Perceptual awareness in the ancient commentators
Most Neoplatonists were convinced that the perceptual activity of the senses is a conscious activity, including even the reception of primary sense-qualities such as colours and sounds. This means that we cannot perceive anything unless we are aware of the specific impact exerted by the sense-object upon the sense-organ. The commentators can also rely on the doctrine found in Aristotle’s Physics 7.2, according to which what is distinctive of perceptual alterations is that the subject is aware of them.1 The problem with that discussion was that it did not explain why some alterations rather than others involve awareness. Why are we supposed to think that sense-perception implies awareness whereas other forms of qualitative change do not? For this reason, the discussion seemed to leave mysterious the possession by the sense-organs of the capacity to perceive. Moreover, an important part of the awareness involved in sense-perception is that we are aware not only of the specific impact, but also of the perceptual activity of our sensory power. The root of the problem is exposed in Aristotle’s de Anima. In 3.2, Aristotle insists that we do perceive that we perceive. He seems to take it for granted that our perceptual system is capable of grasping its own operations. At the beginning of de Anima 3.2, he presents the following aporia:
Since we perceive that we see and hear, it must either be by sight that one perceives that one sees or by another [sense]. But in that case there will be the same [sense] for sight and the colour which is the subject for sight – so that either there will be two senses for the same thing or {the sense} itself will be the one for itself.
(425b12–16, trans. Hamlyn)2
The distinction between perception and perception of perception – perceptual consciousness – is here taken for granted, and the fact that a subject perceives that he perceives is something that calls for explanation. In principle, the problem posed by Physics 7.2 is now resolved. On the account of the de Anima, in order for the subject to be aware of a perceptual alteration, he has to exercise the full capacity for sense-perception which includes the working of both the particular sense in question and the perceptual system as a whole. It implies that not only are the particular sense-organs altered by their proper objects but that the central sense, located in the heart, is also working. Perception of external sense-objects is not the same as perceptual awareness but, as is clear from Aristotle’s explanation of insensitivity in sleep, it requires it (see de Somno 2.455a33–b1, b8–12). If the controlling sense-organ, and hence the common perceptual power, is not operative, the particular senses will not be capable of getting activated either. Although the organ of touch, for instance, will presumably still have the capacity to be heated and cooled when the subject is asleep, such changes do not produce perception because the subject temporarily lacks the capacity to perceive his perceptions. The possession of this capacity depends not on the condition of the particular sense-organs but on that of the central organ, the heart, which controls the entire process at the level of physiology as well. On the other hand, Aristotle also raises the possibility that it is the same particular sense that is capable of perceiving both its primary objects and the act of perceiving them.
The commentators in late antiquity share Aristotle’s conviction that perception is not the same as perceptual awareness. But that seems to be the only point on which they agree, since – as far as our sources allow us to say – they put forward considerably different theories on the reflexivity of the perceptual system. The main thrust of their arguments was not just the seemingly technical issue of how to apprehend the activity of the senses. At stake was the unity of the soul. If the different kinds of reflexive activities in the soul – such as perceptual awareness and awareness of thinking or feeling – did not have a common root, then some philosophers were afraid that the unity of the self would be broken, since different reflexivities might not comply to a hierarchical structure, with the principle of self-consciousness on the top.
The best start for our discussion might be to turn to a survey we come across in one of the commentaries. The survey forms a part of a commentary on Aristotle’s de Anima book 3 and the manuscripts ascribe it to Philoponus, but the authorship is doubted.3 For convenience, I shall call the commentator Pseudo-Philoponus. He takes Aristotle to deny that the central sense has any activity of its own. Aristotle wants the particular senses to lay hold both of the things subject to them and their own activities too. The visual sense apprehends both the colours; that is, the sense-objects peculiar to it, as well as the act of seeing. He launches harsh criticism at Aristotle for the above assumption. Before doing so, however, he mentions three interpretations on the matter. One of them emphasizes the role of the common sense, the second attributes perceptual awareness to the rational soul, whereas the third ascribes it to the so-called attentive faculty. The commentator’s procedure is all the more important because the original sources containing these explanations are lost.
ALEXANDER OF APHRODISIAS
Of the three views expounded there, one is set forth by Alexander of Aphrodisias.4 In his commentary on the de Anima, he thinks that the five particular senses grasp the sense-objects that are their subjects, and the common sense (koine aisthesis) grasps both the subjects and their activities.5 Although the commentary has not survived to us, we have Alexander’s own de Anima, a kind of rehearsal of Aristotle’s work with some important modifications. Here he makes the same point on perceptual awareness and the argument might also be fairly similar. We read that:
It is by this common sense that we perceive ourselves seeing and hearing and exercising each sense. For one who is seeing perceives himself seeing and one who is hearing perceives himself hearing. For it is not by some other capacity besides [common]6 sense that we perceive ourselves perceiving. For we do not see that we are seeing nor hear that we are hearing, since seeing is not visible, nor hearing audible. Rather, it is the activity of the first, controlling sense faculty which is called “common” by which awareness (synaisthesis) of perceiving accrues to those who perceive.
