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Hermeneutical Considerations: Part 1

T his chapter and the next will deal with several hermeneutical questions related to slavery and the issue of women’s roles. The focus will be on William Webb’s criteria that he presents in Slaves, Women, and Homosexuals . ³¹⁷ The first section of this chapter will address more fully the issue of theological analogy. The second section will discuss two of Webb’s criteria that are closely related: preliminary movement and seed ideas. The last section will deal with purpose/intent statements. The next chapter will include a study of four additional issues that are even more pivotal in the discussion: basis in original creation, primogeniture, specific instructions versus general principles, and the relationship between creation and redemption.

Theological Analogy

Webb writes, “A component of a text may be transcultural if its basis is rooted in the character of God or Christ through theological analogy.” ³¹⁸ He considers this criterion inconclusive, and seeks to demonstrate this by providing examples of theological analogy, only some of which support transcultural commands. He first cites verses that command love, holiness, and forgiveness, and relate those commands to God’s love, holiness, and forgiveness. ³¹⁹ Webb then states, “Assuming that the call for Christian love, holiness and forgiveness is transcultural in nature (although I have not made the case here), these examples show that theological analogy often accompanies instructions with a transcultural status.” ³²⁰

The next four examples are intended to show that this is not always the case. He deals with slavery, citing Ephesians 6:5–9, Colossians 3:22–4:1, and 1 Peter 2:18–25, discussing the fact that slavery proponents appealed to theological and Christological analogies as evidence that slavery should be an abiding practice. Webb concludes, “However, if slavery should be assessed as cultural within Scripture (a position developed above), then obviously theological analogy at times accompanies biblical instructions with a dominant cultural component.” ³²¹ Similarly, proponents of monarchy have pointed to theological analogies to support their position, says Webb. “After all, God and Christ are frequently presented as ruling kings (e.g., 1 Tim. 6:15; Rev. 17:14; 19:16). Along with the biblical instructions to submit to the king, it was argued that only a monarchy properly represented God’s sovereign reign over the earth.” ³²²

Next, Webb cites primogeniture as another cultural component of the Bible that is connected to theological analogies. “For instance, the exalted status of Christ is frequently patterned around the special status given to the firstborn.” ³²³ Webb’s last example is right-handedness, which he examined briefly earlier in the book in his section on “breakouts.” ³²⁴ There he observes several texts that reflect the ancient Near Eastern assumption that right-handedness is superior to left-handedness (Gen. 48:18; 1 Chron. 6:39; Ex. 15:6, 12; Ps. 110:1; cf. Matt. 22:44). Then he cites Judges 3:12–30 (cf. 20:16) in which left-handedness breaks out of the cultural right-handed paradigm.

In his summary of these examples of theological analogy, Webb develops a “double-sided guiding principle”:

To the extent that the theological analogy is direct and in a sense “literal” in its overlap of the human and divine, it is more likely to endorse transcultural concepts. In a (more) “literal” sense God is a lover, a forgiver and one who is holy. On the other hand, to the extent that the theological analogy is less direct and less literal, it is more prone to reflect cultural concepts. God is not literally a slave, a monarch, a firstborn or a right-handed individual (italics original). ³²⁵

So Webb’s inference from these examples is that the degree of overlap will determine whether the theological analogy is supporting something that is transcultural. He then makes a statement that is very important for this discussion, and it contains a significant and valid point: “When the biblical text addresses human sociological structures, there is a significant possibility that the theological analogy is intended to motivate behavior within existing structures without necessarily endorsing the structures themselves as transcultural.” ³²⁶

This is helpful, because it is exactly what we see happening in the slavery passages. The theological analogies are used to motivate the behavior of those who are being persecuted or afflicted in some way, but in no way is there an endorsement of the structures that are the means of affliction. This is seen clearly in 1 Peter, as I discussed in chapter 2. ³²⁷ In 1 Peter 3 there is a theological analogy related to how believers should respond to suffering and persecution. In a way similar to the instructions to slaves, suffering Christians are told, “But even if you should suffer for righteousness’ sake, you will be blessed” (v. 14). Peter instructs, “in your hearts honor Christ the Lord as holy” and make your defense “with gentleness and respect, having a good conscience” (vv. 15–16). Also similar to the commands to slaves, he says, “For it is better to suffer for doing good, if that should be God’s will, than for doing evil” (v. 17). In verse 18 Peter points to the example of Christ’s suffering, “For Christ also suffered once for sins.” As I pointed out in chapter 2, we certainly would not use this theological analogy to argue that Peter is in any way endorsing the persecution or slandering of Christians. Similarly, the same analogy used in 1 Peter 2 should not be read as an endorsement of slavery. As Webb says, it is meant to motivate behavior, not support a structure of society.

The crucial question, then, is whether Webb’s statement applies to the structure of male headship. Is it legitimate to conclude, as we have done with the slavery issue in 1 Peter, that the theological analogies in Ephesians 5 and 1 Corinthians 11 are used merely to motivate behavior without endorsing male headship? ³²⁸ Arguing against this conclusion are some important differences between what we have observed in 1 Peter and the theological analogies of Ephesians 5 and 1 Corinthians 11—differences that are overlooked by Webb. I have noted some of these differences in my exegesis of Ephesians 5 and 1 Corinthians 11 in chapter 3, namely that these two passages are more than analogies. They are not just making a comparison, but describing significant aspects of God’s nature that are to serve as a pattern for male-female relationships. Below I will examine some additional key differences between the examples that Webb provides.

After providing the “neutral” examples of theological analogy, Webb turns to the women’s passages that contain a theological analogy. The problem with his reasoning here is that he too quickly identifies Ephesians 5 and 1 Corinthians 11 with the examples he has given of slavery, monarchy, primogeniture, and right-handedness. There may be some general similarities in that a correlation is made between the human realm and the divine realm. But this generalized similarity is not strong enough to justify Webb’s conclusions. This brings to light a difficulty in this discussion, which is the vagueness of what Webb is calling “theological analogy.” Based on his examples, he is using this phrase to refer to a very broad category. It may still be legitimate to conclude that all of these passages are using some kind of theological analogy, generally speaking. What is illegitimate, though, is to draw a specific conclusion from such general comparisons. Here is Webb’s conclusion:

The texts of Ephesians 5 and 1 Corinthians 11 fall into the second set of examples illustrated in the neutral section above. Surely, if we can learn anything from the slavery and monarchy debates of the past (not to mention the other examples cited above), it would be that theological analogy can just as easily append cultural-component injunctions in Scripture as it can transcultural instructions. ³²⁹

Again, it is a valid point that “theological analogy [according to Webb’s examples] can just as easily append cultural-component injunctions in Scripture as it can transcultural instructions.” Webb has made some helpful observations in establishing this point. However, what he has not established is the conclusion that Ephesians 5 and 1 Corinthians 11 are, in fact, in the category of culturally bound instructions. This conclusion is a leap of logic that is not grounded in any compelling observations from the texts themselves.

Based on Webb’s “double-sided guiding principle” that he developed from the various examples, we must infer that the general connection he is seeing between male headship, slavery, monarchy, primogeniture, and right-handedness is that they are all “less direct and less literal” than the analogies connected to love, holiness, and forgiveness. ³³⁰ But the vagueness of these assertions is seen in the fact that I could just as easily make a case for the opposite point. It could be argued that Christ’s headship over the church is analogous to the husband’s headship over his wife in a direct and literal way such that male headship is to emulate Christ’s headship just as our love, holiness, and forgiveness is to emulate God’s love, holiness, and forgiveness. The point is that determining whether an analogy is more or less literal is a subjective endeavor. We may all agree that in “a (more) ‘literal’ sense God is a lover, a forgiver and one who is holy,” while he “is not literally a slave, a monarch, a firstborn or a right-handed individual.” ³³¹ But when it comes to the debated question of male headship, Webb fails to show us why this belongs in the latter category. He has not established his point from his examples.

An additional unfounded assertion is that Paul could have used the Christological analogy of Ephesians 5 in an egalitarian culture and “reapplied it to an egalitarian relationship between husband and wife.” ³³² In this case, Paul would have encouraged not only the husband, but also the wife, to sacrificially love and serve each other as Christ did for the church. Webb cites Philippians 2:1–11 as an example of Paul applying “the same servant Christology to mutual submission contexts that he does to unilateral submission situations.” ³³³ This passage would certainly fit into Webb’s category of theological analogy. It is very similar, in fact, to the examples of love, holiness, and forgiveness that Webb has cited. Here Christians are enjoined to be humble as Christ is humble. But it seems to be a stretch to call this a mutual submission text when the word “submission” is not used. The instruction concerns humility, not submission. Of course, there are similarities and overlap between the two, but they are not the same. Therefore, we cannot label Philippians 2:1–11 a mutual submission text, and Webb’s assumption that Paul could have reapplied the Christological analogy of Ephesians 5 to an egalitarian relationship is left without any support or parallel.

Webb also discusses theological analogy in the book of Hosea. He quotes from Hosea 2:3 in this way: “I [Hosea] will strip her [Gomer] naked and make her as bare as on the day she was born.” ³³⁴ Webb acknowledges that it would be easy to think of this analogy purely in terms of divine judgment. But he rightly observes that “the text is not really talking about a judge. The main actor is a husband, a husband who disciplines his wife for her promiscuity.” ³³⁵ Then he concludes, “The dilemma with theological analogy should be apparent. We cannot use the theological analogy in Ephesians 5 to endorse that material as completely transcultural without doing the same in Hosea 2.” ³³⁶

Let us first examine the analogy in Hosea 2. Throughout chapters 1–3, the relationship between Hosea and Gomer provides a vivid illustration of Yahweh’s relationship to Israel. At certain points Hosea and Gomer are primarily in view, for instance when personal details are given concerning their relationship and their children. But at other points the husband-wife relationship is used mainly as a parable of Yahweh and Israel. Chapter 2 seems to fall into the latter category. A. A. Macintosh observes that “[chapter 2] contains material largely concerned with the relationship of Yahweh and Israel but explained by the ubiquitous parable of a man’s love for his unfaithful wife. Here there is not explicit personal testimony; rather, appeal is made by the use of the parable to the feelings of those who receive the words.” ³³⁷ So in the imagery of the marriage relationship, Israel is being warned by God to flee from her idolatrous ways.

The reference in verse 3 to stripping the wife naked is curious. As Webb points out, this is hard to grasp for the modern reader, for it seems to be an inappropriate and demeaning punishment. Scholars have suggested that this practice was commonly connected with divorce or as a punishment for unfaithfulness. But Duane Garrett does not find these interpretations compelling, and sees in this passage (along with similar statements in Jer. 13:22–27; Ezek. 16:37–39; Nah. 3:4–5) the threat of exile. ³³⁸ He observes that in Hosea 2:10 and Ezekiel 16:37–39 the husband strips his wife in the presence of her lovers . This is something that “no injured husband would do,” Garrett says. “Clearly, the imagery has moved out of the realm of actual Israelite customs for dealing with an adulteress and into an artificial, parabolic world in which metaphors are molded to suit the prophet’s message. The ‘lovers’ are the foreign nations and their gods, and the exposure of the woman is the abandonment of Israel to foreign domination.” ³³⁹ He concludes, “We have no grounds for asserting that Hosea cast Gomer naked out of his house, much less that he called in her former clients and stripped her in their presence. . . . Unlike 1:2–3 or 1:8, 2:3 is not autobiographical; its real focus is the exile and devastation that is ahead for the nation.” ³⁴⁰

These observations call into question the claim that Hosea 2 contains a theological analogy comparable to Ephesians 5. The statements in Hosea 2 are directed primarily toward the nation of Israel. The focus is not on Hosea and Gomer, and hence it should not be understood as conveying what Hosea literally did to Gomer. Rather, it describes a spiritual reality in human terms. The stripping of Gomer functions as a metaphor of Yahweh’s disciplinary action against Israel.

There are two significant differences between Hosea 2 and Ephesians 5 that undermine the parallel Webb seeks to establish. First, it is crucial to recognize that the book of Hosea contains no commands for husbands to strip their wives if they commit adultery. The passage is descriptive (and metaphorical), not prescriptive. This is also the case in the examples of slavery, monarchy, primogeniture, and right-handedness, for the Bible does not contain explicit commands for any of these practices. ³⁴¹ They are present as a piece of the culture in which the Bible was written, and they are used metaphorically to describe spiritual realities. But we do not encounter instructions to perpetuate these structures or customs. On the other hand, Ephesians 5 gives clear and specific commands to wives and husbands. This text is prescriptive, and thus establishes a significant difference from Hosea 2 and from many other analogies that describe rather than prescribe. ³⁴²

Second, Hosea 2 describes God’s relationship to Israel in terms of a human marriage, which is very different from Ephesians 5 where human marriage is described in terms of Christ’s relationship to the church. In the first case, the analogy is working from the human realm to the divine realm, whereas in the second case the analogy works from the divine realm to the human realm. Hence, Hosea 2 does not formally match Webb’s description of a theological analogy. The statement of this criterion is, “A component of a text may be transcultural if its basis is rooted in the character of God or Christ through theological analogy.” ³⁴³ But in Hosea 2:3 there is nothing rooted in the character of God or Christ. The analogy is working in the opposite direction, and would more properly be labeled an anthropo logical analogy. A human relationship is used as a metaphor to describe God’s relationship with His people. This is an anthropo logical analogy, whereas Ephesians 5 is a Christ ological analogy—Christ’s relationship to the church is given as the pattern to be emulated in human marriage. This point applies to the other examples as well. When metaphors of slavery, monarchy, primogeniture, or right-handedness are used to describe God or Christ, it is a human illustration that is used to describe a divine characteristic. An element from the culture is being used to describe God or Christ, whereas in Ephesians 5 and 1 Corinthians 11 the nature of God and Christ is used to demonstrate the pattern for male-female roles. The two sets of analogies are functioning in markedly different ways.

Therefore, we can deduce a clearer principle from these examples. In the case of anthropological analogies, we should not draw from them a necessary endorsement of the human institution or custom that is being used. The divine side of the analogy certainly remains true, but that does not mean the earthly illustration is necessarily intended to be transcultural. Especially since these earthly conditions are not prescribed, we have no good reason to interpret the analogies as such. So when we read that God is “King of kings and Lord of lords” (1 Tim. 6:15; see also Rev. 17:14; 19:16, speaking of Christ), we are given a helpful illustration of God’s sovereign power and authority. But we would not be justified in using that illustration to argue in favor of a monarchical form of government. Similarly, the statement that Jesus Christ sits at the right hand of the Father (Ps. 110:1; Matt. 22:44; 26:64) tells us something about the honor bestowed on the Son, but that cannot be taken to mean right-handedness is better than left-handedness. ³⁴⁴ Again, a cultural notion has been used to make a theological point. Thus Webb’s principle should be modified by observing this critical distinction. When the analogy is working from the human realm to the divine realm, it is quite possible that the human illustration is cultural. However, when a divine characteristic is given as a pattern to emulate, then the presence of an analogy gives no basis for concluding that it is cultural.

The last point I want to make about theological analogy is simply to reiterate the unique nature of Ephesians 5 and 1 Corinthians 11. ³⁴⁵ In the other examples given by Webb, some kind of comparison is made for the purpose of describing a spiritual reality or motivating behavior within a cultural structure. But in 1 Corinthians 11 and Ephesians 5, Paul is doing more than just making a comparison. In 1 Corinthians 11:3 he demonstrates the pattern of authority that exists in three important relationships—Christ’s headship over man, a husband’s headship over his wife, and God’s headship over Christ. Thus, a connection is made between the authority structure within the Godhead and the authority structure within marriage. And in Ephesians 5 Paul quotes Genesis 2:24 not merely in reference to human marriage, but as the mystery of Christ’s union with the church. In neither passage is he simply drawing on an abstract reality in order to illustrate how he thinks husbands and wives should relate to one another. He is not just saying that one thing is like another. It is deeper than that. These passages are telling us something about how God designed the universe. The other examples of theological analogy, whatever terminology we use, do not provide a sufficient parallel to these passages dealing with male-female roles. ³⁴⁶

I still agree with the statement that theological analogy is an inconclusive criterion by which to determine whether a passage is transcultural. I appreciate Webb’s conclusion that theological analogies may very well appear in texts that motivate behavior but do not endorse a cultural structure. We part ways, however, concerning the question of whether this is the case in Ephesians 5 and 1 Corinthians 11. Each text must be examined individually, and when this is done we discover some compelling reasons to differentiate these two texts from the others.

