1 · When things have only a name in common and the definition of being [1a1] which corresponds to the name is different, they are called homonymous. Thus, for example, both a man and a picture are animals. These have only a name in common and the definition of being which corresponds to the name is different; for if one is to say what being an animal is for each of them, one will give two distinct definitions. [5]
When things have the name in common and the definition of being which corresponds to the name is the same, they are called synonymous. Thus, for example, both a man and an ox are animals. Each of these is called, by a common name, an animal, and the definition of being is also the same; for if one is to give the [10] definition of each—what being an animal is for each of them—one will give the same definition.
When things get their name from something, with a difference of ending, they are called paronymous. Thus, for example, the grammarian gets his name from grammar, the brave get theirs from bravery. [15]
2 · Of things that are said, some involve combination while others are said without combination. Examples of those involving combination are: man runs, man wins; and of those without combination: man, ox, runs, wins.
Of things there are: (a) some are said of a subject but are not in any subject. [20] For example, man is said of a subject, the individual man, but is not in any subject. (b) Some are in a subject but are not said of any subject. (By ‘in a subject’ I mean what is in something, not as a part, and cannot exist separately from what it is in.) [25] For example, the individual knowledge-of-grammar is in a subject, the soul, but is not said of any subject; and the individual white is in a subject, the body (for all colour is in a body), but is not said of any subject. (c) Some are both said of a subject and in a subject. For example, knowledge is in a subject, the soul, and is also [1b1] said of a subject, knowledge-of-grammar. (d) Some are neither in a subject nor said of a subject, for example, the individual man or the individual horse—for nothing of [5] this sort is either in a subject or said of a subject. Things that are individual and numerically one are, without exception, not said of any subject, but there is nothing to prevent some of them from being in a subject—the individual knowledge-of-grammar is one of the things in a subject.
[10] 3 · Whenever one thing is predicated of another as of a subject, all things said of what is predicated will be said of the subject also. For example, man is predicated of the individual man, and animal of man; so animal will be predicated [15] of the individual man also—for the individual man is both a man and an animal.
The differentiae of genera which are different1 and not subordinate one to the other are themselves different in kind. For example, animal and knowledge: footed, winged, aquatic, two-footed, are differentiae of animal, but none of these is a [20] differentia of knowledge; one sort of knowledge does not differ from another by being two-footed. However, there is nothing to prevent genera subordinate one to the other from having the same differentiae. For the higher are predicated of the genera below them, so that all differentiae of the predicated genus will be differentiae of the subject also.
[25] 4 · Of things said without any combination, each signifies either substance or quantity or qualification or a relative or where or when or being-in-a-position or having or doing or being-affected. To give a rough idea, examples of substance are man, horse; of quantity: four-foot, five-foot; of qualification: white, grammatical; of [2a1] a relative: double, half, larger; of where: in the Lyceum, in the market-place; of when: yesterday, last-year; of being-in-a-position: is-lying, is-sitting; of having: has-shoes-on, has-armour-on; of doing: cutting, burning; of being-affected: being-cut, being-burned.
[5] None of the above is said just by itself in any affirmation, but by the combination of these with one another an affirmation is produced. For every affirmation, it seems, is either true or false; but of things said without any [10] combination none is either true or false (e.g. man, white, runs, wins).
5 · A substance—that which is called a substance most strictly, primarily, and most of all—is that which is neither said of a subject nor in a subject, e.g. the [15] individual man or the individual horse. The species in which the things primarily called substances are, are called secondary substances, as also are the genera of these species. For example, the individual man belongs in a species, man, and animal is a genus of the species; so these—both man and animal—are called secondary substances.
It is clear from what has been said that if something is said of a subject both its [20] name and its definition are necessarily predicated of the subject. For example, man is said of a subject, the individual man, and the name is of course predicated (since you will be predicating man of the individual man), and also the definition of man [25] will be predicated of the individual man (since the individual man is also a man). Thus both the name and the definition will be predicated of the subject. But as for things which are in a subject, in most cases neither the name nor the definition is [30] predicated of the subject. In some cases there is nothing to prevent the name from being predicated of the subject, but it is impossible for the definition to be predicated. For example, white, which is in a subject (the body), is predicated of the subject; for a body is called white. But the definition of white will never be predicated of the body.
All the other things are either said of the primary substances as subjects or in [35] them as subjects. This is clear from an examination of cases. For example, animal is predicated of man and therefore also of the individual man; for were it predicated of none of the individual men it would not be predicated of man at all. Again, colour is [2b1] in body and therefore also in an individual body; for were it not in some individual body it would not be in body at all. Thus all the other things are either said of the primary substances as subjects or in them as subjects. So if the primary substances [5] did not exist it would be impossible for any of the other things to exist.2
Of the secondary substances the species is more a substance than the genus, since it is nearer to the primary substance. For if one is to say of the primary substance what it is, it will be more informative and apt to give the species than the [10] genus. For example, it would be more informative to say of the individual man that he is a man than that he is an animal (since the one is more distinctive of the individual man while the other is more general); and more informative to say of the individual tree that it is a tree than that it is a plant. Further, it is because the [15] primary substances are subjects for all the other things and all the other things are predicated of them or are in them, that they are called substances most of all. But as the primary substances stand to the other things, so the species stands to the genus: the species is a subject for the genus (for the genera are predicated of the species but [20] the species are not predicated reciprocally of the genera). Hence for this reason too the species is more a substance than the genus.
But of the species themselves—those which are not genera—one is no more a substance than another: it is no more apt to say of the individual man that he is a man than to say of the individual horse that it is a horse. And similarly of the [25] primary substances one is no more a substance than another: the individual man is no more a substance than the individual ox.
It is reasonable that, after the primary substances, their species and genera should be the only other things called secondary substances. For only they, of things [30] predicated, reveal the primary substance. For if one is to say of the individual man what he is, it will be in place to give the species or the genus (though more informative to give man than animal); but to give any of the other things would be out of place—for example, to say white or runs or anything like that. So it is [35] reasonable that these should be the only other things called substances. Further, it is because the primary substances are subjects for everything else that they are called substances most strictly. But as the primary substances stand to everything else, so [3a1] the species and genera of the primary substances stand to all the rest: all the rest are predicated of these. For if you will call the individual man grammatical, then you will call both a man and an animal grammatical; and similarly in other cases. [5]
It is a characteristic common to every substance not to be in a subject. For a primary substance is neither said of a subject nor in a subject. And as for secondary [10] substances, it is obvious at once that they are not in a subject. For man is said of the individual man as subject but is not in a subject: man is not in the individual man. Similarly, animal also is said of the individual man as subject, but animal is not in [15] the individual man. Further, while there is nothing to prevent the name of what is in a subject from being sometimes predicated of the subject, it is impossible for the definition to be predicated. But the definition of the secondary substances, as well as the name, is predicated of the subject: you will predicate the definition of man of the [20] individual man, and also that of animal. No substance, therefore, is in a subject.