(de An. 65.2–10)7
Alexander’s argument is quite Aristotelian in its vein.8 If the proper object of sight is colour, then it would be hard to see how it is possible that the visual sense apprehends its own activity too. The activity is not coloured and therefore it cannot be the object of sight. To illustrate the working of the common sense, Alexander used a metaphor that was to exert great influence on the Neoplatonists, beginning with Plotinus (Enn. IV.7[2].6.89). He likens it to the centre of a circle from which the particular senses as radii branch off (63.9–10). The reason why he adopted the new metaphor of the circle may have been to emphasize the multiplicity of sensations and the central role of common sense power in our perceptual system. It also shows that the central sense is not a sum of the particular senses. Rather, it stands apart from the particular senses just as the centre differs from any points on the circumference. Common sense also seems to coordinate the particular senses in so far as it connects them to one another, which leads to some characteristic functions of its own, such as perceiving the common sense-objects (such as size, shape and motion) and the workings of the particular senses.9
In another text (Quaestiones 3.7) attributed to him, however, Alexander – if he is the author – gives a very different account on the same matter.10 The aim of the argument is to show why sense-perception involves perceptual awareness. Unlike Aristotle, then, Alexander does not take it for granted that we perceive that we are perceiving. The argument from the perception of primary sense-objects to perceptual awareness serves to account for this thesis which will be much disputed in later times. He offers three points that deserve attention. First, he refers to Aristotle in saying that sight is capable of perceiving not only colours and coloured things but also the privation of them, for every sense perceives the privation of its objects. It is by sight that we perceive both light and darkness (92.23–7). The author also assumes that Aristotle accepted that the act of seeing itself is in a way coloured. This must be so if seeing comes about when the sense-organ receives the form of the thing seen without the matter that underlies it. As a sign of this he refers to after-images (aisthesis and phantasia); often, when the thing perceived has departed, there still remain behind in the senses certain sensations and images of them (92.27–31). Third, in the final argument, he claims – on Aristotelian grounds (de An. 3.2.425b26–426a4) – that the actuality of the thing perceived and of the sense are one, differing only in account, since a sense at work is constituted by the possession of the form of the thing perceived without its matter, whereas the thing perceived in actuality is nothing but its form being possessed without its matter (92.32–93.23). Its form is possessed by the sense receiving it. According to a general principle of change, formulated in Physics 3.3 (202a21–b5), the change produced by some cause is always in the thing that is changed. Consequently, as a kind of qualitative change, sense-perception takes place in the perceiving subject. Moreover, sense-perception implies perceptual awareness because sense-perception is a reception of sensible forms coming from without. Perceptual awareness comes about when the sense apprehends the sensible forms in itself and, on account of this, fulfils its function as sense. We perceive the change within ourselves. The two processes are one, differing only in account. For it is by receiving the form from the things perceived, which are outside, that we apprehend them, but it is by the sense having the form of the things perceived in itself that perceptual awareness comes about. To take the example of seeing, we see something in virtue of apprehending the perceptible’s form. By apprehending the form the sense of sight sees and at the same time it comes to see itself seeing (93.15–18). On this account, sense-perception is intimately linked to a certain kind of awareness. In sense-perception, we simultaneously apprehend both the thing perceived and the activity of the sense in relation to the thing perceived. Perceptual awareness is tied to the fact that in sense-perception we must be aware of the reception of external influence. Hence the reflexive nature of sense-perception is somehow included in the activity of grasping the primary objects of sense-perception.
How shall we harmonize the two accounts?11 After all, it seems that in the de Anima, Alexander emphasizes the role of common sense power, whereas in Quaestiones 3.7 he derives perceptual awareness from the general nature of sense-perception. My suggestion is that the two accounts are complementary. The Quaestiones offer a general account of how perceptual awareness is possible. The reception of sensible forms requires awareness. Following Aristotle, Alexander assumes that this kind of awareness belongs to the perceptual faculty. It is not the rational faculty that such a task has been assigned to. In the de Anima, Alexander specifies the thesis by pointing out that perceptual awareness comes about by virtue of the activity of the centre of our perceptual system. It may remain unclear as to what arguments led him to dismiss the possibility that the particular senses might be able to grasp the activity of their own. There seem to be two points that could not have been accepted, for different reasons, and they also marked the limits within which Alexander’s argument must have moved. On the one hand, he accepted the Aristotelian thesis that perceptual awareness is the task of the perceptual system. On the other hand, he might have had doubts about the ability of the particular senses to grasp their own activities. Even if the act of seeing is somehow coloured (de An. 92.27–31), there must be a difference between the perceiver and the perceived. The difference is within the perceptual system and lies between the particular sense and the common sense power.
PLUTARCH OF ATHENS
Going back to Pseudo-Philoponus, we find two other approaches. One is by Plutarch of Athens who was the first head of the Athenian school of Neoplatonists. At first sight, Pseudo-Philoponus’ report seems to be puzzling. First, he says that on Plutarch’s view it is the function of the rational soul to know the activities of the senses. This happens by virtue of the inferior part of the rational soul, which is opinion (doxa) (464.23–30: part of Source 29 in Taormina 1989), for opinion, which is the most common and inferior part of the soul, joins the rational to the non-rational. On this account, Plutarch charges a single rational capacity with the task of being aware of perceiving. It turns out very quickly, however, that the claim is badly established. Pseudo-Philoponus relies on some more recent philosophers who took Plutarch to task for making doxa apprehend the activity of the senses. The core of the criticism was that as the inferior part of the rational soul, doxa would not be capable of grasping the operations of the higher rational capacities. If we want a single power responsible for all sorts of awareness, as the critics obviously do, we must find a capacity which has a certain – cognitive – control over all the conscious activities of the soul. Later on, Pseudo-Philoponus himself responds that he has never come across the view that doxa is the centre of awareness in Plutarch. Instead, he connects Plutarch’s position to that of Alexander. Both of them suggested that it is the common sense that has the function of perceiving that we are perceiving.12 Pseudo-Philoponus rejects this by arguing that as a sense, the common sense cannot apprehend activities because these do not fall under the particular senses and the common sense is after all capable of grasping nothing but sensibles. Activities are not of this kind.
At first sight, Plutarch’s explanation of perceptual awareness is ambiguous. The emphasis may not be on the partial issue of how we can perceive that we are perceiving, but on preserving the unity of the human soul. For, as Pseudo-Philoponus points out, doxa cannot be the faculty of apprehending that our senses are at work. Such a kind of reflexive activity must have one source, otherwise the unity of the soul will be in danger. But doxa cannot be this source because it cannot apprehend the activities of higher faculties, such as intellect and discursive reason. It is a general rule that, in the order of the faculties of the soul, the activities of the higher cannot be grasped by the lower. In fact, doxa could perform such a task on itself or on spirit (thymos) and thus also on sense-perception, but is not able to apprehend the activity of the intellect or discursive reason; it is fully disqualified from being the only reflexive activity in the soul. Following this line of argument, we should point to the intellect, the highest capacity in our soul, as the indirect source of perceptual awareness. This would rule out that beasts are aware of the activity of their senses. But Plutarch does not insist on this explanation; instead he also joins Alexander in attributing perceptual awareness to common sense.
