflict, the American public heard only one side of the story from the American press, which generally reported what the military showed them.

Little did America know, however, that trouble was brewing under the surface of the war front. Taken together, some gray areas formed the seeds of Johnson’s credibility gap, which played a significant role in the interpretations of the events of 1968. Questions about the Tonkin Gulf incident (see Chapter 8 for more information on the Tonkin Gulf incident) began to plague Johnson, ultimately culminating in a Senate investigation of the matter. In addition, a series of private fact-finding missions to North Vietnam and attempts to negotiate an end to the war were reported in the press, embarrassing the administration and giving the American public reason to be suspicious that what they were hearing from the government was not the whole truth. (See Chapter 9 for more on these nongovernmental trips to Vietnam.)

Johnson also created new examples of his duplicity. Because of his desire for secrecy and to be the first to tell the American public about his decisions and accomplishments, he became more willing to mislead the American people. In a March 9, 1967 news conference, when a reporter asked Johnson if he was looking for a replacement for American Ambassador to Vietnam Henry Cabot Lodge, Johnson stated that there was no truth to the rumor. But within days, Johnson named Ellsworth Bunker as Lodge’s replacement, prompting complaints from the press that Johnson had again purposely misled the American people.

In an attempt to cover the gaffe, the White House press secretary explained that Johnson was technically correct when he said he wasn’t looking for a replacement because he had already found one. Though this situation seems somewhat trivial in itself, the fact that it occurred in the midst of the turmoil created by revelations from private missions to Vietnam gave it added prominence in the minds of many Americans. The debate it sparked reveals Johnson’s accelerating credibility gap. Lack of progress in the war and continued requests for more money and troops multiplied the questions many Americans were beginning to seriously struggle with.

Smothering the dream: The Tet Offensive

The Tet Offensive of January 1968 was the North Vietnamese attempt to break the stalemate of the war with a bold offensive that had several important goals:

Cause greater financial strain on the U.S. by forcing them to either further extend troop and equipment commitments or to withdraw in the areas that they could not hold

Demonstrate the limitations of American military power to the South Vietnamese in hopes of driving a wedge between the two governments

Demonstrate American vulnerability to attack anywhere in Vietnam

Spark a popular uprising in the South, which would lead to either a coalition government or a northern victory

When the Tet Offensive occurred in January 1968, Americans were shocked to see that the war they’d been told was nearly over was suddenly out of control. Though the offensive was a military loss for the Viet Cong and the National Liberation Front, it strongly shifted U.S. public opinion regarding the war. (See Chapter 8 for more on the Tet Offensive.) Americans were dismayed that this type of offensive could happen in a war that they had so thoroughly been led to believe that they were winning. Many began to question whether the war could ever be won. Johnson’s growing credibility gap had laid the foundations for the American public to interpret the Tet Offensive, an American victory on the battlefield, as a negative turning point in the war.

Major newspapers and magazines began running antiwar editorials and urged a withdrawal in the wake of Tet. Even Walter Cronkite, one of the most respected television anchormen in America, expressed doubts that the war was winnable. Johnson’s approval polls, which had hovered near 65 percent before Tet, fell to a 35 percent approval rating. The Great Society Program had been undermined by the financial realities of the war; in 1968 the U.S. was spending approximately $322,000 for each Communist killed in Vietnam, while the War on Poverty was spending only $53 per person.

Johnson’s support had clearly eroded, and on March 31, 1968, President Johnson announced that he wouldn’t run for reelection. The man of great ambition no longer believed the war was winnable.