1. Anca M. Pasca and Anna A. Penn, “The Placenta: The Lost Neuroendocrine Organ,” NeoReviews 11, iss. 2 (2010): e64–e77, doi: 10.1542/neo.11-2-e64.
2. Samuel Yen, “The Placenta as the Third Brain,” Journal of Reproductive Medicine 39, no. 4 (1994): 277–80.
3. Neil K. Kochenour, “Physiology of Normal Labor and Delivery,” lecture, Library.med.utah.edu/kw/human_reprod/lectures/physiology/labor.
4. René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, trans. and ed. John Cottingham, in Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 12.
5. Ibid., 44.
6. René Descartes, quoted in Daniel Garber, Descartes’ Metaphysical Physics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 122.
7. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. C. B. Macpherson (London: Penguin, 1981), 111.
8. Ibid., 115.
9. Ibid.
10. Margaret Cavendish, Observations upon Experimental Philosophy, ed. Eileen O’Neill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 158.
11. Panpsychists include the seventeenth-century philosophers Baruch Spinoza (1632–77) and Gottfried Leibniz (1646–1716), the eighteenth-century English philosopher George Berkeley (1685–1753), the German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860), the nineteenth-century physicist and philosopher Gustav Fechner (1801–87), the physician, philosopher, and physiologist Wilhelm Wundt (1832–1920), the American Pragmatist philosophers Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914) and William James (1842–1910), Alfred North Whitehead (1861–1947), the physicist David Bohm (1917–92), the French philosopher Gilles Deleuze (1925–95), and the contemporary analytical philosopher Galen Strawson (1952–). For an overview of the question, see David Skrbina, Panpsychism in the West (Cambridge, MA: MIT University Press, 2007).
12. Cavendish, Observations upon Experimental Philosophy, 135.
13. Margaret Cavendish, quoted in Anna Battigelli, Margaret Cavendish and the Exiles of the Mind (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky), 101.
14. Denis Diderot, Rameau’s Nephew/D’Alembert’s Dream, trans. Leonard Tancock (London: Penguin, 1976), 181.
15. Denis Didierot, quoted in Michael Moriarty, “Figures of the Unthinkable: Diderot’s Materialist Metaphors,” in The Figural and the Literal: Problems of Language in the History of Science and Philosophy, 1630–1800, ed. Andrew E. Benjamin, Geoffrey N. Cantor, and John R. R. Christie (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1987), 167.
16. Princess Elisabeth to Descartes, June 10, 1643, The Hague, in The Correspondence between René Descartes and Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia, trans. Lisa Shapiro (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 68.
17. Ibid.
18. Giambattista Vico, The New Science: Unabridged Translation of the Third Edition (1744) with the Addition of “Practic of the New Science,” trans. Thomas Goddard Bergin and Max Harold Fisch (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1968), 331.
19. Ibid., 338.
20. Ibid., 311.
21. René Descartes, quoted in Geneviève Rodin-Lewis, Descartes: His Life and Thought, trans. Jane Marie Todd (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995), 6.
22. Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), 10.
23. “Cognitive Behavioral Therapy for Depression,” WebMD, www.webmd.com/depression/guide/cognitive-behavioral-therapy-for-depression.
24. John Searle, Minds, Brains, and Science: 1984 Reith Lectures (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984), 17.
25. Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997), 55.
26. Ibid., 17.
27. Ibid.
28. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, quoted in Eva-Maria Simms, “Goethe, Husserl, and the Crisis of the European Sciences,” Janus Head 8 (2005): 166.
29. Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 3rd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 4.
30. Ibid., 5.
31. Katherine Brooks, “It Turns Out Your Brain Might Be Wired to Enjoy Art, So You Have No Excuses,” The Huffington Post, last modified June 20, 2014 www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/06/20/brain-and-art_n_5513144.html; Megan Erickson, “Is the Human Brain Hardwired for God?” Big Think, bigthink.com/think-tank/is-the-human-brain-hardwired-for-religion; “Male and Female Brains Wired Differently, Scans Reveal,” The Guardian, December 2, 2013.
32. Evelyn Fox Keller, The Mirage of a Space Between Nature and Nurture (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2010), 23.
33. Ibid.
34. See Petter Portim, “Historical Development of the Concept of the Gene,” Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 27, no. 3 (2002): 257–86.
35. “Without the highly structured cellular environment which is itself not constructed by DNA, DNA is inert, relatively unstructured, non-functional and so not ontogenetically meaningful.” Jason Scott Robert, Embryology, Epigenesis and Evolution: Taking Development Seriously (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 52.
36. “We have learned, for instance, that the causal interactions between DNA, proteins, and trait development are so entangled, so dynamic, and so dependent on context that the very question of what genes do no longer makes much sense.” Evelyn Fox Keller, The Mirage of a Space Between Nature and Nurture, 50.
37. Mary Jane West-Eberhard, Developmental Plasticity and Evolution (New York: Oxford University Press), 158.
38. Ibid., vii.
39. C. H. Waddington, “The Basic Ideas of Biology,” in Towards a Theoretical Biology, vol. 1, ed. C. H. Waddington (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1968), 1–32.
40. “By extending Waddington’s epigenetic landscape metaphor . . . we can appreciate that an epigenetic landscape underlies each level of organismal organization.” Heather A. Jamniczky et al., “Rediscovering Waddington in a Post-Genomic Age: Operationalizing Waddington’s Epigenetics Reveals New Ways to Investigate the Generation and Modulation of Phenotypic Variation,” Bioessays 32, iss. 7 (2010): 553–58.
41. Michael Meaney, “Environmental Programming of Stress Responses Through DNA Methylation: Life at the Interface Between a Dynamic Environment and a Fixed Genome,” Dialogues in Clinical Neuroscience 7 (2005): 103–23.
42. François Jacob, The Logic of Life, trans. Betty E. Spillman (New York: Pantheon, 1976), 9.
43. Evelyn Fox Keller, A Feeling for the Organism: The Life and Work of Barbara McClintock (New York: Macmillan, 1984), 6.
44. Siri Hustvedt, “Borderlands,” in American Lives (Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag, 2013), 111–35.
45. John Dowling, The Great Brain Debate: Nature or Nurture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 85.
46. Rick Hanson, Hardwiring Happiness: The Practical Science of Reshaping Your Brain (New York: Harmony, 2013). Although the book’s text is identical, Hanson’s subtitle changed at some point between its publication and June 2015; Hardwiring Happiness acquired the far less bold subtitle The New Brain Science of Contentment, Calm, and Confidence. Whether this was due to criticism of the notion of “reshaping” one’s own brain, I have no idea, but it is a plausible explanation.
47. Laurence Tancredi, Hardwired Behavior: What Neuroscience Reveals About Morality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 29.
48. Ibid.
49. David Derbyshire, “Scientists Discover Moral Compass in the Brain Which Can Be Controlled by Magnets,” The Daily Mail, last modified March 30, 2010, www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-1262074/Scientists-discover-moral-compass-brain-controlled-magnets.html. The article describes a study at MIT. After transcranial magnetic stimulation (a noninvasive stimulus) was applied to the subjects in the study, their moral judgments were altered. See Liane Young et al., “Disruption of the Right Temporoparietal Junction with Transcranial Stimulation Reduces the Role of Beliefs in Moral Judgments,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 107, no.15 (2010): 6753–58.
50. For the role of the temporo-parietal junction in perception and attention, see L. C. Robertson, M. R. Lamb, and R. T. Knight, “Effects of Lesions of Temporo-Parietal Junction on Perceptual and Attentional Processing in Humans,” The Journal of Neuroscience 8 (1988): 3757–69; Johannes Rennig et al., “The Temporo-Parietal Junction Contributes to Global Gestalt Perception—Evidence from Studies in Chess Experts,” Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7 (2013): 513. For RTPJ and memory, see J. J. Todd, D. Fougnie, and R. Marois, “Visual Short-Term Memory Load Suppresses Temporo-Parietal Junction Activity and Induces Inattentional Blindness,” Psychological Science 12 (2005): 965–72. For its role in self-other relations, see Jean Decety and Claus Lamm, “The Role of the Right Temporoparietal Junction in Social Interaction: How Low-level Computational Processes Contribute to Metacognition,” The Neuroscientist 13, no. 6 (2007): 580–93. See also Sophie Sowden and Caroline Catmur, “The Role of the Temporoparietal Junction in the Control of Imitation,” Cerebral Cortex (2013), doi: 10.1093/cercor/bht306. For theory of mind, see R. Saxe and A. Wechsler, “Making Sense of Another Mind: The Role of the Right Temporo-Parietal Junction,” Neuropsychologia 43, no. 10 (2005): 1391–99. In a later paper, however, an author questions whether “theory of mind” can be localized: J. P. Mitchell, “Activity in Right Temporo-Parietal Junction Is Not Selective for Theory of Mind,” Cerebral Cortex 18, no. 2 (2008): 262–71. In hysteria or conversion disorder, there is evidence that the RTPJ is less active or hypoactive; see V. Voon et al., “The Involuntary Nature of Conversion Disorder,” Neurology 74, no. 3 (2010): 223–28. Finally, the temporo-parietal junction has been implicated in out-of-body experiences. It is hypothesized that this experience may be the result of a person’s failure to integrate multiple-sensory information about his or her body state in the TPJ. See O. Blanke and S. Arzy, “The Out of Body Experience: Disturbed Self-Processing at the Temporo-Parietal Junction,” Neuroscientist 11 (2005): 16–24.