Preliminary Movement and Seed Ideas

This section will interact with the first two criteria Webb presents in his book. They are closely related, and they are both included in his chapter titled, “Persuasive Criteria.” Prior to this chapter, Webb explains that his categorization of persuasive, moderately persuasive, and inconclusive criteria is based on the outcome of each criterion as it relates to the issue of women’s roles. ³⁴⁷ His persuasive criteria, then, are considered pivotal in this debate, and he begins with the two I am going to address here: preliminary movement and seed ideas.

Preliminary Movement

With this criterion Webb analyzes the commands given to slaves and to women ³⁴⁸ as they compare to the norms of the culture in which they were given . Where the biblical commands are different from the cultural norms, there is “movement.” The important question, then, is whether this should be considered “absolute movement,” meaning the biblical commands portray how things are supposed to be, or “preliminary movement,” meaning “the biblical author pushed society as far as it could go at that time without creating more damage than good; however, it can and should ultimately go further.” ³⁴⁹ Within the discussion of this criterion, Webb does not give a final answer as to how this question should be answered. It is not his intention to do so. Rather, he merely intends to raise this question of whether the cultural movement we see in Scripture should be viewed as absolute or preliminary. ³⁵⁰

Regarding slavery, he mentions several ways in which the biblical commands are kinder and less restrictive than the surrounding culture. Among many Old Testament examples, he includes the New Testament instructions to masters, enjoining them to treat their slaves well (Col. 4:1; Eph. 6:9). He also mentions the Bible’s condemnation of slave trading, and he cites 1 Timothy 1:10 in a footnote. ³⁵¹

Regarding women, he discusses several Old Testament instructions that are much more humane than the norms in the ancient Near East. Moving to the New Testament, he observes “canonical movement” on the issue of divorce. As opposed to the Old Testament, where only men initiate divorce, the New Testament “extends the right of initiating divorce to women,” citing in the footnote Mark 10:12 and 1 Corinthians 7:10–16. ³⁵² He also refers to the Household Codes and the “softening of the husband side” of these codes. While wives are commanded to submit, husbands are not commanded to “rule” or “lead,” but rather to “love.” “Paul assumes the status quo for women; however, he pushes the boundaries for men with the direction of his command.” ³⁵³

In his summary of this criterion, Webb says that “the women texts, like the slavery texts, are generally ‘less restrictive’ or ‘softening’ relative to the broader culture.” ³⁵⁴ This is a valid observation. In both cases, there is a welcomed “softening” of these relationships as compared with the original culture. Webb does not try to make too much of this point, which is fitting. Therefore, the question remains as to whether this movement is absolute or preliminary, so the discussion continues on to seed ideas.

Seed Ideas

Webb describes seed ideas as texts that “suggest and encourage further movement on a particular subject.” ³⁵⁵ The question is whether Webb can demonstrate that the texts he adduces, in fact, do so. A more specific question arises as well, namely, Webb’s precise meaning of “further movement.” Webb’s idea of movement, as suggested by the quotations in the last section, presupposes that an ultimate ethic exists that is beyond what the New Testament presents. He writes of redemptive movement earlier in the book, saying, “The interpreter extrapolates the biblical movement toward a more just, more equitable and more loving form. If a better ethic than the one expressed in the isolated words of the text is possible, and the biblical and canonical spirit is headed in that direction, then that is where one ultimately wants to end up.” ³⁵⁶

The question, though, is whether one needs to move beyond the ethic of the New Testament. We need not (indeed, we must not) move beyond the final and authoritative instructions of God’s Word. To use Webb’s terminology, what we see in the New Testament represents “absolute movement” rather than “preliminary movement.” First, as I tried to show in chapter 2, the NT does not endorse slavery. It is not as though we need to find a way to move beyond the NT endorsement of slavery, because that endorsement does not exist. And while we would like the NT to explicitly condemn slavery, there are some reasonable explanations for why we do not find this. ³⁵⁷

Second, I agree with the words of F. F. Bruce, which Webb cites in his section on the seed ideas related to slavery, that Paul’s letter to Philemon brings “us into an atmosphere in which the institution could only wilt and die.” ³⁵⁸ This is the way the ethic of the NT has worked itself out over the centuries. It is certainly a great disappointment that it took such a long time before societies began to abolish slavery. But we must affirm that human depravity is the reason for this, not a failure to see beyond the ethic of the NT. There is nothing deficient in the Bible’s ethic, but there are great deficiencies in the way we apply that ethic in our own lives. So it was not a matter of finding an ultimate social ethic, but rather the NT ethic had to pervade the consciousness of a society such that it finally dismantled the institution of slavery.

I also resonate with Webb’s quotation of Craig Blomberg, commenting on 1 Corinthians 7:21, “But Paul sowed the seeds for a revolutionary alternative in Christ which in time could only but threaten social institutions of oppression” (emphasis added). ³⁵⁹ Thus, we can speak of “seed ideas” without implying that an ethic beyond that of the NT is needed. The statements about slavery to which Webb points (1 Cor. 7:21 and Philem. 15–16; also the statements of unity in 1 Cor. 12:13; Gal. 3:28; Col. 3:11) certainly point beyond slavery, but they do not point beyond the ethic of the NT. They constitute the ethic of the NT, and as that ethic has impacted individuals, and in turn cultures, there have been major changes regarding slavery.

But Webb sees in these verses a movement toward a superior ethic , and he compares the movement regarding slavery with the movement regarding patriarchy. In an earlier chapter, he exhorts complementarians to recognize that “as with slavery, the patriarchy found within the Bible does not offer us an ultimate social ethic.” ³⁶⁰ In the section on seed ideas pertaining to the issue of women’s roles, Webb first points to the much-debated verse, Galatians 3:28. Is this verse referring solely to spiritual equality (the complementarian position), or are there significant social ramifications as well (the egalitarian position)? This is essentially how Webb frames the question. ³⁶¹

Richard Hove, a complementarian, demonstrates that the question may not be this simple, for he sees some significant social implications in this verse, while denying that those social implications are at odds with other NT statements (e.g., 1 Tim. 2; 1 Cor. 11; 14; Eph. 5; 1 Peter 3). He draws points of application from three principles. “First, all God’s people are in Christ. Second, all God’s people, by virtue of being in Christ, are one. Third, the great mercies and blessing of God are given to all God’s people, without distinction, regardless of one’s sex, race, or social/financial background.” ³⁶² These profound truths portrayed in the statement of Galatians 3:28 will play themselves out in many practical ways in the Christian community. For instance, there should be no boasting or feelings of superiority over others. There ought to be a tangible sense of unity in the body of believers, and therefore self-centeredness, racism, and sexism must all be combated. Nobody should feel like an outcast in the church. ³⁶³ We must embrace the diversity and universality of God’s mission, “that people from all nations and walks of life comprise God’s people.” ³⁶⁴ There are many ways in which Galatians 3:28 has social implications for the church, and complementarians do not deny this. ³⁶⁵ The precise difference in viewpoint, then, relates to the nature and extent of the social implications.

As Webb proceeds in his discussion of Galatians 3:28, he contrasts Paul’s urgency regarding the Jew-Gentile component with the lack of urgency regarding the slave-master and male-female components of the verse. He says, “If one compares the inertia within the early church for Gentile equality to the pressure for equality in the cases of slavery and females, it would be like placing Niagara Falls next to a dripping tap.” ³⁶⁶ This is true, but we must question Webb’s explanation of why this is. He suggests pragmatic reasons. On the one hand, “Without [ethnic equality], there would probably be no universal gospel today.” On the other hand, “for Paul to press for social implications in the slave and the female categories might have been detrimental.” ³⁶⁷ There may be some truth in these statements. However, there was something else that contributed to the urgency of the Jew-Gentile issue. For example, when Paul confronted Peter in Galatians 2:11–14, his concern was that “their conduct was not in step with the truth of the gospel” (v. 14). In other words, it was a theological issue, not just a matter of expediency. ³⁶⁸ The inclusion of the Gentiles was bound up with the gospel, and therefore it was not simply a matter of social ethics. On the other hand, the institution of slavery was a cultural reality that the NT transformed from the inside out rather than attempting a social revolution. And the statement concerning male and female is addressed clearly and more fully in other places, in ways that do not contradict the unity proclaimed here.

The differences between the three categories listed in Galatians 3:28 cannot be explained simply in pragmatic terms. There are differences, indeed, but not because Paul was hesitant to confront his culture. Part of the problem with Webb’s construction, along with other egalitarians, is that he assumes Galatians 3:28 is about equality in roles , when it is better understood to be mainly a statement concerning unity . Webb says, “One must now ask if the ‘in Christ’ formula should carry social implications for the equality of women. It certainly did in Paul’s day for Gentiles. And, it did over the course of church history for slaves. Why should it not today for females?” ³⁶⁹ This verse could very well have reference to the equality of these categories of individuals, and certainly we affirm that men and women are equals. However, as Hove argues, the main thrust of the context is unity . He demonstrates that the statement “you are all one in Christ Jesus” cannot be taken to mean “you are all equal in Christ Jesus.” ³⁷⁰ He studies other places where the phrase occurs and finds that “in fact, ‘you are all one’ is used of diverse objects to denote one element they share in common; it is not used of similar objects to denote that they are the same (italics original).” ³⁷¹ Hence, Galatians 3:28 cannot be taken as a statement that male and female are equal in an unqualified sense. But Webb’s argument is not this bold. He rather sees Galatians 3:28 as one piece of the puzzle—one (significant) verse that points us in a certain direction as it is pieced together with other indicators of redemptive movement.

Still, the argument is suspect, for it assumes a fundamental similarity between slavery and male headship. Webb fails to see some important differences between the categories mentioned in the verse. The following quotation from Ronald Fung is helpful in this regard.

It appears that the three categories differ in nature, and that accordingly the social implementations for them are not the same. Whereas slavery, as a social institution created by sinful men, can and should be abolished, and the Jew/Gentile distinction, which retains its validity as a purely ethnic reality, has been transcended through the reconciliation accomplished by Christ (Eph. 2:14–16), the male/female distinction, unlike the other two, has its roots in creation itself and continues to have significance in the realm of redemption. ³⁷²

This supports Hove’s point that the oneness of this verse cannot mean equal in every respect . Certainly men and women are “one in Christ Jesus,” but we cannot use that statement to cancel out other instructions that are rooted in creation. The oneness we share in Christ is compatible with the distinct roles God has assigned to men and women; it is not necessary to set oneness and role distinctions at odds with one another.

The amazing truth of this verse should be neither minimized nor overstated. Complementarians are accused of the former, and egalitarians of the latter. We should recognize the new age that has dawned by virtue of Christ’s work. In him these earthly distinctions are no longer barriers. Hove summarizes, “Galatians 3:28 definitely describes a new, important, and exciting change. It is not difficult to imagine Paul’s enthusiasm as he proclaimed the truths of Galatians 3:26–29: You are all sons of God, you have all put on Christ, you are all fully heirs, you all have God’s Spirit and call out Abba , Father.” ³⁷³ On the other hand, it is not legitimate to use this verse to erase gender role distinctions that are established in other texts and rooted in creation.

The other verses that Webb addresses in this section are 1 Corinthians 11:11–12, which he analyzes again in an appendix and at much greater length in his article, “Balancing Paul’s Original-Creation and Pro-Creation Arguments: 1 Corinthians 11:11–12 in Light of Modern Embryology.” ³⁷⁴ I dealt with these verses in chapter 3, but here I want to probe further into the hermeneutical questions that are involved. Specifically, we must consider Webb’s suggestion that if Paul’s embryology was limited by his culture, then his understanding of gender relationships must have been similarly limited.

Webb points out that in 1 Corinthians 11:11–12, Paul describes woman as coming “from” man, while man is “through” woman. In Webb’s mind, the choice of prepositions here conveys an ancient understanding of embryology, that women were “reproductive gardens.” The common understanding was that the male provided the seed, while the woman provided the garden in which the seed grew. I quoted in chapter 3 from Judith Gundry-Volf, who offers a simpler and more reasonable explanation for the prepositions we find in these verses. ³⁷⁵ But what if Paul’s statement in 1 Corinthians 11:11–12 really reflects his understanding of embryology? It is possible that his wording is connected to the idea that women are “reproductive gardens.” Man is not born “from” woman, in Paul’s perception of things, but only “through” woman. If this is the case, how does that affect the way we interpret this passage? We will come to this question in due course.

Webb states in Appendix D, “The idea of man coming ‘through’ woman appears to reflect the ancient view of women as reproductive gardens, contributing nothing more than a fertile environment to the birthing process. Surely his distinction of woman ‘from’ man and man ‘through’ woman is culture-bound: scientific developments since Paul’s day have proven such.” ³⁷⁶ In Webb’s more detailed treatment of these matters in his journal article, he outlines three ancient views of embryology: the traditional one-seed theory, Aristotle’s modified one-seed theory, and the two-seed theory. ³⁷⁷ The second and third views are increasingly “egalitarian,” but Webb notes that they still include “minor aspects of distorted inequality and a deficient view of a mother’s contribution to her offspring.” ³⁷⁸

He then goes on to discuss Paul’s statement in 1 Corinthians 11:12, and he first admits, “The preposition dia by itself in ‘man comes through ( dia ) woman’ tells us nothing about what position Paul himself held.” ³⁷⁹ But then he asserts, “However, it is reasonably certain that Paul was arguing from a ‘minimalist’ embryo contribution perspective in 1 Cor. 11:12.” ³⁸⁰ It seems that Webb has not seriously considered any other explanations for these prepositions. ³⁸¹ Nor does he cite anyone who has suggested that the dia in verse 12 is somehow portraying a particular view of embryology. ³⁸²

Although it seems unlikely, it is possible that Webb is on to something here. Therefore, we come to the question of how this insight would affect our interpretation of the passage. Webb first posits a primary implication: “Paul, if he were alive today, would acknowledge the significance and weight of the female contribution within procreation.” ³⁸³ This is based on the Copernican revolution that has occurred in our understanding of human embryology. ³⁸⁴ He suggests, then, that the advances in our understanding of the woman’s ek contribution, and not just her dia contribution, “begins to tip the scales toward a much greater sense of balance and equality in gender status than would ever have been realized in the first-century Corinthian context.” ³⁸⁵ The verses (1 Cor. 11:11–12) already served to balance what Paul said previously (vv. 8–9), but even that was limited by first-century embryology. Now we understand that Paul, if writing today, could refer to man coming ek woman and not just dia woman. Hence we can see a greater significance in this verse as it modifies what the rest of the passage is communicating. This is the essence of Webb’s argument.

Webb draws out some secondary implications. Three are stated. First, “one wonders if a mother’s half-of-the-chromosome ( ek ) contribution to the whole child should count for something when compared to an only-the-rib ( ek ) contribution from Adam to Eve.” Second, “one wonders if the repeated enactment of the ‘creation pattern’ in procreation should count for something when compared to the singular event of the garden.” And third, “one wonders if the production of female offspring within procreation theology should count for something since Paul’s ancient-world argument looks only at the production of males through females.” ³⁸⁶ It is Webb’s assertion that Paul’s limited understanding of embryology, and the development to our modern understanding of embryology, should heighten the significance of the “seed idea” in 1 Corinthians 11:12. Indeed, it should dramatically soften the teaching of male headship in this passage and elsewhere.

In the conclusion of the article, Webb reiterates his thesis: “Paul’s counterbalancing procreation argument must be given much greater weight in forging our contemporary application of gender relationships than was ever possible in Paul’s day” (emphasis original). ³⁸⁷ If Webb is right that Paul’s choice of prepositions in this verse represent his ancient view of embryology (I am not yet convinced of this), then it could be that the verse should be given at least some extra weight in the way we apply it today. Regardless of whether Paul’s discussion here is tied to specific views of embryology, the fascinating insights that Webb includes in this article should certainly give us a greater appreciation for the beautiful interdependence of the sexes. Modern embryology has given us a much clearer picture of this, a picture unavailable in Paul’s day.

