Where there are attributed quotes in the text that are not cited in the notes, they derive from personal interviews.
1. In both public and private comments, McConnell and the director of the CIA, Michael Hayden, noted that the first bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993 came in the first year of the Clinton administration, and 9/11 in the first year of the Bush administration. Whether that was coincidence or part of a strategy of striking when administrations are new is a subject of considerable debate.
2. Remarks by the Director of National Intelligence at the United States Geospatial Intelligence Foundation, October 30, 2008.
3. According to intelligence officials, a number of the reports for the candidates were distilled in part from new National Intelligence Estimates that were being prepared around the same time.
4. Mark Mazzetti, “C.I.A. Chief Says Qaeda Is Extending Its Reach,” The New York Times, November 13, 2008, p. A12.
5. “Hackers and Spending Sprees,” Newsweek, November 5, 2008.
6. A fascinating history of intelligence briefings for presidential candidates can be found on the CIA's website, at https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/cia-briefings-of-presidential-candidates/index.htm.
7. The difference was that Kennedy acknowledged the mistake in the case of Cuba, whereas Bush spent years denying he miscalculated about Iraq. Kennedy ruefully noted later: “If someone comes in to tell me this or that about the minimum wage bill, I have no hesitation in overruling them. But you always assume that the military and intelligence people have some secret skill not available to ordinary mortals.” Quoted in Kurt M. Campbell and James B. Steinberg, Difficult Transitions: Foreign Policy Troubles at the Outset of Presidential Power, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, D.C., 2008, pp. 26-27.
8. Gates resigned from the group when he was appointed Defense Secretary, so he never signed its final report. Fellow members of the commission, however, say they heard no dissent from him about its major conclusions.
1. Some details of the network penetration have been omitted at the request of senior intelligence officials.
2. This account of the description Bush was given is based on interviews with a number of officials who were involved in vetting the intelligence and passing it on to the White House, along with interviews of White House officials. But none directly witnessed the conversation—they heard about it later—and none would agree to be named because of the highly sensitive nature of the intelligence.
3. McCain interview on Face the Nation, January 15, 2006. He repeated versions of the statement several times throughout the presidential campaign.
4. See Seymour Hersh, “Shifting Targets,” The New Yorker, October 8, 2007; Seymour Hersh, “The Redirection,” The New Yorker, March 5, 2007; Seymour Hersh, “The Next Act,” The New Yorker, November 27, 2006; Seymour Hersh, “Last Stand,” The New Yorker, July 10, 2006; and Seymour Hersh, “The Iran Plans,” The New Yorker, April 17, 2006. Hersh also wrote that consideration was being given to use nuclear weapons to wipe out Iran's facilities, an idea dismissed by several top military officials as highly unlikely, in part because conventional weapons could do the trick and in part because it would put the United States in the position of employing nuclear weapons to prevent a nuclear war.
5. Several of the authors of the National Intelligence Estimate on Iran agreed to be interviewed for this chapter. Except as noted later in the chapter, most refused to be named because they remain in their jobs in the intelligence agencies.
6. Lawrence Wright, “The Spymaster,” The New Yorker, January 21, 2008.
7. Author interview with senior intelligence official, December 2007
8. In January 2008, after the NIE was published, Israeli intelligence officials handed a secret dossier to the authors of the report to make the case that the report's authors had underestimated the threat. “A little late and nothing new,” one of the Americans who reviewed it said to me later, dis-missively.
9. Author interview with a senior Israeli official, January 2008.
10. Author interview with a senior intelligence official, December 2007
11. Bush press conference, October 17, 2007.
12. The Iranians were referring, accurately, to Article IV of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, “Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.” Many of the debates about whether the treaty needs to be amended center on this sentence, which creates a loophole for any nation that pursues a civilian program, to renounce the treaty and uses their nuclear material for weapons. In the parlance of nuclear experts, this is called “breakout.”
13. Lawrence Wright, “The Spymaster,” The New Yorker, January 21, 2008.
14. Author interview with former intelligence official, spring 2008.
15. Jim Rutenberg and David E. Sanger, “Overhaul Moves White House Data Center into the Modern Era,” The New York Times, December 19, 2006.
16. Unclassified key judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate entitled, “Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities,” p. 1.
17. Author interview with Thomas Fingar, January 25, 2008.
18. After McConnell told a conference on intelligence analysis in Washington on October 13, 2007, that he planned to reverse the practice of releasing “key judgments” of NIEs, one of his deputies, David R. Shedd, told reporters that McConnell had issued a directive to discourage declassification. “It affects the quality of what's written,” he said. “Spy Chief Makes It Harder to Declassify NIE's,” Washington Post, October 27, 2007
19. David E. Sanger, “Bush Says U.S. Will Not Tolerate Building of Nuclear Arms by Iran,” The New York Times, June 19, 2003.