What conclusion can we draw here? The most important is that the common sense cannot be entirely distinct from the particular senses. It cannot be a distinct sense over and above the particular senses. If it were distinct altogether Plutarch would have to confront the difficulties he faced in discussing the supposed role of doxa. As a higher, rational capacity doxa cannot be the centre of reflexivity and if we separate the seat of perceptual awareness from sense-perception proper we have to ask for an extra capacity to grasp the activity of this capacity. To illustrate the relation of common sense to particular senses we can thus return to Alexander’s reinterpretation of Aristotle’s simile of the point and limit into the simile of the centre of a circle and its radii. The centre is different from the particular senses but it depends on them. There is no other cognitive source for the common sense power except for the particular senses. They furnish it with the information it shapes further by division and combination.
It is not quite clear what prompted Plutarch to adhere to this double account of perceptual awareness. How to reconcile the two accounts? Perhaps he simply changed his mind. That is certainly a possibility. In that case, we have to say that the change did not exclude the former position from his successors’ minds and, consequently, there were two doxographical traditions on Plutarch’s view on the human soul.13 There may also have been problems in transmission of the text with the result that either the more recent commentators or Pseudo-Philoponus misconstrued Plutarch’s position. Alternatively, one might say that the divergence between the two accounts is not overwhelming. We have to bear in mind that for Iamblichus the human soul is permeated by the intellect in a way that sense-perception itself becomes rational.14 Moreover, at Athens Iamblichus was the greatest authority after Plato.15 If our perceptual system is rational, then the gap between common sense and doxa does not represent the gap between the non-rational and the rational element in us, which thus includes the whole perceptual activity as well.16
PROCLUS AND DAMASCIUS
Let us look at the final group referred to in Pseudo-Philoponus’ doxography (464.30–465.17). The so-called “more recent” commentators criticized Plutarch’s theory and suggested that it is the function of the attentive part (prosektikon) of the rational soul to apprehend the activities of the senses.17 They credited the rational soul with six powers, among them the attentive, the task of which was to stand over what happens in human being and say “I exercised intellect”, “I thought”, “I became spirited”, and so on. In general, this attentive capacity ranges over all the powers of the soul.18 For this reason, it presides over the perceptive power as well, and this is why I am able to say that “I see”, “I hear”, and so on. They insisted on this claim because on their view this was the way to preserve the unity of the human soul. It seems that they held the attentive part responsible for self-consciousness in general, since it is by virtue of this attentive part that we are able to say that “I think” or “I see”. Pseudo-Philoponus does not name the philosophers representing this group but we know that Proclus and Damascius, one of Proclus’ successors at Athens, were of this view.19
In Proclus’ commentary on the Parmenides we find a detailed exposition of the thesis.20 On discussing the conative powers in the soul and using a slightly modified version of the Aristotelian division into appetite, spiritedness and rational choice, he says that there must be a single vital principle which presides over them. Hence perceptual awareness arises not from the perceptual system, but from a rational capacity. To emphasize reflexivity, Proclus uses the term “awareness” (parakolouthein) to maintain that the attentive capacity is following all the other activities and cooperates with them.21 To some extent he could rely on his predecessors, most notably Plotinus.22 Thus perceptual awareness is endowed with two functions. It moves the soul towards all these objects and at the same time enables us to say that “I have appetite”, and so on. The unitary principle is also responsible for the capacity of saying “I am perceiving”, “I am reasoning” and “I will”. It seems that Proclus connects the two functions, which implies that reflexivity of this sort has a guiding force as well. It not only works as a capacity of registering certain kinds of psychic activities but also directs them. Direction can take two forms: either moving the capacities in the right direction so that we desire the right thing, for instance, or moving us, human beings, towards the goals set by the conative powers. In the latter case it would be an extra moving force in us, along with appetite, spiritedness and rational choice. I have not found any evidence in Proclus for such a conception.23 However, the passage may allow for another explanation as well: the attentive capacity seems to check the direction of desires. It is said to give the nod (synepineuein) to desires and live along with them. If the gesture of giving a nod is to be taken at face value then the function of the attentive capacity is to let the various desires aim at the right goal. Awareness is endowed with a controlling function as well, then, which may or may not be efficient in directing desires. The double function of the attentive capacity, not mentioned in Pseudo-Philoponus’ doxography, connects awareness to guidance and, hence, evaluation. The source for evaluation, just as for attention, is the high position of the capacity in the soul. It belongs to the rational capacities. Proclus says that it presides over the sensus communis, and is prior to opinion, desire and rational wish.24 In sum, it is closer to the intellect (nous) that is the transmitter of truth in the soul.
Proclus also lays great emphasis on the singular nature of the attentive capacity. If it were manifold, we would not be able to say that “I desire” and “I perceive”.25 Furthermore, the attentive capacity is not only singular but also partless. This is why in each case it can say “I” and “I am active”. From a Neoplatonic point of view it may be interesting to note that this “I” is not only a bearer of rational capacities. It cannot be identified with intellect or discursive reason (dianoia) since it is also the bearer of sense-perception and appetite. We might say that, for Proclus, sense-perception is a very complex phenomenon, but it still contains elements or stages, such as perception of pleasure and pain, which are clearly not rational.26 Appetite and spiritedness lack such complexity; they only can listen to reason without being rational themselves (see in Ti. 1.250.20; 3.355.14–15). Since the “I” covers both appetite and spiritedness, along with sense-perception and some purely rational capacities, we may conclude that reflexivity is constitutive of the “I”, and since reflexivity extends to non-rational capacities as well, the “I”, too, is intimately related to certain non-rational elements in us. Perceptual awareness does not seem to be essentially different from other reflexive activities; there is no mention made about the possibility that all the first-order activities such as desire and opinion are apprehended in different ways.27
On the other hand, elsewhere Proclus proposed another theory which might contradict the one we find expounded in the Parmenides Commentary. In the commentary on the Timaeus he distinguished four strata of sense-perception, with the highest one being a kind of internal perception (2.83.16–84.5). This is the context where Proclus also mentions synaisthesis. The term has a chequered career, but here it does not seem to me to refer to reflexive self-awareness. Rather, it might be a joint-perception which serves to apprehend motion and time, and as a consequence, to perceive the affections that are produced in the perceiver.28 Hence synaisthesis may refer to something non-conceptual.29 For this reason, it differs from any rational capacity. If we want to clarify the relation between synaisthesis and the activity of the attentive part of the rational soul, there seem to be two marks that are relevant. First, the attentive part is verbal; it says that “I perceive” or “I desire”, whereas synaisthesis is not tied to the usage of words. Second, the attentive part apprehends activities exclusively; it grasps that the senses are working. By contrast, synaisthesis apprehends content as well; it also grasps the affections produced in the perceiver. Perception of motion is linked to perception of affections but is directed both to inward and outward motions. Hence perception of motion is not directed to the perceiving subject as a perceiving subject. Apprehension of the perceiving subject as a perceiving subject is too specific a task for synaisthesis to complete. That can be done by the attentive part solely.