However, I disagree with Webb’s further statement, summarizing the corollary arguments. “Correspondingly, a set of corollary arguments suggest that the ‘applicational’ weight of Edenic creation theology must be given far less weight in shaping the extent of hierarchy within male-female relationships today than was ever possible in Paul’s day” (emphasis original). ³⁸⁸ I do not see how this statement follows logically, or is grounded in, the previous point. It may be true that a better understanding of procreation gives us a greater appreciation for the equality between the sexes, but it does not follow that the reference to creation order in verses 8–9 is diminished in any way. There continues to be a counterbalance between creation and procreation. In effect, Webb is trying to cancel out the significance of verses 8–9 with the statement in verse 12, based on the development of embryology. But this argument, as creative and fascinating as it may be, does not accomplish its goal. There are some helpful insights to be gleaned, but it does not provide a compelling reason for using Paul’s latter point (verse 12) to overshadow his former one (vv. 8–9). The two still fit together in a complementary manner.

Nothing in Webb’s “seed ideas” provides a compelling reason to move beyond the ethic of the New Testament. He does not demonstrate that further movement is implied or needed, and therefore we must conclude that what we are seeing in these passages is absolute movement, not preliminary movement.

Purpose/Intent Statements

I have discussed this criterion both in chapter 2 and chapter 3. There are four passages in view. Regarding slavery, Paul writes in 1 Timothy 6:1, “Let all who are under a yoke as slaves regard their own masters as worthy of all honor, so that the name of God and the teaching may not be reviled .” Similarly, in Titus 2:9–10, “Slaves are to be submissive to their own masters in everything; they are to be well-pleasing, not argumentative, not pilfering, but showing all good faith, so that in everything they may adorn the doctrine of God our Savior .” In the passages that instruct women, there are also two places where we find purpose clauses, one of them in the same context as the verses just cited. Just a few verses earlier in Titus 2, Paul writes, “and so train the young women to love their husbands and children, to be self-controlled, pure, working at home, kind, and submissive to their own husbands, that the word of God may not be reviled ” (vv. 4–5). Last, Peter’s statement to wives also contains a purpose clause. “Likewise, wives, be subject to your own husbands, so that even if some do not obey the word, they may be won without a word by the conduct of their wives , when they see your respectful and pure conduct” (1 Peter 3:1–2).

Webb’s statement of this criterion is as follows: “A component of a text may be culturally bound, if by practicing the text one no longer fulfills the text’s original intent or purpose. The other side of this criterion is that a text is more likely to be transcultural to the degree that its original purpose is fulfilled when practiced in a subsequent culture and time.” ³⁸⁹ In a footnote, Webb cites two places where this point has been made previously. First, Willard Swartley refers to this as he compares the issues of women and slavery: “Paul’s conservative stance on both issues appears motivated (at some places) by a concern that the gospel not be defamed.” In the next paragraph, he states, “This raises an important point when we interpret these texts, especially if unbelievers are now more offended when Christians argue for slavery or for male headship.” ³⁹⁰ Second, Mary Hayter lays down three principles for applying New Testament teaching today, and the first two are closely related to this discussion. “The first principle is that Church order , including specific directives on women’s place within the worshipping community, should always be designed to meet the interdependent objectives of glorifying God and edifying the whole congregation ” (italics original). ³⁹¹ Her second principle adds that church order should also “be designed to promote the proclamation of the Gospel.” ³⁹² She asserts that in the early church there was variety when it came to church order. There were consistent objectives, but various means of accomplishing those objectives. In the same way, churches today should consider how best to meet the objectives of glorifying God, edifying the congregation, and proclaiming the gospel. “Church order, then, must not be rigid and inflexible, but adaptable to local conditions.” ³⁹³

In Webb’s discussion, he proceeds to mention some neutral examples of purpose/intent statements. First is the holy kiss. ³⁹⁴ This command does not contain an explicit purpose clause, but the obvious intent is to demonstrate Christian charity and fellowship. But in our culture we would fail to accomplish this purpose, and even undermine it, if we implemented the command just as it is stated. ³⁹⁵ This is a helpful way of thinking about the problem of applying the holy kiss to our culture. If we were to greet others in our culture with a holy kiss, we would not be expressing Christian love and fellowship, but would rather make people feel very awkward and uncomfortable. Therefore, we apply these commands by discerning the intent of the physical action and adjusting it to what is appropriate in our culture (e.g., smile, handshake, hug). In this way, Webb’s point is helpful and illuminating. He concludes, “The underlying principle of Christian community and friendship remains transcultural, while the holy kiss itself is a culture-bound expression of these values.” ³⁹⁶ This is precisely how we ought to think about several passages (most notably in this discussion, the issue of head coverings in 1 Cor. 11). Therefore, Webb is helpful in his assessment of the holy kiss and how we ought to think about its application to our lives today.

However, as we move on to the other examples of purpose/intent statements (all of which include some kind of purpose statement, unlike the holy kiss), it becomes less clear that the purpose statements necessarily imply a cultural component to the text. As Wayne Grudem has pointed out, a redemptive-movement hermeneutic is not needed to address things such as the holy kiss. It is a relatively simple point, and one that is easily understood, that in some cases like this we find a cultural component that can and should be adjusted, while the underlying principle is still binding. ³⁹⁷ Webb’s statements concerning the holy kiss are right in line with this, but he stretches this observation too far when he tries to apply it in certain other places, as I will try to demonstrate.

The other passages that Webb discusses have to do with slavery, civil government, and women. I have already quoted the verses pertaining to slaves and women. Webb also quotes from 1 Peter 2:13–15, in this way: “submit . . . to the king . . . [ purpose ] for it is God’s will that by doing good you should silence the ignorant talk of foolish men.” ³⁹⁸ In their entirety, the verses read this way, “Be subject for the Lord’s sake to every human institution, whether it be to the emperor as supreme, or to governors as sent by him to punish those who do evil and to praise those who do good. For this is the will of God, that by doing good you should put to silence the ignorance of foolish people.” Webb argues that applying these verses in a democratic society would be detrimental to the gospel. Just as “slavery-form submission” no longer achieves the purpose stated in 1 Timothy 6:1 and Titus 2:9–10, so also “monarchy-type submission” does not achieve the purpose of silencing the ignorance of foolish people. Rather, Webb insists that we must move “to a more abstracted level of application” in order to fulfill the stated purpose of the biblical instruction. ³⁹⁹ In the case of slavery, this means “showing deference/respect in order to win people (employers).” ⁴⁰⁰ In terms of government, we should apply these verses by showing honor and respect toward our political leaders and submitting to the law, but not by obeying the president or other government leaders. ⁴⁰¹

Thus far, the basic point is valid that “slavery-form submission” and “monarchy-type submission” reveal cultural components of these texts. Neither the institution of slavery nor a monarchical form of government can be supported by these passages. However, is Webb making too much of 1 Peter 2:13–15? Certainly there are differences between Peter’s culture and ours, and our application of the passage will be affected by those differences, but it seems that Webb’s portrayal of the situation puts the two farther apart than is warranted. It seems to be implied by Webb that the verses call for personal obedience to any commands that an emperor might give to a citizen. ⁴⁰² But does this capture the thrust of Peter’s admonition? Would it not be better to see the principle as something like this: “Be a submissive citizen, abiding by the rules of the land”? In Peter’s culture, he could articulate this in terms of the emperor. In our democratic society, we think of it more in terms of our nation’s laws. But the principle remains. We are to be submissive, law-abiding citizens. ⁴⁰³

Thus, it is wrong to conclude that this command no longer fulfills its stated purpose. That would be true only if the instruction was at the same time an endorsement of monarchy. But if we recognize appropriately the principle that is conveyed, there is no reason to think that the purpose can no longer be fulfilled. As we conduct ourselves in our society as law-abiding citizens who are submissive to the governing authorities, we will be a positive witness for Christ and will silence those who want to ridicule Christianity. Similarly, in the case of slavery, the stated purpose of the instructions to slaves fails only if those instructions constitute an endorsement of the institution of slavery. I do not believe this is the case, as I argued in chapter 2.

Therefore, when we apply Titus 2:9–10 in the workplace, it does not mean we are supporting slavery. It simply means that employees should be submissive toward their employers, “well-pleasing, not argumentative, not pilfering, but showing all good faith.” As this submissive, good-natured attitude is fostered by Christian employees, they will “adorn the doctrine of God our Savior.” Thus, the case that Webb is trying to make in terms of purpose/intent statements is weakened considerably. It is not clear that by practicing these texts we are no longer fulfilling the text’s original intent or purpose. ⁴⁰⁴

This is related to a later criterion that Webb examines, which he considers to be a persuasive extrascriptural criterion. It is criterion 17: “Pragmatic Basis Between Two Cultures.” There we find a diagram of Webb’s ladder of abstraction. On the lower end of the ladder is the pragmatic basis for a command (e.g., leave the corners of your fields unharvested, Lev. 19:10). ⁴⁰⁵ Moving up the ladder brings us to the transcultural principle that we should help/feed the poor. At the top of the ladder, an even more abstracted principle is derived, namely, love your neighbor. The next example he uses is washing one another’s feet. Again there are significant differences between the pragmatic concerns of our culture and the culture in which this command was given (John 13:14). Since we no longer deal with the factors that made foot-washing necessary in the first century, we must move up the ladder of abstraction to apply this command generally in terms of serving others. ⁴⁰⁶

The ladder of abstraction is helpful, and so is Webb’s assessment of the foot-washing command. The ladder of abstraction is also helpful in discussing issues such as the holy kiss and head coverings. But Webb is less persuasive in the way he “moves up the ladder” with respect to the issues of civil government and wifely submission. With respect to civil government, he derives the abstracted principle of honoring leaders , based on the pragmatic differences between cultures. But the clearer abstracted principle is to be a submissive, law-abiding citizen . In one way Webb agrees, for he refers to obeying the law. ⁴⁰⁷ Neither do I disagree with Webb that we should honor our leaders (1 Peter 2:17). However, the way in which we move up the ladder is crucial, and it seems that Webb’s desire is to soften the submission command rather than preserve it and reapply it in a new setting. The principle of being a submissive, law-abiding citizen does more to preserve the essence of the command, while applying it to a democratic rather than a monarchical society.

Similarly with the submission commands to slaves, Webb draws the principle of “showing deference/respect in order to win people (employers).” ⁴⁰⁸ Again, it is true that we should show deference and respect toward employers, and that is certainly part of applying those passages. But we should derive a more specific principle, namely, submit to those in authority over you in the workplace. As Webb moves up the ladder the submission commands turn into deference, respect, and honor. But the principles of authority and submission should not be diminished just because of certain differences between cultures. Thus, Webb’s abstracted principles assume the egalitarianism that he is seeking to prove. He uses the ladder of abstraction to subtly minimize the authority-submission structure that is present in these passages.

In society, in the workplace, in the local church, ⁴⁰⁹ and in the home, God has ordained a certain structure and order. Therefore, while we must reapply the biblical commands in a different setting, we must be careful to preserve the principle that is contained in the command. We should be cautioned against some of the ways Webb abstracts principles from specific commands, for his process of abstraction often fails to maintain enough of a link with the biblical instruction. For instance, from 1 Timothy 2:12 he derives the following principle: “choose teachers/leaders who are worthy of high honor within the congregation.” ⁴¹⁰

To summarize, it is not clear that the purpose/intent statements necessarily imply a cultural component to the text. As Webb builds his case, it may appear to be persuasive. But two things should encourage caution. First, Webb’s method of deriving principles does not clearly capture the heart of the original commands. Second, and related to the first, is the assumption that we can no longer fulfill the purpose statements in our culture. Both of these points are examples of Webb’s tendency to portray certain hermeneutical questions as more complex than they are. The holy kiss, washing one another’s feet, and commands concerning civil government are explained relatively easily (and Webb offers some helpful ways of doing this). But it becomes a stretch—and overly complex and subjective—when those explanations are imposed on the texts regarding women.

There is one more important point in the discussion of purpose statements, and that is the assertion that wives submitting to husbands in our culture would contradict the intention for which those commands were given in the New Testament. Webb says of 1 Peter 3, “For today’s unbelieving husband who values his wife as a completely equal partner and who happily functions within a mutual-deference and mutual-honor framework, this kind of unilateral, patriarchy-type submission may actually repulse him and prevent him from being won to Christ.” ⁴¹¹

There are two problems with this statement. First, it casts biblical submission in a negative light, assuming that the principles of these verses would be offensive in our society. But when we think about wifely submission as presented here, accompanied by respectful and pure conduct, and the imperishable beauty of a gentle and quiet spirit, it is not at all clear that these things would repulse an unbelieving husband.

Second, Webb’s statement assumes that Peter gave these instructions primarily as a means to appease the culture of his day. In other words, Peter did not hold a deep-seated conviction that wifely submission was part of God’s plan for marriage, but rather he saw it as a pragmatic means of furthering the Christian mission in that setting. Peter Davids states the point more boldly:

Ironically, interpretations that focus on the unilateral obedience or submission of wives to husbands, regardless of cultural context, achieve the opposite of Peter’s intention. Rather than promoting harmony with culture, they set Christian marriage partners at odds with culture and thus heighten the tension, and Christianity is perceived as undermining culture in a retrogressive way. This is precisely what 1 Peter is seeking to minimize. ⁴¹²

This is in line with the view presented by David Balch, who maintains that Peter’s domestic code is mainly serving an apologetic function. Outsiders were ridiculing the Christian faith because of slaves and wives who had converted, and therefore “the author of 1 Peter encouraged the slaves and wives to play the social roles which Aristotle had outlined; this, he hoped, would shame those who were reviling their good behavior (3:16; 2:12).” ⁴¹³

We must question, though, whether Peter’s main intent was to appease the culture. Not all agree with this assessment. John Elliott takes issue with Balch’s proposal, stating that the exhortations given in 1 Peter cannot have as their goal conformity to the culture, for the Christian community was to have a “ distinctive identity” (emphasis original). ⁴¹⁴ He also says that Balch’s interpretation “fails to account for the letter’s repeated call for Christian separation from the world and it understates its missionary interests as well.” ⁴¹⁵ J. W. Pryor responds to both Balch and Elliott and asserts, “slaves and wives are called to behave in a certain way not because it will promote peace and may avoid conflict, nor out of conformity to society’s expectations, but because the pattern of submission is the will of God to whom they are bound as his people (2:13).” ⁴¹⁶

These are significant points. On the one hand, it is plain that Peter desired that Christians live in harmony with the surrounding culture. On the other hand, this must not be viewed as the main goal. There was an evangelistic motive, as Webb and Davids observe. But we also see the goal of maintaining a distinctive identity, and ultimately of doing the will of God. Therefore, it is unwarranted to conclude that Peter would give certain instructions to the church simply for the purpose of conforming to the culture. He would not present a less-than-ultimate ethic for the pragmatic purpose of living in harmony with one’s neighbors or even for the purpose of winning others to Christ. If Peter intended by this command that wives be submissive merely as a means to an end, surely there would be some clear indication of this. But no such indication can be found. ⁴¹⁷

In addition to this, we must recognize how Peter moves decisively against the cultural expectations of his day in this passage. Of course, he is moving against the culture by promoting the Christian gospel, and by advocating that Christian women continue in the faith even when that means rejecting the religion of a pagan husband. Davids provides a helpful portrait of the first-century landscape, showing what a radical idea this was in that setting, for it was expected that wives would follow the religion of their husbands. ⁴¹⁸ But even in the marriage relationship, Peter instructs husbands in a way that would have been very different from the prevailing assumptions of his culture (1 Peter 3:7). Specifically, he commands husbands to show honor to their wives. Steven Bechtler says, “The expression ‘bestowing honor’ ( aponemō timēn ) is common in the literature of antiquity, but, so far as I can determine, 1 Peter’s demand that the husband bestow honor on his wife is unique.” ⁴¹⁹ We also read the amazing statement of equality that Christian husbands and wives are co-heirs of the grace of life. So while Peter upholds the distinction in the roles of husbands and wives, he also emphasizes the fundamental equality between them. ⁴²⁰ This latter point would not have been a popular one. ⁴²¹ Hence, we must doubt the thesis that Peter desired conformity with the culture. Therefore, it is not convincing (1) that the submission of wives in 1 Peter 3 was merely for the purpose of conforming to the culture, nor (2) that the principles of 1 Peter 3 can no longer fulfill the stated purpose today.