20. Author interview with a senior Egyptian official, fall 2007
1. Robert Gates, From the Shadows (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).
2. Author interview with Robert Gates, April 22, 2008.
3. Robert Gates, From the Shadows (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).
4. Author interview with Robert Gates, April 22, 2008.
5. “Iran's Strategic Weapons Programmes: A Net Assessment,” International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006, p. 12.
6. “Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A. Q. Khan and the Rise of Proliferation Networks, A Net Assessment,” International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2007
7. John Lancaster and Kamran Khan, “Pakistanis Say Nuclear Scientists Aided Iran,” Washington Post, January 24, 2004.
8. The best description of these meetings appears in Doug Frantz and Catherine Collins's excellent book about Khan and his network, The Nuclear Jihadist (New York: Twelve Books, 2007), p. 154-61.
9. Doug Frantz and Catherine Collins, The Nuclear Jihadist (New York: Twelve Books, 2007), pp. 211-13.
10. The exact nature of the threat has been reported in several different versions, but there are accounts in two excellent books, Steve Coll's Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: Penguin, 2004), 220, and in Doug Frantz and Catherine Collins, The Nuclear Jihadist (New York: Twelve Books, 2007).
11. Interview with Benazir Bhutto for “Nuclear Jihad: Can Terrorists Get the Bomb?” a New York Times/Canadian Broadcasting/Discovery Channel documentary, first broadcast April 20, 2006. My thanks to our producer, Julian Scher, who conducted the interview.
12. Author interview with John McLaughlin, February 2008.
13. Bush made his comments during a meeting with reporters at the White House in February 2007
14. “Leading Conservative Ayatollah Condemns Slaughter of Innocent People,” Financial Times, September 15, 2001.
15. A good discussion of these tensions appears in Barbara Slavin's account of America's ill-fated relationship with Iran, Bitter Friends, Bosom Enemies (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2007), pp. 90-91.
16. I would cite David Kilcullen's work on disaggregating terrorist threats. He wrote a CNAS Solarium paper on the subject and a great article called “Countering Global Insurgency,” available from http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/kilcullen.pdf.
17. The President's State of the Union Address, available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html.
18. Ibid.
19. David E. Sanger, “Bush, Focusing on Terrorism, Says Secure U.S. Is Top Priority,” The New York Times, January 30, 2002, p. 1.
20. Karen DeYoung, Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell (New York: Knopf, 2006).
21. David E. Sanger, “Bush Aides Say Tough Tone Put Foes on Notice,” The New York Times, January 31, 2002, p. 1.
22. Ibid.
23. Michael Slackman, “All Sides in Iran Seize on Bush's Condemnations,” Los Angeles Times, July 20, 2002.
24. Todd S. Purdum and David E. Sanger, “It Was Clinton at Waldorf Instead of Dessert,” The New York Times, February 5, 2002, p. 1.
25. Glenn Kessler, “Front Firms Aided Iran Nuclear Bomb Effort, Sources Say; India and China Said to Provide Materials,” Washington Post, December 19, 2002.
26. National Intelligence Council, “Regional Consequences of Regime Change in Iraq,” ICA 2003-03, p. 18, available on the website of the Senate Intelligence Committee.
27. Nicholas Kristof, “Iran's Proposal for a ‘Grand Bargain,’” NYTimes on the Ground Blog, April 28, 2007.
28. The text of the letter is available from the Inter Press Service News Agency website, at http://ipsnews.net/iranletterfacsimile.pdf
29. Author interview with a senior administration official, July 2008.
30. Author interview with Richard Haass, January 2008.
31. Glenn Kessler, “In 2003, U.S. Spurned Iran's Offer of Dialogue,” Washington Post, June 18, 2006.
32. John Bolton, interview for a PBS Frontline episode, “Showdown with Iran,” http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/showdown/themes/grandbar-gain.html.
33. Joby Warrick, “Iran Given Deadline to Lay Bare Nuclear Program,” Washington Post, September 13, 2003.
34. Nazila Fathi, “Iran Cleric Suggests Nation Quit Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty,” The New York Times, September 20, 2003.
35. See Glenn Frankel and Keith B. Richburg, “Europeans Seek Arms Accord in Tehran; Iran Would Get Aid on Civilian Nuclear Program,” Washington Post, October 21, 2003; and Elaine Sciolino, “Iran Will Allow UN Inspections of Nuclear Sites,” The New York Times, October 22, 2003.
36. David E. Sanger and Steven Weisman, “U.S. and Allies Agree on Steps in Iran Dispute,” The New York Times, March 11, 2005.