This is not, however, peculiar to substance, since the differentia also is not in a subject. For footed and two-footed are said of man as subject but are not in a [25] subject; neither two-footed nor footed is in man. Moreover, the definition of the differentia is predicated of that of which the differentia is said. For example, if footed is said of man the definition of footed will also be predicated of man; for man is footed.
[30] We need not be disturbed by any fear that we may be forced to say that the parts of a substance, being in a subject (the whole substance), are not substances. For when we spoke of things in a subject we did not mean things belonging in something as parts.
It is a characteristic of substances and differentiae that all things called from [35] them are so called synonymously. For all the predicates from them are predicated either of the individuals or of the species. (For from a primary substance there is no predicate, since it is said of no subject; and as for secondary substances, the species is predicated of the individual, the genus both of the species and of the individual. [3b1] Similarly, differentiae too are predicated both of the species and of the individuals.) And the primary substances admit the definition of the species and of the genera, and the species admits that of the genus; for everything said of what is predicated [5] will be said of the subject also. Similarly, both the species and the individuals admit the definition of the differentiae. But synonymous things were precisely those with both the name in common and the same definition. Hence all the things called from substances and differentiae are so called synonymously.
[10] Every substance seems to signify a certain ‘this’. As regards the primary substances, it is indisputably true that each of them signifies a certain ‘this’; for the thing revealed is individual and numerically one. But as regards the secondary substances, though it appears from the form of the name—when one speaks of man [15] or animal—that a secondary substance likewise signifies a certain ‘this’, this is not really true; rather, it signifies a certain qualification—for the subject is not, as the primary substance is, one, but man and animal are said of many things. However, it does not signify simply a certain qualification, as white does. White signifies [20] nothing but a qualification, whereas the species and the genus mark off the qualification of substance—they signify substance of a certain qualification. (One draws a wider boundary with the genus than with the species, for in speaking of animal one takes in more than in speaking of man.)
Another characteristic of substances is that there is nothing contrary to them. For what would be contrary to a primary substance? For example, there is nothing [25] contrary to an individual man, nor yet is there anything contrary to man or to animal. This, however, is not peculiar to substance but holds of many other things also, for example, of quantity. For there is nothing contrary to four-foot or to ten or to anything of this kind—unless someone were to say that many is contrary to few or [30] large to small; but still there is nothing contrary to any definite quantity.
Substance, it seems, does not admit of a more and a less. I do not mean that one substance is not more a substance than another (we have said that it is), but that [35] any given substance is not called more, or less, that which it is. For example, if this substance is a man, it will not be more a man or less a man either than itself or than another man. For one man is not more a man than another, as one pale thing is more [4a1] pale than another and one beautiful thing more beautiful than another. Again, a thing is called more, or less, such-and-such than itself; for example, the body that is pale is called more pale now than before, and the one that is hot is called more, or less, hot. Substance, however, is not spoken of thus. For a man is not called more a [5] man now than before, nor is anything else that is a substance. Thus substance does not admit of a more and a less.
It seems most distinctive of substance that what is numerically one and the [10] same is able to receive contraries. In no other case could one bring forward anything, numerically one, which is able to receive contraries. For example, a colour which is numerically one and the same will not be black and white, nor will numerically one and the same action be bad and good; and similarly with everything [15] else that is not substance. A substance, however, numerically one and the same, is able to receive contraries. For example, an individual man—one and the same—becomes pale at one time and dark at another, and hot and cold, and bad and [20] good.
Nothing like this is to be seen in any other case, unless perhaps someone might object and say that statements and beliefs are like this. For the same statement seems to be both true and false. Suppose, for example, that the statement that somebody is sitting is true; after he has got up this same statement will be false. [25] Similarly with beliefs. Suppose you believe truly that somebody is sitting; after he has got up you will believe falsely if you hold the same belief about him. However, even if we were to grant this, there is still a difference in the way contraries are received. For in the case of substances it is by themselves changing that they are [30] able to receive contraries. For what has become cold instead of hot, or dark instead of pale, or good instead of bad, has changed (has altered); similarly in other cases too it is by itself undergoing change that each thing is able to receive contraries. Statements and beliefs, on the other hand, themselves remain completely [35] unchangeable in every way; it is because the actual thing changes that the contrary comes to belong to them. For the statement that somebody is sitting remains the same; it is because of a change in the actual thing that it comes to be true at one [4b1] time and false at another. Similarly with beliefs. Hence at least the way in which it is able to receive contraries—through a change in itself—would be distinctive of [5] substance, even if we were to grant that beliefs and statements are able to receive contraries. However, this is not true. For it is not because they themselves receive anything that statements and beliefs are said to be able to receive contraries, but because of what has happened to something else. For it is because the actual thing [10] exists or does not exist that the statement is said to be true or false, not because it is able itself to receive contraries. No statement, in fact, or belief is changed at all by anything. So, since nothing happens in them, they are not able to receive contraries. A substance, on the other hand, is said to be able to receive contraries because it [15] itself receives contraries. For it receives sickness and health, and paleness and darkness; and because it itself receives the various things of this kind it is said to be able to receive contraries. It is, therefore, distinctive of substance that what is numerically one and the same is able to receive contraries. This brings to an end our discussion of substance.
[20] 6 · Of quantities some are discrete, others continuous; and some are composed of parts which have position in relation to one another, others are not composed of parts which have position.
Discrete are number and language; continuous are lines, surfaces, bodies, and [25] also, besides these, time and place. For the parts of a number have no common boundary at which they join together. For example, if five is a part of ten the two fives do not join together at any common boundary but are separate; nor do the three and the seven join together at any common boundary. Nor could you ever in [30] the case of a number find a common boundary of its parts, but they are always separate. Hence number is one of the discrete quantities. Similarly, language also is one of the discrete quantities (that language is a quantity is evident, since it is measured by long and short syllables; I mean here language that is spoken). For its [35] parts do not join together at any common boundary. For there is no common boundary at which the syllables join together, but each is separate in itself. A line, [5a1] on the other hand, is a continuous quantity. For it is possible to find a common boundary at which its parts join together, a point. And for a surface, a line; for the parts of a plane join together at some common boundary. Similarly in the case of a [5] body one could find a common boundary—a line or a surface—at which the parts of the body join together. Time also and place are of this kind. For present time joins on to both past time and future time. Place, again, is one of the continuous [10] quantities. For the parts of a body occupy some place, and they join together at a common boundary. So the parts of the place occupied by the various parts of the body, themselves join together at the same boundary at which the parts of the body do. Thus place also is a continuous quantity, since its parts join together at one common boundary.