Conclusion

In each section of this chapter, certain similarities can be detected between the slavery issue and the issue of women’s roles. In each case, we find theological analogies. In each case, the biblical commands demonstrate “movement” with respect to the culture in which those commands were given. And in each case there are purpose clauses attached to some of the commands. But these similarities do not form a compelling argument for interpreting the two sets of texts in the same way. In the case of theological analogies, I have noted important ways in which Ephesians 5 and 1 Corinthians 11 are distinct from the other passages Webb references. Concerning preliminary movement and seed ideas, it is true that there are New Testament passages that point beyond certain social structures of the first century. But we have no clear reasons for thinking that these texts point us beyond the ethic of the New Testament. Therefore, we can detect a movement beyond slavery that is inherent in the ethic of the New Testament. And we need not move beyond male headship, for the New Testament ethic prescribes it. We are happy to find movement when we compare the New Testament commands with the first-century culture, and we must recognize this to be “absolute movement,” not “preliminary movement.” Finally, regarding purpose/intent statements, the fact that these appear in both slavery and women’s texts does not imply any significant connection between the two issues. The presence of a purpose statement does not necessarily imply a cultural component to the command. Therefore, we have to examine each issue separately and discern how the commands are to be applied today.

Webb seeks to build a cumulative case as he works his way through the various criteria. Since there is an element of truth in many places, the cumulative effect may seem compelling. However, as we closely analyze each criterion we begin to see some weaknesses. The similarities between the issues of slaves and women are superficial rather than substantive, and the logic that ties the two together is suspect. This chapter has dealt with various arguments that emphasize the similarities between the two. The next chapter will continue the hermeneutical discussion by analyzing four additional criteria.

6

Hermeneutical Considerations: Part 2

T he last chapter dealt with three main arguments that Webb uses to bind together the slavery texts and the women’s texts. Now we come to a discussion of an important dis similarity between the two, namely, basis in original creation. This is what I will take up first in this chapter, including the related matter of primogeniture. Then we must step back and deal with two broader hermeneutical questions: the relationship between creation and redemption, and the relationship between specific instructions and general principles.

Basis in Original Creation

Webb’s discussion of original creation begins with a section on “patterns” in the creation account, and then moves specifically to the custom of primogeniture. As neutral examples, Webb points to nine issues that may be seen as “patterns” rooted in original creation, and his intention is to demonstrate that not all facets of the creation account are transcultural. ⁴²² The first example is transcultural, the prohibition against divorce. Jesus refers back to creation in his statement against divorce in Matthew 19:3–12 (Gen. 1:27; 2:24). Although the law permitted divorce, this was only because of the hardness of the human heart (Matt. 19:8). Webb states, “The social structure of lifelong marriage takes precedence over divorce regulations, since it reflects a higher moral ideal. In this instance, the creation pattern carries a strong transcultural force.” ⁴²³

Webb’s conclusion is surely right that the pattern of marriage in original creation is transcultural. However, he should be clearer as to the reason why lifelong marriage takes precedence over divorce regulations. Webb says it is because “it reflects a higher moral ideal.” I agree with this. And I assume Webb would agree with me when I say that Jesus’ words in Matthew 19 are binding simply because they are the words of Jesus. But the fact that Webb states one and not the other gives us an insight into his thinking. Webb is looking for “a higher moral ideal” which may or may not be contained in the Bible itself. But if we recognize that the New Testament is God’s final and authoritative word to his new covenant people, ⁴²⁴ then we can look at Matthew 19 and conclude that divorce is wrong because Jesus says so . And based on Jesus’ words we can look back to the creation account and see that from the very beginning God’s design for marriage has been lifelong faithfulness to one’s spouse. ⁴²⁵

Webb’s next example is polygamy, which is closely related to divorce. He says, though, that because of the polygamy practiced by the patriarchs, the creation account has only a “mild transcultural force” with regard to this matter. ⁴²⁶ It is much more helpful, though, to see polygamy as a practice that was tolerated but never condoned, just as in the case of divorce. ⁴²⁷ The instances of polygamy found in the Bible do not constitute an endorsement of it. Therefore, the pattern of original creation provides more than a mild transcultural principle regarding polygamy. God’s original design of one man and one woman speaks forcefully against both divorce and polygamy, which can be seen in the NT statements upholding monogamy. ⁴²⁸

The Sabbath and the related matter of the length of a workweek are two other examples Webb provides in this section. He says that “Sabbath offers a good example of a creation pattern with a significant cultural component.” ⁴²⁹ He goes on to describe the differences between now and then: “We live in an industrial, technological and informational society. The six-day work schedule was probably related to the agrarian setting of the original audience.” ⁴³⁰ In a footnote, and at the end of his summary on the next page, Webb acknowledges that salvation history may have something to do with the shift in how we apply the Sabbath. ⁴³¹ But his clear emphasis is on cultural factors that brought about change.

The issue of the Sabbath is not a simple one—certainly not as simple as an analysis of changing agricultural practices. It is true, as Webb points out, that God gave his people instructions concerning their cultivation of the land. Those instructions corresponded to the Sabbath principle of six periods of work followed by one period of rest. However, to call these directives “cultural” is to oversimplify the matter. The fact that these instructions do not apply directly to us does not mean that cultural factors are the sole (or even main) reason for this. Rather, it is in the development of salvation history that we find a much more illuminating answer to these questions. I will not try to defend a particular position here. But it is important to recognize that the answer lies not in the cultural factors of Old Testament agrarian practices, but in New Testament statements that elucidate the meaning and substance toward which the Old Testament Sabbath pointed. Therefore, it is overly simplistic, and thus misleading, to say that the pattern of Sabbath rest in the creation account is cultural. A more nuanced understanding of the issue would affirm that salvation history is by far the most significant factor in determining how to apply this creation pattern to our lives today.

Another cultural component, according to Webb, is the procreation command. God commanded the first couple, “Be fruitful and multiply and fill the earth and subdue it” (Gen. 1:28). Webb assumes that this command is at odds with any form of birth control, and therefore concludes that this must be a cultural component of the creation pattern and something we must significantly modify in our cultural context. We must ask, however, whether this procreation command means that everyone should have as many children as possible. That does not seem clear from the text. What is clear is the mandate to bear children, which is to be seen as a blessing from the Lord (Gen. 33:5; Ps. 127:3–5). We should not read this as an absolute mandate for all individuals to bear as many children as possible. First, this would mean that singleness is unacceptable. Second, it would imply that procreation is the primary (and possibly the sole) purpose of marriage. ⁴³² It is better, therefore, to understand Genesis 1:28 as a statement of God’s intent for marriage to be procreative. When taken in this straightforward way it does not constitute an absolute prohibition on birth control. Instead, it should be seen as a censure of those who would view childbearing as an inconvenience rather than a divine blessing. ⁴³³ Thus, in his treatment of the Sabbath issue and the procreation command, Webb’s hermeneutic is reductionistic and simplistic. This weakness seems to be evident throughout the discussion of original creation.

The issue of singleness is related, as we have just seen. If the creation pattern establishes the expectation that all individuals marry and have children, then singleness clearly deviates from that pattern. Webb says, “If the creation material provides a tightly ordered paradigm for all of humanity to follow, one might get the impression that singleness was outside the will of God.” ⁴³⁴ Of course, he acknowledges that this is not so, citing New Testament verses that portray singleness as honorable and even preferable for some (Matt. 19:11; 1 Cor. 7:7–9, 25–35). Therefore, concerning this issue, “most Christians would view departure from creation pattern as an acceptable option.” ⁴³⁵ But again, as in the case of the procreation command, we must ask whether the intent of the creation account is to command all individuals to be married. As Wayne Grudem points out, “to say that marriage is good does not imply that singleness is bad , or that marriage is required for every single individual, nor does the Genesis narrative imply those things (italics original).” ⁴³⁶

Thus, in the case of the procreation command and singleness, Webb has assumed unlikely and hermeneutically simplistic interpretations of the creation account in an attempt to heighten the perceived tension between original creation and today’s culture. ⁴³⁷ In this way he has set up reductionistic arguments that are easily dismantled.

This attempt becomes even more evident in the three remaining examples: farming as an occupation, ground transportation, and vegetarian diet. ⁴³⁸ These were facets of life in the garden of Eden, but these practices do not apply to all generations. Webb correctly concludes that we are not to require everyone to farm, to walk, or to eat only vegetables, just because that was the pattern in the garden. Indeed, we can determine relatively easily that these are not binding on subsequent generations. The Bible speaks of individuals who honored God in various occupations, indicating that farming is not the only acceptable way to make a living. ⁴³⁹ In the Bible, we also find alternative modes of transportation (e.g., by boat). ⁴⁴⁰ And we also know it is permissible to eat meat (e.g., Gen. 9:3). Therefore, it is not helpful to list these as creation patterns since biblical revelation itself clarifies that these practices were never intended to be transcultural. Thus, Webb’s mention of farming, ground transportation, and vegetarianism make it appear that he is grasping for ways to minimize the weight of the creation account. He is searching for ways to lessen the force of those New Testament passages that cite the creation account as a basis for role distinctions between men and women. ⁴⁴¹

It is much more helpful to let Scripture interpret Scripture. In this way we can look at Jesus’ words regarding divorce and conclude that the creation pattern of one man and one woman is an abiding expectation for marriage. In the case of the other creation patterns that Webb cites, we must examine each one according to the continuing revelation of Scripture to determine whether it is intended to be binding for other cultures. Thomas Schreiner states, “Complementarians, rightly understood, have never argued that every element of the creation narrative should be reproduced today. We have a canonical view of the Scriptures in which we see scripture as the interpreter of scripture, and the redemptive historical flow of the Bible is crucial.” ⁴⁴² In light of this, Webb’s discussion of creation patterns is unhelpful, unenlightening, and hermeneutically weak. His point is moot since the complementarian understanding of 1 Timothy 2:13 and 1 Corinthians 11:8–9 does not assume that the creation account is binding in all of its details. The point is rather that certain things God established at creation are extremely significant, and the New Testament reveals those aspects to us.

Following the discussion of neutral examples, Webb then examines the features of the creation narrative that pertain to the relationship between man and woman. He first lists two aspects that “reflect an egalitarian spirit”: the fact that both man and woman are created in God’s image, and the creation mandate that is given to both of them. ⁴⁴³ Complementarians certainly agree that the creation narrative portrays a fundamental equality between male and female. ⁴⁴⁴ The question is whether or not that equality excludes male headship. Therefore, Webb must deal with the other elements of creation which indicate that equality and male headship are both present in creation in a complementary way. Webb provides six examples that “provide possible hints of patriarchy within the garden.” ⁴⁴⁵ (1) The woman as helpmate; (2) the woman taken from Adam’s rib; (3) the woman named by the man; (4) the man leaves and cleaves, not the woman; (5) God addresses the man first; (6) creation order—man first, then the woman. Webb minimizes these points in different ways, but recognizes the weight of the last one mentioned. “In view of our analysis of the creation story so far, it seems fair to say that this element of creation order supplies one of the strongest pieces of patriarchal data.” ⁴⁴⁶ I will not quibble with the points Webb makes concerning the other features of the creation account. But the creation order, as Webb rightly recognizes, is extremely significant. He will return to this in the subsequent discussion of primogeniture.

Since the focus of this book is the comparison of the slavery issue and the issue of women’s roles (or combination of issues), I have not given much attention to the third issue that Webb deals with extensively—homosexuality. But at this point the discussion is relevant. After citing the neutral patterns within creation, and then examining the patterns that relate specifically to the gender debate, Webb then comments on the issue of homosexuality as it relates to creation patterns. As we might expect, Webb minimizes the significance of creation order for the issue of homosexuality. He writes, “No biblical passages refer back to the creation material in a direct manner to make a point about homosexuality (although one Pauline text mentions creation within the immediate context, and an inference might be drawn).” ⁴⁴⁷ Only in the footnote, then, does he cite Romans 1. This comprises Webb’s most extensive comment on Romans 1 in his entire book.

Rom. 1:20, 25 explicitly refers to the original creation (cf., the allusions in 1:23). This provides the broader context for Paul’s comments about homosexual relationships (1:26–27). In view of these references to creation, it is likely that the original creation setting influenced his discourse on homosexuality. The expressions “natural relations” and “unnatural relations” (1:26–27) may allude to the original creation context as well as speaking about nature in general. ⁴⁴⁸

It seems that Webb feels compelled at least to acknowledge these features of the text, but he minimizes them so as not to weaken his point. He says that it is “ likely that the original creation setting influenced [Paul’s] discourse on homosexuality,” and that “ ‘natural relations’ and ‘unnatural relations’ may allude to the original creation context.” But this seriously minimizes a very important component of the text.

Webb concludes that other criteria in his book must be brought alongside the criterion concerning original creation. “Only as an interpreter establishes a dialogue between the creation story and other criteria can there be any emerging assurance of creation’s continuing applicability or its needed discontinuance.” ⁴⁴⁹ This is a telling move, for he ends up elevating his hermeneutical system above the clear and authoritative words of Romans 1:26–27. Rather than affirming the force of Paul’s indictment against homosexuality which is rooted in the created order, Webb shifts the emphasis to the complex hermeneutical system involving his eighteen criteria.

Richard Hays offers some insights on Romans 1 that are relevant here. In an article responding to John Boswell, Hays writes, “The reference to God as creator [in verse 25] would certainly evoke for Paul, as well as for his readers, immediate recollections of the creation story in Genesis 1–3.” ⁴⁵⁰ He also says, “Though he offers no explicit reflection on the concept of ‘nature,’ it is clear that in this passage Paul identifies ‘nature’ with the created order.” ⁴⁵¹ Similarly, C. E. B. Cranfield states, “the decisive factor in Paul’s use of [nature] is his biblical doctrine of creation. It denotes that order which is manifest in God’s creation and which men have no excuse for failing to recognize and respect.” ⁴⁵² Observing these points, we should be able to recognize how critical this passage is for the issue of homosexuality. Paul here is condemning homosexual practice, and his reasoning is that it is contrary to God’s creation design for man and woman. Heterosexuality is God’s purpose for manhood and womanhood, not homosexuality.

Ultimately, we need not decipher various hermeneutical criteria in order to determine whether the prohibitions against homosexuality are transcultural. Rather, we simply need to read the text and understand that homosexual relations are contrary to God’s design as revealed in creation. Webb fails to acknowledge the thrust of these verses and therefore plays down the importance of original creation. When that bias is removed, a very important principle emerges, namely, that some significant instructions are given to God’s people which are rooted in creation and intended to be followed in every age and culture. Thomas Schreiner critiques Webb on this point, for Webb fails to recognize that “when it comes to divorce, homosexuality, and the women’s issue, the NT argues from the created order.” ⁴⁵³ The rationale given in the New Testament for the prohibition of homosexual behavior is that it contradicts God’s created order. Similarly, the rationale given in the New Testament for the distinct roles of men and women is that it accords with God’s created order.

While Webb’s conclusion concerning homosexuality is to be commended, the means by which he reaches that conclusion makes his position prone to “further movement.” As Kevin Vanhoozer observes, “others, such as Luke Johnson and Stephen Fowl, appeal to the very same logic of redemptive trajectory in order to legitimate same-sex relations.” ⁴⁵⁴ Thus, it may appear to some that Webb has presented a persuasive egalitarian argument and at the same time upheld heterosexual marriage. This is certainly the case regarding what he affirms and denies. But it must be acknowledged that the logic of his position makes it susceptible to the impetus to condone the homosexual lifestyle. A much stronger defense against this impetus is the creation design in which Paul roots his condemnation of same-sex relations in Romans 1:26–27.

In this way, the issue of original creation highlights two very important weaknesses in Webb’s system. On the one hand, original creation differentiates the slavery issue and the gender issue, which Webb attempts to tie together throughout his book. While Webb sees the two as fundamentally similar, he fails to recognize the significance of the fact that slavery is never rooted in creation, whereas gender roles are. On the other hand, basis in original creation plays an important role in the discussion of gender roles and homosexuality, affirming distinct roles for men and women and condemning homosexual relations.