51. The role of memory in Broca’s area remains controversial. Some scientists believe it plays a role in working memory and others don’t. See C. J. Fiebach et al., “Revisiting the Role of Broca’s Area in Sentence Processing: Syntactic Processing Versus Syntactic Working Memory,” Human Brain Mapping 24 (2005): 79–91. For its role in music, see L. Fadiga, L. Craighero, and A. D’Ausilio, “Broca’s Area in Language, Action, and Music,” The Neurosciences and Music III—Disorders and Plasticity 1169 (2009): 448–58. See also Ferdinand Binkovski and Giovanni Buccino, “Motor Functions of Broca’s Region,” Brain and Language 89 (2004): 362–69, as well as Emeline Clerget, Aline Winderickx, Luciano Fadiga, and Etienne Olivier, “Role of Broca’s Area in Encoding Sequential Human Actions: A Virtual Lesson Study,” Cognitive Neuroscience and Neuropsychology 20 (2009): 1496–99.
52. John Hughlings Jackson, “On Aphasia and Affections of Speech,” in Brain: A Journal of Neurology 38, ed. Henry Head (New York: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1915), 81.
53. Karl Friston, “Functional and Effective Connectivity: A Review,” Brain Connectivity 1, no. 1 (2011): 13.
54. Aleksandr Romanovich Luria, Higher Cortical Functions in Man, 2nd ed., trans. Basil Haigh (New York: Basic Books, 1966), 20.
55. Ibid.
56. For a recent paper on the subject, see Eve G. Spratt et al., “The Effects of Early Neglect on Cognitive, Language, and Behavioral Functioning in Childhood,” Psychology 3, no. 2 (2012): 175–82.
57. Jonah Lehrer, Proust Was a Neuroscientist (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2007), 140.
58. Ibid., 141.
59. M. Nitsche et al., “Dopaminergic Impact on Neuroplasticity in Humans: The Importance of Balance,” Klinische Neurophysologie 40, doi:1055/s-0029-1216062.
60. See Oliver D. Howes and Shitij Kapur, “The Dopamine Hypothesis of Schizophrenia: Version III—The Final Common Pathway,” Schizophrenia Bulletin 35, no. 3 (2009): 549–62. The authors point out that there is strong evidence that no single gene is involved in schizophrenia, and it has been linked to environmental factors including social isolation: “While further work is clearly needed to investigate the nature and extent of all these possible interactions, the evidence indicates that many disparate, direct and indirect environmental and genetic, factors may lead to dopamine dysfunction and that some occur independently while others interact.” They also write, “Because so much is unknown, it is a given that the hypothesis will be revised as more data become available.” For glutamate research, see Bita Moghaddam and Daniel Javitt, “From Revolution to Evolution: The Glutamate Hypothesis of Schizophrenia and Its Implication for Treatment,” Neuropsychoparamacology 37, no. 1 (2012): 4–15. For serotonin research, see Herbert Y. Meltzer et al., “Serotonin Receptors: Their Key Role in Drugs to Treat Schizophrenia,” Progress in Neuro-Pharmacology and Biological Psychiatry 27, no. 7 (2003): 1159–72. And for a follow-up to suspicions about birth trauma, see P. B. Jones et al., “Schizophrenia as a Long-Term Outcome of Pregnancy, Delivery, and Perinatal Complications: A 28-Year Follow Up of the 1966 North Finland General Population Birth Cohort,” American Journal of Psychiatry 155, no. 3 (1998): 355–64. For the involvement of the insula, see Korey P. Wylie and Jason R. Tregallas, “The Role of the Insula in Schizoprenia,” Schizophrenia Research 123, nos. 2–3 (2010): 93–104. For gray matter loss, see A. Vita et al., “Progressive Loss of Cortical Gray Matter in Schizophrenia: A Meta-Analysis and Meta-Regression of Longitudinal MRI Studies,” Translational Psychiatry 2 (2012), doi: 10.1038/tp.2012.116.
61. Steven Pinker, How the Mind Works (New York: Norton, 2009), 449.
62. Ibid., 448.
63. Steven Pinker, The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature (New York: Viking, 2002), 350.
64. In an interview with The Harvard Crimson, Summers is cited as having said that “the evidence for his speculative hypothesis that biological differences may partially account for this gender gap comes instead from scholars cited in Johnstone Family Professor of Psychology Steven Pinker’s best-selling 2002 book The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature.” Daniel J. Hemel, “Sociologist Cited by Summers Calls His Talk ‘Uninformed,’ ” The Harvard Crimson, January 19, 2005, www.thecrimson.com/article/2005/1/19/sociologist-cited-by-summers-calls-his.
65. Larry Summers, “Remarks at NEBR Conference on Diversifying the Science and Engineering Workforce,” January 14, 2005, www.harvard.edu/president/speeches/summers_2005/nber.php.
66. Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex, vol. 2 (London: John Murray, 1st ed., 1871), 316–17.
67. Angus J. Bateman, “Intrasexual Selection in Drosophila,” Heredity 2 (1948): 363.
68. Ibid., 365.
69. Robert Trivers, “Parental Investment and Sexual Selection,” in Sexual Selection and the Descent of Man: 1871–1971, ed. Bernard Campbell (Chicago: Aldine, 1972): 136–81.
70. Patricia Adair Gowaty, Yong-Kyu Kim, and Wyatt W. Anderson, “No Evidence of Sexual Selection in a Repetition of Bateman’s Classic Study of Drosophila Melanogaster,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (2012): 11740–45, doi: 10.1073/pnas.1207851109. The authors note, “However, bias in the methodology is obvious in that mothers were statistically significantly less often counted as parents than fathers, a biological impossibility in diploid sexual species.”
71. Patricia Adair Gowaty and William C. Bridges, “Behavioral, Demographic, and Environmental Correlates of Extra Pair Copulations in Eastern Bluebirds, Scialia sialis,” Behavioral Ecology 2 (1991): 339–50.
72. Russell Bonduriansky and Ronald J. Brooks, “Male Antler Flies (Protopiophila litigate; Diptera: Piophilidae) Are More Selective Than Females in Mate Choice,” Canadian Journal of Zoology 76 (1998): 1277–85.
73. Elisabet Forsgren, Trond Amundsen, Asa A. Borg, and Jens Bjelvenmark, “Unusually Dynamic Sex Roles in Fish,” Nature 429 (2004): 551–54.
74. Robert R. Warner, D. Ross Robertsen, and Egbert Leigh, Jr., “Sex Change and Sexual Selection: The Reproductive Biology of a Labrid Fish Is Used to Illuminate Theory of Sex Change,” Science 190, no. 4215 (1975): 633–38.
75. Marcel Eens and Rianne Pinxten, “Sex Role Reversal in Vertebrates: Behavioral and Endocrinological Accounts,” Behavioral Processes 51 (2000): 135–47.
76. Sarah Blaffer Hrdy, “Empathy, Polyandry, and the Myth of the Coy Female,” in Feminist Approaches to Science, ed. Ruth Bleier (New York: Pergamon Press, 1986), 137.
77. Sarah Blaffer Hrdy. Mothers and Others: The Evolutionary Origins of Mutual Understanding (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011).
78. Michel Ohmer, “Challenging Sexual Selection Theory: The Baby Became the Bathwater Years Ago, but No One Noticed Until Now,” Discoveries: John S. Knight Institute for Writing in the Disciplines, no. 9 (Spring 2008): 16.