In Damascius’ commentary on the Phaedo, we have explicit references to attention as a separate capacity. The commentary has survived to us in two versions, each devoting a passage to explain the phenomenon (in Phd. 1.269–72; 2.21–2). The explanations are very similar. In both passages, the line of thought starts with a fairly specific question. What is the reason why we do not know, when recollecting, that it is a recollection? It happens many times that recollection comes up as a newly acquired knowledge and we are not aware that we are recollecting. As a matter of fact, it is easier to recollect something than to know that we are recollecting. The latter requires a more specific knowledge. As a consequence, the act of recollection does not involve the awareness that we are recollecting, although it certainly involves the awareness that something is coming up in our mind. We are aware that something goes on in our mind but we cannot specify it; it can be a sort of discovering, thinking of something new, but it equally can be an act of recollecting. The problem is subtle and Damascius tries to solve it with reference to the attentive part of the soul (to prosektikon). Accordingly, we fail to know that we are recollecting because the attentive part does not focus on the activity of recollection. The reason is that attention is easily diversible, since its direction varies constantly. As an awareness, that is, knowledge of the activities of the soul, attention is tied to the subject’s reversion upon oneself, whereas other kinds of knowledge are directed towards external objects.30 One might perhaps say that attention zigzags, which causes an occasional failure to realize that we are recollecting. Beasts also have recollection, which means only that they can recall past memories, not that they have any specific knowledge of the Forms.31 Their memories might pop up again, but they do not reflect on them either. The reason for this lack is that they are devoid of any trace of rationality. They are not endowed with the attentive capacity, not even in a downgraded form.
There are three points to be emphasized here. First, it seems that Damascius distinguishes two levels of attention: at one level we can be aware that we think of something, at the other level we can qualify the activity in question and say that we are recollecting, and not thinking of something new. The diverted focus of attention may only be responsible for the failure at the latter level. Second, unlike Proclus, however, Damascius thought that reflexivity has two sources. The attentive part is directed towards all the cognitive activities only, whereas reflection on desiderative activities requires another activity. It is called syneidos, joint-cognition. We are aware of our feelings, emotions and desires by virtue of a certain joint-cognition. This joint-cognition may not be responsible for the arousal of the various conative activities, since they are raised by memory or synaisthēsis, joint-perception.32 It seems, therefore, that the main shift within the human soul lies between the cognitive and the appetitive capacities, not between the rational and the non-rational ones.33 Third, the division between the two forms of reflection raises the problem of the unity of the reflective capacity. Damascius does not deal with it in the commentary, although it is of crucial importance, since the dual structure of reflexivity endangers the unity of the subject. He might have suggested a derivational structure to make sure that awareness of the appetitive activities depends on the attentive. The problem was clear both to Proclus and Pseudo-Philoponus.
PSEUDO-PHILOPONUS
We need some sort of transition here. Pseudo-Philoponus agrees with all three interpretations to a certain extent and offers a detailed justification for each one.34 His text contains the most elaborated arguments for the prosektikon theory, and against Aristotle’s assumptions. First of all, he fully agrees that there is not a sixth sense of which the task is to come to know that we see or hear. The reason for agreeing with this, however, is not that the same sense is capable of apprehending both its peculiar objects and its own activity. When it comes to the denial of a sixth sense, Aristotle’s explanation in de Anima 3.1 can be accepted. By contrast, the commentator criticizes him bluntly for the claim that it is the same sense that perceives and realizes that it is perceiving. Aristotle attempted to prove the point by saying that sight, for example, does not grasp colour only, but also light and dark, to which the commentator replies that sight apprehends only colour, and it knows others by denial, by their not being colour, and is not affected by them. We come to know our activity in a way which is very different from the way we know things by denial, however.
It is also absurd to say that activity is coloured in any way. Activity is incorporeal and incorporeal entities cannot have colours. Furthermore, Pseudo-Philoponus thinks it is impossible that the same sense should know that it sees. He develops an argument to the effect that, if it can revert to itself (this is what perceptual awareness means to him), the power of perception is both immortal and incorporeal. In order to get to know that it sees, the visual sense should revert to itself after having seen the colour. If, however, it reflects on itself it also has an activity which is separate from matter, which implies that it has a being separate from matter. Therefore it must be both immaterial and incorporeal. Separation is limited, however, since without grasping a perceptible object the activity of perceptual awareness cannot exist. Moreover, the senses are not eternal, since they are tied to bodily organs. Therefore, they cannot revert to themselves. As a consequence, it is the rational part of the human soul to apprehend that we are perceiving. It is the attentive part that has this job.35 The thesis clearly goes against the Aristotelian assumptions, since in the de Anima Aristotle did not envisage the possibility that perceptual awareness might be due to reason. It is not quite clear how to explain the status of the attentive part. Does Pseudo-Philoponus think that it is an independent part or faculty of the rational soul, which might mean that it can be defined without reference to other rational faculties, or is it just a well-described function of reason? It seems as if he tends to favour the first option. He uses the attribute of the “more recent” commentators without any reservation, which implies that he accepted that the attentive power is a part of the rational soul. It has the function of grasping every psychic activity. Perceptual awareness is just one part of its activity.36 It is true that Pseudo-Philoponus uses such terminology very rarely. Indeed, except for this doxographical digression he makes use of the term “attentive” only once (555.12); he says that Plato used to call “intellective cognition” (noera gnōsis) attentive. He must have drawn on some doxographical report, since the term does not occur in Plato’s works, as they have come down to us. Neither is there any passage in the dialogues – to my best knowledge – where some cognate of prosektikon turns up in a similar context. The commentator justifies the claim by saying that if the subject stating “I thought” and the subject stating “I fed” were different, then one may reasonably say that it would be as if I perceived this and you perceived that. It recalls the Trojan Horse model in the Theaetetus. In any case – independently of any historical reliability – in Pseudo-Philoponus’ use, attention seems to be a phenomenon which applies to a broader range of rational activities in the soul, not only to a single one.