Primogeniture

Now we move on to Webb’s treatment of primogeniture, which is of fundamental importance for his argument against the transcultural status of 1 Timothy 2:12–13. His statement of this criterion is as follows: “A component of a text may be transcultural, if it is rooted in the original-creation material, and, more specifically, its creative order.” ⁴⁵⁵ This criterion specifically deals with the logic of Paul’s statement in 1 Timothy 2:13 that “Adam was formed first, then Eve,” and his use of this fact to ground the instruction in the previous verse, “I do not permit a woman to teach or to exercise authority over a man; rather, she is to remain quiet.” Webb writes, “While we do not know for certain what Paul sees as the logical relationship between creation order (1 Tim. 2:13) and the restrictions on women teaching (1 Tim. 2:11–12), the most plausible explanation is that it is based upon, or is an extension of, primogeniture customs.” ⁴⁵⁶

Next, he cites three complementarian writers who refer to firstborn customs in relation to either 1 Timothy 2:13 or 1 Corinthians 11:8. ⁴⁵⁷ The portrayal of the complementarian position, however, is somewhat misleading. First, he quotes John Piper and Wayne Grudem, “The contextual basis for this argument [from 1 Tim. 2:13—i.e., male authority based upon the man being created before the woman] in the book of Genesis is the assumption throughout the book that the ‘firstborn’ in a human family has the special responsibility of leadership in the family .” ⁴⁵⁸ It is important to consider the context in which Piper and Grudem make this statement. This is part of their chapter that surveys various matters in a question-answer format, and the question they are addressing here is as follows: “Paul seems to base the primary responsibility of man to lead and teach on the fact that he was created first, before woman (1 Timothy 2:13). How is this a valid argument when the animals were created before man, but don’t have primary responsibility for leading him?” ⁴⁵⁹ The statement quoted by Webb was meant by Piper and Grudem to show that this question would have never entered the minds of those in Moses’ day or Paul’s day. ⁴⁶⁰ Therefore, the emphasis is not on primogeniture as a transcultural principle, but simply as a reality of the ancient mind-set that helps us better understand the historical background.

Webb then quotes from Craig Blomberg’s commentary on 1 Corinthians: “People in the ancient world familiar with the privileges that firstborn sons retained (of dynastic succession, inheritance, etc.) would not have found Paul’s argument unusual.” ⁴⁶¹ As in the quote from Piper and Grudem, Blomberg is responding to the challenge that if the order of creation implies hierarchy of authority, then the animals would have authority over humans. Blomberg responds, “But Paul is not arguing from Genesis 1 but from Genesis 2. He is not claiming that order always implies rank, merely that it does in the one part of the one creation account to which he refers.” ⁴⁶² Thus Blomberg makes the point that the original readers would not have been confused by Paul’s reasoning.

Finally, Webb quotes from Thomas Schreiner, from the first edition of Women in the Church . Webb’s quotation from Schreiner is as follows:

It seems the unclarity [of logic in 1 Tim. 2:13] is in the eye of the beholder, for the thrust of the verse has been deemed quite clear in the history of the church. The creation of Adam first gives the reason why men should be the authoritative teachers in the church. James Hurley notes that the reasoning would not be obscure to people of Paul’s time, for they were quite familiar with primogeniture . ⁴⁶³

Again, the point is simply to recognize that the original recipients of this instruction would have easily understood the rationale because of the customs of primogeniture.

Webb does not state explicitly how he thinks complementarians view primogeniture customs. But the implication that seems to come through in this section is that primogeniture customs are extremely important to the complementarian position. And it may even appear from Webb’s discussion that complementarians are in favor of continuing those practices today (or at least that they should be if they want to be consistent in their application of Scripture). This can be seen in his point that Christians no longer apply firstborn customs today, where he says, “it is interesting that those who appeal to primogeniture in affirming the transcultural status of 1 Timothy 2:13 say very little about the sustained application of their primogeniture texts for our lives.” ⁴⁶⁴ In these ways, Webb’s presentation of this issue is misleading, for Webb has misunderstood and wrongly conveyed how complementarians use the background feature of primogeniture in their discussions of creation order. Thomas Schreiner states the matter clearly:

In referring to primogeniture, complementarian scholars are scarcely suggesting that the cultural practice of primogeniture should be enforced today, nor do they think that Paul is endorsing primogeniture per se. Nor would they deny the many examples from the Old Testament, adduced by Webb, in which primogeniture was overturned. Instead, they appeal to primogeniture to explain that the notion of the firstborn having authority would be easily understood by Paul’s readers. ⁴⁶⁵

Complementarians would certainly agree with many of Webb’s points concerning primogeniture customs. Webb makes three main points. First, he provides many biblical examples in which a younger sibling was chosen over the firstborn, something we all surely recognize. Second, he makes the point that primogeniture is tied to the ancient world, another point on which complementarians are happy to agree. Webb has studied these customs extensively, and it is interesting to read his findings. Third, he asserts that believers today no longer apply these firstborn customs. Here, again, there is agreement. It seems that Webb must have missed the intent of complementarians in citing primogeniture, for he goes to such great lengths to prove the cultural limitations of it.

It is important to examine the connection (or lack thereof) between primogeniture and the instruction in 1 Timothy 2:12. First, we must recognize that primogeniture practices are not commanded. Paul is not instructing (here or elsewhere) that we should give special honor to firstborns. Rather, the instruction is that women should not teach or have authority over men. Second, we have to recognize that the basis given for this instruction is not the custom of primogeniture. Paul does not say that women shouldn’t teach or have authority over men because honoring the firstborn is a biblical principle that applies to this issue. Rather, Paul refers specifically to an historical event. He cites a specific detail of the creation narrative, namely, that God formed Adam first, and then Eve.

These points demonstrate how tenuous Webb’s conclusion is, for his argument is that the cultural component of primogeniture (1 Tim. 2:13) implies a cultural limitation on the instruction regarding women (1 Tim. 2:12). Webb views primogeniture as a principle that Paul applies to a particular situation. He states later in the book, “The apostle Paul applies the primogeniture principle in his culture. But his application does not equal the principle itself.” ⁴⁶⁶ In this way, Webb derives a transcultural principle from the culturally bound customs of primogeniture. He states the abstracted universal principle as “Grant honor to whom honor is due.” ⁴⁶⁷ Then, in the context of 1 Timothy 2, which addresses the matter of teaching, the application of this principle should include both genders: “choose teachers/leaders who are worthy of high honor within the congregation.” ⁴⁶⁸

In this way, Webb’s reasoning begins with the cultural component of primogeniture, which is related to the statement of 1 Timothy 2:13. He thoroughly demonstrates the cultural nature of this ancient mind-set and the fact that it does not apply today. Then he abstracts a general principle from this custom, and finally applies that principle to the matter of teaching and leadership in the church. But Paul is not using the principle of primogeniture and applying it to a specific issue in the church. Rather, he is citing a historical event which has great theological significance, and he uses it to ground a clear instruction for the church. Thus the fact that primogeniture is cultural cannot legitimately be used to say that Paul’s instruction in 1 Timothy 2:12 is cultural. It is a very fragile connection, indeed.

It is in this section of the book that Webb proceeds to question whether the patriarchy seen in the creation narrative was really present in the garden. In his evaluation of this criterion, he responds to the question of “how cultural features could possibly be found in the garden before the influence of culture.” ⁴⁶⁹ This is an important question, for Paul’s appeal is not to primogeniture per se but to creation order itself. Therefore if Webb wishes to prove that 1 Timothy 2:13 is culturally bound, he must show that a reference to creation order is somehow also a direct reference to primogeniture customs. ⁴⁷⁰ As we will see, this is not an easy hurdle for him to overcome. He offers three explanations. “First, the whispers of patriarchy in the garden may have been placed there in order to anticipate the curse.” ⁴⁷¹ He cites the craftiness of the serpent as another literary foreshadowing of the curse, for he assumes that craftiness could not exist in the pre-fall garden. “Second, Eden’s quiet echoes of patriarchy might be a way of describing the past through present categories.” ⁴⁷² Here he refers to prophetic descriptions that accommodate the present audience so as not to foster confusion. “Third, given the agrarian base to primogeniture logic, the patriarchy of the garden may reflect God’s anticipation of the social context into which Adam and Eve were about to venture.” ⁴⁷³ An agrarian society is naturally patriarchal, Webb explains, because the women must rely on the men for provision.

In a paper responding to Wayne Grudem, Webb states that “my cultural/transcultural analysis of the creation accounts and my primogeniture perspective is supplemental (not instrumental ) to a RMH [redemptive-movement hermeneutic]. If you do not like my approach to the creation account, then simply place it aside and work with a RMH from your own alternative creation-account vantage point (italics original).” ⁴⁷⁴ He also seeks to make this point in the last chapter of his book, “What If I Am Wrong?” In that chapter he is not questioning whether he is wrong concerning the entirety of his system, but instead is examining the specific matter of 1 Timothy 2:13. He recognizes that 1 Timothy 2:13 is a weak link in the chain of his overall argument, and he tries to assess what his conclusions would be if he happened to be wrong on this point.

Hypothetically conceding the point, he says, “If one accepts a transcultural dimension to the garden’s patriarchy, the most that can be said is that man should have some kind of greater honor or prominence than woman . Paul applied the principle of the Genesis text within his day and culture. But Paul’s use of the Genesis text in restricting women from teaching is an application of the principle, not the principle itself” (italics original). ⁴⁷⁵ It is the primogeniture principle that Webb has in mind here. As I stated above, Paul is not using the principle of primogeniture and applying it to a particular situation. Rather, he is citing a significant historical event as the basis for a command to the church. In our attempt to derive a principle from the creation order, it would be a mistake to do so mainly through the lens of a cultural custom such as primogeniture.

Based on this, Webb comes up with a principle of greater honor . But that is not the way the New Testament uses the historical data concerning creation order. In fact, we should say based on the truth of Galatians 3:28 that men should not receive greater honor than women. And the significance of creation order does not contradict this, for it is cited as a means of demonstrating God’s design for the roles of men and women. The fact that Adam was created first is not used to say that men should receive greater honor than women. Instead, Paul cites this fact as a basis for the differing roles of men and women (1 Tim. 2:13; 1 Cor. 11:8).

Webb develops an alternative view that he labels “ultra-soft patriarchy,” based on the possibility that the Genesis material is transcultural. Again we see Webb’s rationale concerning primogeniture. “At least in an analogous way, the creative-order argument by Paul reflects primogeniture customs that accentuate a kind of social-honor logic within that culture. If one sees primogeniture as transcultural, surely it still leaves open the question of whether the degree or weight of creative-order deference should be viewed as cultural.” ⁴⁷⁶ Therefore, in Webb’s mind, if one retains this social-honor principle of primogeniture, then it would involve “granting men a certain level of symbolic honor for their firstborn status within the human family (italics original).” ⁴⁷⁷ He maintains that the redemptive-movement hermeneutic would still push us to affirm an equality of roles in the home and church. But if it turns out that he’s wrong concerning primogeniture, the only difference would involve this symbolic honor for men. ⁴⁷⁸

The problem, again, is that Webb makes the primogeniture principle the determining factor rather than what the New Testament texts actually state. The fact is that later biblical revelation shows that the creation material is significant in relation to the roles of men and women in the home and church. Webb’s focus on primogeniture customs diverts his discussion from the specific matter of creation order. The two issues are related, but they are not synonymous. Thus, primogeniture serves as a kind of red herring that leads us away from the logic of the pertinent New Testament texts. Primogeniture, as complementarians have explained, is helpful in understanding the historical backdrop of Paul’s statements in 1 Timothy 2:13 and 1 Corinthians 11:8. But the weight of those statements is not found in the principle of primogeniture. The significance of the creation material for Paul’s inspired instructions to the church is that God’s design from the very beginning has been for men and women to fulfill different (and complementary) roles in the home and church. And the order in which God created the man and the woman is indicative of this design.

Creation versus Redemption

Webb’s next criterion is “Basis in New Creation,” and on this point we will hear from some other redemptive-movement proponents as well. Webb cites five Pauline passages that describe the new-creation community. I will quote them with Webb’s interpretive comments. ⁴⁷⁹ “For we were all baptized by one Spirit into one body—whether Jews or Greeks, slave or free—and we were all given the one Spirit to drink” (1 Cor. 12:13). “There is neither Jew nor Greek, slave nor free, male nor female . . . in Christ Jesus” (Gal. 3:28). “His [Christ’s] purpose was to create in himself one new man [i.e., one new humanity] out of the two [Jew and Gentile]” (Eph. 2:15). “You were taught, with regard to your former way of life, to put off your old self [identity in the old humanity/society] which is being corrupted by its desires . . . and to put on the new self [identity in the new humanity/society], created to be like God in true righteousness and holiness” (Eph. 4:22–24). “Here [in the new society in Christ] there is no Greek or Jew, circumcised or uncircumcised, barbarian, Scythian, slave or free” (Col. 3:11). Webb concludes from these verses that “new-creation patterns should be given prominence over the old-creation patterns.” ⁴⁸⁰

Krister Stendahl, many years earlier, stressed this same point. In his discussion of Galatians 3:28 he says “it should be noted that this statement [Gal. 3:28] is directed against what we call the order of creation, and consequently it creates a tension with those biblical passages—Pauline and non-Pauline—by which this order of creation maintains its place in the fundamental view of the New Testament concerning the subordination of women.” ⁴⁸¹ He goes on to develop this by emphasizing the tension between creation and redemption. “If one counters that this would lead to a conflict with the order of creation, and hence must be wrong, we must say that it does indeed lead to such a conflict, and that is precisely what it should do and intends to do.” ⁴⁸² As Stendahl draws out some implications from his observations, he reflects on the matter of continuity and discontinuity between creation and redemption. He uses the following historical illustration to stress our current need to emphasize that which is new.

When Marcion and the Gnostics stressed what was new in Christ, their radicalism led them to affirm a discontinuity between the old and the new, between the Creator and the Redeemer. This overstatement should, however, not blind us to the validity of their emphasis on the actual newness in Christ and in the church, even if the orthodox theologians, in their defense of the continuity, were compelled to stress the order of creation and the “not yet” aspect of this newness. ⁴⁸³

Stendahl asserts that in certain situations, such as Corinth, there is the need for an emphasis on the old. In other situations, such as Galatia, there is the need for an emphasis on the new. He concludes that our current situation calls for the latter, for “we need badly the reminder of that which is new. We are not in danger of overstating that. We need help to see the forces toward renewal and re-creation. A mere repetition of Paul’s reminder of the order of creation is not our most crying need.” ⁴⁸⁴

Richard Longenecker also develops this notion of a tension between creation and redemption. As he discusses the tension in 1 Corinthians 11:2–16, he asserts, “What Paul appears to be saying, in effect, is that though he has argued on the basis of creation for the subordination of women in worship, on the basis of redemption he must also assert their equality.” ⁴⁸⁵ He also observes that in the Household Codes, as well as in 1 Corinthians 11:2–16, “Paul seems to be attempting to bring together two important theological categories: the redemptive category of new life in Christ wherein freedom, mutuality, and equality are prominent, and the category of what God has done by means of creation wherein order, submission, and subordination are features.” ⁴⁸⁶ In Longenecker’s view, this tension is not just something we perceive, but something that was present in Paul’s own thinking. This extended quotation captures the thrust of Longenecker’s point.

When circumstances within the churches urged on [Paul] a more moderate course, he seems at times to have argued more from the categories of creation and curse than from the categories of eschatological redemption in Christ. At such times he appears, when judged from our present Christian perspective, almost chauvinistic. But we should not blame Paul too severely for failing to resolve all the tensions or solve all the difficulties, particularly since we seem to have done very little better in resolving them ourselves. On the contrary, we should applaud him for what he did do: he began to relate the theological categories of creation and redemption, most often emphasizing the latter; and he began to apply the gospel principles of freedom, mutuality, and equality to the situations of his day—including that of the place and status of women. In so doing, he set a pattern and marked out a path for Christian thought and action after him to follow. ⁴⁸⁷

Thus, in the view of Webb, Stendahl, and Longenecker, there is a tension between creation and redemption, with a clear biblical emphasis on redemption. We are urged to heed this biblical emphasis by moving further along the trajectory that upholds freedom, mutuality, and equality over against order, submission, and subordination.