79. Hermann von Helmholtz, “Concerning the Perceptions,” in General Treatise on Physiological Optics (1910), vol. 3, ed. James P. C. Southall (Mineola, NY: Dover, 1962), 5.
80. Peggy Seriès and Aaron Seitz, “Learning What to Expect (in Visual Perception),” Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 24 (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2013.00668. The authors advocate an approach to expectation through Helmholtz’s idea of unconscious inference and Bayesian statistical inference.
81. William Wright, Born That Way: Genes, Behavior, Personality (New York: Knopf, 1998), 80.
82. Genetics and Human Behavior: the Ethical Context (London: Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2002), 41.
83. Héctor González-Pardo and Marino Pérez Alvarez, “Epigenetics and Its Implications for Psychology,” Psicothema 25, no. 1 (2013): 5.
84. Bella English, “Led by the Child Who Simply Knew,” The Boston Globe, December 11, 2011.
85. Myrtle McGraw, “The Experimental Twins,” in Beyond Heredity and Environment: Myrtle McGraw and the Maturation Controversy, ed. Thomas C. Dalton and Victor W. Bergman (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), 110.
86. Myrtle McGraw, “Perspectives of Infancy and Early Childhood,” in Beyond Heredity and Environment, 47.
87. Quoted in Donald A. Dewsbury, “Introduction: The Developmental Psychobiology of Myrtle McGraw,” in Beyond Heredity and Environment, 213.
88. Ibid.
89. Paul Dennis, “Introduction: Johnny and Jimmy and the Maturation Controversy: Popularization, Misunderstanding and Setting the Record Straight,” in Beyond Heredity and Environment, 75.
90. Dr. Langford, quoted in Myrtle McGraw, “Later Development of Children Specially Trained During Infancy: Johnny and Jimmy at School Age,” in Beyond Heredity and Environment, 94.
91. Ibid., 98.
92. Stephen M. Downes, “Heritability,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Summer 2015 edition, ed. Edward N. Zalta, forthcoming, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/heredity/.
93. Jeremy C. Ahouse and Robert Berwick, “Darwin on the Mind: Evolutionary Psychology Is in Fashion—But Is Any of It True?” Boston Review, April/May 1998.
94. Letter to the editor, New York Times, January 1, 2015.
95. Pinker, The Blank Slate, 347.
96. Ibid., 348.
97. Richard Lynn, “Sorry, Men ARE More Brainy than Women (and More Stupid Too!) It’s a Simple Scientific Fact, Says One of Britain’s Top Dons,” Daily Mail, May 8, 2010.
98. Scott H. Liening and Robert A. Josephs, “It Is Not Just About Testosterone: Physiological Mediators and Moderations of Testosterone’s Behavioral Effects,” Social and Personality Compass 4, no. 11 (2010): 983.
99. For these findings, discussion, and numerous other studies, see Stephen Peter Rosen, War and Human Nature (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009): 81–98.
100. David M. Stoff and Robert B. Cairns, ed., Aggression and Violence: Genetic, Neurobiological, and Biosocial Perspective (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1996), 317.
101. Jordan W. Finkelstein et al., “Estrogen or Testosterone Increases Self-Reported Aggressive Behaviors in Hypogonadal Adolescents,” Journal of Endocrinology and Metabolism 82, no. 8 (1997): 2433–38. See also J. Martin Ramirez, “Hormones and Aggression in Childhood,” Aggression and Violent Behaviors 8 (2003): 621–44.
102. Cristoph Eisenegger et al., “Prejudice and Truth About the Effect of Testosterone on Human Bargaining Behavior,” Nature 463 (2010): 356–59. For an account of hormones and their ideological uses in science, see Anne Fausto-Sterling, Myths of Gender: Biological Theories About Men and Women. (New York: Basic Books, 1982). For a critique of sex difference in brain studies, see Rebecca Jordan-Young, Brain Storm: The Flaws in the Science of Sex Differences (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010).
103. Michael Naef, quoted in “Testosterone Does Not Induce Aggression,” University of Zurich News Releases, December 8, 2009.
104. Richard Alleyne, “Testosterone Makes People More Friendly and Reasonable,” The Telegraph, December 9, 2009.
105. Wouter De la Marche et al., “No Aggression in Four-Year-Old Boy with an Androgen-Producing Tumor: Case Report,” Annals of General Psychiatry 4, no. 17 (2005), doi: 1186/1744-859X-4-17.
106. Allan Mazur, “Dominance, Violence and the Neurohormonal Nexus,” in Handbook of Neurosociology, ed. David D. Franks and Jonathan H. Turner (Dordrecht: Springer, 2013), 367.
107. Lee T. Gettler, Thomas W. McDade, Alan B. Feranil, and Christopher W. Kuzawa, “Longitudinal Evidence that Fatherhood Decreases Testosterone in Human Males,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 108, no. 39 (2011): 16194–99.
108. For dopamine release in placebo, see R. de la Fuente Fernández, S. Lidstone, and A. J. Stoessl, “Placebo Effect and Dopamine Release,” Journal of Neural Transmission, Supplementa 70 (2006): 415–18. For sham surgery report, see Raine Sihvonen et al., “Arthroscopic Partial Meniscectomy Versus Sham Surgery for Degenerative Meniscal Tear,” The New England Journal of Medicine 369 (2013): 2515–24.
109. Irving Kirsch and Guy Sapirstein, “Listening to Prozac but Hearing Placebo: A Meta-Analysis of Antidepressant Medication,” Prevention and Treatment 1, article 0002a (2008), doi: 10.1037/1522-3736.1.1.12a.
110. Fabrizio Benedetti, “The Opposite Effects of the Opiate Antagonist Naloxone and the Cholecystokinin Antagonist Proglumide on Placebo Analgesia,” Pain 64, no. 3 (1996): 535–43.
111. Fabrizio Benedetti et al., “Neurobiological Mechanisms of the Placebo Effect,” The Journal of Neuroscience 25, no. 45 (2005): 10390–402.
112. Margaret Cavendish, Philosophical Letters, London (1664), 185–6.
113. Anne Harrington, introduction to The Placebo Effect: An Interdisciplinary Exploration, ed. Anne Harrington (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 5.
114. Robert Ader, “The Role of Conditioning in Pharmacotherapy,” in The Placebo Effect, 138–65.
115. Perpetus C. Ibekwe and Justin U. Achor, “Pyschosocial and Cultural Aspects of Pseudocyesis,” Indian Journal of Psychiatry 50, no. 2 (2008): 112–16.
116. Juan J. Tarin and Antonio Cano, “Endocrinology and Physiology of Pseudocyesis,” Reproductive Biology and Endocrinology 11 (2013): 39.
117. T. Tulandi, R. A. McInnes, and S. Lal, “Altered Pituitary Hormone Secretion in Patients with Pseudocyesis,” Fertility, Sterility 40, no. 5 (1982): 637–41.
118. Deidre Barrett, “Trance-Related Pseudocyesis in a Male,” International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis (1988), doi:10.1080/00207148808410516.
119. Jean-Martin Charcot, quoted in Edward Shorter, From Paralysis to Fatigue: A History of Psychosomatic Illness in the Modern Era (New York: The Free Press, 1992), 194.
120. See Onno Van der Hart and Rutger Horst, “The Dissociation Theory of Pierre Janet,” Journal of Traumatic Stress 2, no. 4 (1989). For another more recent perspective on Janet, see John F. Kihlstrom, “Trauma and Memory Revisited,” in Memory and Emotions: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (New York: Blackwell, 2006), 259–91.
121. P. W. Halligan, B. S. Athwal, D. A. Oakley, and R. S. J. Frackowiak, “The Functional Anatomy of a Hypnotic Paralysis: Implications for Conversion Hysteria,” The Lancet 365 (2005): 986–87.
122. V. Voon, C. Gallea, and M. Hallet, “The Involuntary Nature of Conversion Disorder,” Neurology 74, no. 3 (2010): 223–28.
123. For a summary of findings on physiological differences among personalities that goes back to research in the nineteenth century, see Philip M. Coons, “Psychophysiological Aspects of Multiple Personality Disorder,” Dissociation 1, no. 1 (1998): 47–53. For a more recent description with a case study, see Abnormal Psychology: An Integrative Approach, 7th ed., ed. David Barlow and V. Durand (Stamford, CT: Cengage Learning, 2015), 201–7. For a wholly skeptical position, see H. Merklebach, G. J. Devilly, and E. Rassin, “Alters in Dissociative Identity Disorder: Metaphors or Genuine Entities?” Clinical Psychological Review 22, no. 4 (2002): 481–97.