37. Author interview with Condoleezza Rice and Stephen J. Hadley, June 2, 2006.
1. This strained credulity. Both before and after Ahmadinejad's talk, American forces were capturing members of the elite Quds Force, part of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, inside Iraq. See David E. Sanger and Michael R. Gordon, “Rice Says Bush Authorized Iranians’ Arrest in Iraq,” The New York Times, January 13, 2007
2. The most detailed public account of the contents of the laptop—though the computer itself is not mentioned—is in the IAEA's report to its board of governors, dated February 22, 2008, and available on www.iaea.org.
3. The first detailed account of the acquisition of the laptop was reported by the author and Bill Broad, and appeared as “The Laptop: Relying on Computer, U.S. Seeks to Prove Iran's Nuclear Aims,” The New York Times, November 13, 2005, p. 1. Carla Anne Robbins wrote an earlier account: “U.S. Gives Briefing on Iranian Missile to Nuclear Agency,” Wall Street Journal, July 27, 2005, p. A3. Both current and retired intelligence officials have since filled in additional details, and the data on the laptop was revisited during the compilation of the National Intelligence Estimate in late 2007 It concluded that although the description of the program contained in the computer was largely accurate, the program was suspended after the laptop left Iran.
4. “The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction: Report to the President of the United States,” March 31, 2005, p. 305. The commission said almost nothing about Iran and North Korea in its unclassified report, but had eleven findings that it included in the classified version.
5. Author interview with John McLaughlin, January 2008.
6. The statement was reported to the author by two senior administration officials during the course of separate interviews.
7. William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, “The Laptop: Relying on Computer, U.S. Seeks to Prove Iran's Nuclear Aims,” The New York Times, November 13, 2005.
8. Presidential news conference, December 18, 2005.
9. Author interviews with senior American officials, June 2006.
10. Much of the account of the American effort to sabotage the Iranian program first appeared in a story with my colleague Bill Broad, whose reporting contributed greatly to our understanding of the American effort. William Broad and David E. Sanger, “In Nuclear Net's Undoing, A Web of Shadowy Deals,” The New York Times, August 25, 2008, p. 1. Souad Mekhennet aided us from Frankfurt, and Uta Harnischfeger from Zurich.
11. Ayande-ye Now, January 6, 2007.
12. Iranian officials talked briefly about the power-supply incident but said they were moving to build their own. All the evidence suggests they have solved the problem, and at the beginning of 2008 they showed IAEA inspectors a second generation of centrifuges—called the P-2—that they were preparing to install in coming years. The P-2, also a Pakistani design, should enable the country to enrich uranium faster, more efficiently, and more reliably. The first detailed explanation of this transition appeared in a German news service, “Iran is bereit für nächsten wichtigen Schritt im Atomporgramm,” APA Online, January 25, 2008.
13. Remarks by Condoleezza Rice at State Department ceremony, April 10, 2008.
1. Elaine Sciolino and William J. Broad, “To Iran and Its Foes, an Indispensable Irritant,” The New York Times, September 17, 2007, p. A1.
2. My thanks to Elaine Sciolino and Bill Broad, who conducted much of the reporting on the Heinonen briefing. Several diplomats who attended the session shared their notes. In addition, David Albright has posted useful details at http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/IAEA_Briefing_ Weaponization.pdf.
3. Ahmadinejad's statement was reported on the Iranian presidency's website on December 5, 2007. It is also quoted in Dennis Ross's excellent paper “Diplomatic Strategies for Dealing with Iran,” included in Iran: Assessing U.S. Strategic Options (Washington, D.C.: Center for a New American Security, June 2008).
4. David E. Sanger, “Why Not a Strike on Iran?” The New York Times, January 22, 2006, p. 1.
5. Robert Gates's Senate hearing for confirmation as secretary of Defense, December 5, 2006.
6. My colleague James Risen documented several of these efforts in State of War: The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush Administration, (New York: Free Press, 2006).
Much of the initial reporting for this chapter was conducted with my Times colleague David Rohde, an extraordinary journalist with a deep understanding of Afghanistan. Our joint project resulted in a lengthy Times investigation, “Losing the Advantage: How the ‘Good War’ in Afghanistan Went Bad,” published in The New York Times on August 12, 2007. Many of the original sources for that story have been re-interviewed, and many others have been added since, to update the account. My thanks to David for his reporting and his advice; the editorial conclusions about the administration's successes and failures are, of course, my own.
1. Author interview with Gen. Dan McNeill, June 16, 2008.
2. M. K. Bhadrakumar, “Afghanistan: Why NATO Cannot Win,” Asia Times, September 30, 2006; Tim Shipman, “US Officials ‘Despair’ at Nato Allies’ Failings in Afghanistan,” The Telegraph, June 22, 2008.
3. I cited Bush's political use of the Afghan war in “At All Bush Rallies, Message Is ‘Freedom Is on the March,’” The New York Times, October 21, 2004, p. A1.