Pseudo-Philoponus’ last argument emphasizing the inability of the sense to perceive its own activity is particularly striking when we turn to the texts of fellow philosophers at Athens. Moreover, against the background offered by the conceptions of Proclus and Damascius, it is also interesting to see that other Athenian commentators were of a different view. The commentators were Damascius’ younger contemporaries and their conceptions show internal discrepancies in the school that, in this case, seemed to be an upshot of their diverging allegiance to Iamblichus.
PSEUDO-SIMPLICIUS
We have a commentary on Aristotle’s de Anima that has been attributed to Simplicius by the manuscripts. Doubts have been raised on the authorship, which I will not discuss now. But much in it seems to me to show clearly that the text cannot be by Simplicius, although I am still a little bit puzzled as to whom we have to attribute it to. For convenience, again, I shall call the author “Pseudo-Simplicius”.37 We also possess a work by Priscian of Lydia who paraphrases Theophrastus’ views on the soul and also adds some remarks and corrections which are – as far as we can say with some certainty – based on Iamblichus’ views.
Unlike Pseudo-Philoponus and the “more recent” commentators, Pseudo-Simplicius strongly insists that our perceptual power is capable of apprehending the activities of the soul. On the other hand, he agrees with Pseudo-Philoponus that, properly speaking, reflexivity is the function of the rational soul. But that does not lead him to the conclusion that the perceptual system is not capable of grasping the activity of its own. He gets support from Iamblichus who claims that our rationality penetrates as far as sense-perception.38 He takes it for granted that the perceptual system is endowed with such a capability, and tries to find an explanation for those characteristics. He comes to the conclusion that sense-perception is rational in so far as it can revert to itself. The argument for the thesis is somewhat obscure, although there might be some possibility to reconstruct it, since the following argument reflects the structure of the relevant section in Proclus’ Elements of Theology (167). What is perceiving cognizes itself – this is the starting point emphasizing the conscious nature of sense-perception. For this reason it reverts to itself, which is nothing but a formula expressing awareness. It cannot have bodily characteristics, since every body which has different parts of itself in different places would never be able to turn its attention to itself entirely. There would always be a spatially distinct part taking cognizance of another spatially distinct part. The activity of perceptual awareness is gathered together and becomes undivided, while every body is divided. Thus perceptual awareness belongs to a power, the rational soul, which is entirely independent from the body.39 This line of thought is quite interesting. On the one hand, the commentator does his best to maintain the Aristotelian thesis that perceptual awareness is a function of the perceptual system itself. On the other hand, he uses Iamblichus’ doctrines – and perhaps Iamblichus’ proofs – to argue for the thesis. Unlike Aristotle, he is convinced that sense-perception retains features that characterize the rational faculties. By “rationality”, he may not mean that the content of sense-perception is propositional, but only that the activity of the perceptual system mirrors the activity of the intellect in so far as it is capable of reverting to itself. It is because of this feature that the perceptual system is capable of grasping the activities of its own.40
How does he resolve the particular problem posed by Aristotle’s account? How to describe the mechanism of perceptual awareness in detail? If a sense is to grasp its own activity, then the activity itself should possess the peculiar features which the sense is able to grasp. First, the commentator takes Aristotle to support the claim that the sense is primarily cognitive of its primary object – sight is of colours, hearing is of sounds – but that does not exclude the possibility that it can cognize other things as well, although in a different way. Perception of darkness is a proper case in point (this had already been noted by Aristotle: see de An. 426b31–427a9). In the act of perceiving, the sense is capable of making the judgement even when, though it tries to perceive, there is nothing around to be perceived. We may illuminate this point with the help of a thought experiment. Imagine that we enter a dark room from a sunny place. We do not see anything, although we are pretty sure that our visual sense is working. In this case, we judge by sight that it is dark. We do not see anything, but we can be sure that our visual sense is working in a way; it is trying to perceive something, without success.41 We cannot say that we see. For this reason, our awareness is not of seeing, but of trying to see and failing to do so. This implies that by the act of attempting to perceive we can also judge/discriminate the fact that our senses are working. Hence our senses have a certain kind of independence, since the activity of the senses does not consist of receiving a sensible form only. On trying to expound this, the commentator turns to the analysis of sight, and draws attention to a distinction between two ways of apprehending light (189.19–21). The first happens through the perception of colours; it is when we perceive colours that have light falling on them. Thus we perceive light incidentally. The second happens when we perceive light on its own – when we see the air as it is lit. Perception of darkness is not perceiving in either – direct or indirect – way. On seeing something, sight perceives itself acting, which is due to its rational nature. By seeing nothing, it also has to grasp something, since it is not inactive. We are aware that we do not see anything, but as awareness is always additional to some activity, there must be an activity of which we are aware. This is a kind of perception where the only thing our visual sense perceives is its being at work (perception must have an object). Taken in this way, seeing in darkness might appear a borderline case, but the commentator feels free to generalize the point; each act of perception involves both a perception of a proper object (colour) and a perception of the act of perceiving. This latter is a special kind of grasp, since in many cases – such as the one suggested by the example – perceptual awareness consists in perceiving that the sense is trying to perceive something, unsuccessfully.
To prove the case more forcefully, Pseudo-Simplicius discusses another solution to the problem raised by Aristotle on perceptual awareness (189.28–33). He focuses on the involvement of primary objects of sense-perception in perceptual awareness. Again, take the example of sight. The primary objects of sight are colours. We see things in so far as they are coloured. Seeing, however, as every kind of sense-perception, is a reception of forms without the underlying matter. For this reason the sense itself also, in a way, becomes coloured, as being coloured it can also be the object of seeing, which is of course an actuality. Thus the visual sense perceives itself in the act of perception; that is, in the reception of visual form. The commentator takes Aristotle to apply the term “reception” to signify the functioning of the sense-organ, not to that of the sense itself. Reception of visual form does not mean that the sense itself gets coloured as a result of an affection. The sense actualizes colours, and is not affected by them. It actualizes colours not by producing them, but by discriminating them.42 In order to preserve the general impassibility of human sense-perception (and that of the soul in general),43 the commentator describes the process in which the sense-organ receives the form of the objects. These forms are received by the sense actively; the sense only makes the appropriate discrimination. This is why perceptual awareness is inevitable in the process of sense-perception. The sense grasps its own act of discriminating. This argument is strikingly different from the previous one, since it relied on the extreme case of seeing no colours, whereas the latter is based on the ordinary process of sense-perception, and heavily influenced by Neoplatonic notions.
