Ethics, political theory and aesthetics
From the contemporary point of view, ethics is often centrally concerned with behaviour or conduct. Morality is understood as principles about right or wrong, principles that are effected and govern our life with one another, in a group or society. Further, some theorists today see these principles as being shaped entirely by that same society. There are many profound ways in which ancient philosophy – and Neoplatonism – differ from this picture. First, the whole idea of ethics as some kind of a search for or a collection of principles of moral behaviour may be intrinsically foreign to the ancient philosopher. In antiquity, the emphasis lies in the virtuous character capable of adapting to different circumstances and situations – a view which has, of course, given rise to the contemporary reactionary movement within ethics, virtue ethics. Talk about moral obligations is rare in antiquity, whereas a lot of space is devoted to therapy of emotions and other means of character improvement. Second, in so far as some moral principles are discussed, the search is for principles that would be unqualifiedly true. That is, many ancient philosophers (apart from Cynics and Sceptics and, according to one interpretation, Artistotle) are ethical realists. Neoplatonists are also ethical realists but of a special and radical kind. Goodness is an objective feature of being, a crucial and existing aspect of the metaphysical system, present in different degrees on all its levels, and to be traced all the way to the primary cause, the origin of its derivation, the One. While the relationship of goodness in the sensible realm to the higher kind of goodness it imitates may be tricky (both ontologically and epistemologically), it is only that relationship which ensures that the former truly qualifies as goodness, and not mere apparent goodness. Third, as Stern-Gillet argues forcefully in her “Plotinus on metaphysics and morality” (Chapter 25), to understand Neoplatonic ethical treatises one must let go of the modern and contemporary expectation that ethics centrally deals with how to reconcile an inherently dangerous self-interest (or, better, self-partiality) and other-interest. It does not preoccupy itself with what duties we have to other people and how these are in conflict with our own interests, or how we should minimally treat other people well, in a way that would ensure common good.
In Neoplatonism, the crucial axis is not between the self and the other – rather, it is between the higher and the lower, between the origin of all goodness and the lack of it, between that which is immaterial and that which is the body, as already discussed, at ontological and cosmological levels, by Chiaradonna and Narbonne above respectively in their chapters on “Substance” (Chapter 14) and “Matter and evil in the Neoplatonic tradition” (Chapter 15). The often-called “denigration” of the body in Platonism has to be understood in its proper context. While undoubtedly singular in its emphases, it should also be seen as a continuation of the Classical and Hellenistic discussions on the invulnerability of true happiness and goodness, as a state worth striving for.1 In doing so, it also provides room for further developments within conceptualizing independence, autonomy and freedom.
Collette-Dučić, in his “Plotinus on founding freedom in Ennead VI.8[39]” (Chapter 26), introduces the Neoplatonists’ interest in the concept of human freedom in the larger metaphysical framework of the question about the free will of the One. Again, we will see Plotinus working on both levels at the same time, explicating the freedom of the One in parallel with that of the human individual. As Collette-Dučić points out, Plotinus’ real interest lies in the question of the freedom of individuals, and in showing how that resides in goodness and self-knowledge. Collette-Dučić’s contribution shows us, further, how subtly Plotinus engages in philosophizing with his Stoic predecessors, as well as the extent to which there would seem to be quite a wide agreement concerning the nature of freedom between the two camps. In Adamson’s “Freedom, providence and fate” (Chapter 27) we continue with the same theme and see how one central motivation in Neoplatonic philosophizing is in grounding human freedom in the face of different challenges posed to it. From Plato’s Phaedo and Timaeus onwards, Platonists had struggled to define and limit the causes that they considered mechanistic from such causation that is organized towards a goal, towards goodness. The latter is understood as more crucial because it has more explanatory value for the thing/action caused. In the late ancient period, in which the Stoic discussions on determinism already belonged to at least the advanced philosophical syllabus, the further challenges posed to autonomy were acutely perceived. Adamson’s chapter operates through explicating the ways in which the Neoplatonists divide fate and providence, subjecting the human to the latter but saving her from the former. As Adamson puts it, “autonomy or freedom is compromised not by the absence of multiple options, but by the threat of determination from outside”. And it is precisely the body, and what the embodiment brings with itself, through which human beings encounter external determination.