124. B. Waldvogel and Ulrich A. Strasburger, “Sighted and Blind in One Person: A Case Report and Conclusions on the Psychoneurobiology of Vision,” Nervenarzt 78, no. 11 (2007): 1303–9.
125. Heather Berlin, “The Neural Basis of the Dynamic Unconscious,” Neuropsychoanalysis 13, no. 1 (2011): 5–31.
126. David Morris, “Placebo, Pain, and Belief,” in The Placebo Effect, 202.
127. Margaret Cavendish, quoted in Lisa Walters, Margaret Cavendish (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 95.
128. In The Rise of Embryology, Arthur William Mayer presents an often articulated view, which is that for Aristotle “the male semen” contributes “the immaterial or controlling force in generation” (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1939), 135. Another view is closer to my own understanding of the role of sperm in Generation of Animals. In On Intuition and Discursive Reasoning in Aristotle (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1988), 92 Victor Kal writes, “For this matter, sperm, is not potentially a living body, so that the soul cannot become an actual soul by the combination with sperm. Sperm can only transport the potentially sensitive soul. The sensitive soul does not gain actuality until it has joined what is potentially the body of a living being endowed with sense.”
129. See Feminist Interpretations of Aristotle, ed. Cynthia A. Freeland (University Park: Penn State University Press, 1998). See also Deborah K. W. Modrak, “Aristotle: Women, Deliberation, and Nature,” in Engendering Origins: Critical Feminist Readings in Plato and Aristotle, ed. Bat-Ami Bar On (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 207–22. For a defense of Aristotle’s views on women, see Paul Schollmeier, “Aristotle and Women: Household and Political Roles,” Polis 20, nos. 1–2 (2003): 22–42. To get a flavor of the struggles over Aristotle, see Larry Arnhart, “A Sociobiological Defense of Aristotle’s Sexual Politics,” International Political Science Review 15 (1994): 389–415 and an opposing opinion by James Bernard Murphy, “Aristotle, Feminism, and Biology: A Response to Larry Arnhart,” International Political Science Review 15, no. 4 (1994): 417–26.
130. Aristotle, Generation of Animals, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, vol. 1, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 1146.
131. Ibid.
132. Londa Schiebinger, The Mind Has No Sex: Women in the Origins of Modern Science (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), 41.
133. Henry Beighton, quoted in Schiebinger, 42.
134. Ibid., 44.
135. Paul Broca, quoted in Stephen Jay Gould, “Women’s Brains,” in The Panda’s Thumb (New York: Norton, 1980), 152.
136. Ibid.
137. Pinker, The Blank Slate, 350–51.
138. Edward H. Clarke, Sex in Education: A Fair Chance for Girls (Boston: James R. Osgood and Company, 1875), 11.
139. Donald Symons, The Evolution of Human Sexuality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 27.
140. Pinker, The Blank Slate, 355–56.
141. Janet Shibley Hyde, “The Gender Similarities Hypothesis,” American Psychologist 6, no. 6 (2005): 581–92.
142. David I. Miller and Diane F. Halpern, “The New Science of Cognitive Sex Differences,” Trends in Cognitive Sciences 18, iss. 1 (2014): 37–45.
143. The following is taken from a section on cognitive sex differences in a psychology textbook under the heading “Verbal, Reading and Writing Skills”: “Females consistently score much higher than males on tests of verbal fluency, reading comprehension, spelling, and, especially basic writing skills. Although you rarely read about the ‘gender gap’ in writing skills, researchers Larry Hodges and Amy Newell (1995) have pointed out, ‘The data imply that males are, on average, at a rather profound disadvantage in the performance of this basic skill.’ ” In Don H. Hockenbury and Sandra E. Hockenbury, ed., Psychology (New York: Macmillan, 2005). The same year the textbook was published, Janet Shibley Hyde’s meta-analysis, “The Gender Similarities Hypothesis,” found the difference in language abilities between men and women to be so small, it made no statistical difference.
144. For a paper that found strong effects of prenatal testosterone (T) on spatial skills, see Sheri A. Berenbaum et al., “Early Androgen Effects on Spatial and Mechanical Abilities: Evidence from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia,” Behavioral Neuroscience 126 (2012): 86–96. For a paper that found T effects in spatial rotation but found them also to enhance nonrotation skills, see Carole K. Hooven et al., “The Relationship of Male Testosterone to Components of Mental Rotation,” Neuropsychologia 42 (2004): 782–90. For a paper that found a link between T in puberty and mental rotation, see Eero Vuoksimaa et al., “Pubertal Testosterone Predicts Mental Rotation Performance of Young Adult Males,” Psychoneuroendocrinology 37, no. 11 (2012): 1791–1800. For a careful overview of the data on testosterone, the variable findings, and brain research in general on sex differences, see also Rebecca Jordan-Young’s Brain Storm (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010).
145. David A. Puts et al., “Salivary Testosterone Does Not Predict Mental Rotation Performance in Men or Women,” Hormones and Behavior (2010), doi:10.1016/j.yhbeh.2010.03.005. The authors do not rule out the effects of T at organizational moments of development.
146. R. De List and J. L. Wolford, “Improving Children’s Mental Accuracy with Computer Game Playing,” Journal of Genetic Psychology 163, no. 3 (2002): 272–82.
147. Amanda Kanoy, Sheila Brownlow, and Tiffany F. Sowers, “Can Rewards Obviate Stereotype Threat Effects on Mental Rotation Tasks?” Psychology 3, no. 7 (2012): 542–47; Maryjane Wraga et al., “Stereotype Susceptibility Narrows the Gender Gap in Imagined Self-Rotation Performance,” Psychonomic Bulletin & Review 5, no. 8 (2006): 813–19. Maryjane Wraga et al., “Neural Basis of Stereotype-Induced Shifts in Women’s Mental Rotation Performance,” Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience 2, no. 7 (2007): 12–19; See also, Matthew S. McGlone and Joshua Aronson, “Stereotype Threat, Identity Salience, and Spatial Reasoning,” Journal of Applied Developmental Psychology 27, no. 5 (2006): 486–93.
148. Thomas D. Parsons et al., “Sex Differences in Mental Rotation and Spatial Rotation in a Virtual Environment,” Neuropsychologia 42 (2004): 555–62.
149. See Aljosha C. Neubauer, Sabine Bergner, and Martina Schatz, “Two vs. Three-Dimensional Presentation of Mental Rotation Tasks: Sex Differences and Effects of Training on Performance and Brain Activation,” Intelligence 38, no. 5 (2010): 529–39.
150. Tim Koscik et al., “Sex Differences in Parietal Lobe Morphology: Relationship to Mental Rotation Performance,” Brain and Cognition 69, no. 3 (2009): 451–59.
151. J. Feng, J. Spence, and J. Pratt, “Playing an Action Video Game Reduces Gender Differences in Spatial Cognition,” Psychological Science 10 (2007): 850–55.
152. U. Debamo et al., “Mental Rotation: Effects of Gender, Training and Sleep Consolidation,” PLoS One 8, no. 3 (2013), doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0060296.
153. Moshe Hoffman, Uri Gneezy, and John A. List, “Nurture Affects Gender Differences in Spatial Abilities,” PNAS 108, no. 36 (2011): 14786–88. Drew Bailey, Richard A. Lippa, Marco Del Guidice, Raymond Hames, and Dave C. Geary all signed a letter to PNAS criticizing the methods used by Hoffman and his colleagues: “Sex Differences in Spatial Abilities: Methodological Problems in Hoffman et al.,” PNAS 109, no. 10 (2012), doi: 10.1073/pnas.1114679109.
154. Lewis Carroll, Alice in Wonderland, in The Penguin Complete Lewis Carroll (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1982), 65.
155. Pinker, The Blank Slate, 345.
156. Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, trans. Constance Borde and Sheila Malovany-Chevallier (New York: Vintage, 2011), 46.
157. E. O. Wilson, “Human Decency Is Animal,” The New York Times Magazine, October 12, 1975.
158. David Barash, The Whisperings Within (New York: Harper & Row, 1979), 14.
159. Stanislas Dehaene, Loren Cohen, and José Morais Régine Kolinsky, “Illiterate to Literate: Behavioral and Cerebral Changes Induced by Reading Acquisition,” Nature Reviews Neuroscience 16 (2015): 234–44.
160. Allen Newell and Herbert S. Simon, “Computer Science as Empirical Inquiry: Symbols and Search,” Communications of the Association for Computing Machinery 19, no. 3 (1976): 113–26.
