AT this stage of our inquiry, we have opened up the play—the to-and-fro movement—of science, hermeneutics, and praxis. In exploring the new image of science that has been developing in the postempiricist philosophy and history of science, we have witnessed the recovery of the hermeneutical dimension of science in both the natural and the social sciences. In the philosophy of the natural sciences, this development has been characterized as having begun with an obsession with the meaning and reference of single terms (logically proper names and ostensive definition), moved to the search for a rigorous criterion for discriminating empirically meaningful sentences or propositions, shifted to the evaluation of competing conceptual schemes, and finally turned to the realization that science must be understood as a historically dynamic process in which there are conflicting and competing paradigm theories, research programs, and research traditions. In order to gain a fruitful perspective on the rationality of science itself, it is necessary to see that reasons and arguments employed by the community of scientists are grounded in social practices and that there is an essential openness in the very criteria and norms that guide scientific activity. There has been a growing awareness of the vital role that interpretation plays at every stage of scientific activity and a questioning of any permanent division between observation and theory. The distinction between the relevant facts and observations and our theoretical explanation of these is a changing and a pragmatic one; what are taken to be the facts themselves are shaped by our preunderstandings and theoretical interpretations. We have come to appreciate the extent to which scientific theories are underdetermined by the “facts” and how this allows for alternative and competing theoretical explanations. We have seen the error of thinking that there is or can be some calculus or algorithmic decision procedure for evaluating scientific hypotheses and theories. Although much of the polemic in the field of the philosophy and history of science is still influenced by the dichotomy of objectivism and relativism, this dichotomy obscures the underlying coherence and the common ground shared by the participants in the discussion. And central to this new understanding is a dialogical model of rationality that stresses the practical, communal character of this rationality in which there is choice, deliberation, interpretation, judicious weighing and application of “universal criteria,” and even rational disagreement about which criteria are relevant and most important. It is an illusion to think that before the fact we always know (in principle) what will count as a decisive refutation of a proposed theory or that the epistemologist can discover fixed, permanent rules that are to be used to resolve differences. Various theories of “instant rationality” fail to capture what is distinctive about science as a rational activity. Yet alternative paradigms, theories, and research programs can be warranted by communal rational argumentation. What is to count as evidence and reasons to support a proposed theory can be rationally contested—even what is to count as proper criticism. Hunches, intuitions, guesses all have a role to play in scientific inquiry, but the scientist never escapes the obligation to support his or her judgments with the best possible reasons and arguments. Communal decisions and choices are not arbitrary or merely subjective. There may be losses and gains in the replacement of one scientific tradition by another, but science does progress. The new understanding of science does not call into question scientific progress and the growth of scientific knowledge but rather faulty epistemological doctrines that claim that progress can be measured by an appeal to a permanent ahistorical matrix or a neutral descriptive language. The “truth” of the incommensurability thesis does not support the type of relativism suggested by the Myth of the Framework, according to which we are prisoners trapped in closed linguistic frameworks. Rather it enables us to become more sensitive to the challenges to be confronted in the comparison and evaluation of different paradigms and theoretical orientations.
We have seen, too, how many parallels there are between the rationality debates in the natural sciences and the social sciences. We have noted that the hermeneutical dimension is even more important in the social disciplines than in the natural sciences, since the social disciplines are concerned with human beings who are always engaged in the social construction and deconstruction of their world. While such a difference presents us with a variety of problems in the understanding of human beings, it is not sufficient to justify our concluding that there is a logical gap or a conceptual dichotomy between the natural and social disciplines. A false picture is suggested when we think that our task is to leap out of our own linguistic horizon, bracket all our preunderstandings, and enter into a radically different world. Rather the task is always to find the resources within our own horizon, linguistic practices, and experience that can enable us to understand what confronts us as alien. And such understanding requires a dialectical play between our own preunderstandings and the forms of life that we are seeking to understand. It is in this way that we can risk and test our own prejudices, and we can not only come to understand what is “other” than us but also better understand ourselves.
Underlying the recovery of the hermeneutical dimension of the sciences is a practical-moral concern, one which seeks to root out the various forms of scientism and positivism that are still so prevalent and to open a space for the concept of “learning from” what is different and alien, and for reclaiming the integrity of the concept of practical wisdom.
