Moscow, 1400 GMT (1700 Local)

The afternoon meeting in the General Secretary’s office began precisely at 4:00 p.m. The General Secretary had napped for two hours after lunch, as his doctors required, and looked fresh as he presided. Marshal Tikunin, the Defense Minister, had arrived at Domodedovo Airfield in central Moscow at three and had been driven directly to the meeting. As Doryatkin had expected, the marshal had opposed any effort to tweak the Americans’ noses ineffectively, and he had supported Doryatkin’s arguments in favor of pushing Baruni to take the situation in hand and defuse it. Doryatkin had been surprised, however, to hear the old soldier’s vehement arguments that the Russian advisers help the Libyans if the Americans did attack, albeit anonymously. And so a compromise was reached. Baruni would be told in no uncertain terms to control his protégé, Abu Salaam. Soviet advisers would prepare the Libyans for battle as best they could and manage the battle if it occurred. Nevsky thought better of provoking a confrontation, believing he had won half a loaf.

After the meeting adjourned, Doryatkin and Tikunin hurried back to their offices in the Kremlin and Nevsky to his in Dzerzhinsky Square. In all three offices, communiqués were drafted and encoded. The Foreign Ministry sent its cable first, to the Ambassador to Libya, Fyotr Aleksandrovich Timkin, which began:

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

AMBASSADOR ONLY

PRIORITY IMMEDIATE

SEE COL. BARUNI AND PUTITTO HIM IN THE STRONGEST TERMS THAT THE SOVIET UNION VIEWS THE PRESENT SITUATION AT UQBA BEN NAFI WITH ALARM AND DEMANDS. . . .

The Defense Minister’s message was for the senior military adviser in Tripoli, General Koslov:

DEFENSE MIN MOST SECRET

IMMEDIATE PERS GENERAL KOSLOV

IMPERATIVE YOU TAKE CONTROL DEFENSE OPERATIONS UQBA BEN NAFI. IMPERATIVE YOU ESTABLISH INDEPENDENT SOVIET REPEAT SOVIET MANEUVER CAPABILITY WITHIN BASE STRONG ENOUGH TO SEIZE CONTROL OF HOSTAGES IF INSTRUCTED. PROCEED WITH EXTREME POLITICAL CAUTION. . . .

The KGB’s message was the longest and was addressed to the senior KGB officer in the embassy, Colonel Ychengko:

KGB MOST SECRET

IMMEDIATE YCHENGKO ONLY DECODE

REQUIRE YOU IDENTIFY BEST INSTRUMENTS FOR UTMOST KGB LOYALTY WITHIN THIRD DIRECTORATE ATTACHED FORCES UQBA BEN NAFI AND ESTABLISH SECURE COMMUNICATIONS FOR USE KGB ONLY. OPERATION INDEPENDENT SOVARMY MASTERS POSSIBLE. UTMOST CARE. . . .

Each of these messages was sent in a completely different code.