161. Ibid., 113.
162. Karl J. Fink, Goethe’s History of Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 21–25.
163. Arthur Zajonc, “Goethe and the Phenomenological Investigation of Consciousness,” Proceedings from the 1998 Conference Toward a Science of Consciousness III, ed. S. Hameroff, A. Kasniak, and D. Chalmers (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999), 417-28.
164. Michael Ruse, Defining Darwin: Essays on the History and Philosophy of Evolutionary Biology (New York: Prometheus Books, 2009), 57.
165. Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, 30th Anniversary Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 37.
166. Paul E. Griffiths and Eva M. Neumann-Held, “The Many Faces of the Gene,” BioScience 49, no. 8 (1999): 661.
167. Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, 19.
168. Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, vol. 2, trans. E. F. J. Payne (New York: Dover, 1958), 511.
169. Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex, vol. 1 (1871) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 36.
170. Sigmund Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920), The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. 18 ed. and trans. James Strachey (London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1958), 46.
171. Sigmund Freud, Introductory Lectures in Psychoanalysis (1916–17), Standard Edition, vol. 16, 284.
172. Sigmund Freud, New Introductory Lectures in Psychoanalysis (1933), Standard Edition, vol. 22, 95.
173. Mark Solms and Oliver Turnbull, The Brain and the Inner World: An Introduction to the Neuroscience of Subjective Experience (New York: Other Press, 2002); Georg Northoff, Neuropsychoanalysis in Practice: Brain, Self, and Objects (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); R. L. Cathart-Harris and Karl Friston, “The Default Mode, Ego-Functions and Free-Energy: A Neurobiological Account of Freudian Ideas,” Brain 133, no. 4 (2010): 1265–83. Although Solms, Northoff, and Friston all subscribe to what might loosely be called a Freudian model, each of their approaches is different.
174. Mark Solms and Jaak Panksepp, “The Id Knows More than the Ego Admits: Neuropsychoanalytic and Primal Consciousness Perspectives on the Interface Between Affective and Cognitive Neuroscience,” Brain Sciences 2 (2012): 145–75.
175. Elizabeth Grosz, Becoming Undone: Darwinian Reflections on Life, Politics, and Art (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2011), 17.
176. Ibid., 148.
177. Grosz is further informed by the panpsychist naturalism of Gilles Deleuze, who was influenced by Leibniz, Spinoza, Bergson, and Whitehead. Although most poststructuralist thought is opposed to the idea of the natural, Deleuze took a different view. His perspective resists the very idea of things, essences, and subjects as unified beings and instead champions a radical form of process philosophy. Ideas affect prose, and the language of Deleuze mirrors the dynamism of the thought, in which stable definition is itself a problem. Grosz’s prose is similarly elusive. See Gilles Deleuze, The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, trans. Tom Conley (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992). Irigaray’s prose is often ironic, playful, wild, and opaque, an echo of her desire to subvert the Western philosophical tradition. See Luce Irigaray, Speculum of the Other Woman, trans. Gillian C. Gill (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985).
178. For a history of how sexual difference has been understood, see Thomas Laqueur, Making Sex: Body and Gender from the Greeks to Freud (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992).
179. The literature is vast. For a “constructivist” answer to the problem of material bodies, see Judith Butler, Bodies that Matter (London: Routledge, 1993). For diverse views, see Feminist Theory and the Body, ed. Janet Price and Margit Schildrick (New York: Routledge, 1999).
180. Grosz, 149.
181. Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, ix.
182. Richard Dawkins, The Blind Watchmaker (New York: Norton, 1986), 112.
183. Steven Pinker, “Deep Commonalities Between Life and Mind,” in Richard Dawkins: How a Scientist Changed the Way We Think, ed. Alan Grafen and Mark Ridley (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 133.
184. N. Katherine Hayles, How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 53–54.
185. George Boole, quoted in Keith Devlin, Goodbye Descartes: The End of Logic and the Search for a New Cosmology of Mind (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1997), 72.
186. Devlin, 77.
187. Whitehead, 22.
188. Norbert Wiener, The Human Use of Human Beings: Cybernetics and Society (Boston: Da Capo Press, 1950), 102.
189. Ibid., 104.
190. A. M. Schrader, “In Search of a Name: Information Science and Its Conceptual Antecedents,” Library and Information Science Research 6 (1984): 227–71.
191. Tom Stonier, Information and the Internal Structure of the Universe (London: Springer, 1990), 21.
192. Rom Harré, “The Rediscovery of the Human Mind,” Asian Journal of Social Psychology 2, no. 1 (1999): 43–62.
193. Leda Cosmides and John Tooby, “Evolutionary Psychology: A Primer,” Center for Evolutionary Psychology, University of California, Santa Barbara, www.cep.ucsb.edu/primer/html.
194. C. R. Hallpike, On Primitive Society and Other Forbidden Topics (Bloomington, IN: Author House, 2011), 221.
195. Pinker, How the Mind Works, 21.
196. Jerry Fodor, The Mind Doesn’t Work That Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000). In his introduction, Fodor remarks that although he has written favorably about computational theory of mind, “it hadn’t occurred to me that anyone could suppose that it’s a very large part of the truth; still less that it’s within miles of being the whole story about how the mind works.”
197. Steven Pinker, Twitter post, October 16, 2012, 4:36 p.m., http://twitter.com/sapinker.
198. Thomas Nagel, “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” Philosophical Review 83, no. 4 (1974): 435–50.
199. Ibid., 449.
200. See Dan Zahavi, Husserl’s Phenomenology (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003).
201. Georg Northoff, Minding the Brain: A Guide to Philosophy and Neuroscience (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 176.
202. Ladan Shams and Robyn Kim, “Crossmodal Influences on Visual Perception,” Physics of Life Reviews (2010), doi: 10.1016/j.plrev.2010.04.006.
203. For a short encapsulation see L. E. Bahrick and R. Lickliter, “Perceptual Development: Intermodal Perception,” in Encyclopedia of Perception, ed. E. Goldstein (Los Angeles: Sage, 2010), 754–57. For an overview, see David J. Lewkowicz and Robert Lickliter, The Development of Intersensory Perception (New York: Psychology Press, 2013). For synesthesia in infancy, see Daphne Mauer, Laura C. Gibson, and Ferrinne Spector, “Synesthesia in Infants and Very Young Children,” in The Oxford Handbook of Synesthesia, ed. Julia Simner and Edward M. Hubbord (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 46–63.
204. Emily Dickinson, The Complete Poems of Emily Dickinson, ed. Thomas H. Johnson (Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1951), no. 1130, line 3, p. 507; no. 1593, line 3, p. 660; and no. 785, lines 1 and 2, p. 382.
205. For a clearly written paper on brain development and plasticity, see Bryan Kolb and Robbin Gibb, “Brain Plasticity and Behavior in the Developing Brain,” Journal of the Canadian Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry 20, no. 4 (2011): 265–76.
206. K. Sathian and Randall Stilla, “Cross Modal Plasticity of Tactile Perception in Blindness,” Restorative Neurology and Neuroscience 28, no. 2 (2010): 271–81.
207. M. Bedny et al., “Language Processing in the Occipital Cortex of Congenitally Blind Adults,” PNAS 108, no. 11 (2011): 4429–34.
208. Pinker, The Blank Slate, 90. Pinker does not deny plasticity or learning, but he resists articulating what had become a commonplace among most neuroscientists at the time he wrote the book, which is that learning, especially during critical periods of development, does alter or “shape” the brain through synaptic connectivity. Learning and memory also appear to affect nonsynaptic plasticity, modifications in the ion channel in a neuron’s axon, dentrites, and cell body. This by no means suggests that genetic factors aren’t also at work. It seems clear that the problem is one of degree. Too much plasticity in the human cortex in relation to a person’s learning threatens to dismantle the innate modules hypothesis of evolutionary psychology.
209. Jaak Panksepp and Jules Panksepp, “The Seven Sins of Evolutionary Psychology,” Evolution and Cognition 6, no. 2 (2000): 111.
210. Ibid.
211. For recent views in interaction linguistics, see New Adventures in Language and Interaction, ed. Jürgen Streeck (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2010).
212. Michael Tomasello, “Language Is Not an Instinct,” review of Steven Pinker’s The Language Instinct, Cognitive Development 10 (1995): 131–56.
213. Andrew Hodges, Alan Turing: The Enigma (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014), 137.
214. Ibid.
215. A. M. Turing, “Computing Machinery and Intelligence,” Mind: A Quarterly Review of Psychology and Philosophy 59 (1950): 460.