[15] Further, some quantities are composed of parts which have position in relation to one another, others are not composed of parts which have position. For example, the parts of a line have position in relation to one another: each of them is situated somewhere, and you could distinguish them and say where each is situated in the [20] plane and which one of the other parts it joins on to. Similarly, the parts of a plane have some position here again: one could say where each is situated and which join on to one another. So, too, with the parts of a solid and the parts of a place. With a number, on the other hand, one could not observe that the parts have some position in relation to one another or are situated somewhere, nor see which of the parts join [25] on to one another. Nor with the parts of a time either; for none of the parts of a time endures, and how could what is not enduring have any position? Rather might you say that they have a certain order in that one part of a time is before and another after. Similarly with a number also, in that one is counted before two and two before [30] three; in this way they may have a certain order, but you would certainly not find position. And language similarly. For none of its parts endures, once it has been uttered it can no longer be recaptured; and so its parts cannot have position, seeing [35] that none of them endures. Some quantities then are composed of parts which have position, others are not composed of parts which have position.
Only these we have mentioned are called quantities strictly, all the others derivatively; for it is to these we look when we call the others quantities. For [5b1] example, we speak of a large amount of white because the surface is large, and an action or a change is called long because the time is long. For it is not in its own right that each of these others is called a quantity. For example, if one is to say how long [5] an action is, one will determine this by the time, saying that it is a-year-long or something of that sort; and in saying how much white one will determine it by the surface—whatever the size of the surface one will say that the white too is that size. Thus only those we mentioned are called quantities strictly and in their own right, while nothing else is so in its own right but, if at all, derivatively. [10]
Next, a quantity has no contrary. In the case of definite quantities it is obvious that there is no contrary; there is, for example, no contrary to four-foot or five-foot or to a surface or anything like that. But might someone say that many is contrary [15] to few or large to small? None of these, however, is a quantity; they are relatives. For nothing is called large or small just in itself, but by reference to something else. For example, a mountain is called small yet a grain of millet large—because one is larger than other things of its kind while the other is smaller than other things of its kind. Thus the reference is to something else, since if a thing were called small or [20] large in itself the mountain would never be called small yet the grain of millet large. Again, we say that there are many people in the village but few in Athens—though there are many times more here than there; and that there are many in the house [25] but few in the theatre—though there are many more here than there. Further, ‘four-foot’, ‘five-foot’, and the like all signify a quantity, but ‘large’ or ‘small’ does not signify a quantity but rather a relative, since the large and the small are looked at in relation to something else. So it is clear that these are relatives.
Moreover, whether one counts them as quantities or does not, they have no [30] contrary. For how could there be any contrary to what cannot be grasped just in itself but only by reference to something else? Further, if large and small are to be contraries it will turn out that the same thing admits contraries at the same time, and that things are their own contraries. For the same thing turns out to be at the [35] same time both large and small—since in relation to this thing it is small but in relation to another this same thing is large; so the same thing turns out to be both large and small at the same time and thus to admit contraries at the same time. But [6a1] nothing seems to admit contraries at the same time. In the case of a substance, for example, while it seems to be able to receive contraries, yet it is certainly not at the same time ill and well nor is it at the same time pale and dark; nor does anything else admit contraries at the same time. It turns out also that things are their own [5] contraries. For if large is contrary to small, and the same thing is at the same time large and small, a thing would be its own contrary. But it is impossible for a thing to be its own contrary. Large, therefore, is not contrary to small, nor many to few. So [10] that even if someone says that these belong not to relatives but to quantity, it will still have no contrary.
But it is most of all with regard to place that there seems to be contrariety of a quantity. For people regard up as contrary to down—meaning by ‘down’ the region [15] towards the centre—because the centre is at the greatest distance from the limits of the world. And they probably derive from these their definition of the other contraries also; for they define as contraries those things in the same genus which are most distant from one another.
A quantity does not seem to admit of a more and a less. Four-foot for example: [20] one thing is not more four-foot than another. Or take number: we do not speak of a three as more three than a five, nor of one three as more three than another three. Nor yet is one time called more a time than another. Nor is there a single one, among those we listed, as to which a more and a less is spoken of. Hence a quantity [25] does not admit of a more and a less.
Most distinctive of a quantity is its being called both equal and unequal. For each of the quantities we spoke of is called both equal and unequal. For example, a body is called both equal and unequal, and a number is called both equal and [30] unequal, and so is a time; so also with the others we spoke of, each is called both equal and unequal. But anything else—whatever is not a quantity—is certainly not, it would seem, called equal and unequal. For example, a condition is certainly not called equal and unequal, but, rather, similar; and white is certainly not equal and [35] unequal, but similar. Thus most distinctive of a quantity would be its being called both equal and unequal.
7 · We call relatives all such things as are said to be just what they are, of or than other things, or in some other way in relation to something else. For example, what is larger is called what it is than something else (it is called larger than something); and what is double is called what it is of something else (it is called [6b1] double of something); similarly with all other such cases. The following, too, and their like, are among relatives: state, condition, perception, knowledge, position. For each of these is called what it is (and not something different) of something else. A [5] state is called a state of something, knowledge knowledge of something, position position of something, and the rest similarly. All things then are relative which are called just what they are, of or than something else—or in some other way in relation to something else. Thus a mountain is called large in relation to something else (the mountain is called large in relation to something); and what is similar is called similar to something; and the others of this kind are in the same way spoken [10] of in relation to something.
Lying, standing, and sitting are particular positions; position is a relative. To-be-lying, to-be-standing, or to-be-sitting are themselves not positions, but they get their names paronymously from the aforesaid positions.
There is contrariety in relatives, e.g. virtue is contrary to vice (and each of [15] them is relative), and knowledge to ignorance. But there is not a contrary to every relative; there is no contrary to what is double or treble or anything like that.
Relatives seem also to admit of a more and a less. For a thing is called more [20] similar and less similar, and more unequal and less unequal; and each of these is relative, since what is similar is called similar to something and what is unequal unequal to something. But not all admit of a more and less; for what is double, or [25] anything like that, is not called more double or less double.