4. Author interview with Lt. Gen. Douglas Lute, June 2008.
5. Adm. Mike Mullen, testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on Security and Stability in Afghanistan: “Status of U.S. Strategy and Operations and the Way Ahead,” December 11, 2007
6. David Rohde and David E. Sanger, “How a ‘Good War’ in Afghanistan Went Bad,” The New York Times, August 12, 2007
7. Ibid.
8. President Bush's speech at the Virginia Military Institute, April 17, 2002.
9. Author interview with James Dobbins, June 7, 2008. Dobbins wrote about the experience in his book After the Taliban (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2008).
10. Author interview with President Bush, January 14, 2001.
11. David Rohde and David E. Sanger, “How a ‘Good War’ in Afghanistan Went Bad,” The New York Times, August 12, 2007
12. Author interview with Condoleezza Rice, April 28, 2003.
13. E-mail exchange with Colin Powell, July 2007
14. David Rohde and David E. Sanger, “How a ‘Good War’ in Afghanistan Went Bad,” The New York Times, August 12, 2007
15. Ibid.
16. James F. Dobbins, After the Taliban (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2008).
17. Author interview with John McLaughlin, June 2007
18. David Rohde and David E. Sanger, “How a ‘Good War’ in Afghanistan Went Bad,” The New York Times, August 12, 2007
19. Ibid.
20. Mark Mazzeti and David Rohde, “Amid U.S. Policy Disputes, Qaeda Grows in Pakistan,” The New York Times, June 30, 2008.
21. David Rohde and David E. Sanger, “How a ‘Good War’ in Afghanistan Went Bad,” The New York Times, August 12, 2007
22. Author interview and e-mail exchange with Lt. Gen. Karl Eikenberry, June 2008.
23. Lt. Gen. Karl Eikenberry's written testimony to the House Armed Services Committee, February 13, 2007.
24. David Rohde and David E. Sanger, “How a ‘Good War’ in Afghanistan Went Bad,” The New York Times, August 12, 2007
25. Ibid.
26. Bush and Musharraf meeting at the White House, February 13, 2002.
27. Douglas Jehl, “A Nation Challenged: Journalists; Pakistan Officials Arrest a Key Suspect in Pearl Kidnapping,” The New York Times, February 13, 2002.
28. Remarks by President Bush and President Musharraf at Camp David, June 24, 2003.
29. David E. Sanger, “Bush Offers Pakistan Aid, but No F-16's,” The New York Times, June 25, 2003.
30. David Rohde and David E. Sanger, “How a ‘Good War’ in Afghanistan Went Bad,” The New York Times, August 12, 2007
1. Author interview with Gen. Dan McNeill, June 16, 2008.
2. Remarks by Secretary Rumsfeld in Kabul, Afghanistan, May 1, 2003.
3. Carlotta Gall, “Warlords Yield to Afghan Leader, Pledging to Hand Over Funds,” The New York Times, May 21, 2003.
4. Linda D. Kozaryn, “U.S. Focus Turns to Afghanistan's Reconstruction,” American Forces Press Service, U.S. Dept. of Defense, January 16, 2003.
5. David Rohde and David E. Sanger, “How a ‘Good War’ in Afghanistan Went Bad,” The New York Times, August 12, 2007.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Mark Mazzeti and David Rohde, “Amid U.S. Policy Disputes, Qaeda Grows in Pakistan,” The New York Times, June 30, 2008.
10. David Rohde and David E. Sanger, “How a ‘Good War’ in Afghanistan Went Bad,” The New York Times, August 12, 2007
11. Mark Mazzeti and David Rohde, “Amid U.S. Policy Disputes, Qaeda Grows in Pakistan,” The New York Times, June 30, 2008.
12. Eric Schmitt and David S. Cloud, “U.S. May Start Pulling Out of Afghanistan Next Spring,” The New York Times, September 14, 2005.
13. David S. Cloud, “Europeans Oppose U.S. Plan for NATO in Afghanistan,” The New York Times, September 13, 2005.
14. Ibid.
15. David Rohde and David E. Sanger, “How a ‘Good War’ in Afghanistan Went Bad,” The New York Times, August 12, 2007
16. Kenneth Katzman, “Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy,” CRS Report RL30588, July 11, 2008, pp. 59-60.
17. David Rohde and David E. Sanger, “How a ‘Good War’ in Afghanistan Went Bad,” The New York Times, August 12, 2007
18. Ibid.
19. Mark Mazzetti and David Rhode, “Amid U.S. Policy Disputes, Qaeda Grows in Pakistan,” The New York Times, June 30, 2008.
20. Carlotta Gall, “Musharraf Pledges to Pursue Qaeda and Taliban Insurgents,” The New York Times, September 8, 2006.
21. Carlotta Gall and Ismail Khan, “Taliban and Allies Tighten Grip in North of Pakistan,” The New York Times, December 11, 2006.