216. A. M. Turing, “Intelligent Machinery,” in Alan Turing: His Work and Impact, ed. S. Barry Cooper and Jan van Leeuwen (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2013), 511.
217. Ibid.
218. Sigmund Freud, Project for a Scientific Psychology (1895), Standard Edition, vol. 1, 295.
219. Walter Pitts and Warren McCulloch, “A Logical Calculus of the Ideas Immanent in Nervous Activity,” The Bulletin of Mathematical Biophysics 5 (1943): 115–33.
220. Ibid., 115.
221. Warren McCulloch, quoted in Gualtiero Piccinini, “The First Computational Theory of Mind and Brain: A Close Look at McCulloch and Pitts ‘Logical Calculus of Ideas Immanent in Nervous Activity,’ ” Synthese 141 (2004): 181.
222. James A. Anderson, An Introduction to Neural Networks (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), 51.
223. Walter J. Freeman and Rafael Núñez, “Reclaiming Cognition: The Primacy of Action, Intention, and Emotion,” introduction to a special issue, Journal of Consciousness Studies 6, nos. 11–12 (1999): xvi.
224. Piccinini, 206.
225. Karl Friston has proposed a new computational model of the brain based on a free energy principle (which he views as parallel to Freud’s dynamics of energy in his model of mind) and Bayesian inference, via Helmholtz’s unconscious inference. The brain in this model is a predictive and conservative (energy-saving) organ. It functions according to “priors”—earlier perceptions. Some have greeted this model with enthusiasm because it has a completeness few other models have and has the rigor that only mathematical calculation can offer. Whether this will lead to a new “logical calculus” for the brain or not is unknown. See Peter Freed, “Research Digest,” Neuropsychoanalysis 12, no. 1 (2010): 103–4.
226. Karl H. Pribram, “A Century of Progress?” in Neuroscience of the Mind: On the Centennial of Freud’s Project for a Scientific Psychology, ed. Robert M. Bilder and F. Frank Le Fever; Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 843 (1998): 11–19.
227. I ran across the following statement at the end of a blog on Karl Friston’s ideas and their debt to Freud. It is just one person’s view, of course, but it provides a possible insight into the lasting fury about Freud’s thought: “Would it not be better to allow Freud’s terrible theory to just fade away? Do we really need to have people struggle with the myth that they have a sex crazed monster living in the cellar of their minds?” Janet Kwasniak, Thoughts on Thought: A Blog on Consciousness, September 10, 2010.
228. Margaret Boden, Mind as Machine: A History of Cognitive Science, vol. 1 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006), 198.
229. John von Neumann, “The General and Logical Theory of Automata,” in Cerebral Mechanisms of Behavior: The Hixon Symposium, ed. Lloyd A. Jeffress (New York: Wiley & Sons, 1951), 1–14.
230. Robert Herrick, “Upon Prue, His Maid,” in The Norton Anthology of Poetry: Shorter Edition, ed. Arthur M. Eastman (New York: Norton, 1970), 116.
231. Peter beim Graben and James Wright, “From McCulloch-Pitts Neurons Toward Biology,” Bulletin of Mathematical Biology 73, iss. 2 (2011): 263.
232. Walter Pitts, quoted in Elizabeth Wilson, Affect & Artificial Intelligence (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2010), 118.
233. There is a lot written about cybernetics, systems theory, and chaos theory in complex systems in books, papers, and websites, with subjects ranging from corporations to psychology to tourism. For a clear brief description, see Vladimir G. Ivancevic and Tijana T. Ivancevic, ed., Computational Mind: A Complex Dynamics Perspective (Berlin: Springer, 2007), 115–18.
234. Keith Franklin and William M. Ramsey, ed., The Cambridge Book of Artificial Intelligence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 336–37.
235. Hubert L. Dreyfus, introduction to the MIT edition, What Computers Still Can’t Do: A Critique of Artificial Reason (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), ix.
236. David Deutsch, “Creative Blocks: The Very Laws of Physics Imply that Artificial Intelligence Must Be Possible. What’s Holding Us Up?” Aeon: Creative Blocks, October 3, 2012, aeon.co/magazine/technology/david-deutsch-artificial-intelligence/.
237. Turing, “Computing Machinery and Intelligence,” 450.
238. Deutsch, “Creative Blocks.”
239. John Searle, “Is the Brain a Digital Computer?” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 64, no. 3 (1990): 21–37. Please note that I have avoided retelling Searle’s Chinese room argument. I have read it so many times, have read objections to it so many times, that I am tired of it. I am more impressed with his critique in this essay.
240. Dreyfus, xi–xii.
241. Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post Critical Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), 264.
242. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962), 146.
243. Damasio, Descartes’ Error, 248.
244. Antonio Damasio, Self Comes to Mind: Constructing the Conscious Brain (New York: Pantheon Books, 2010), 45.
245. Ibid.
246. Leonid Perlovsky, Ross Deming, and Roman Ilin, Emotional Cognitive Neural Algorithms with Engineering Applications: Dynamic Logic; From Vague to Crisp (Berlin: Springer, 2011), 4–5. There are a growing number of scientists and philosophers who do not regard emotion as a “cognitive” function. Emotion as cognitive is founded on the appraisal theory of emotion. For a lucid refutation of the appraisal theory, see Jesse Prinz, Beyond Human Nature: How Culture and Experience Shape the Human Mind (New York: Norton, 2012), 242–47.
247. Craig Delancey, Passionate Engines: What Emotions Reveal About the Mind and Artificial Intelligence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 207.
248. Rodney Brooks, “Intelligence Without Reason,” prepared for Computers and Thought, IJCAI-91, research for MIT Artificial Intelligence Laboratory (1991), 15. Brooks argues, “Only through a physical grounding can any internal symbolic system find a place to bottom out, and give meaning to the processing going on within the system.”
249. Ibid., 17.
250. Rodney Brooks, “Intelligence Without Representation,” Artificial Intelligence 47, iss. 1–3 (1991): 139–59.
251. Rodney Brooks, Flesh and Machines: How Robots Will Change Us (New York: Pantheon Books, 2003), 159.
252. Brooks, quoted in Joseph Guinto, “Machine Man: Rodney Brooks,” Boston Magazine, November 2014, www.bostonmagazine.com/news/article/2014/10/18/rodney-brooks-robotics.
253. Brooks, Flesh and Machines, 158.
254. Ibid., 156.
255. Ibid., 5.
256. Cynthia L. Breazeal, Designing Sociable Robots (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002), 27–37.
257. Ibid., xiii.
258. Breazeal subscribes to the appraisal theory of emotions. She admits that Kismet is not conscious and has no subjective feelings and no pattern of physiological activity. It does have “a parameter that maps to arousal level,” which she calls a simple “correlate to autonomic nervous system activity” (Ibid., 112). The correlate remains startlingly distant from a human autonomic nervous system, however.
259. Ibid., 5.
260. Ruth Feldman et al., “Mother and Infant Coordinate Heart Rhythms Through Episodes of Interaction Synchrony,” Infant Behavior and Development 34 (2011): 574.
261. Breazeal, 234.
262. Wilson, Affect and Artificial Intelligence, 53.
263. Claudia Dreifus, “A Conversation with Cynthia Breazeal: A Passion to Build a Better Robot, One with Social Skills and a Smile,” The New York Times, June 10, 2003.
264. David Gelernter, “Dream Logic, the Internet and Artificial Thought,” Edge Foundation, June 22, 2010, https://edge.org/conversation/dream-logic-the-internet-and-artificial-thought.
265. Ibid.
266. Niels Bohr, quoted in Werner Heisenberg, Physics and Beyond, trans. Arnold Pomerans (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), 48.
267. John L. Heilbron, “The Mind That Created the Bohr Atom,” Seminaire Poincaré 17 (2013): 48.
268. Søren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments, vol. 1, ed. and trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), 11.
269. Ibid., 282.
270. Niels Bohr, quoted in Heilbron, 38.
271. Ibid.
272. Ibid., 49.
273. Werner Heisenberg, Physics and Philosophy: The Revolution in Modern Science (New York: Harper & Row, 1958), 109.
274. Evelyn Fox Keller discusses Turing’s model and its legacy: “Turing’s foray into biology was of immense importance for the study of chemical systems, for the development of the mathematics of dynamical systems, even for many problems in physics. But not, it would seem, for developmental biology.” She goes on to say, however, that a rapprochement between mathematical and biological science would arrive later. See Evelyn Fox Keller, Making Sense of Life: Explaining Biological Development with Models, Metaphors, and Machines (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 90–108.