All relatives are spoken of in relation to correlatives that reciprocate. For example, the slave is called slave of a master and the master is called master of a slave; the double double of a half, and the half half of a double; the larger larger [30] than a smaller, and the smaller smaller than a larger; and so for the rest too. Sometimes, however, there will be a verbal difference, of ending. Thus knowledge is called knowledge of what is knowable, and what is knowable knowable by knowledge; perception perception of the perceptible, and the perceptible perceptible [35] by perception.3
Sometimes, indeed, they will not seem to reciprocate—if a mistake is made and that in relation to which something is spoken of is not given properly. For example, if a wing is given as of a bird, bird of a wing does not reciprocate; for it has not been given properly in the first place as wing of a bird. For it is not as being a [7a1] bird that a wing is said to be of it, but as being a winged, since many things that are not birds have wings. Thus if it is given properly there is reciprocation; for example, a wing is wing of a winged and a winged is winged with a wing. [5]
It may sometimes be necessary even to invent names, if no name exists in relation to which a thing would be given properly. For example, if a rudder is given as of a boat, that is not to give it properly (for it is not as being a boat that a rudder is said to be of it, since there are boats which have not got rudders); and so there is [10] not reciprocation—a boat is not called boat of a rudder. But perhaps it would be given more properly if given thus, that a rudder is rudder of (or somehow else related to) a ‘ruddered’ (since there is no established name); and now there is reciprocation, if it is given properly—a ruddered is ruddered by a rudder. Similarly [15] in other cases. For example, a head would be more properly given as of a headed than as of an animal, because it is not as being an animal that a thing has a head, since many animals have not got a head. This is perhaps the easiest way to lay hold of things for which there are no established names—if names derived from the original relatives are assigned to their reciprocating correlatives, as in the above [20] case ‘winged’ was derived from ‘wing’ and ‘ruddered’ from ‘rudder’.
All relatives, then, are spoken of in relation to correlatives that reciprocate, provided they are properly given. For, of course, if a relative is given as related to some chance thing and not to just that thing in relation to which it is spoken of, [25] there is not reciprocation. I mean that even with relatives that are admittedly spoken of in relation to correlatives that reciprocate and for which names exist, none reciprocates if a relative is given as related to something accidental and not to just that thing in relation to which it is spoken of. For example, if a slave is given as of—not a master, but—a man or a biped or anything else like that, there is not [30] reciprocation; for it has not been given properly.
Again, if that in relation to which a thing is spoken of is properly given, then, when all the other things that are accidental are stripped off and that alone is left to which it was properly given as related, it will always be spoken of in relation to that. [35] For example, if a slave is spoken of in relation to a master, then, when everything accidental to a master is stripped off—like being a biped, capable of knowledge, a man—and there is left only being a master, a slave will always be spoken of in relation to that. For a slave is called slave of a master. On the other hand, if that in [7b1] relation to which a thing is spoken of is not properly given, then, when the other things are stripped off and that alone is left to which it was given as related, it will not be spoken of in relation to that. Suppose a slave is given as of a man and a wing [5] as of a bird, and strip off from man his being a master; a slave will no longer be spoken of in relation to a man, for if there is no master there is no slave either. Similarly, strip off from bird its being winged; a wing will no longer be a relative, for if there is nothing winged neither will there be a wing of anything.
[10] One must therefore give as correlative whatever it is properly spoken of in relation to; and if a name already exists it is easy to give this, but if it does not it may be necessary to invent a name. When correlatives are given thus it is clear that all relatives will be spoken of in relation to correlatives that reciprocate.
[15] Relatives seem to be simultaneous by nature; and in most cases this is true. For there is at the same time a double and a half, and when there is a half there is a double, and when there is a slave there is a master; and similarly with the others. [20] Also, each carries the other to destruction; for if there is not a double there is not a half, and if there is not a half there is not a double. So too with other such cases.
Yet it does not seem to be true of all relatives that they are simultaneous by nature. For the knowable would seem to be prior to knowledge. For as a rule it is of [25] actual things already existing that we acquire knowledge; in few cases, if any, could one find knowledge coming into existence at the same time as what is knowable. Moreover, destruction of the knowable carries knowledge to destruction, but knowledge does not carry the knowable to destruction. For if there is not a knowable [30] there is not knowledge—there will no longer be anything for knowledge to be of—but if there is not knowledge there is nothing to prevent there being a knowable. Take, for example, the squaring of the circle, supposing it to be knowable; knowledge of it does not yet exist but the knowable itself exists. Again, if animal is destroyed there is no knowledge, but there may be many knowables.
[35] The case of perception is similar to this; for the perceptible seems to be prior to perception. For the destruction of the perceptible carries perception to destruction, but perception does not carry the perceptible to destruction. For perceptions are to do with body and in body, and if the perceptible is destroyed, body too is destroyed (since body is itself a perceptible), and if there is not body, perception too is [8a1] destroyed; hence the perceptible carries perception to destruction. But perception does not carry the perceptible. For if animal is destroyed perception is destroyed, but there will be something perceptible, such as body, hot, sweet, bitter, and all the [5] other perceptibles. Moreover, perception comes into existence at the same time as what is capable of perceiving—an animal and perception come into existence at the same time—but the perceptible exists even before perception exists; fire and water and so on, of which an animal is itself made up, exist even before there exists an [10] animal at all, or perception. Hence the perceptible would seem to be prior to perception.
It is a problem whether (as one would think) no substance is spoken of as a relative, or whether this is possible with regard to some secondary substances. In the [15] case of primary substances it is true; neither wholes nor parts are spoken of in relation to anything. An individual man is not called someone’s individual man, nor an individual ox someone’s individual ox. Similarly with parts; an individual hand is not called someone’s individual hand (but someone’s hand), and an individual head [20] is not called someone’s individual head (but someone’s head). Similarly with secondary substances, at any rate most of them. For example, a man is not called someone’s man nor an ox someone’s ox nor a log someone’s log (but it is called someone’s property). With such cases, then, it is obvious that they are not relatives, [25] but with some secondary substances there is room for dispute. For example, a head is called someone’s head and a hand is called someone’s hand, and so on; so that these would seem to be relatives.
Now if the definition of relatives given above was adequate, it is either exceedingly difficult or impossible to reach the solution that no substance is spoken [30] of as a relative. But if it was not adequate, and if those things are relatives for which being is the same as being somehow related to something, then perhaps some answer may be found. The previous definition does, indeed, apply to all relatives, yet this—their being called what they are, of other things—is not what their being [35] relatives is.