An important question surfaces at this point, and both Webb and Longenecker address it. The question concerns the destination of this path. Where is it taking us? Are there any limits that guide this pathway to freedom, mutuality, and equality? This question is particularly relevant in relation to homosexuality. If the freedom that accompanies redemption can be used to trump the order of creation, then one must ask whether this can happen in an open-ended way, or only in certain respects. Webb raises this question and responds by asserting that “Galatians 3:28 and the other Pauline clusters [1 Cor. 12:13; Eph. 2:15; 4:22–24; Col. 3:11] set definite limits to the modification.” ⁴⁸⁸ The fact that Paul mentioned certain categories—Jew and Greek, slave and free, male and female—shows the newness of redemption applied in certain ways but not necessarily in every imaginable way. Webb clarifies concerning the issue of homosexuality: “New-creation theology does not intend for ‘male and female’ intimacy and complementary relations to degenerate into homosexual relations, that is, no relations between men and women.” ⁴⁸⁹ Longenecker frames the question in terms of “how we correlate the theological categories of creation and redemption.” ⁴⁹⁰ He answers,

Because of creation there are differences between the sexes which exist for the blessing of both men and women and for the benefit of society. Paul does not argue for anything like unisexuality or some supposed androgynous ideal. Heterosexuality is presupposed in all of his letters as having been ordained by God, and he has nothing but contempt and condemnation for homosexual practices. Yet Paul also lays emphasis on redemption in such a way as to indicate that what God has done in Christ transcends what is true simply because of creation. ⁴⁹¹

So for both of these scholars, there is the desire to move beyond the confines of creation theology as it relates to the roles of men and women, while maintaining the clear creation design of heterosexuality. It is commendable that Webb and Longenecker are constrained by God’s Word to uphold the biblical prohibitions against homosexuality, but it is doubtful that the developmental hermeneutic can be passed along to another generation without allowing “further movement” on that issue. This is a major concern with the way that these writers view a tension between creation and redemption.

Another critique of this position is that it confuses creation and the curse. It is certainly appropriate and necessary to see a painful tension between fallen creation and redemption. This is the tension that we experience every day as believers, and it is the reality that Ephesians 4:22–24 speaks of (one of the “new-creation” texts cited by Webb). We must put off the old self and put on the new self. The tension between these two is not between creation and redemption, but rather between sin and redemption. An additional tension is seen in this statement when we compare it with what Paul says in Colossians 3:9–11 (Webb also cites Col. 3:11 as another “new-creation” text). For there the old self/new self contrast is stated in the indicative rather than the imperative, and thus we see the dynamic that we experience in this age, namely, the “already” and the “not yet.” We have already put off the old self and put on the new self (Col. 3:9–10), but we are painfully aware this has not yet happened to the full extent that is intended. Hence, we are commanded to continually put off the old self and put on the new self (Eph. 4:22–24). ⁴⁹²

Therefore when we think about two eras of history that are in tension with one another, the primary dichotomy exists between the fallen old age and the new age of redemption that has been inaugurated but not yet consummated. Comparing and contrasting creation itself with redemption may be legitimate in a secondary sense, as I will discuss below. But it is surely confusing and misleading to suppose there is a fundamental and ongoing strain between the two. Ben Witherington, in responding to Stendahl’s view that Galatians 3:28 is directed against the order of creation, ⁴⁹³ observes that “Paul nowhere else in his letters indicates such distinctions are obliterated in Christ.” ⁴⁹⁴ Then Witherington quotes his former instructor, Andrew Lincoln, as saying, “All this should immediately make us suspicious of any interpretation of Paul which makes a sharp distinction between creation and new creation . . . in Paul, redemption presupposes creation and includes creation (cf. Rom. 8:18ff., Col. 1:20, Eph. 1:10), and Christ as Lord is mediator both of creation and redemption (cf. 1 Cor. 8:6).” ⁴⁹⁵ In this way we should observe a significant cohesion between the realms of creation and redemption rather than drawing a sharp distinction between the two. ⁴⁹⁶

The standard egalitarian argument has been that male headship is simply a result of the fall. On this reasoning, one need not assert any tension between creation and redemption, for male headship is not part of the pre-fall creation. It is, rather, a product of sin, which is erased in the work of redemption. ⁴⁹⁷ Webb develops this argument in the discussion of his fifth criterion, “Basis in Fall or Curse.” In responding to complementarians who understand the curse as introducing a distortion of male headship, Webb writes, “It is just as easy to work from the assumption that hierarchy and submission were a part of the pain that entered into a previous relationship of mutuality and equality.” ⁴⁹⁸ He says later, “If hierarchy was introduced into human relationships post-Fall as a part of the curse, then there is no need to sustain hierarchy as part of gender relationships today. A redemptive approach to the curse would be to restore equality, not to perpetuate hierarchy.” ⁴⁹⁹ If this was the extent of Webb’s argument, he would not need to give new-creation patterns prominence over old-creation patterns. ⁵⁰⁰ He could simply emphasize the need to restore the equality of the original creation prior to the fall. But it seems that he wants to go one step further for the sake of argument. He recognizes that his assessment of the creation material may be a weak link in his system, as evidenced by the specific point on which he asks, “What if I am wrong?” ⁵⁰¹ Therefore, he continues the discussion in his next two criteria pertaining to original creation, which I have discussed earlier in this chapter. It is commendable that Webb wrestles seriously with the elements of the creation narrative that point to God’s pre-fall design for the distinct roles of men and women. He does not brush them off quickly, but recognizes that they exist and attempts some new explanations for why they appear before the fall. I have outlined these explanations in the previous section of this chapter, and it seems that the novelty of these hypotheses highlights the difficulty of denying male headship before the fall. It is certainly a stretch to acknowledge “whispers of patriarchy” in the garden and yet claim that they were not there in actuality. ⁵⁰² So Webb first defends the standard egalitarian assumption that male headship is a result of the fall. But then he goes on to defend the egalitarian position even if this point is not true. He does so (1) by suggesting that the elements of original creation are not necessarily transcultural ⁵⁰³ and (2) by asserting that new-creation patterns should take precedence over old-creation patterns. ⁵⁰⁴

The position of Stendahl and Longenecker is slightly different, for they do not seek to diminish the fact that the original creation possesses clear aspects of leadership and submission. They do not argue that male headship is only a product of sin. Instead, they focus on the priority of redemption over against creation. As evident in the quotations above, both Stendahl and Longenecker assert a very real tension between the two realms. Terrence Teissen rightly objects to Longenecker: “My major point of discomfort with Longenecker’s proposal is the disjunction it introduces between creation and redemption and the suggestion that there is an unresolved tension in Paul’s own ethical teaching that later Christians must resolve.” ⁵⁰⁵ This reveals a fundamental problem for any redemptive-movement or developmental hermeneutic, for we must not assume that God’s Word contains tensions we must resolve. The grave danger in such an assumption is the elevation of our contemporary subjective ideals above the authoritative instruction of the Bible.

It is much better to view the realms of creation and redemption as complementary, rather than disjunctive. As David Clowney points out, “In Ephesians 5, the husband’s headship (a nurturing role, but apparently also one of primary accountability) is grounded by Paul simultaneously in creation and redemption, by his claim that the mystery of marriage, quoted from Genesis, means Christ and the church.” ⁵⁰⁶ Clowney also sees this in 1 Timothy 2:11–15 and 1 Corinthians 11:3–16 in the same way. “In these passages, Paul argues for his conclusions by appeal to the order of creation, transformed in Christ.” ⁵⁰⁷ Wayne Grudem also makes this point that male headship is part of the new creation in Christ. He cites, for instance, Colossians 3:18, “Wives, submit to your husbands, as is fitting in the Lord .” And he adds, “In fact, Paul’s commands as an apostle for the NT church are part of the ‘new-creation’ in Christ, and therefore ‘I do not permit a woman to teach or exercise authority over a man’ is also part of that new creation , because it is part of the teaching of the NT for the church” (italics original). ⁵⁰⁸ In this way, we should recognize the New Testament ethic as the final and authoritative ethic of the new creation in Christ. And the movement of redemption will not take us beyond creation in any way that involves tension with creation. On the contrary, redemption will renew and restore the beauty of creation. In the area of male-female relationships, this will involve a restoration of the equality and complementarity of original creation, in which men and women delight in the respective roles God has assigned to them.

Finally in this section, it should be clarified in what ways redemption does go beyond creation. Redemption is not merely a restoration of creation—it is not limited to that. The new heaven and new earth will exceed the garden of Eden in beauty and splendor and glory. My point, though, is that the trajectory of redemption will not lead us to something that violates the order of God’s original good creation. In other words, redemption will be more than a restoration of creation, but it will not be less than that or something that is in tension with it. Therefore, the way in which redemption goes beyond creation will be consistent with the patterns of creation.

Richard Hove provides some helpful insights in clarifying this point. First, after quoting Richard Longenecker and Stanley Grenz, Hove acknowledges that they are right in their claim that redemption transcends creation. Hove writes, “For example, in the consummate age believers will have resurrection bodies (1 Cor. 15) and people will ‘neither marry nor be given in marriage’ (Matt. 22:30).” ⁵⁰⁹ But then Hove makes a critical point that trajectory advocates seem to miss, namely, that we now live between the ages and therefore “cannot assume that consummated Christian ethics are the norm for today, in every respect, when we are not yet in the consummate age.” ⁵¹⁰ Thus, it is certainly appropriate to see redemption taking us beyond creation in certain respects, but it would be an over-realized eschatology to assume that all of those developments will happen in this age. The question, then, is how we are to discern God’s ethical guidelines for us during this overlap of the ages. Hove responds, “The answer to this question is that God’s Word both prescribes and describes life between the ages. Texts such as Ephesians 5, Colossians 3, 1 Timothy 2, etc., are given to this end.” ⁵¹¹

Second, Hove agrees that the new era is significantly different from the old (e.g., Paul’s emphasis on freedom [Gal. 5], mutuality [1 Cor. 7], and equality). However, we cannot read the New Testament writers as introducing “a sharp break with creation.” He says, “On the contrary, Paul views the present redemption as including the restoration of creation (cf. Col. 3:10).” ⁵¹² And third, Hove points to the clear fact, which I have discussed at length, that “when Paul deals with sexual roles he often grounds his teaching by appealing to the created order (e.g., 1 Cor. 11:8; Eph. 5:31; 1 Tim. 2:13). This in itself should make one wary of affirming that sexual roles in the present are a radical break with sexual roles at creation.” ⁵¹³ These points should certainly give us pause when a writer appeals to redemption in order to minimize principles that are rooted in creation.

Specific Instructions versus

General Principles

Redemptive-movement advocates appeal also to the tension between specific instructions and general principles. The point is built on a sound principle of hermeneutics: we must interpret Scripture with Scripture. R. T. France states this principle by saying, “It is a good rule to interpret Scripture in the light of Scripture, and to interpret the more obscure in the light of the clearer.” ⁵¹⁴ On this point we certainly agree. However, when it comes to deciding which passages are more obscure and which are clearer, divergent opinions emerge. The following statement by F. F. Bruce has been quoted by many egalitarians. He comments on Galatians 3:28, “Paul states the basic principle here; if restrictions on it are found elsewhere in the Pauline corpus, as in 1 Cor. 14:34f . . . or 1 Tim. 2:11f, they are to be understood in relation to Gal. 3:28, and not vice versa ” (italics original). ⁵¹⁵ Longenecker cites this statement by Bruce as a fundamental point that must inform our treatment of the New Testament gender passages. “We must, we have argued, first of all take our stand with the gospel proclamation and its principles (i.e., with the confession of Galatians 3:28) and seek to understand these passages [Col. 3:18–4:1; Eph. 5:21–6:9; 1 Cor. 11:2–16] from that perspective, and not vice versa.” ⁵¹⁶ The general principle of Galatians 3:28 is given clear priority over the specific instructions given elsewhere.

In accord with the hermeneutical principle stated above, egalitarians contend that Galatians 3:28 is the clearer verse, and the other passages are more obscure. This is what R. T. France states emphatically, “The above discussion suggests that 1 Timothy 2:8–15 (no less than 1 Corinthians 14:34–35) falls rather firmly into the category of the more obscure!” ⁵¹⁷ W. Ward Gasque writes similarly, “ Galatians 3:28 is the necessary theological starting place for any discussion of the role of women in the church . Here is an unequivocal statement of absolute equality in Christ in the church. . . . Other texts must not be used to undermine this fundamental theological affirmation” (italics original). ⁵¹⁸

So on the one hand egalitarians have trumpeted Galatians 3:28 as the fundamental truth through which the other passages must be interpreted. On the other hand, complementarians are accused of using 1 Timothy 2 as the starting point that takes precedence over Galatians 3:28. ⁵¹⁹ Andreas Köstenberger responds to this accusation in a balanced way. He first agrees that 1 Timothy 2 cannot simply be asserted as the fundamental teaching on gender issues. But then he observes that “generally writers are less aggressive in arguing that 1 Timothy 2 is a ‘paradigm passage’ than those who assign central importance to Gal. 3:28.” ⁵²⁰ And he observes that “it is often those writers focusing on Gal. 3:28 who isolate 1 Timothy 2 as the only passage of its kind in the NT, thus dichotomizing between different kinds of gender passages of the NT and seeking to marginalize and relativize 1 Timothy 2.” ⁵²¹ Such a stark dichotomy is unneeded and unhelpful, and that applies to those on either side of the debate. Complementarians should not write off Galatians 3:28, ⁵²² nor should egalitarians use Galatians 3:28 to silence the passages that give specific instructions for gender roles.

The question that we must wrestle with is how to put these various passages together in a coherent way. If Galatians 3:28 emphasizes equality, whereas other passages (1 Tim. 2; 1 Cor. 11, 14; Eph. 5; Col. 3) emphasize role distinctions, then how are we to understand the unified biblical message concerning gender issues? We should first recognize that not all think this is possible. Many see a disjunction that is irreconcilable. They cannot comprehend how one person could write these seemingly contradictory statements, and therefore they search for other explanations. For instance, it may be that Paul’s views had changed from the time he wrote Galatians to the time he wrote his other letters. ⁵²³ Or it may be that Paul wrote Galatians 3:28, while 1 Timothy 2 and 1 Corinthians 14:34–35 were written later by other individuals. ⁵²⁴ Yet another explanation is that there may have been an unresolved tension in Paul’s own mind. ⁵²⁵

Most evangelical feminists, however, do not resort to these explanations. Their contention is simply that we should begin with Galatians 3:28 (and other statements like it) as the starting place for the gender issue, and then with that as our foundation move to the other passages that seem to command distinct roles for men and women. Gretchen Gaebelein Hull, for instance, compares the issue to reconciling God’s love with the Imprecatory Psalms or the Canaanite Wars. She says that she puts these passages to one side, “But I do not throw out the known truth ‘God is love,’ simply because some passages about the nature of God puzzle me (italics original).” ⁵²⁶ In the same way, she contends, we should put aside the “hard passages” about women. “Therefore we may legitimately put these Scripture portions aside for the very reason that they remain ‘hard passages’—hard exegetically, hard hermeneutically, and hard theologically (italics original).” ⁵²⁷ W. Ward Gasque makes a similar point, and is very transparent about how one’s starting point affects the conclusion.

The Egalitarian View also takes these texts seriously [1 Cor. 11:2–16; 14:33–35; 1 Tim. 2:11–15; Eph. 5:22–33; 1 Peter 3:1–7], but it does not begin with these. It points out that if you leave these texts to the side until the end of the discussion, you will come out with a different conclusion. If you look at these texts first, you have basically programmed yourself to come to the Traditional View; but if you put these texts aside for the time being and first study all else that the Bible has to teach theologically about the role of men and women—in society and in the created order, in the Old Testament people of God and the New Testament people of God, in the church and the home—then you come to a different position. ⁵²⁸

There is a serious hermeneutical problem with this dichotomy, as is evidenced in the above quotation, for it increases subjectivism rather than diminishes it. If one simply needs to find the verses that confirm his or her preconceived notions about a particular matter, and can then bring in the other passages only at the end of the discussion, then the presuppositions of the interpreter become dangerously influential. Of course, we would all acknowledge that our presuppositions will always be influential to some extent. But our goal should be to diminish that influence rather than increase it.