275. A. M. Turing, “The Chemical Basis of Morphogenesis,” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, Series B, Biological Sciences 237, no. 641 (1952): 37.
276. Heisenberg, Physics and Philosophy, 58.
277. William W, Lytton, From Computer to Brain: Foundations of Computational Neuroscience (New York: Springer, 2002), 88.
278. For a clear explanation of how junk DNA is not junk, see Stephen S. Hall, “Hidden Treasures in Junk DNA,” Scientific American 307, iss. 4 (2012).
279. Jonathan Swift, The Poems of Jonathan Swift, vol. 2 (Chiswick: Press of C. Whittingham, 1822), 86–90.
280. Bernard de Fontenelle, quoted in Evelyn Fox Keller, “Secrets of God, Nature and Life,” in The Gender and Science Reader, ed. Muriel Lederman and Ingrid Bartsch (London: Routledge, 2001), 106.
281. R. Howard Block, “Medieval Misogyny,” in Misogyny, Misandry, and Misanthropy, ed. R. Howard Block and Frances Ferguson (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 11.
282. Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966), 6.
283. Ibid., 121.
284. Ray Kurzweil, The Singularity Is Near (New York: Penguin, 2006).
285. David Chalmers, “The Singularity: A Philosophical Analysis,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 17, nos. 9–10 (2010): 9.
286. David Pearce, “The Hedonistic Imperative,” 1995, www.hedweb.com/hedab.htm.
287. Jeffrey L. Lacasse and Jonathan Leo, “Serotonin and Depression: A Disconnect Between Advertisements and the Scientific Literature,” PLoS, November 8, 2005, doi: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0020392.
288. Hans Moravec, Mind Children: The Future of Robot and Human Intelligence (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988), 1.
289. “Gelernter, Kurzweil Debate Machine Consciousness,” transcript by MIT Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory. December 6, 2006, www.kurzweilai.net.
290. Hans Moravec, “The Rise of the Robots: The Future of Artificial Intelligence,” Scientific American, March 23, 2009, 124.
291. Leon Trotsky, Literature and Revolution (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2005), 207.
292. Donna Haraway, “A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century,” in Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature (New York: Routledge, 1991), 149–81.
293. Steven Weinberg, “Sokal’s Hoax,” in Facing Up (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), 150. In his essay “The Boundaries of Scientific Knowledge” in the same collection, Weinberg addresses the conundrums of consciousness but argues, “All these problems may eventually be solved without supposing that life or consciousness plays any role in the fundamental laws of nature or initial conditions,” p. 81. Another physicist takes a different view. See Richard Conn Henry, “The Mental Universe,” Nature 436, no. 7 (2005): 29.
294. René Descartes, Discourse on Method, in Essential Works of Descartes, trans. Lowell Bair (New York: Bantam Books, 1961), 12.
295. Virginia Woolf, To the Lighthouse (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1955), 38.
296. David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, book 1, part 4, section 5 (Cleveland: Meridian Books, 1962), 289.
297. Merleau-Ponty, The Structure of Behavior, trans. Alden L. Fisher (Boston: Beacon Press, 1963), 188.
298. Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, trans. Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer (New York: Zone Books, 1988), 21.
299. Simone Weil, Lectures on Philosophy, trans. Hugh Price (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 31–32.
300. James J. Gibson, The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception (New York: Psychology Press, 2015), 119–36. Gibson also advocated the idea of “direct perception,” perception that is not aided by inference, memories, or representations but is essentially unmediated. It is not hard to understand why this is controversial. The debates on this subject are ongoing and often about degrees of immediacy. One need not accept direct perception, however, to be interested in the idea of affordance. See Harold S. Jenkins, “Gibson’s ‘Affordances’: Evolution of a Pivotal Concept,” Journal of Scientific Psychology (December 2008): 34–45.
301. Weil, Lectures, 32.
302. Vico, The New Science, 313.
303. Ibid., 129.
304. Ibid., 215.
305. Andreas K. Engel, Pascal Fries, and Wolf Singer, “Dynamic Predictions: Oscillations and Synchrony in Top-Down Processing,” Nature Reviews Neuroscience 2 (2001): 704–16.
306. Humberto Maturana, “Biology of Language: Epistemology of Reality,” in Psychology and Biology of Language and Thought: Essays in Honor of Eric Lenneberg, ed. George A. Miller and Elizabeth Lenneberg (New York: Academic Press, 1978), 61.
307. Humberto R. Maturana and Francisco J. Varela, Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1980), 121.
308. Francisco J. Varela, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch, The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and the Human Experience (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993), 217.
309. Francisco Varela, quoted in David Rudrauf et al., “From Autopoiesis to Neurophenomenology: Francisco Varela’s Exploration of the Biophysics of Being,” Biological Research 36 (2003): 38.
310. Ibid., 39–40.
311. Gerald Edelman, Second Nature: Brain Science and Human Knowledge (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006), 87.
312. Ibid.
313. Francisco Varela and Jonathan Shear, “First Person Methodologies: What, Why, and How,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 6, nos. 2–3 (1999): 1–14.
314. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 3.
315. Michael L. Slepian, Max Weisbuch, Nicholas O. Rule, and Nalini Ambady, “Tough and Tender: Embodied Categorization of Gender,” Psychological Science 22, no. 1 (2011): 26–28.
316. Michael Slepian, Nicholas O. Rule, and Nalini Ambady, “Proprioception and Person Perception: Politicians and Professors,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 38, no. 12 (2012): 1621–28.
317. Simon Lacey, Randall Stilla, and K. Sathian, “Metaphorically Feeling: Comprehending Textural Metaphors Activates Somatosensory Cortex,” Brain and Language 120, no. 3 (2012): 416–21.
318. Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi, The Phenomenological Mind: An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science (London: Routledge, 2008), 49.
319. William James, “Reflex Action and Theism,” in The Will to Believe: And Other Essays in Popular Philosophy (New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 2005), 92.
320. William James, Psychology: Briefer Course (Cambridge: MA: Harvard University Press, 1984), 11.
321. John Dewey, “The Problem of Logical Subject Matter,” from Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (1938), in The Essential Dewey: Ethics, Logic, Psychology, ed. Larry Hickman and Thomas M. Alexander (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), 166.
322. David Bohm, quoted in B. V. Sreekantan, “Reality and Consciousness: Is Quantum Biology the Future of Life Sciences?” in Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Consciousness and the Self, ed. Sangeetha Menon, Anindya Sinha, and B. V. Sreekantan (New Delhi: Springer, 2014), 276.
323. Andy Clark, “Embodiment: From Fish to Fantasy” (1999), www.philosophy.ed.ac.uk/people/clark/pubs/TICSEmbodiment.pdf. See also Andy Clark, Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension (Oxford University Press, 2008).
324. Andy Clark and David Chalmers, “The Extended Mind,” Analysis 58, no. 1 (1998): 7–19.
325. For various views, see Dorothea Olkowski and Gail Weiss, ed., Feminist Interpretations of Merleau-Ponty (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2006).
326. John Dewey, Art as Experience (1934), in John Dewey: The Later Works 1925–53, vol. 10 (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1987), 271.
327. Edith Stein, On the Problem of Empathy, in The Collected Works of Edith Stein, vol. 3, trans. Waltraut Stein (Washington, D.C.: ICS Publications, 1989), 56–89.
328. Karl Groos, The Play of Man, trans. Elizabeth L. Baldwin (New York: Appleton, 1898), 361–406.
329. Vernon Lee and C. Anstruther-Thomson, “Anthropomorphic Aesthetics,” in Beauty and Ugliness and Other Studies in Psychological Aesthetics (London: John Lane, 1912), 19.
330. Massimo Ammaniti and Vittorio Gallese, The Birth of Intersubjectivity: Psychodynamics, Neurobiology, and the Self (New York: Norton, 2014), 4.
331. Ibid., 24.
332. Ibid.
333. Gallese believes that some rudimentary mirror system is innate. See Vittorio Gallese et al., “Mirror Neuron Forum,” Perspectives on Psychological Science 6, no. 4 (2011): 369–407. For discussion on mirror systems as innate or learned and a view counter to Gallese’s, see Lindsay M. Overman and V. S. Ramachandran, “Reflections on the Mirror Neuron System: Their Evolutionary Functions Beyond Motor Representation,” in Mirror Neuron Systems: The Role of Mirroring in Social Cognition (New York: Springer, 2009), 39–62. See also Marco Iacoboni, “Imitation, Empathy, and Mirror Neurons,” Annual Psychological Review 60 (2009): 653–70.