It is clear from this that if someone knows any relative definitely he will also know definitely that in relation to which it is spoken of. This is obvious on the face of it. For if someone knows of a certain ‘this’ that it is a relative, and being for relatives is the same as being somehow related to something, he knows that also to which this [8b1] is somehow related. For if he does not in the least know that to which this is somehow related, neither will he know whether it is somehow related to something. The same point is clear also in particular cases. For example, if someone knows definitely of a certain ‘this’ that it is double he also, by the same token, knows [5] definitely what it is double of; for if he does not know it to be double anything definite neither does he know whether it is double at all. Similarly, if he knows of a certain ‘this’ that it is more beautiful, he must also, because of this, know definitely what it is more beautiful than. (He is not to know indefinitely that this is more [10] beautiful than an inferior thing. For that sort of thing is supposition, not knowledge. For he will no longer strictly know that it is more beautiful than an inferior thing, since it may so happen that there is nothing inferior to it.) It is plain, therefore, that anyone who knows any relative definitely must know definitely that also in relation [15] to which it is spoken of.
But as for a head or a hand or any such substance, it is possible to know it—what it itself is—definitely, without necessarily knowing definitely that in relation to which it is spoken of. For whose this head is, or whose the hand, it is not [20] necessary4 to know definitely. So these would not be relatives. And if they are not relatives it would be true to say that no substance is a relative.
It is perhaps hard to make firm statements on such questions without having examined them many times. Still, to have gone through the various difficulties is not unprofitable.
[25] 8 · By a quality I mean that in virtue of which things are said to be qualified somehow. But quality is one of the things spoken of in a number of ways.
One kind of quality let us call states and conditions. A state differs from a condition in being more stable and lasting longer. Such are the branches of [30] knowledge and the virtues. For knowledge seems to be something permanent and hard to change if one has even a moderate grasp of a branch of knowledge, unless a great change is brought about by illness or some other such thing. So also virtue; [35] justice, temperance, and the rest seem to be not easily changed. It is what are easily changed and quickly changing that we call conditions, e.g. hotness and chill and sickness and health and the like. For a man is in a certain condition in virtue of these but he changes quickly from hot to cold and from being healthy to being sick. [9a1] Similarly with the rest, unless indeed even one of these were eventually to become through length of time part of a man’s nature and irremediable or exceedingly hard to change—and then one would perhaps call this a state. It is obvious that by a state [5] people do mean what is more lasting and harder to change. For those who lack full mastery of a branch of knowledge and are easily changed are not said to be in a state of knowledge, though they are of course in some condition, a better or a worse, in regard to that knowledge. Thus a state differs from a condition in that the one is easily changed while the other lasts longer and is harder to change.
[10] States are also conditions but conditions are not necessarily states. For people in a state are, in virtue of this, also in some condition, but people in a condition are not in every case also in a state.
Another kind of quality is that in virtue of which we call people boxers or [15] runners or healthy or sickly—anything, in short, which they are called in virtue of a natural capacity or incapacity. For it is not because one is in some condition that one is called anything of this sort, but because one has a natural capacity for doing something easily or for being unaffected. For example, people are called boxers or [20] runners not because they are in some condition but because they have a natural capacity to do something easily; they are called healthy because they have a natural capacity not to be affected easily by what befalls them, and sickly because they have an incapacity to be unaffected. Similarly with the hard and the soft: the hard is so [25] called because it has a capacity not to be divided easily, the soft because it has an incapacity for this same thing.
A third kind of quality consists of affective qualities and affections. Examples of such are sweetness, bitterness, sourness, and all their kin, and also hotness and [30] coldness and paleness and darkness. That these are qualities is obvious, for things that possess them are said to be qualified in virtue of them. Thus honey because it possesses sweetness is called sweet, and a body pale because it possesses paleness, and similarly with the others. They are called affective qualities not because the things that possess them have themselves been affected somehow—for honey is not [9b1] called sweet because it has been affected somehow nor is any other such thing. Similarly, hotness and coldness are not called affective qualities because the things that possess them have themselves been affected somehow, but it is because each of [5] the qualities mentioned is productive of an affection of the senses that they are called affective qualities. For sweetness produces a certain affection of taste, hotness one of touch, and the rest likewise.
Paleness and darkness, however, and other colourings are not called affective [10] qualities in the same way as those just mentioned, but because they themselves have been brought about by an affection. That many changes of colour do come about through an affection is clear; when ashamed one goes red, when frightened one turns pale, and so on. And so if somebody suffers by nature from some such [15] affection it is reasonable that he should have the corresponding colouring. For the very same bodily condition which occurs now when one is ashamed might occur also in virtue of a man’s natural make-up, so that the corresponding colouring too would come about by nature.
When such circumstances have their origin in affections that are hard to [20] change and permanent they are called qualities. For if pallor or darkness have come about in the natural make-up they are called qualities (for in virtue of them we are said to be qualified); and if pallor or darkness have resulted from long illness or from sunburn, and do not easily give way—or even last for a lifetime—these too are [25] called qualities (since, as before, in virtue of them we are said to be qualified). But those that result from something that easily disperses and quickly gives way are called affections; for people are not, in virtue of them, said to be qualified somehow. Thus a man who reddens through shame is not called ruddy, nor one who pales in [30] fright pallid; rather he is said to have been affected somehow. Hence such things are called affections but not qualities.
Similarly with regard to the soul also we speak of affective qualities and affections. Those which are present right from birth as a result of certain affections are called qualities, for example, madness and irascibility and the like; for in virtue [10a1] of these people are said to be qualified, being called irascible and mad. Similarly with any aberrations that are not natural but result from some other circumstances, and are hard to get rid of or even completely unchangeable; such things, too, are [5] qualities, for in virtue of them people are said to be qualified. But those which result from things that quickly subside are called affections, e.g. if a man in distress is rather bad-tempered; for the man who in such an affection is rather bad-tempered is not said to be bad-tempered, but rather he is said to have been affected somehow. [10] Hence such things are called affections but not qualities.
A fourth kind of quality is shape and the external form of each thing, and in addition straightness and curvedness and anything like these. For in virtue of each of these a thing is said to be qualified somehow; because it is a triangle or square it is [15] said to be qualified somehow, and because it is straight or curved. And in virtue of its form each thing is said to be qualified somehow.
‘Rare’ and ‘dense’ and ‘rough’ and ‘smooth’ might be thought to signify a qualification; they seem, however, to be foreign to the classification of qualifications. [20] It seems rather to be a certain position of the parts that each of them reveals. For a thing is dense because its parts are close together, rare because they are separated from one another; smooth because its parts lie somehow on a straight line, rough because some stick up above others.
[25] Perhaps some other manner of quality might come to light, but we have made a pretty complete list of those most spoken of.