22. Musharraf's interview with Wolf Blitzer of CNN, September 26, 2006.
23. Private dinner meeting at the White House with Bush, Karzai, and Musharraf, September 27, 2006.
24. Mark Mazzetti and David Rohde, “Amid U.S. Policy Disputes, Qaeda Grows in Pakistan,” The New York Times, June 30, 2008.
25. The account of Townsend's meeting is based on interviews with several participants.
26. Carlotta Gall and David E. Sanger, “Civilian Deaths Undermine Allies’ War on Taliban,” The New York Times, May 13, 2007, p. 1.
27. Testimony of Robert Gates before the House Armed Services Committee, December 11, 2007.
28. Author interview with Gen. Dan McNeill, June 16, 2008.
29. Thomas Schweich, “Is Afghanistan a Narco-State?” New York Times Magazine, July 27, 2008.
30. Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, New York: Free Press, 2006, 273-74.
31. Mark Mazzetti and David E. Sanger, “Bush Advisers See a Failed Strategy Against al Qaeda,” The New York Times, July 17, 2007, p. 1.
32. David Rohde and David E. Sanger, “How a ‘Good War’ in Afghanistan Went Bad,” The New York Times, August 12, 2007
33. Ibid.
34. Author interview with David Kilcullen, December 2007
1. Author interview with Khalid Kidwai, April 2008.
2. Khan made his comments to the Associated Press, which ran them in a series of dispatches on July 4, 2008.
3. “Fareed Zakaria's Interview with President Pervez Musharraf,” Newsweek, January 12, 2008.
4. Author interview with Rolf Mowatt-Larrsen, April 2008.
5. Ron Suskind, “The Untold Story of al-Qaeda's Plot to Attack the Subway,” Time, June 19, 2006.
6. Author interview with Adm. Timothy Keating, May 15, 2008.
7. Bush expressed this concern to the author and other reporters in February 2007
8. Tim Weiner, “After an Anguished Phone Call, Clinton Penalizes Pakistanis,” The New York Times, May 29, 1998.
9. Author interview with Pervez Musharraf by the author, September 12, 2005, at the Roosevelt Hotel in New York.
10. Bhutto described her father's insistence on starting the bomb project during an interview in London conducted for a New York Times/Canadian Broadcasting/Discovery Channel documentary, “Nuclear Jihad: Can Terrorists Get the Bomb?”
11. Author interview with Gen. Talat Masood, April 6, 2008, in Islamabad.
12. Ibid.
13. The first detailed story on Mahmood's meeting and the American effort to understand it appeared as part of the first investigations we conducted at the Times about Pakistan's involvement with al Qaeda and the Taliban. See Douglas Frantz, James Risen, and David E. Sanger, “Nuclear Experts in Pakistan May Have Links to al Qaeda,” The New York Times, December 9, 2001, p. A1.
14. Peter Baker, “Pakistani Scientist Who Met Bin Laden Failed Polygraphs, Renewing Suspicions,” Washington Post, March 3, 2002, p. 1.
15. Some of the most detailed accounts of Mahmood's life and adventures, to the extent they are understood, were recounted in David Albright and Holly Higgins, “A Bomb for the Ummah,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 2, 2003. Also, Graham Allison has an account in Nuclear Terrorism: the Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe (New York: Times Books, 2004), pp. 20-24, and Doug Frantz and Catherine Collins explore the issue in The Nuclear Jihadist (New York: Twelve Books, 2007), pp. 263-71.
16. David Albright and Holly Higgins, “A Bomb for the Ummah,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 2, 2003.
17. George Tenet, At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), p. 268.
18. Patrick Tyler, “Powell Suggests Role for Taliban,” The New York Times, October 17, 2001.
19. George Tenet, At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), 265.
20. Ibid.
21. Author interview with Colin Powell, March 18, 2008.
22. Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire (London: Simon and Schuster, 2006).
23. Author interview with Pervez Musharraf in September 2005 for a New York Times/Canadian Broadcasting/Discovery Channel documentary, “Nuclear Jihad: Can Terrorists Get the Bomb?”
24. David E. Sanger, “So, What About Those Nukes?” The New York Times, November 11, 2007, p. 1.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. Author interview with an official who was a member of the delegation.
28. I am indebted to my colleague Bill Broad for explaining the intricacies of PALs systems, and to the guidance of a number of current and former American officials who requested that they not be named.
29. David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “U.S. Secretly Aids Pakistan in Guarding Nuclear Arms,” The New York Times, November 18, 2007
30. Richard Ullman, “The Covert French Connection,” Foreign Policy, no. 75 (Summer 1989).
31. David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “In Nuclear Net's Undoing, A Web of Shadowy Deals,” The New York Times, August 24, 2008.
32. “Nuclear scientist says he confessed to ‘save’ Pakistan,” Agence France-Presse, April 7, 2008.
33. “A. Q. Khan says he confessed to ‘save’ Pakistan,” Daily Times (Islamabad), April 8, 2008, p. 1.