John Piper and Wayne Grudem recognize the danger in this. In responding to the suggestion that hotly debated texts should not be allowed any significant influence in the matter of manhood and womanhood, they state, “we are all biased and would very likely use this principle of interpretation to justify neglecting the texts that do not suit our bias while insisting that the ones that suit our bias are crystal clear.” ⁵²⁹ They go on to say, “Our procedure should be rather to continue to read Scripture carefully and prayerfully, seeking a position that dismisses no texts but interprets all the relevant texts of Scripture in a coherent way.” ⁵³⁰ David Scholer, an egalitarian, also recognizes this dilemma. He says, “What I want to stress is that from a hermeneutical point of view the question of where one enters the discussion is really an open question to which no canonical text speaks with clarity.” ⁵³¹ We would all agree that we should attempt to give each passage its due weight in our conclusions. Our goal should be to understand each text on its own terms, in its own context, and then to integrate them as best we can.

The problem with using Galatians 3:28 as a starting point is that it so easily and so quickly becomes a slogan for gender equality, ⁵³² while it remains unclear whether Paul intended it in such a way. Köstenberger critiques Gasque for his statement, “In Galatians 3:28, Paul opens wide the door for women, as well as for Gentiles and slaves, to exercise spiritual leadership in the church.” ⁵³³ Köstenberger asks “whether this is really Paul’s point in the text’s context or an implication drawn by Gasque himself,” and he suggests “it would be advisable to distinguish more clearly between historical exegesis and contemporary application (italics original).” ⁵³⁴

Köstenberger goes on to examine Galatians 3:28 in its context, tying it together with Galatians 3:16, 26, 29. He concludes, “In the context of the divine promise to Abraham, Paul’s point is that in the one Son of the promise, Jesus Christ, all believers are indiscriminately heirs of God’s promise to Abraham. There is no discrimination in that promise between Jew or Gentile, slave or free, male or female, as Paul proceeds to develop in chapter four of Galatians.” ⁵³⁵ This is Hove’s conclusion as well: “Sandwiched between verses 26 and 29, Galatians 3:28 describes God’s people in the new covenant. . . . As predicted by the Old Testament, the new covenant is now known by its universal call; all are invited, whether Jew or Greek, slave or free, male or female.” ⁵³⁶ With these observations from the context of Galatians, egalitarians should be careful not to use this verse too forcefully in the gender debate. Yes, it is a significant verse that should influence our understanding of gender roles in the body of Christ, but it must be understood in its own context and alongside other pertinent texts.

On the one hand, egalitarians elevate the importance and relevance of Galatians 3:28, and on the other hand they seek to obscure the clarity of other passages, such as 1 Timothy 2. Thomas Schreiner demonstrates this point by citing several egalitarians.

Egalitarians back away from verse 13 because it calls into question the exegetical edifice they have built to justify women teaching men. For example, Mary Evans says that the relevance of verse 13 for verse 12 is unclear, and that verse 13 merely introduces the next verse about Eve. Gordon Fee asserts that the verse is not central to Paul’s argument. Timothy Harris says that the verse “is difficult to understand on any reading.” Craig Keener thinks that the argument here is hard to fathom. David Scholer protests that the text is unclear and that Paul cites selectively from Genesis. Steve Motyer says that logic and justice are nullified if the complementarian position of verses 13–14 is accepted. ⁵³⁷

Admittedly, there are difficult exegetical issues in 1 Timothy 2. For instance, what does it mean that “she will be saved through childbearing”? Nevertheless, the text contains a clear command in verse 12 and a clear ground for that command in verse 13. Therefore, Schreiner says of the egalitarian writers just cited, “It seems that unclarity is in the eye of the beholder, for the thrust of the verse [vs. 13] has been deemed quite clear in the history of the church. The creation of Adam first gives a reason why men should be the authoritative teachers in the church.” ⁵³⁸

In addition to this, Köstenberger finds it interesting that “the same commentators who view Gal. 3:28, a passage that is clearly part of a polemical context, as a paradigmatic passage for gender roles, tend to be the ones who seek to limit the applicability of 1 Timothy 2, a passage that is much less clearly polemical but rather seems to be self-consciously and explicitly grounded on antecedent OT Scripture.” ⁵³⁹

Finally, Grudem highlights a key difference between the specific instructions to which complementarians appeal for their position, and the general principles to which egalitarians appeal. On the one hand, “The passages that prohibit women from being elders and from teaching or having authority over men in the assembled church are not isolated passages. They occur in the heart of the main New Testament teachings about church office and about conduct in public worship.” ⁵⁴⁰ On the other hand, “egalitarian claims that all church leadership roles should be open to women are based not on any direct teaching of Scripture but on doubtful inferences from passages where this topic is not even under discussion.” ⁵⁴¹

My attempt thus far in this section has been to illustrate how egalitarians use general principles (specifically the general principle of Gal. 3:28) as a starting point in establishing their view of gender equality, and to cite some of the complementarian responses to this practice. The point is not to suggest that Galatians 3:28, or any of the other texts highlighted by egalitarians, should be ignored. Nor am I recommending that 1 Timothy 2, or any other particular text, should be used as a “starting point.” My hope is simply that we would not drive a wedge between general principles and specific instructions. When we come to the gender debate, all the relevant passages should be incorporated into our discussion and each text should be studied in its context and brought alongside the others.

Having surveyed the broader landscape of egalitarianism on this issue, I will now interact with William Webb, who lists this as one of his eighteen criteria. His thirteenth criterion is “Specific Instructions Versus General Principles,” and he states the criterion in this way: “A component of a text may be culturally relative if its specific instructions appear to be at odds with the general principles of Scripture.” ⁵⁴² He considers this a “moderately persuasive criteria,” and we must note that he is using this principle in a more nuanced way than other egalitarians. He is not asserting that Galatians 3:28 simply trumps the other texts. In fact, he doesn’t even mention Galatians 3:28 in his treatment of this criterion. ⁵⁴³ Rather, he is adding this principle to his arsenal, as it were, in order to push us further along the trajectory of redemptive movement. His assumption is that “ specific statements within Scripture are more likely to be culturally confined in some aspect than general statements ” (italics original). ⁵⁴⁴

Webb then appeals to the slavery debate of the nineteenth century, because in that debate the same dichotomy emerged between specific instructions and general principles. I have discussed in chapter 1 the nature of this distinction as it was used by abolitionists. Webb summarizes the point in this way, “Slave owners in the United States valued the concession-based specifics of Scripture and argued their case primarily from those verses. . . . Abolitionists, on the contrary, began with the broad principles of Scripture and showed that slavery should be repealed on the basis of love and the ethics of equality in God’s kingdom and in Jesus’ new community” (italics original). ⁵⁴⁵ This is a valid and interesting observation from the slavery debate. At first it seems to give much credence to the trajectory hermeneutic in that the contemporary fight to end patriarchy is identified with the nineteenth-century fight to end slavery.

But a couple things should be noted. First, while many abolitionists did employ this strategy in arguing their case, it was by no means the only way that individuals used the Bible to oppose slavery. Other arguments were made, some of which were sound appeals to specific biblical texts without resorting to immutable principles. Second, the move to immutable principles in the slavery debate may have aided the abolitionists in certain respects, but it did not serve to uphold the authority of the Bible. As Mark Noll notes, “This move led directly or indirectly to the theological liberalism of the last third of the twentieth century.” ⁵⁴⁶ Therefore, we should be careful not to accept an argument uncritically, even if it was used for a very noble cause. Thus, the fact that a distinction between specific instructions and general principles was present in abolitionist arguments cannot be taken as a compelling reason to do the same in the gender debate.

Webb’s second illustration has to do with gleaning laws (cf. Lev. 19:9–10; 23:22), which made provision for the poor. He makes the helpful point that while the principle of these instructions is still applicable, the manner in which we carry it out will most likely be different. ⁵⁴⁷ Webb qualifies his point, “While this example does not illustrate the tension that sometimes arises between the general and specific features of Scripture (as with slavery above), it does support the basic general-specific dictum: general statements within Scripture are more likely to be transcultural than specific statements.” ⁵⁴⁸

This illustration appears again in criterion 17, in which Webb offers a diagram of his ladder of abstraction. ⁵⁴⁹ As I discussed in my last chapter, in the section on purpose/intent statements, Webb’s ladder of abstraction is helpful. The problem, however, is the manner in which one moves up the ladder. On the matter of gleaning laws, Webb rightly abstracts the principle inherent in these instructions. There is a transcultural principle that we should help the poor, and there is ultimately the principle of loving one’s neighbor. But the way in which Webb “moves up the ladder” with respect to civil government and wifely submission is questionable. ⁵⁵⁰ Thus, Webb is correct that with certain biblical instructions we will need to move up the ladder of abstraction in our attempt to apply the instruction to our own lives today. And in this way general biblical principles will guide us in our application of specific instructions. However, Webb is wrong to use certain general statements to minimize the specific instructions concerning manhood and womanhood.

In the case of slavery, we can discern statements that undermine the practice and eventually brought about its abolition. ⁵⁵¹ And in this way it is legitimate to point to general principles that complement those statements. The key difference, though, between this issue and the gender issue, is that slavery is not commanded, and it is never rooted in the order of creation. Therefore, we need not drive a wedge between general principles and specific instructions, for the specific instructions concerning slavery are not commanding slavery. On the other hand, the specific instructions concerning gender roles are clear commands and are rooted in the order of creation, and therefore to posit that general principles somehow undermine these commands is to insert an unnecessary and harmful tension into the Bible’s message.

As Webb discusses the impact of this criterion on the issue of women’s roles, he says, “It would appear that the broad ethical principles of justice, love, fairness, compassion, etc. offer a rationale for change to, or at least further improvements in, the kind of treatment that women received in the biblical text.” ⁵⁵² We should recognize that this is a step beyond the argument that Galatians 3:28 teaches gender equality and eliminates role distinctions. What Webb is saying here is even a step higher on the ladder of abstraction. He is not appealing to a particular text, but rather to the broad principles of justice, love, fairness, compassion, etc. This is more akin to the arguments from moral intuition that were marshaled by some abolitionists, arguments that were well intentioned but ultimately undercut the Bible’s authority. ⁵⁵³ Similarly, Webb is appealing to general principles in a way that seems to put his moral intuition above biblical revelation. In fairness to him, it is doubtful that he intends to diminish the authority of the Bible in the least. He does not even classify this criterion as persuasive, but only moderately persuasive. However, this move will have the unintended effect of placing one’s own perception of justice and fairness above the ethical instructions presented in the Bible.

Webb claims that complementarians (the “soft patriarchy” position, in Webb’s terminology) also utilize this criterion, although perhaps unwittingly. He says they move “away from certain biblical texts in their own journey from hard to soft patriarchy,” by which he is referring to the complementarian position that women are equal to men in essence and dignity and importance. Apparently Webb believes that the movement from hard patriarchy (I assume he means the position that women are inferior to men) to soft patriarchy must involve the elevation of certain general principles above specific instructions. He cites the first chapter of Recovering Biblical Manhood and Womanhood , but without any specific comment. ⁵⁵⁴ However, it does not require an appeal to broad general principles to establish the essential equality of male and female. One needs only to cite Genesis 1:27, “So God created man in his own image, in the image of God he created him; male and female he created them.” Other passages and principles may be used, as John Piper does in his chapter, ⁵⁵⁵ but this does not involve a tension between general principles and specific instructions. The troublesome aspect of Webb’s suggestion is that it places general principles over against certain instructions in such a way that those instructions are effectively silenced.

This becomes more precarious as Webb moves finally to the issue of homosexuality. He immediately acknowledges that advocates for the homosexual lifestyle often use this same reasoning. He refers to the book by Letha Scanzoni and Virginia Mollenkott titled Is the Homosexual My Neighbor? A Positive Christian Response . ⁵⁵⁶ Webb summarizes the argument of the book: “From the broad principle of loving one’s neighbor Scanzoni and Mollenkott infer that a Christian response should ultimately be one that accepts homosexuality as an appropriate alternative form of sexual expression.” ⁵⁵⁷

Webb’s response to this book is very gracious and very helpful in many ways. He urges us to love and minister to homosexuals while telling them the truth about sin and the forgiveness that comes through Christ. I wholeheartedly agree with these points, and I am grateful for Webb’s winsome treatment of this delicate issue. Nevertheless, Webb’s stance against homosexual behavior is severely weakened by the way he juxtaposes general principles and specific instructions. He seeks to distance himself from Scanzoni and Mollenkott, but his rationale is not compelling. The reasons he gives for why we should not adopt the hermeneutic developed in Is the Homosexual My Neighbor? are reasons I could cite for why we should not adopt the egalitarian use of Galatians 3:28. Webb writes, “To the question, ‘Is the homosexual my neighbor?’ we should answer with a resounding ‘Yes!’ But having given that answer, it hardly affirms the acceptance of homosexuality.” ⁵⁵⁸ He is correct. But Webb does not demonstrate why his use of this principle is any different from Scanzoni and Mollenkott. Similarly, our response to the questions, “Is the woman my neighbor?” or “Is Galatians 3:28 transcultural?” or “Should we uphold justice and fairness?” should be a resounding “Yes!” But that hardly denies the biblical pattern of manhood and womanhood clearly taught in other passages.

As he concludes his discussion of this criterion, Webb makes a couple additional points. He tries to distinguish between the “women/slavery issues” and the homosexual issue by saying that the slavery issue and the gender issue “involve options that are on a graded scale,” whereas “we see that a person either practices homoerotic acts or does not; thus, incremental assessment is not part of the equation.” ⁵⁵⁹ He then makes the point that a person’s conclusions on slavery or gender roles do not threaten the person’s position in Christ’s kingdom. “Compared to the homosexual issue, the spectrum of alternatives in the slavery/women issues does not call into question one’s salvation or eternal destiny.” ⁵⁶⁰ These points are odd, and somewhat out of place in this section, for they do not give any concrete reason why general principles take precedence over instructions concerning gender roles but not instructions concerning homosexuality. These points offer certain dissimilarities between the issues, but they do not specifically relate to the criterion under discussion. Additionally, the issue of gender roles is not as “incremental” as Webb makes it out to be. It may be true that there is a spectrum of positions, each with its particular nuances (as is true in the debate over homosexuality), but when we get to the bottom of the matter there are those who believe that 1 Timothy 2:12 still means that in the church women should not teach or have authority over men, and there are those who deny that the verse still applies in this way. And concerning marriage, there are those who believe Ephesians 5:22–33 still prescribes male headship and wifely submission, and there are those who deny this. Therefore, Webb’s attempt to turn the discussion into a sliding scale of positions muddles the discussion and diminishes the importance of the pivotal texts.

The criterion of specific instructions versus general principles reveals an attempt by egalitarians to minimize certain texts that contradict their conclusions. This reveals the subjective tendency to emphasize passages and principles that favor one’s presuppositions and to minimize those texts that teach otherwise. This criterion also drives an arbitrary wedge into Scripture, by setting certain principles over against certain instructions. Finally, it makes Webb’s system, as well as the arguments of other egalitarians, susceptible to those who seek to condone the homosexual lifestyle. It is good that Webb has not taken this step, but he has not provided an adequate foundation for future generations who would utilize his hermeneutical method.

Conclusion

This chapter has dealt with four additional matters. First, I interacted with Webb concerning the important issue of original creation. The significance of original creation is seen in all three components of Webb’s book, Slaves, Women, and Homosexuals . In comparing the slavery issue and the issue of women’s roles, we see an extremely important difference, for slavery is never rooted in the order of creation while gender roles are. And a similarity can be seen in the instructions concerning gender roles and homosexuality, for these instructions find their basis in creation. Male headship and wifely submission, as well as the prohibition against homosexuality, are all rooted in God’s creation design for manhood and womanhood. The second section of this chapter dealt with the closely related issue of primogeniture. This is a cultural custom which gives us an insight into the minds of those who would have originally heard the instructions of 1 Timothy 2:11–15. But the cultural nature of primogeniture itself does not undermine the transcultural nature of Paul’s instructions. Paul was not appealing to primogeniture per se, but to the specific order of creation, “For Adam was formed first, then Eve” (1 Tim. 2:13). This is the ground for his instruction in the previous verse; he is not basing it on a cultural practice that calls for greater honor to be attributed to the firstborn.