These, then, that we have mentioned are qualities, while things called paronymously because of these or called in some other way from them are qualified. Now in most cases, indeed in practically all, things are called paronymously, [30] as the pale man from paleness, the grammatical from grammar, the just from justice, and so on. But in some cases, because there are no names for the qualities, it is impossible for things to be called paronymously from them. For example, the runner or the boxer, so called in virtue of a natural capacity, is not [10b1] called paronymously from any quality; for there are no names for the capacities in virtue of which these men are said to be qualified—as there are for the branches of knowledge in virtue of which men are called boxers or wrestlers with reference to their condition (for we speak of boxing and of wrestling as branches of knowledge, [5] and it is paronymously from them that those in the condition are said to be qualified). Sometimes, however, even when there is a name for a quality, that which is said to be qualified in virtue of it is not so called paronymously. For example, the good man is so called from virtue, since it is because he has virtue that he is called good; but he is not called paronymously from virtue. This sort of case is, however, [10] rare. Things then that are called paronymously from the qualities we mentioned, or called from them in some other way, are said to be qualified.
There is contrariety in regard to qualification. For example, justice is contrary to injustice and whiteness to blackness, and so on; also things said to be qualified in [15] virtue of them—the unjust to the just and the white to the black. But this is not so in all cases; for there is no contrary to red or yellow or such colours though they are qualifications.
Further, if one of a pair of contraries is a qualification, the other too will be a qualification. This is clear if one examines the other predicates. For example, if justice is contrary to injustice and justice is a qualification, then injustice too is a [20] qualification. For none of the other predicates fits injustice, neither quantity nor relative nor where nor in fact any other such predicate except qualification. Similarly with the other contraries that involve qualification. [25]
Qualifications admit of a more and a less; for one thing is called more pale or less pale than another, and more just than another. Moreover, it itself sustains increase (for what is pale can still become paler)—not in all cases though, but in most. It might be questioned whether one justice is called more a justice than [30] another, and similarly for the other conditions. For some people dispute about such cases. They utterly deny that one justice is called more or less a justice than another, or one health more or less a health, though they say that one person has health less than another, justice less than another, and similarly with grammar and the other [11a1] conditions. At any rate things spoken of in virtue of these unquestionably admit of a more and a less: one man is called more grammatical than another, juster, healthier, and so on.
Triangle and square do not seem to admit of a more, nor does any other shape. [5] For things which admit the definition of triangle or circle are all equally triangles or circles, while of things which do not admit it none will be called more that than another—a square is not more a circle than an oblong is, for neither admits the [10] definition of circle. In short, unless both admit the definition of what is under discussion neither will be called more that than the other. Thus not all qualifications admit of a more and a less.
Nothing so far mentioned is distinctive of quality, but it is in virtue of qualities [15] only that things are called similar and dissimilar; a thing is not similar to another in virtue of anything but that in virtue of which it is qualified. So it would be distinctive of quality that a thing is called similar or dissimilar in virtue of it.
We should not be disturbed lest someone may say that though we proposed to [20] discuss quality we are counting in many relatives (since states and conditions are relatives). For in pretty well all such cases the genera are spoken of in relation to something, but none of the particular cases is. For knowledge, a genus, is called just [25] what it is, of something else (it is called knowledge of something); but none of the particular cases is called just what it is, of something else. For example, grammar is not called grammar of something nor music music of something. If at all it is in virtue of the genus that these too are spoken of in relation to something: grammar is called knowledge of something (not grammar of something) and music knowledge [30] of something (not music of something). Thus the particular cases are not relatives. But it is with the particular cases that we are said to be qualified, for it is these which we possess (it is because we have some particular knowledge that we are called knowledgeable). Hence these—the particular cases, in virtue of which we are [35] on occasion said to be qualified—would indeed be qualities; and these are not relatives.
Moreover, if the same thing really is a qualification and a relative there is nothing absurd in its being counted in both the genera.
[11b1] 9 · Doing and being-affected admit of contrariety and of a more and a less. For heating is contrary to cooling, and being heated to being cooled, and being pleased to being pained; so they admit of contrariety. And of a more and a less also. [5] For it is possible to heat more and less, and to be heated more and less, and to be pained more and less; hence doing and being-affected admit of a more and a less.5
. . . . . . . . .
[10] [So much, then, is said about these; and about being-in-a-position too it has been remarked, in the discussion of relatives, that it is spoken of paronymously from the positions. About the rest, when and where and having, owing to their obviousness nothing further is said about them than what was said at the beginning, that having is signified by ‘having-shoes-on’, ‘having-armour-on’, where by, for example, ‘in the Lyceum’—and all the other things that were said about them.]
[15] 10 · [About the proposed genera, then, enough has been said; but something must be said about opposites and the various ways in which things are customarily opposed.]
Things are said to be opposed to one another in four ways: as relatives or as contraries or as privation and possession or as affirmation and negation. Examples [20] of things thus opposed (to give a rough idea) are: as relatives, the double and the half; as contraries, the good and the bad; as privation and possession, blindness and sight; as affirmation and negation, he is sitting—he is not sitting.
Things opposed as relatives are called just what they are, of their opposites or [25] in some other way in relation to them. For example, the double is called just what it is (double) of the half. Again, knowledge and the knowable are opposed as relatives, and knowledge is called just what it is, of the knowable, and the knowable too is [30] called just what it is, in relation to its opposite, knowledge; for the knowable is called knowable by something—by knowledge. Thus things opposed as relatives are called just what they are, of their opposites or in some other way in relation to one another.
Things opposed as contraries, however, are never called just what they are, in [35] relation to one another, though they are called contraries of one another. For the good is not called good of the bad, but the contrary of it; and the white not white of the black, but its contrary. Thus these oppositions differ from one another.
[12a1] If contraries are such that it is necessary for one or the other of them to belong to the things they naturally occur in or are predicated of, there is nothing intermediate between them. For example, sickness and health naturally occur in [5] animals’ bodies and it is indeed necessary for one or the other to belong to an animal’s body, either sickness or health; again, odd and even are predicated of numbers, and it is indeed necessary for one or the other to belong to a number, either odd or even. And between these there is certainly nothing intermediate—between sickness and health or odd and even. But if it is not necessary for one or the [10] other to belong, there is something intermediate between them. For example, black and white naturally occur in bodies, but it is not necessary for one or the other of them to belong to a body (for not every body is either white or black); again, bad and good are predicated both of men and of many other things, but it is not [15] necessary for one or the other of them to belong to those things they are predicated of (for not all are either bad or good). And between these there is certainly something intermediate—between white and black are grey, yellow and all other colours, and between the bad and the good the neither bad nor good. In some cases [20] there exist names for the intermediates, as with grey and yellow between white and black; in some, however, it is not easy to find a name for the intermediate, but it is by the negation of each of the extremes that the intermediate is marked off, as with the neither good nor bad and neither just nor unjust. [25]
Privation and possession are spoken of in connexion with the same thing, for example sight and blindness in connexion with the eye. To generalize, each of them is spoken of in connexion with whatever the possession naturally occurs in. We say that anything capable of receiving a possession is deprived of it when it is entirely absent from that which naturally has it, at the time when it is natural for it to have [30] it. For it is not what has not teeth that we call toothless, or what has not sight blind, but what has not got them at the time when it is natural for it to have them. For some things from birth have neither sight nor teeth yet are not called toothless or blind.