34. The quotes are from a private communication from A. Q. Khan shared with the author.
1. The broad outlines, and some specifics, of Bush's secret decisions about Pakistan are described in this account. A few specific details have been withheld at the request of officials who made a persuasive case that they could compromise ongoing intelligence or military operations.
2. Remarks by Ted Gistaro, National Intelligence Officer for Transnational Threats, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, August 12, 2008, at www.dni.gov/speeches.
3. The reconstruction of what happened that night was put together brilliantly by my colleague Carlotta Gall in “Taliban Gain New Foothold in Afghan City,” The New York Times, August 27, 2008, p. 1.
4. Several intelligence officials confirmed that they had seen intelligence reports in which General Kayani was reported to have described Haqqani in those terms. A senior Pakistani intelligence official used the same term to describe Haqqani to a Times reporter several years ago.
5. Mark Mazzetti and Eric Schmitt, “Pakistanis Aided Attack in Kabul, U.S. Officials Say,” The New York Times, August 1, 2008, p. 1.
6. Dexter Filkins, “The Long Road to Chaos in Pakistan,” The New York Times, Week in Review, September 28, 2008.
7. Mark Mazzetti and Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Study Is Said to Warn of Crisis in Afghanistan,” The New York Times, October 8, 2008, p. 1.
8. Ibid.
1. Author interview with Robert Gates, April 22, 2008.
2. Author interview with Condoleezza Rice, May 8, 2008.
3. Stephen J. Hadley at the editorial board of The New York Times, September 2007
4. Helene Cooper, “Bush Rebuffs Hard-Liners to Ease North Korean Curbs,” The New York Times, June 27, 2008, p. 1.
5. Author interview with a senior administration official, May 30, 2008.
1. Author interview with Adm. Timothy J. Keating, May 15, 2008.
2. For more of these encounters, see “North Korea Asks Investors to Look Beyond Bleakness of Communist Decay,” The New York Times, May 21, 1992.
3. Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry, Preventive Defense: A New Security Strategy for America (Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 1999).
4. Author interview with Jim Steinberg, December 11, 2007.
5. A good summary of the Vulcans’ debate is contained in James Mann, The Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet (New York: Viking, 2004), 277-81.
6. Helene Cooper, “A New Bush Tack on North Korea,” The New York Times, December 7, 2007, p. A1.
7. Notes from conversation with Condoleezza Rice, March 5, 2001.
8. David E. Sanger, “Bush Tells Seoul Talks with North Won't Resume Now,” The New York Times, March 8, 2001, p. 1.
9. Ibid.
10. Khan appeared to have been trying to implicate President Pervez Musharraf in the case, perhaps out of revenge for Khan's house arrest. “Pakistani Says Army Knew Atomic Parts Were Shipped,” The New York Times, July 5, 2008, p. 8.
11. David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “U.S. Concedes Uncertainty on Korean Uranium Effort,” The New York Times, March 1, 2007, p. 1.
12. David E. Sanger, “Administration Divided Over North Korea,” The New York Times, April 21, 2003, p. A15.
13. Author interview with Gen. Richard Myers, April 2006.
14. Chairman Donald H. Rumsfeld, Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, July 15, 1998.
15. Conversation with Stephen Hadley, December 2002.
1. Siegfried S. Hecker, testifying during a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on “Visit to the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center in North Korea,” January 21, 2004.
2. Hecker recounted his experiences in “The Nuclear Crisis in North Korea,” Bridge (Summer 2004). This account is supplemented by his public speeches and two conversations.
3. Sigfried S. Hecker, “The Nuclear Crisis in North Korea,” Bridge (Summer 2004).
4. Author interview with a senior administration official, September 2006.
5. Helene Cooper and Norimitsu Onishi, “Rice Says North Korean Missile Test Would Be a ‘Provocative Act,’” The New York Times, June 20, 2006.
6. Author interview with Adm. Timothy J. Keating, May 15, 2008.
7. Norimitsu Onishi and David E. Sanger, “Missiles Fired by North Korea; Tests Protested,” The New York Times, July 5, 2006.
8. In 2008, Stephen J. Hadley, Bush's national security adviser, gave two speeches that appeared to broaden the policy beyond North Korea.
9. Thom Shanker and Warren Hoge, “Rice Asserts U.S. Plans No Attack on North Korea,” The New York Times, October 11, 2006.
10. Warren Hoge, “Security Council Supports Sanctions on North Korea,” The New York Times, October 15, 2006.
11. Joseph Kahn and Helene Cooper, “North Korea Will Resume Nuclear Talks,” The New York Times, November 1, 2006.
12. Thom Shanker and David E. Sanger, “Making Good on North Korea Vow Will Take Detective Work,” The New York Times, October 13, 2006.