The recovery of the hermeneutical dimension of the sciences has led to an encounter with philosophic hermeneutics itself, especially as it has been elaborated by Gadamer. Ever since the nineteenth century, whenever an appeal has been made to hermeneutics to clarify what is distinctive about the Geisteswissenschaften, there has been a tendency to contrast the Geisteswissenschaften with the Naturwissenschaften—to “locate” some fixed principle of demarcation. But much of this discussion and many of the typical contrasts between the Naturwissenschaften and the Geisteswissenschaften have been based on a false and discredited epistemological understanding of the natural sciences. There are continuities and differences among these various disciplines, and these continuities and differences are shifting and pragmatic. Whereas an earlier stage of inquiry was directed to the search for some fixed and rigorous principle of demarcation—between science and nonscience, or between the natural and the social sciences, or between Naturwissenschaften and Geisteswissenschaften, this global strategy has now been replaced by the highlighting of changing pragmatic differences.
We have seen, too, how in the twentieth century there has been a significant shift in the very understanding of hermeneutics. Hermeneutics is now claimed to be ontological and universal. In Gadamer’s investigations of the role of prejudgments and prejudices in all understanding and knowing, in his restoration of the centrality of the concept of tradition as always effectively shaping what we are in the process of becoming, in his attempt to situate rationality itself within the context of developing, living traditions, we have pursued themes that are implicit in the recovery of the hermeneutical dimension of the natural and social sciences. But the movement or play here is not simply in one direction. Gadamer, we have seen, is at his weakest in clarifying the role of argumentation in the validation of all claims to truth and in elucidating the nature of criticism in hermeneutical interpretation. His contrast between Method and Truth is overdrawn. This dichotomy obscures the continuity between the Naturwissenschaften and the Geisteswissenschaften. The judgmental character of evaluating competing scientific theories and paradigms is more like the judgmental character of evaluating rival hermeneutical interpretations than Gadamer makes explicit. And just as it is essential to focus attention on the effective criteria for evaluating rival theories and research traditions in science, there is an analogous problem when it comes to testing and evaluating rival interpretations of texts, works of art, and traditions.
The outstanding theme in Gadamer’s philosophic hermeneutics is his fusion of hermeneutics and praxis, and the claim that understanding itself is a form of practical reasoning and practical knowledge—a form of phronēsis. Initially Gadamer’s appeal to phronēsis was introduced to clarify the moment of application or appropriation that is involved in all understanding. But in arguing that hermeneutics itself is the heir to the older tradition of practical philosophy, Gadamer has sought to show how the appropriation of the classical concepts of praxis and phronēsis enables us to gain a critical perspective on our own historical situation, in which there is the constant threat and danger of the domination of society by technology based on science, a false idolatry of the expert, a manipulation of public opinion by powerful techniques, a loss of moral and political orientation, and an undermining of the type of practical and political reason required for citizens to make responsible decisions. I have tried to show how the various paths that Gadamer pursues all contribute to an understanding of our being-in-the-world as dialogical, and how they contribute to the movement beyond objectivism and relativism. But at the same time I have sought to expose some of the deficiencies and tensions in his own appropriation of praxis and phronēsis and to reveal the radical thrust of his own thinking, one which points to the goal of nurturing the type of dialogical communities in which phronēsis can be practiced and where the freedom of all human beings is concretely realized.
In this part, I want to explore further the issues that arise in addressing our historical situation and in understanding the meaning of praxis, phronēsis, and such related concepts as practical discourse and judgment. And I want to do this by considering the contributions to this conversation by two thinkers who at once have a great deal in common with Gadamer but who also give strikingly different emphases than Gadamer does to the significance of praxis: Jürgen Habermas and Hannah Arendt. By playing off the strengths and weaknesses of these thinkers against each other, we can enrich our understanding of praxis and of the tasks that confront us in our historical situation. I also want to test the projects of Gadamer and Habermas against the type of deconstructive criticism that has become so fashionable today. By pressing the objections of Richard Rorty, I hope to show that despite what at first might appear to be a devastating critique, Rorty helps to bring out the most essential insights in the respective visions of Gadamer and Habermas. Throughout this part, then, my primary objective is to bring forth the ground that is shared which helps to make sense of the differences among these thinkers. It is this common ground that is most relevant to us and that enables us to grasp what might be called the modern (or postmodern) paradox concerning the prospects of human praxis—that the type of solidarity, communicative interaction, dialogue, and judgment required for the concrete realization of praxis already presupposes incipient forms of the community life that such praxis seeks to foster. Finally, we will see the sense in which the movement beyond objectivism and relativism is itself a practical task.