Being deprived and possessing are not privation and possession. For sight is a [35] possession and blindness a privation, but having sight is not sight nor is being blind blindness. For blindness is a particular privation but being blind is being deprived, not a privation. Moreover, if blindness were the same as being blind both would be [40] predicated of the same thing. But though a man is called blind a man is certainly not called blindness. These do, however, seem to be opposed—being deprived and [12b1] having a possession—as privation and possession are. For the manner of opposition is the same. For as blindness is opposed to sight so also is being blind opposed to having sight. (Nor is what underlies an affirmation or negation itself an affirmation [5] or negation. For an affirmation is an affirmative statement and a negation a negative statement, whereas none of the things underlying an affirmation or negation is a statement. These are, however, said to be opposed to one another as [10] affirmation and negation are; for in these cases, too, the manner of opposition is the same. For in the way an affirmation is opposed to a negation, for example ‘he is sitting’—‘he is not sitting’, so are opposed also the actual things underlying each, his [15] sitting—his not sitting.)
That privation and possession are not opposed as relatives is plain. For neither is called just what it is, of its opposite. Sight is not sight of blindness nor is it spoken of in any other way in relation to it; nor would one call blindness blindness of [20] sight—blindness is called privation of sight but is not called blindness of sight. Moreover, all relatives are spoken of in relation to correlatives that reciprocate, so that with blindness, too, if it were a relative, that in relation to which it is spoken of would reciprocate; but it does not reciprocate, since sight is not called sight of [25] blindness.
Nor are cases of privation and possession opposed as contraries, as is clear from the following. With contraries between which there is nothing intermediate it is necessary for one or the other of them always to belong to the things they [30] naturally occur in or are predicated of. For there was nothing intermediate in just those cases where it was necessary for one or the other to belong to a thing capable of receiving them, as with sickness and health and odd and even. But where there is something intermediate it is never necessary for one or the other to belong to everything: it is not necessary for everything to be white or black that is capable of [35] receiving them, or hot or cold, since something intermediate between these may perfectly well be present. Moreover, there was something intermediate in just those cases where it was not necessary for one or the other to belong to a thing capable of receiving them—except for things to which the one belongs by nature, as being hot belongs to fire and being white to snow; and in these cases it is necessary for [40] definitely one or the other to belong, and not as chance has it. For it is not possible for fire to be cold or snow black. Thus it is not necessary for one or the other of them [13a1] to belong to everything capable of receiving them, but only to things to which the one belongs by nature, and in these cases it must be definitely the one and not as chance has it.
But neither of these accounts is true of privation and possession. For it is not necessary for one or the other of them always to belong to a thing capable of [5] receiving them, since if it is not yet natural for something to have sight it is not said either to be blind or to have sight; so that these would not be contraries of the sort that have nothing intermediate between them. Nor, however, of the sort that do have something intermediate between them. For it is necessary at some time for one or the other of them to belong to everything capable of receiving them. For when [10] once it is natural for something to have sight then it will be said either to be blind or to have sight—not definitely one or the other of these but as chance has it, since it is not necessary either for it to be blind or for it to have sight, but as chance has it. But with contraries which have something intermediate between them we said it was never necessary for one or the other to belong to everything, but to certain things, [15] and to them definitely the one. Hence it is clear that things opposed as privation and possession are not opposed in either of the ways contraries are.
Further, with contraries it is possible (while the thing capable of receiving [20] them is there) for change into one another to occur, unless the one belongs to something by nature as being hot does to fire. For it is possible for the healthy to fall sick and for the white to become black and the hot cold; and it is possible to become bad instead of good or good instead of bad. (For the bad man, if led into better ways [25] of living and talking, would progress, if only a little, towards being better. And if he once made even a little progress it is clear that he might either change completely or make really great progress. For however slight the progress he made to begin with, he becomes ever more easily changed towards virtue, so that he is likely to make still [30] more progress; and when this keeps happening it brings him over completely into the contrary state, provided time permits.) With privation and possession, on the other hand, it is impossible for change into one another to occur. For change occurs from possession to privation but from privation to possession it is impossible; one who has gone blind does not recover sight nor does a bald man regain his hair nor [35] does a toothless man grow teeth.
It is plain that things opposed as affirmation and negation are not opposed in any of the above ways; for only with them is it necessary always for one to be true [13b1] and the other one false. For with contraries it is not necessary always for one to be true and the other false, nor with relatives nor with possession and privation. For [5] example, health and sickness are contraries, and neither is either true or false; similarly, the double and the half are opposed as relatives, and neither of them is either true or false; nor are cases of possession and privation, such as sight and blindness. Nothing, in fact, that is said without combination is either true or false; [10] and all the above are said without combination.
It might, indeed, very well seem that the same sort of thing does occur in the case of contraries said with combination, ‘Socrates is well’ being contrary to ‘Socrates is sick’. Yet not even with these is it necessary always for one to be true [15] and the other false. For if Socrates exists one will be true and one false, but if he does not both will be false; neither ‘Socrates is sick’ nor ‘Socrates is well’ will be true if Socrates himself does not exist at all. As for possession and privation, if he does [20] not exist at all neither is true, while not always one or the other is true if he does. For ‘Socrates has sight’ is opposed to ‘Socrates is blind’ as possession to privation; and if he exists it is not necessary for one or the other to be true or false (since until the time when it is natural for him to have it both are false), while if Socrates does not [25] exist at all then again both are false, both ‘he has sight’ and ‘he is blind’. But with an affirmation and negation one will always be false and the other true whether he exists or not. For take ‘Socrates is sick’ and ‘Socrates is not sick’: if he exists it is [30] clear that one or the other of them will be true or false, and equally if he does not; for if he does not exist ‘he is sick’ is false but ‘he is not sick’ true. Thus it would be distinctive of these alone—opposed affirmations and negations—that always one or [35] the other of them is true or false.