13. David E. Sanger, “For U.S., a Strategic Jolt After North Korea's Test,” The New York Times, October 10, 2006.
14. Author interview with Condoleezza Rice, July 3, 2008.
15. Discussion with Bush, February 2007.
16. Jane Perlez, “Albright Greeted with Fanfare by North Korea,” The New York Times, October 24, 2000.
1. Juliet Macur and David Lague, “China Won't Alter Olympic Torch Path,” The New York Times, March 20, 2008.
2. My thanks to Keith Bradsher, the Times's Hong Kong bureau chief, for assistance on this information.
3. Exact numbers are hard to come by. Data from 2004, from the Guangdong Statistical Yearbook, show that there were 14.9 million factory workers in the province. Overall job growth since then has exceeded 20 percent. That would make the 18 million number, so widely repeated in Guangdong, entirely plausible.
4. Elizabeth C. Economy, “The Great Leap Backward?” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2007
5. Author interview with Bill Amelio, June 23, 2008.
6. For the description of the temples and monasteries of Tibet, I am indebted to one of my research assistants, Laura Stroh, who traveled the region.
7. David Barboza, “Protesting Monks Interrupt a Scripted Press Tour in Tibet,” The New York Times, March 28, 2008, p. A6. The Times account was based on wire and pool reports because the paper was banned from the tour.
8. John F. Burns, “Protests of China Make Olympic Torch Relay an Obstacle Course,” The New York Times, April 7, 2008, p. A12.
9. Andrew Jacobs and Jimmy Wang, “Indignant Chinese Urge Anti-West Boycott over Pro-Tibet Stance,” The New York Times, April 20, 2008, p. A8.
10. The best account of the training of the Sacred Flame Protection Unit appeared in the Times of London. Jane Macartney and Richard Ford, “Unmasked: Chinese Guardians of Olympic Torch,” The Times (London), April 9, 2008.
11. Jim Yardley, “Olympic Torch's Tibet Visit Is Short and Political,” The New York Times, June 22, 2008.
12. James Mann, The China Fantasy: How Our Leaders Explain Away Chinese Repression (New York: Viking, 2007).
13. David E. Sanger, “Democracy, Limited,” The New York Times Book Review, May 18, 2008, p. 20.
1. For a good discussion of the test, see Bruce W MacDonald, “China, Space Weapons and U.S. Security,” Council on Foreign Relations Report No. 38, September 2008.
2. David E. Sanger and Joseph Kahn, “U.S. Officials Try to Interpret China's Silence Over Satellite,” The New York Times, January 22, 2007, p. A3. (Months later, Hadley and other administration officials concluded that the Chinese leadership had been taken by surprise—and surmised that embarrassment may have explained their unwillingness to answer Washington's questions.)
3. United States National Space Policy, August 31, 2006.
4. For more discussion of the reactions of the Chinese, the Russians, and the others to America's technological dominance in the late 1990s, see David E. Sanger, “Agony of Victory: America Finds It's Lonely at the Top,” The New York Times, July 18, 1999, p. 1.
5. Ibid.
6. Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry, “China on the March,” The National Interest, March/April 2007, p. 18.
7. David E. Sanger, “Bush to Outline Doctrine of Striking Foes First,” The New York Times, September 20, 2002.
8. United States National Space Policy, August 31, 2006.
9. For the best unclassified estimates of the Chinese arsenal, see Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2008,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 2008.
10. “China's Strategic Modernization,” Report from the ISAB Task Force. As of October 2008, the report had not yet been published, but was widely distributed.
11. Author interview with Adm. Timothy J. Keating, May 15, 2008.
12. Jim Yardley, “China's Leaders Are Resilient in Face of Change,” The New York Times, August 7, 2008, p. A1.
13. Exact numbers are suspect. See Rick Carew, “China Deals Extend Global Push,” Wall Street Journal, September 26, 2008, p. B4.
14. For further discussion, see David E. Sanger, “China's Rising Need for Oil Is High on the U.S. Agenda,” The New York Times, April 19, 2006, p. A1.
15. Keith Bradsher and David Barboza, “Pollution from Chinese Coal Casts a Global Shadow,” The New York Times, June 11, 2006.
16. David Barboza, “China Reportedly Urged Omitting Pollution-Death Estimates,” The New York Times, July 5, 2007.
17. Joseph Kahn and Mark Landler, “China Grabs West's Smoke-Spewing Factories,” The New York Times, December 21, 2007
1. This description of a nuclear device detonated on the edge of downtown Washington is fictional, but hardly fanciful. It draws heavily on Scenario #1 in “National Planning Scenarios,” a guide created by the Department of Homeland Security in April 2005, and updated since then. That scenario describes the effects of a 10-kiloton, gun-type weapon, with a core of highly enriched uranium smuggled into the United States. The government document posits that it was “stolen from a nuclear facility in another country” and “assembled near a major metropolitan center” inside the United States. In the scenario, the weapon is detonated in a delivery van and casualties run into the hundreds of thousands. The description appearing in this chapter imagines a far smaller, less capable weapon, yielding only 1 kiloton. By way of comparison, the crude device tested by North Korea in October 2006 produced less than a 1-kiloton yield.