334. J. Haueisen and T. R. Knösche, “Involuntary Motor Activity in Pianists Evoked by Music Perception,” Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 13 (2001): 786–91.
335. See Jaime A. Pineda, ed., The Role of Mirroring Processes in Social Cognition (San Diego, CA: Springer, 2009).
336. See Stephen Salloway and Paul Malloy, ed., The Neuropsychiatry of Limbic and Subcortical Disorders (Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric Press, 1997), 15.
337. Onno van der Hart, Annemieke van Dijke, Maarten van Son, and Kathy Steele, “Somatoform Dissociation in Traumatized World War I Combat Soldiers: A Neglected Heritage,” Journal of Trauma and Dissociation 1, no. 4 (2001): 33–66.
338. Paul Ekman, “Basic Emotions,” in Handbook of Cognition and Emotion, ed. T. Dalgleish and M. Power (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1999), 45–60.
339. Rachel E. Jack, Olivier G .B. Garrod, and Philippe G. Schyns, “Dynamic Facial Expressions of Emotion Transmit an Evolving Hierarchy of Signals Over Time,” Current Biology 24, no. 2 (2014): 187–92.
340. For an argument against six basic emotions, see Prinz, Beyond Human Nature, 241–66.
341. Jaak Panksepp, Affective Neuroscience: The Foundations of Human and Animal Emotions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 261–79.
342. Daniel N. Stern, The Interpersonal World of the Infant: A View from Psychoanalysis and Developmental Psychology (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 54.
343. Susanne Langer, Problems of Art: Ten Philosophical Lectures (New York: Charles Scribner & Sons, 1957), 15.
344. Freud, “Instincts and Their Vicissitudes” (1915), Standard Edition, vol. 14, 118.
345. Antonio Damasio, “The Somatic Marker Hypothesis and the Possible Functions of the Prefrontal Cortex,” Philosophical Transcript of the Royal Society London B 351 (1996): 1413–20.
346. Colwyn Trevarthen, “The Concept and Foundations of Infant Intersubjectivity,” in Intersubjective Communication and Emotion in Early Ontogeny, ed. Stein Bråten (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 15–46.
347. Philippe Rochat, “Early Objectification of the Self,” in The Self in Infancy: Theory and Research (Amsterdam: North-Holland-Elsevier Science Publishers, 1995), 66.
348. D. W. Winnicott, “Mirror Role of Mother and Family in Child Development,” in Playing and Reality (London: Routledge, 1989), 111.
349. George Herbert Mead, “The Social Self,” Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 10 (1913): 374.
350. Edward Tronick, “Commentary on a Paper by Frank M. Lachman,” Psychoanalytic Dialogues 11, no. 1 (2001): 193.
351. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 353–54.
352. Stein Bråten, “Infant Learning by Altercentric Participation: the Reverse of Egocentric Observation in Autism,” in Intersubjective Comunication and Emotion in Early Ontogeny, 105–26.
353. See Peter Carruthers, “Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Fall 2011 ed., http://plato.standford.edu/achives/fall2011/entries/consciousness-higher/.
354. John Bowlby, Attachment and Loss (New York: Basic Books, 1973).
355. Mary Ainsworth, “Attachment: Retrospect and Prospect,” in The Place of Attachment in Human Behavior, ed. C. M. Parker and J. Stevenson (New York: Basic Books, 1982), 3–30.
356. Allan Schore, Affect Regulation and the Origin of the Self: The Neurobiology of Emotional Development (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1994).
357. Claudia Lieberman and Zuoxin Wang, “The Social Environment and Neurogenesis in the Adult Mammalian Brain,” Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 6 (2012): 118, doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2012.00118.
358. Ruth Feldman, “Mother-Infant Synchrony and the Development of Moral Orientation in Childhood and Adolescence: Direct and Indirect Mechanisms of Developmental Continuity,” American Journal of Orthopsychiatry 77 (2007): 582–97.
359. See Antonio Damasio’s discussion of his research with Hanna Damasio into the famous historical case of Phineas T. Gage, who suffered a prefrontal injury, and his own patient Eliot in Descartes’ Error, 3–82. For a neural correlate approach to the problem, see Michael Koenig, “The Role of Prefrontal Cortex in Psychopathy,” Reviews in Neuroscience 23, no. 3 (2012): 253–62. In his review Koenig writes, “In sum, across all of the aforementioned studies, psychopathy was associated with significant reductions in prefrontal grey matter.” How this occurs is unknown. Another study, however, found increased grey matter volume in youth with psychopathic traits. S.A. De Brito et al., “Size Matters: Increased Grey Matter in Boys with Conduct Problems and Callous Unemotional Traits,” Brain 132, no. 4 (2009): 843–52. For a paper that speculates that there is a genetic component to psychopathy but also understands it as a developmental disorder, see R. J. R. Blair, “The Amygdala and Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex: Functional Contributions and Dysfunction in Psychopathy,” Philosophical Transactions Royal Society London B 363, no. 1503 (2008): 2557–65. For an overview, see Andrea L. Glenn and Adrian Raine, eds. Psychopathy: An Introduction to Biological Findings and Their Implications, (New York: New York University Press, 2014).
360. Bryan Kolb et al., “Experience and the Developing Prefrontal Cortex,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 109 (2012), doi: 10.1073/pnas.11212511109.
361. Richard Kradin, “The Placebo Response: An Attachment Strategy that Counteracts the Effects of Stress Related Dysfunction,” Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 54, no. 4 (2011): 438. See also Richard Kradin, The Placebo Response and the Power of Unconscious Healing (New York: Taylor & Francis, 2008).
362. Fabrizio Benedetti, Placebo Effects, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 45.
363. Ibid., 44.
364. Ibid., 91.
365. Ibid., 137.
366. For a brief overview, see “Towards a Neurobiology of Psychotherapy,” in Psychiatry, vol. 1, 4th ed., ed. Allan Tasman, Jerald Kay, Jeffrey A. Lieberman, Michael B. First, and Michelle B. Riba (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2015), 1815–16.
367. See Linda A. W. Brakel, “The Placebo Effect: Psychoanalytic Theory Can Help Explain the Phenomenon,” American Imago 64 (2007): 273–81.
368. Cristina Alberini and Joseph LeDoux, “Memory Reconsolidation,” Current Biology 23, no. 17 (2013): 746–50.
369. For psychotherapeutic brain effects, see A.L. Brody et al., “Regional Brain Metabolic Changes in Patients with Major Depression Treated with Either Paroxetine or Interpersonal Therapy,” Archives of General Psychiatry 58 (2001): 631–40. For placebo changes, see H. Mayberg et al., “The Functional Neuroanatomy of the Placebo Effect,” American Journal of Psychiatry 159, no. 9 (2002): 728–37.
370. Freud, who attended Charcot’s lectures in Paris, recorded the comment “La théorie c’est bon; mais ça n’empêche pas d’exister.” “Extracts from Freud’s “Footnotes to His Translation of Charcot’s Tuesday Lectures” (1887–88), Standard Edition, vol. 1, 139.
371. Peter Burkhard et al., “Hypnotic Suggestibility and Adult Attachment,” Contemporary Hypnosis and Integrative Therapy 28, no. 3 (2011): 171–86.
372. Siri Hustvedt, “I Wept for Four Years and When I Stopped I Was Blind,” Clinical Neurophysiology 44 (2014): 305–13.
373. Harré, “The Rediscovery of the Human Mind,” 45.
374. Polanyi, 290.
375. See Yuval Nir and Giulio Tononi, “Dreaming and the Brain: From Phenomenology to Neurophysiology,” Trends in Cognitive Science 14, no. 2 (2010): 88.
376. Siri Hustvedt, “Three Emotional Stories,” in Living, Thinking, Looking (New York: Picador, 2012), 175–95.
377. William James, Pragmatism in William James: Writings 1902–1910, ed. Bruce Kuklick (New York: The Library of America, 1987), 489–92.
378. John Bowlby, quoted in Frank van der Horst and René van Leer, “The Ontogeny of an Idea: John Bowlby and Contemporaries on Mother-Child Separation,” in History of Psychology 13, no. 1 (2010): 28.
379. Blaise Pascal, Pensées, trans. A. J. Krailsheimer (London: Penguin, 1995), 130.
380. Simone Weil, First and Last Notebooks, trans. Richard Rees (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), 207.