PRISCIAN OF LYDIA
Like Pseudo-Simplicius, Priscian of Lydia was also against the assumption that a distinct part of the rational soul is responsible for perceptual awareness, and joins those who ascribe it to the perceptual system. The approach in his treatise on Theophrastus’ views on sense-perception and intellect, however, slightly differs from Pseudo-Simplicius in so far as he did not discuss the possibility of perceiving the vain effort of the sense to perceive. In the wake of Iamblichus, he affirms the rational nature of sense-perception.44 The rational nature extends as far as to the particular senses, which gives the ground of his criticism of Theophrastus’ thesis that perceptual awareness is due to the common sense power. He does not see any crucial difference between the particular senses and the common sense, since he regards the latter as a synthesis and concentration of the former. Furthermore, just like Pseudo-Simplicius and many other Neoplatonists, he also insists on the active nature of the sensory power. But we find an interesting shift here, since he says that the individual sense perceives its own activity in a way.45 To see the importance of the modifying clause we have to realize that the particular sense seems to perceive that it is perceiving because it is a part of the perceptual system, or more precisely, because it is connected to the common sense power. It would not be capable of performing such a task on its own.46 Thus Priscian ascribes perceptual awareness to sensus communis. He thinks that, owing to the common power, we are able to perceive that we are perceiving. His emphasis is on the capacity of perceiving both the activity and the inactivity of the senses (22.11–14). It seems paradoxical that a sense can perceive its own inactivity. This Priscian tries to resolve by saying that the common sense power, as it were, transcends its specific activity and inactivity. Hence the sensory power seems to be endowed with a two-stage model of perception: the first stage is directed towards the sensible objects whereas the second apprehends the first. So far, this is a commonplace in the Greek epistemological tradition. The novelty is that there is no such dependence between the two stages that the second would work only if the first works, too. From this point of view it has its own independence. Furthermore, the commentator does not say that the particular sense works even if it does not perceive anything. It is not the effort that is perceived during second-order perception. The common sense power apprehends the inactivity of the particular senses, which means that it apprehends the stillness of the sense.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Parts of the infant version of the paper were delivered in October 2011, in Fribourg, and I am indebted to the audience, especially to Filip Karfík and Martine Nida-Rümelin for important clarifications. I also owe much to Pauliina Remes, Svetla Slaveva-Griffin and the anonymous referee for their insightful remarks. My study was supported by the Hungarian Research Fund (OTKA), project number 104574.
1. See Ph. 244b15, commented on both by Simplicius (in Ph. 1059.23–29) and Philoponus (757.15–20); see the Arabic paraphrase of his in Ph. VII, edited by Abû l-Husayn al-Baṣrî in the first half of the eleventh century, preserved in a Leiden manuscript (MS Leiden Or. 583) and translated into English by Paul Lettinck (1994).
2. The problem was touched upon, very abruptly and without further thoughts, in Plato’s Charmides 167a–169c.
3. The literature abounds: for good summaries, see Charlton (2000: 1–10) and Perkams (2008: 237–9), both opting for Stephanus of Alexandria (floruit 610) as the author.
4. Given the confines of my contribution, his views will not be discussed at length. The only reason I shall talk about him in this context is that his theory of the soul exerted enormous influence on those authors in late antiquity who were thinking about the soul philosophically.
5. According to the report in Pseudo-Philoponus’ in de Anima 3.464.20–23.
6. The word “common” (κοινή) in line 6 has been inserted by Ivo Bruns (1887), the editor of the Greek text, with reference to the medieval Hebrew translation, on which see his Preface xiv–xv. We can follow Accattino & Donini (1996: 234) who reject the inclusion by pointing out that the text is perfectly understandable as it stands in the Greek manuscripts.
7. Translated by Sorabji (2004: 148–9), slightly modified. The account recalls Aristotle’s de Somno 2.455a15–22. Caston (2012: 33) argues that συναίσθησις does not mean self-awareness, although it refers to it; primarily, it has the meaning of “being aware of something while perceiving something else” (ibid.: 34). The examples he adduces concern joint-perception of another object, whereas perceptual awareness implies perception of a mental act.
8. See de An. 3.2.425b12–25, although Alexander is explicit in attributing to the sensus communis the capacity to perceive the activities of the particular senses: see Accattino & Donini (1996: 234).
9. As a late antique parallel to Alexander’s notion, especially in the use of the metaphor of centre and radii, one might be tempted to refer to Themistius. But even if he uses the metaphor in order to clarify the operation of the perceptual system, he does it for different purposes. On his view, a particular sense is able to perceive that it is perceiving, hence there is no need for a common sense power to do that job (his in de An. 83.21–35). He employs the metaphor to emphasize the role of common sense in distinguishing different types of perceptual qualities, such as telling the difference between white and sweet.
10. For the authorship of the treatise, see Bruns (1892: viii), assuming that the text could form a part of a continuous commentary. Sharples (1994: 3 n. 23; 134 n. 270) has found the claim lacking decisive evidence.
11. Caston (2012: 41) doubts if the two accounts can be reconciled. On his view, it is possible that one account was discarded in favour of the other at some later stage. Later on (ibid.: 48–9) he adds that the crucial difference is that in the Quaestiones the explanation of perceptual awareness turns on sameness of perceived object and perceiving subject and as such applies equally to perception and thinking, whereas in the de Anima it turns on the disanalogy in their objects; it applies to thinking only. The disanalogy might be not so sharp if we take into account that forms – intelligible and perceptible alike – must be in the soul in order that a cognitive activity get going, irrespective of their origins.
12. I have argued for an interpretation in Lautner (2000) which I summarize here with small revisions. Of the two accounts attributed to Plutarch, the second seems to me to be the one held by Plutarch, which implies that the “more recent” commentators misinterpreted his position. Blumenthal (1975: 134–6) and Taormina (1989: 91–2) think that both positions were held by Plutarch. They envision some kind of developmental evolution of Plutarch’s view, and assume that he held the former view at the end of his career. There may be a possibility of reconciling the two positions and regard the change as a shift in aspect, but to do so we must have a clearer account of the relation between doxa and sensus communis. If doxa concerns the physical world exclusively, as it seems, and the perceptual system contains propositional elements – seeing not a colour only but also that something is the case – then such a link can be established. In lack of textual evidence, however, I do not think we can say too much about the issue in Plutarch. Furthermore, If Blumenthal and Taormina were right, it is curious that Ps.-Philoponus never came across the doxa theory in Plutarch: see Tornau (2007: 124–5). I owe this point to the anonymous referee.