11 · What is contrary to a good thing is necessarily bad; this is clear by induction from cases—health and sickness, justice and injustice, courage and [14a1] cowardice, and so on with the rest. But what is contrary to a bad thing is sometimes good but sometimes bad. For excess is contrary to deficiency, which is bad, and is itself bad; yet moderation as well is contrary to both, and it is good. However, though this sort of thing may be seen in a few cases, in most cases what is contrary [5] to a bad thing is always a good.
With contraries it is not necessary if one exists for the other to exist too. For if everyone were well health would exist but not sickness, and if everything were white whiteness would exist but not blackness. Further, if Socrates’s being well is contrary [10] to Socrates’s being sick, and it is not possible for both to hold at the same time of the same person, it would not be possible if one of the contraries existed for the other to exist too; if Socrates’s being well existed Socrates’s being sick would not.
It is clearly the nature of contraries to belong to the same thing (the same [15] either in species or in genus)—sickness and health in an animal’s body, but whiteness and blackness in a body simply, and justice and injustice in a soul.
All contraries must either be in the same genus or in contrary genera, or be [20] themselves genera. For white and black are in the same genus (since colour is their genus), but justice and injustice are in contrary genera (since the genus of one is virtue, of the other vice), while good and bad are not in a genus but are themselves [25] actually genera of certain things.
12 · One thing is called prior to another in four ways. First and most strictly, in respect of time, as when one thing is called older or more ancient than another; for it is because the time is longer that it is called either older or more ancient. [30] Secondly, what does not reciprocate as to implication of existence. For example, one is prior to two because if there are two it follows at once that there is one whereas if there is one there are not necessarily two, so that the implication of the other’s existence does not hold reciprocally from one; and that from which the implication [35] of existence does not hold reciprocally is thought to be prior. Thirdly, a thing is called prior in respect of some order, as with sciences and speeches. For in the demonstrative sciences there is a prior and posterior in order, for the elements are [14b1] prior in order to the constructions (and in grammar the elements are prior to the syllables); likewise with speeches, for the introduction is prior in order to the exposition. Further, besides the ways mentioned, what is better and more valued is [5] thought to be prior by nature: ordinary people commonly say of those they specially value and love that they ‘have priority’. This fourth way is perhaps the least proper.
There are, then, this many ways of speaking of the prior. There would seem, [10] however, to be another manner of priority besides those mentioned. For of things which reciprocate as to implication of existence, that which is in some way the cause of the other’s existence might reasonably be called prior by nature. And that there are some such cases is clear. For there being a man reciprocates as to implication of [15] existence with the true statement about it: if there is a man, the statement whereby we say that there is a man is true, and reciprocally—since if the statement whereby we say that there is a man is true, there is a man. And whereas the true statement is [20] in no way the cause of the actual thing’s existence, the actual thing does seem in some way the cause of the statement’s being true: it is because the actual thing exists or does not that the statement is called true or false. Thus there are five ways in which one thing might be called prior to another.
13 · Those things are called simultaneous without qualification and most [25] strictly which come into being at the same time; for neither is prior or posterior. These are called simultaneous in respect of time. But those things are called simultaneous by nature which reciprocate as to implication of existence, provided that neither is in any way the cause of the other’s existence, e.g. the double and the [30] half. These reciprocate, since if there is a double there is a half and if there is a half there is a double, but neither is the cause of the other’s existence. Also, co-ordinate species of the same genus are called simultaneous by nature. It is those resulting from the same division that are called co-ordinate, e.g. bird and beast and fish. For [35] these are of the same genus and co-ordinate, since animal is divided into these—into bird and beast and fish. And none of them is prior or posterior, but things of this kind are thought to be simultaneous by nature. (Each of these might itself be [15a1] further divided into species—I mean beast and bird and fish). So those things resulting from the same division of the same genus will also be simultaneous by nature. Genera, however, are always prior to species since they do not reciprocate as [5] to implication of existence; e.g. if there is a fish there is an animal, but if there is an animal there is not necessarily a fish. Thus we call simultaneous by nature those things which reciprocate as to implication of existence provided that neither is in any way the cause of the other’s existence; and also co-ordinate species of the same [10] genus. And we call simultaneous without qualification things which come into being at the same time.
14 · There are six kinds of change: generation, destruction, increase, diminution, alteration, change of place. That the rest are distinct from one another [15] is obvious (for generation is not destruction, nor yet is increase or diminution,6 nor is change of place; and similarly with the others too), but there is a question about alteration—whether it is not perhaps necessary for what is altering to be altering in virtue of one of the other changes. However, this is not true. For in pretty well all the [20] affections, or most of them, we undergo alteration without partaking of any of the other changes. For what changes as to an affection does not necessarily increase or diminish—and likewise with the others. Thus alteration would be distinct from the [25] other changes. For if it were the same, a thing altering would, as such, have to be increasing too or diminishing, or one of the other changes would have to follow; but this is not necessary. Equally, a thing increasing—or undergoing some other change—would have to be altering. But there are things that increase without altering, as a square is increased by the addition of a gnomon but is not thereby [30] altered; similarly, too, with other such cases. Hence the changes are distinct from one another.
Change in general is contrary to staying the same. As for the particular kinds, [15b1] destruction is contrary to generation and diminution to increase, while change of place seems most opposed to staying in the same place—and perhaps to change towards the contrary place (upward change of place, for example, being opposed to [5] downward and downward to upward). As for the other change in our list, it is not easy to state what is contrary to it. There seems to be nothing contrary, unless here too one were to oppose staying the same in qualification or change towards the contrary qualification (just as with change of place we had staying in the same [10] place or change towards the contrary place). For alteration is change in qualification. Thus to change in qualification is opposed staying the same in qualification or change towards the contrary qualification (becoming white, for example, being [15] opposed to becoming black). For a thing alters through the occurrence of change towards contrary qualifications.
15 · Having is spoken of in a number of ways: having as a state and condition or some other quality (we are said to have knowledge and virtue); or as a [20] quantity, like the height someone may have (he is said to have a height of five feet or six feet); or as things on the body, like a cloak or tunic; or as on a part, like a ring on a hand; or as a part, like a hand or foot; or as in a container, as with the measure of [25] wheat or the jar of wine (for the jar is said to have wine, and the measure wheat, so these are said to have as in a container); or as a possession (for we are said to have a house and a field). One is also said to have a wife, and a wife a husband, but this seems to be a very strange way of ‘having’, since by ‘having a wife’ we signify [30] nothing other than that he is married to her. Some further ways of having might perhaps come to light, but we have made a pretty complete enumeration of those commonly spoken of.