2. In the official “National Planning Scenario,” the fuel is also pieced together, and the scenario contained this chilling line: “The latest theft of 5 kilograms will likely be discovered at the next quarterly inventory at the primary facility, but by then the bribed security official, the UA [Universal Adversary] terrorists, and the HEU will be long gone.”
3. Mimi Hall, “2012 Deadline to Scan All Port Cargo Won't Be Met,” USA Today, October 21, 2008.
4. Charles J. Hanley, “Studies: Iraq Costs US $12B Per Month,” Associated Press, March 9, 2008.
5. Hearing of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, “Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: Hard Lessons Learned from Troubled Investments,” September 25, 2008.
6. George W. Bush, “Remarks on New Leadership on National Security,” Washington, D.C., May 23, 2000.
7. Charles B. Curtis, “Preventing Nuclear Terrorism—Our Highest Priority— Isn't,” National Defense University Foundation, May 21, 2008.
8. Remarks by the National Security adviser, Stephen Hadley, to the Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, Palo Alto, California, February 8, 2008.
9. The conference was sponsored by the Preventive Defense Project, a research collaboration of Stanford and Harvard Universities that is run by former defense secretary William J. Perry and Professor Ashton B. Carter. The readings were unclassified but sensitive; the entire discussion was unclassified, but the comments of individual participants could not be directly quoted. The author was one of the participants.
1. This is a fictional scenario, but the infection times and the frailties of the detection systems are real. Some details were described by Jeffrey Stiefel, director, Early Detection Division, BioWatch Program Executive at the Department of Homeland Security, at a Joint CBRN Conference, June 25, 2008.
2. Danzig has written several reports on the threat of bioterrorism. His latest is “Preparing for Catastrophic Bioterrorism: Toward a Long-Term Strategy for Limiting the Risk,” Washington, D.C.: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, May 2008.
3. Margo Nash, “Where Terrorism Meets Optimism,” The New York Times, November 24, 2002.
4. Lawrence M. Wein, Yifan Liu, and Terrance J. Leighton, “HEPA/Vaccine Plan for Indoor Anthrax Remediation,” Emerging Infectious Diseases, vol. 11, No. 1 (January 2005): p. 71.
5. For a good discussion of this debate, see Barton Gellman, Angler: The Cheney Vice Presidency, (New York: Penguin Press, 2008), pp. 343-44.
6. National Security Presidential Directive 33, “Biodefense for the 21st Century,” April 28, 2004.
7. The technology is called LIDAR, for Laser Imaging Detection and Ranging. For a more detailed discussion, see Shane D. Mayor, Paul Benda, Christina E. Murata, and Richard J. Danzig, “LIDARs: A Key Component of Urban Biodefense,” Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science, Vol. 6, No. 1 (2008).
8. Richard Danzig, “Preparing for Catastrophic Bioterrorism,” Washington, D.C.: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, May 2008, p. 18.
9. Lawrence M. Wein, “Neither Snow, Nor Rain, Nor Anthrax…” The New York Times, October 13, 2008.
1. O. Sami Saydjari, “Addressing the Nation's Cyber Security Challenges: Reducing Vulnerabilities Requires Strategic Investment and Immediate Action,” testimony before the House Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity and Science and Technology, April 25, 2007.
2. Interview with Maria Bartiroma, CNBC, October 23, 2006.
3. With McConnell's agreement, Hathaway began to speak publicly in the fall of 2008.
4. Jeanne Meserve, “Sources: Staged Cyber Attack Reveals Vulnerability in Power Grid,” CNN, September 26, 2007. The video is available through CNN's website.
5. Thom Shanker and Eric Schmitt, Firing Leaflets and Electrons, U.S. Wages Information War,” The New York Times, February 23, 2003.
1. Lincoln's protestation was in a letter to Albert G. Hodges on April 4, 1864, and is quoted in David Donald, Lincoln, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), p. 15. Several generations of journalists, historians, and politicians, me included, were fortunate enough to study the American presidency, and particularly Lincoln, in the warmth and wonder of Prof. Donald's lecture hall.
2. Jeff Zeleny, “Obama Weighs Quick Undoing of Bush Policy,” The New York Times, November 9, 2008.
3. Robert Kagan, “The September 12 Paradigm,” Foreign Affairs, September/ October 2008.
4. Barack Obama, The Audacity of Hope, (New York: Crown, 2006).
5. As of Election Day 2008, the total public debt, according to Treasury Department statistics, was about $10.62 trillion. When Bush took office on January 20, 2001, the figure stood at $5.72 trillion.