13. This may imply that the more recent commentators did not use the doxographical material in Alexandria. As the most probable candidates for the title were Proclus and Damascius, the material at Athens might have been different from that in Alexandria from this point of view too.
14. Apud Ps.-Simplicius, in de An. 173.1–7; 187.35–9. In fact, the rational soul pervades human beings to the extent that the human body will be rationally arranged, which, of course, reflects Plato’s views in the Timaeus.
15. Again, Pseudo-Simplicius called him the best judge of the truth (in de An. 1.12–14).
16. These philosophers must have understood this as going very well with the sensus communis business – one power that gathers the information from different modalities. I owe this note to one of my referees.
17. It is unclear who was the first of the Platonists to posit such an independent capacity. Proclus referred to Atticus (in Ti. 2.306.1–2 = frag. 36 [Des Places]), who might have been the earliest exponent of the theory.
18. There is a puzzle here, since the thesis implies that the attentive part stands over the vegetative activities as well. But it is not easy to see how one can be aware of (not know about!) one’s metabolic processes. On the other hand, both Damascius and Proclus employed examples referring to what we call “mental” activities.
19. See Westerink’s extensive note to Damascius’ in Phd. 1.271 (Westerink 1977: 162–3). He mentions that “the more recent” commentators cannot be identified because the references in Proclus and Damascius did not come from commentaries on Aristotle’s work. Perhaps by “commentators” Pseudo-Philoponus did not mean commentators of Aristotle’s de Anima exclusively.
20. 957.28–958.11 Cousin (= 4c10 in Sorabji 2004). The passage does not contain the term προσεκτικόν μέρος, but the function described here fits in with what Pseudo-Philoponus ascribes to the “more recent”commentators. Furthermore, Proclus assumes that we have a fifth rational capacity, called προσοχή, beside intellect, discursive reason, opinion and rational choice (in Phil. Chald. 4.55–6 = 211.1–4 [Des Places]), and the extant remains of his, partial or not, commentary on the Enneads do refer to the προσεκτικὸν μέρος: see § 16 in Westerink (1959: 7).
21. “Following” translates παρακολουθοῦν. Παρακολούθησις and its cognates were used by the commentators to refer to various phenomena. Sometimes they refer to attention (see in Alc. 336.13: εἰ δέ βούλει τοῖς ρήμασι παρακολουθεῖν ἀκριβῶς, see also in Prm. 621.21, 1099.11). Sometimes they allude to consciousness (e.g. in Remp. II 93.10). Elsewhere, however, and especially in the Parmenides Commentary, they refer to following an argument or a process (in Alc. 170.7; in Prm. 676.8, 1071.17, 1088.35, 1099.11), not a state. This is the reason why I think that the term “consciousness”, with all its modern connotations, does not fit perfectly to the field of παρακολούθησις. If “awareness” is a better way of putting it, we should use that term.
22. Plotinus used it in making a distinction between minimal or perceptual consciousness and a second-order awareness of one’s thoughts or actions. See Enn. I.4[46].9.14–25; 10.22–8; IV.3[27].26.40–46. For further references and clarifications, see Remes (2007: 98 n. 7, 112, 119–22). How deep the late Neoplatonists’ knowledge of the Enneads was is an intricate question. Sometimes, as in the case of Philoponus and Damascius, their knowledge seems to be superficial at best, but Proclus wrote a commentary on some texts of Plotinus’ work.
23. In in Prm. (927.15–18) Proclus mentions that attention (προσοχή) is certainly concentrated by enthusiasm (προθυμία), if not raised by it. As enthusiasm seems to be a kind of desire, attention may be subordinate to desire from this point of view.
24. “Rational wish” translates βούλησις, which, in the wake of the Nicomachean Ethics, cannot be regarded as an independent faculty, rather a kind of motivational force which works in accordance with the precepts of reason.
25. It seems as if Proclus were relying on the Trojan Horse model in the Theaetetus.
26. See the fourfold division of sense-perception in in Tim. 2.83.16–84.5.
27. This is not the place to pursue the both general and very nuanced issue of self-reflexion in Proclus, which supposes that the subject must return to itself (ἐπιστροφή), i.e. its origin. This kind of activity is more than simple introspection: see Steel (2004: 237).
28. See also 3.8.28–9.2. I have argued for this point in Lautner (2006: 119–22). Baltzly (2009: 266–71), on the other hand, argues that in order to show that the highest form of sense-perception is given to human beings as well, not only to the cosmos, we have to explain how human sense-perception can meet the requirement of apprehending the sensible essences of things (2.84.17–18). It can only apprehend the activities of the sensible things (1.293.1–5). This is true, and my claim must be modified accordingly. However, the case is still to be clarified, since the apprehension of the cosmos seems to include both sense-perception and opinion (καὶ ὁ κόσμος οὖν ὄψις τέ ἐστιν ὅλος καὶ ὁρατὸν καὶ ὄντωϛ αἰσθήσεικαὶ δόξῃ περιληπτὸν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ αἰσθήσει καὶ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ δόξῃ, 2.84.8–10). Since the goal of opinion is to apprehend substances (ούσίας, 1.248.11–12; 293.3), it seems as if the cosmos, too, perceives substances owing to its opinative element. The expression “whole perception” (ὂλη αἲσθησις 2.84.15–16, emphasis added) might indicate that it is a complex activity containing many partial acts. By describing the δόξα λογική as a kind of sense-perception (2.83.7–8) Proclus perhaps suggests that there is no sharp division between the two capacities.
29. Baltzly (2009: 270) suggests that, by using this term, Proclus wants to say that the cosmos’ perception of itself is “not localized into individual sense-objects or divided into distinct sense-faculties. It is rather more like our awareness of the totality of our own bodies.” I would add that it seems to be tied to opinion intimately, which might indicate that, in the case of the cosmos, the whole process is propositional.