The question of how deep a hostility all this brings towards the embodied life, its activities and objects, has been the subject of lively discussion. This is the famous question of the extent of otherworldliness and possible ascetism of Neoplatonism.2 It is perhaps fair to say that in the past, the predominant reading underlined the causal primacy, both efficient and teleological, of the immaterial realm and activities connected with that realm, as well as the undeniable hostility shown in the sources as regards bodily objects and beauty, and the embodied activities connected with them. More than vestiges of this approach remain, and rightly so, given the rhetorically powerful passages about the insignificance, ugliness and risky nature of everything connected with the body – the danger of external determination mentioned above. However, it is equally undeniable that a view, with its own textual backing, in which the two aspects of reality are seen in a more balanced relationship is emerging. This interpretative line tries in different ways to explicate why neither spirituality nor belief in the causal predominance of the higher, intelligible level of reality, and ultimately the One, needs to lead to trivialization and turning away from the bodily. Ethical and political themes cannot be considered separated from the metaphysical system governing Neoplatonism as a whole, but when one starts to tease out their implications in these areas, one quickly notes how much more material the sources contain than initially envisioned.
In this volume, the latter interpretative option is testified in three different discussions. First, in “Action, reasoning and the highest good” (Chapter 28), Remes contrasts Plotinus’ more straightforward top-down approach as regards both the explanatory and value hierarchy between intellection and action to the Stoic, Epictetan approach explicated and further elaborated by Simplicius. At least as regards those still progressing in their quest for virtue and knowledge, acting on moral principles is as important as the principles themselves. In fact, putting virtue into action is the reason for which moral principles are learned in the first place. This call to act morally contains two goals the co-suitability of which the Neoplatonists did not see a reason to argue: the improvement of the person’s surroundings, and of her own soul. Because acting improves the state of the agent, through virtuous action the agent further improves her character.
According to a view that has been even more persistent than the one claiming that the Neoplatonists had no ethics to speak of,3 there really is no Neoplatonic political theory. In his “Political theory” (Chapter 29), O’Meara draws on that part of his work which simply proves this view wrong (D. O’Meara 2003, and numerous articles). His studies show that Neoplatonists had a theory of what political science concerns, divided this further into legislative and judicial branches, and theorized over how practical and political reasoning differs from theoretical intellection. The top-down approach is visible in, among other things, their heavy inclination to treat political constitutions through different kinds of ideals (following, of course, already the Kallipolis of Plato’s Republic). Sociability, or friendship, is understood as one imitation and unfolding of the unity present on higher levels of being, and thus, again, not in contrast with care of one’s own virtue or ascent to intelligible origin, but as intimately connected with it.
Concerning aesthetics, the situation has been slightly different. The Neoplatonists have long had a recognized place within aesthetic theory. In many circles within the history of Western philosophy, Plotinus has been credited as the inventor of the idea of this worldly beauty as an imitation or unfolding of a transcendental source (see e.g. Kuisma 2003). While real beauty lies in the intelligible, the sensible objects may transmit some of this beauty by symbolic or mimetic relationship with the origin. In her “Plotinus’ aesthetics: in defence of the lifelike” (Chapter 30), Vassilopoulou situates Plotinus’ remarks about beauty within different approaches in aesthetics. She brings to the fore especially Plotinus’ notion of “lifelikeness”. The role of beauty in art is not simply to reproduce any combination of qualities considered harmonious and hence beautiful. Beauty captures something else, the formative force that not merely organizes, but also moves and governs change, a dynamic presence of the soul in bodies. A good work of art, even one that is two-dimensional and not moving, captures some of this internal power, some of its life. Living things (and lifelike things) are beautiful because they display the activities characteristic of the higher levels, the life of the Soul, the life of the Intellect, as present in the sensible world.
Besides the interrelations with many topics in Part III on metaphysics, this section connects with Part IV as regards especially the ethical implications of psychology visible in Schroeder (Chapter 19) and Aubry (Chapter 20).
NOTES
1. Studies now considered classic are e.g. Nussbaum (1986) and Annas (1993). For Neoplatonism, see also Bussanich (1990).
2. Chapter 25, by Stern-Gillet, offers plenty of references for this discussion.
3. Examined critically, for instance, by Schniewind (2003).