30. I cannot discuss the issue of reversion (ἐπιστροφή) here. It is a central tendency or dynamism of every being, implying a return to its true self, which originates from a higher entity. For a useful discussion, see Gerson (1997a) and Perkams (2008: 285–99); the latter also compares ancient and some more modern notions.
31. Here Damascius treats άνάμνησις in the same way as Aristotle does in Mem. 2. Hence Damascius does not require that this kind of memory must be directed towards any transcendent entity exclusively.
32. In in Phil. 161.5; 163.5, Damascius admits that ἐπιθυμία can be twofold: one comes about by virtue of anticipation through memory, the other by συναίσθησις alone. My suggestion is that συναίσθησις means here a kind of joint-perception, an additional movement of the soul which is linked to sense-perception which gives rise to appetite. It may not mean awareness or consciousness in general.
33. The same distinction between προσεκτικόν and συνειδός is also made by Olympiodorus (in Alc. 23.16–17), but he does not seem to have much to say about the precise working of perceptual awareness.
34. In de Anima 465.31–467.13. Pseudo-Philoponus’ agreement with Proclus is all the more interesting, since it is well known that elsewhere he fiercely criticized his Athenian predecessor.
35. As he spells it out in 466.27–8: ὥστε οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγει Ἀριστοτέλης, ἀλλ’ὡς εἴπομεὡς εἴπομεν τοῦ προσεκτικοῦ ἐστι τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ γινώσκειν τὰς ἐνεργείας τῶν αἰσθήσεων (emphasis added). See also 465.33–4.
36. Here I have to disagree with Bernard’s important analysis stating that “self-awareness is neither self-contained, nor a faculty” (1987: 160), but an ability of the ultimate cognizing faculty, the reason. The disagreement might only be in terminology. Pseudo-Philoponus accepts that the προσεκτικόν is a part of the rational soul, along with other parts. Of course, it depends on other parts and “soul” (the αἰσθητική soul mentioned in 549.29–31, 595.36, 598.10), but that should not be a disqualifying factor. After all, in certain circumstances, discursive reason can also depend on the perceptual power for its content derived from the physical world.
37. For a useful overview on the question of authorship, see Steel (1997b: 103–41) and Perkams (2005; 2008: 150–55), both of whom think that the author is Priscian of Lydia, a fellow philosopher at Athens who joined Simplicius and other Athenian Neoplatonists in the exile to Persia after 529.
38. 173.1–7 and 187.35–9, the latter containing an explicit reference to Iamblichus. This is why he thinks that perceptual consciousness is a specific feature of human beings (187.27).
39. 187.30–36. “Perceptual awareness” translates here συναίσθησις (177.32; 181.23; 188.4; 189.24, 25, 27). It refers to a kind of joint-perception (or simultaneous perception – see Blumenthal 2000). The capacity belongs to the perceptual power, but is rational, as all the perceptual power is. Literally, we perceive that we are perceiving even if this perception, as all the others, is a rational activity. This is the capacity that enables us to perceive that something is good or true (211.11). I. Hadot (1997: 74) understands the term as a kind of “irreflexive conscience”. Certainly, it refers to a kind of awareness, but it must also be somehow reflexive since it is tied to ἐπιστροφή.
40. Hubler (2005: 310) stresses that Pseudo-Simplicius and Pseudo-Philoponus achieved the same general result, since both divorced perceptual awareness from the non-rational soul. This is certainly true in so far as perceptual awareness is a rational activity since it manifests reversion. But the views of Pseudo-Simplicius and Pseudo-Philoponus diverge, since the latter ascribed it to a faculty of the rational soul itself, whereas the former keeps it within the confines of sense-perception.
41. 189.20–28. As the commentator puts it: ώς καί τήν συναίσθησιν οὐχ τῆς όράσεως εἶναι, ἀλλά τῆς πείρας οἷον ἀποτυγχανούσης (emphasis added). This kind of distinction may remind us of Themistius’ distinction in his in de Anima 83.24–5 where he says that we perceive that we are not seeing/hearing anything by the very same sense by which we also perceive that we are seeing/hearing.
42. 189.34: ἀλλ’ ἐνεργεῖ τὰ χρώματα οὐ ποιητικῶς ἡ ὂψις ἀλλά κριτικῶς. Blumenthal (2000: 126 n. 124) takes the term κριτικῶς to refer to the perceptual faculty as making judgements about what happens in the sense-organs. It is not quite clear what kind of judgement is involved here. The opposition of productive and discriminative ways of actualizing may point to an activity through which the sense cannot create impressions but is able to discern different impressions/changes in the sense-organ. The difference may be individual or by type. On the other hand, κριτικῶς was connected to συνετικῶς (166.5, see also 166.17). The primary meaning of the latter term may not be “in a conscious way” but perhaps “comprehensively’, in so far as it refers to a combination of the various perceptual alterations. The ambiguity in the Greek term is mirrored in the English “comprehensively”, to mean both “with understanding” and “in a holistic way”. Discernment and comprehension are the two ways in which the senses work: see also Priscian’s Metaphrasis 7.16.
43. For the Neoplatonists, impassibility of the soul means that the causal processes are always from upwards. The soul cannot be subject to changes caused efficiently by bodily processes. The soul cannot receive πάθη. In sense-perception it means that the sense does not receive anything; it judges the qualitative change in the sense-organ. Plotinus has already emphasized it; see Enn. IV.3[27].3.23, 26.8; IV.4[28].22.30–33; IV.6[41].1.1–2. This has been taken over by the commentators.
44. He does not say this explicitly but it is obvious from the direct connection between sense-perception and λόγος (meaning notion or reason-principle): see e.g. 3.22–3.
45. 22.3–4: ἑκάστῃ πως συναισθήσεται ὃτι αἰσθάνηται. See also I. Hadot (1997: 63–6), who sees here and other passages in Pseudo-Simplicius and Priscianus a transition from σύνεσις to συναίσθησις, which signals a change from an ontological point of view, since συναίσθησις belongs to the perceptual power which is an essentially non-rational faculty. It is difficult to see to what extent sense-perception is rational or non-rational in these commentators. There are explicit statements that it is pervaded by the rational soul, and the perceptual power works with λόγοι.
46. 22.14–20. By contrast, Pseudo-Simplicius seems to accept that the particular sense is capable of perceiving its activity.