The second half of this chapter contained a discussion of two broader hermeneutical questions: the relationship between creation and redemption, and the relationship between specific instructions and general principles. On the question of creation and redemption, I contended that the two realms should be viewed as harmonious and cohesive, rather than disjunctive. Certainly there are ways in which redemption transcends creation, but this will not happen in a way that creates tension between the two. In the area of manhood and womanhood, redemption will restore the beauty of gender equality and complementarity that was present in the garden before the fall. Finally, on the issue of specific instructions and general principles, we must be wary of subjective tendencies to elevate the passages or principles that fit our preconceived notions while suppressing the texts that challenge them. This tendency easily raises our own intuitions above the authoritative revelation of God’s Word. Instead, we must seek to examine every pertinent text, understanding it in its own context, and then seek to understand how the various passages fit together in a coherent whole.

Conclusion

T he comparison of New Testament slavery passages and women’s passages is a fascinating study. We have been faced with difficult hermeneutical questions, and my hope is that this book will serve to clarify at least some of those questions.

Slavery

The issue of slavery in the Bible is certainly complex, and an examination of the New Testament slavery passages does not yield easy or simple solutions. We can look back to the nineteenth-century debate over slavery and see the difficulty for abolitionists to convince others that the Bible does not support slavery but rather undermines it. ⁵⁶¹ Some of these abolitionist arguments were sound appeals to the Bible, and yet they failed to convince, largely, it seems, because of the racist presupposition that resided in so many minds and hearts. Other abolitionist arguments distinguished between specific instructions and general principles and eventually led to more liberal views of Scripture. These were the arguments that resemble the trajectory approach, for they used the spirit of certain passages to override the letter of other texts, as those texts had been understood.

However, as we examine the specific commands to slaves and other comments on slavery in the Bible, we see that the institution, in fact, does not receive biblical support or sanction. While we do not find a clear condemnation of slavery, neither do we find it commended. ⁵⁶² The New Testament writers assume the reality of slavery and speak to masters and slaves in their specific roles, but there is nothing that positively supports the institution of slavery. In addition to this, we observe that references to creation are absent from the slavery passages, which marks the crucial distinction between these passages and the passages dealing with gender roles.

In the three texts where a ground clause undergirds a command to slaves (Eph. 6:8; Col. 3:24; 1 Peter 2:19–20), the ground involves a reference to God looking kindly on those who obey Him. There is nothing in these passages that establishes slavery as a God-ordained institution. Rather, instructions are given to slaves and masters in their respective positions without explicit comment on the morality of slavery itself. In 1 Timothy 6:1 and Titus 2:10, which contain purpose clauses, slaves are exhorted to obey so that they might adorn the reputation of Christianity rather than tarnish it. In this way, these two verses resemble 1 Peter 3:1 and Titus 2:5, which state similar purposes for wifely submission.

After close examination of the New Testament slavery passages, we do not detect a “biblical” case favoring the institution of slavery. This is in contrast with those in the past who have defended slavery from the Bible. It is also in contrast with certain egalitarian writers who assert that such a biblical case for slavery exists, and thus argue that we must move beyond the biblical teaching on slavery and the biblical teaching on gender roles .

Women

A comparison of the slavery passages with the women’s passages reveals critical differences between the two. ⁵⁶³ Most notable are the repeated references to creation found in 1 Timothy 2:13, 1 Corinthians 11:8–9, Ephesians 5:31, and most likely 1 Corinthians 14:34 in its reference to “the Law.” Also significant are the Christological and theological analogies of Ephesians 5:22–33 and 1 Corinthians 11:3. William Webb seeks to trivialize these analogies by comparing them to other “theological” analogies that are connected to slavery, monarchy, primogeniture, and right-handedness. ⁵⁶⁴ But important differences have been blurred. In the slavery passages where a theological analogy is used (Eph. 6:5–9; Col. 3:22–4:1; 1 Peter 2:18–25), the example given is not intended as a basis for the institution of slavery. Rather, Paul and Peter offer examples that illustrate appropriate behavior. In contrast with those passages, Ephesians 5:22–33 and 1 Corinthians 11:3 are offering much more than an illustration of appropriate behavior. They are making profound statements about the reality of how God designed us. Indeed, there is an intentional parallel between God’s relationship with his Son, Christ’s relationship with his church, and a husband’s relationship with his wife.

Hermeneutics

Following the exegesis of chapters 2 and 3, and the summary and comparison of chapter 4, I moved to the hermeneutical discussion related to a redemptive-movement hermeneutic. I did not interact with every one of Webb’s eighteen criteria but chose eight that seemed particularly relevant to the focus of this book. In the case of theological analogies, Webb’s discussion is helpful with respect to the slavery passages. For he says, “When the biblical text addresses human sociological structures, there is a significant possibility that the theological analogy is intended to motivate behavior within existing structures without necessarily endorsing the structures themselves as transcultural.” ⁵⁶⁵ This is precisely what is going on in the slavery texts. However, this principle cannot be applied to Ephesians 5 and 1 Corinthians 11, since these are not mere analogies, but rather describe significant aspects of God’s nature that are to serve as a pattern for male-female relationships. Also, the comparisons Webb makes between these texts and other “theological analogies” are highly suspect.

Preliminary movement and seed ideas are the two criteria I dealt with next. While there are New Testament passages that point beyond certain social structures of the first century, this does not give us warrant to move beyond the ethic of the New Testament. In particular, we can detect in the ethic of the New Testament a movement beyond the institution of slavery. On the other hand, though, we must not move beyond biblical gender roles, for the New Testament ethic prescribes them. Purpose/intent statements is another criterion Webb uses to build his case for a trajectory hermeneutic. But it is not clear that purpose/intent statements necessarily imply that a text is cultural. In particular, it is not clear that the purpose of 1 Peter 3 can no longer be fulfilled in our day.

Issues related to creation are pivotal to this study, and the next three criteria relate to it. Basis in original creation is a compelling reason to assume the transcultural application of the gender passages. Webb attempts to minimize this by pointing to several aspects of original creation that are not transcultural. However, his discussion assumes unlikely and hermeneutically simplistic interpretations of the creation account in an attempt to heighten the perceived tension between original creation and today’s culture. But his reasoning fails to address the issue at hand since the complementarian understanding of 1 Timothy 2:13 and 1 Corinthians 11:8–9 does not assume that the creation account is binding in all of its details. The point is rather that certain things God established at creation are extremely significant, and the New Testament reveals those aspects to us. In this way, basis in original creation is extremely significant for the gender passages. Slavery is never rooted in creation, but gender roles are. This is also important in relation to the issue of homosexuality, for this is prohibited based on God’s creation design for manhood and womanhood (Rom. 1:26–27). ⁵⁶⁶

Primogeniture is closely related to the issue of original creation, and it is a pivotal point for Webb. Webb argues that the cultural nature of primogeniture customs points to the cultural nature of 1 Timothy 2:13. But complementarians refer to primogeniture only to point out how the original readers of 1 Timothy would have understood this statement. When we examine the text itself, we see that Paul is appealing to the order of creation, not to the custom of primogeniture. He cites the specific order in which God created the man and the woman, and he uses this to ground his instruction that women are not to teach or exercise authority over men. The third criterion related to creation is the relationship between creation and redemption. On this question I acknowledged that there are ways in which redemption transcends creation. However, we must recognize that the New Testament reveals how this will be so, and the authoritative instructions of the New Testament include guidelines for the differing roles of men and women. We would need clear textual warrant for overturning the design for manhood and womanhood revealed in creation, but what we find rather are appeals to creation in order to uphold gender differences (e.g., 1 Tim. 2:13; 1 Cor. 11:8–9). Thus, concerning the matter of manhood and womanhood, redemption cannot be viewed as moving beyond creation in any way that would contradict or create tension with the order of creation.

Last of all is the criterion that juxtaposes specific instructions and general principles. Here Galatians 3:28 is asserted by many egalitarian writers as the clear gospel principle that must supersede the specific instructions of passages such as 1 Timothy 2. But we need not drive a wedge between the two. Asserting this tension between certain biblical principles and specific biblical instructions is not only unnecessary, it can be extremely harmful. For instance, in the debate over homosexuality, this same dichotomy is used to condone behavior that is clearly condemned in Scripture. Webb distances himself from such arguments, but his system is susceptible to this line of thinking. ⁵⁶⁷ A significant problem with distinguishing general principles and specific instructions and using the first to minimize the latter, is that it makes the interpretive task more subjective, and thus diminishes the authority of the Bible. It allows a person to emphasize the principles that fit his or her presuppositions and to undermine the texts that are at odds with those presuppositions. We must strive, rather, to understand how each passage fits into the unified message of the Bible. And we must allow each passage to challenge and refine any assumptions we may have absorbed from sources other than the Bible.

What Is at Stake?

This study has not been an abstract, academic endeavor for me. As a pastor, I am zealous to teach and preach and lead in such a way that individuals are inspired and instructed to glorify God in every aspect of their lives, not least of which is the area of manhood and womanhood. By pursuing the model of marriage presented in Ephesians 5, husbands and wives vividly display Christ’s relationship to his church and thus proclaim the gospel to those around them. Single individuals and young people will also glorify God as they grow into godly men and godly women who recognize their God-ordained roles in the home and church and affirm and encourage those roles as they are played out in the marriages around them. I desperately want our church and other churches to recognize the beauty of what God has done in creating us male and female.

As a husband, I am very aware of the ways in which I fall short of the biblical model of manhood. But I have also begun to experience the delights of living with my wife in a way that honors God and brings both of us great satisfaction. As I grow and mature in my role as the sacrificial leader of our home, and as Stacy supports and encourages my leadership, we are discovering the joy of our complementary, God-given roles.

Finally, as a father, I want to pass on to our children a clear vision of manhood and womanhood. In the moral confusion of our culture, I want my son and two daughters to know what it means to be a man and what it means to be a woman. I want them to know that there is a difference between the two, and that it is a wonderful and noble thing to grow into the roles that God has set out for each of them. I desire that our daughters one day will know what to look for in a prospective husband, and that our son will know what to look for in a prospective wife.

Therefore, there is much at stake in this debate—for the church, for marriages, and for families. The debate over gender roles has not diminished, and I do not see any end in sight. But we must not grow weary in defending the beautiful portrait of gender complementarity presented in the Bible. For by minimizing this aspect of Scripture, we put ourselves at great risk of looking more and more like the world, and we also miss out on many joys God intends for his people. May we rather submit ourselves to the teaching of God’s Word, no matter how countercultural it may be, and discover the joy of affirming and conforming to God’s plan for manhood and womanhood.

Postscript:

The Continuing Discussion

T he redemptive-movement hermeneutic continues to develop, and it will continue to be an important subject of discussion. In this postscript I will summarize some of the relevant publications that have appeared in the last few years.

Four Views on Moving Beyond the Bible

to Theology

An important work was published in 2009 which highlights the significance of these matters. Four Views on Moving Beyond the Bible to Theology includes chapters by Walter Kaiser, Daniel Doriani, Kevin Vanhoozer, and William Webb. ⁵⁶⁸

What is most intriguing to me in this book is to see two egalitarians, Kaiser and Webb, presenting opposing hermeneutical approaches for their conclusions. I will give a general overview of the book and then focus on comparing and contrasting Kaiser and Webb. ⁵⁶⁹

General Overview

The book consists of the presentation of four hermeneutical models, each followed by responses from the three other contributors. Following this section of the book there are three “reflection” chapters, offered by Mark Strauss, Al Wolters, and Christopher Wright.

Walter Kaiser presents a principlizing model of biblical interpretation. A key aspect of this approach is using the Ladder of Abstraction, which Kaiser defines as “a continuous sequence of categorizations from a low level of specificity up to a high point of generality in a principle and down again to a specific application in the contemporary culture” (24). He illustrates this by citing the Old Testament prohibition against muzzling an ox (Deut. 25:4) and showing how Paul applies that principle to the matter of financially supporting pastors in the church (1 Cor. 9:9–12; 1 Tim. 5:18).

Kaiser then addresses various issues in order to demonstrate the use of a principlizing model. He discusses euthanasia, women and the church, homosexuality, slavery, abortion, and embryonic stem cell research. In each case he seeks to show that principles within the Word of God are sufficient for our instruction concerning these matters. There is no need to go beyond the Bible.

Daniel Doriani commends a redemptive-historical model for hermeneutics. The focus here is on the progressive development and christocentricity of the Bible. Doriani strongly affirms the authority, sufficiency, and perspicuity of Scripture and the need for interpreters to be both technically skilled and spiritually sensitive. On the matter of Scripture’s authority he states, “If Scripture says something I do not prefer, then so much the worse for my preferences” (77).

Doriani discusses two specific ways in which one may go beyond the sacred page. First, casuistry can be used to answer questions that are not addressed specifically in the Bible. Quoting Thomas Merrill, Doriani defines casuistry as the “ ‘art of resolving particular cases of conscience through appeal to higher general principles,’ especially when one must act at a time when principles seem to be in conflict or when a new problem has emerged” (100). Second, we must go beyond the sacred page by asking the right questions, specifically having to do with duty, character, goals, and worldview (103). Doriani applies this approach to issues such as gambling, wedding planning, architecture, and women in ministry.

Kevin Vanhoozer presents a drama-of-redemption model for understanding Scripture. This position is similar to the redemptive-historical model, but with an emphasis on our role as performers in the theodrama that continues to unfold. We hold a script, but it is also incumbent on us to improvise in response to the unexpected situations that we encounter. Vanhoozer applies his method to the theology of Mariology and the contemporary issue of transsexuality.

William Webb advances a redemptive-movement hermeneutic. He begins his chapter by qualifying what he means by moving beyond the Bible. He states that in one sense “we should never move beyond the Bible for it contains the sacred and cherished covenant with the God we have come to love deeply” (215). By moving beyond the Bible he means moving beyond the concrete specificity of the Bible, or the time-restricted elements of the Bible, or an isolated or static understanding of the Bible (215). In this essay Webb summarizes his previous points concerning slavery and also develops his hermeneutical model in relation to two additional matters: war and corporal punishment.

Slavery and the Gender Debate

Now I will focus on a few of the points made by Kaiser, Doriani, and Webb that specifically relate to slavery and the gender debate. The fascinating thing to see here is the drastically different (and opposing!) ways in which Kaiser and Webb defend the egalitarian stance. Doriani’s complementarian position helps to highlight these differences. Webb believes we must move beyond the “concrete specificity” of the Bible in order to arrive at abolitionism and egalitarianism. Kaiser sees both of these positions inherent in the biblical statements themselves.

Kaiser, through an interesting word study, concludes that Gen. 2:18 should read “I will make a power corresponding to the man” (Kaiser’s translation, page 30) rather than “I will make him a helper fit for him” ( ESV ). He then offers this alternative translation as a possible explanation for Paul’s wording in 1 Cor. 11:10, “For this reason, a woman ought to have power/authority [Gk. exousia ] on her head” (Kaiser’s translation, page 31). As for 1 Cor. 14:33b–35, he says that it “actually comes from a letter addressed to Paul from the Corinthian church and therefore is not normative teaching” (32). Then on the pivotal text of 1 Timothy 2, Kaiser suggests that Paul is basing his instructions not on the “orders of creation” but on the “orders of education.” He bases this on the fact that Paul does not employ his usual word for “to create” ( ktizō ) in verse 13. Rather, he uses the word “to form” ( eplasthē ), which can carry the meaning of “shaping or molding educationally, spiritually” (35). Therefore, “since the woman had not as yet been taught, she was all the more easily ‘tricked’ ” (35). Kaiser’s reading of 1 Timothy 2, then, is that women should be taught and then allowed to teach and exercise authority over men. Thus, one need not go beyond the Bible to see the principles of egalitarianism.

Kaiser also addresses the issue of slavery, drawing a sharp distinction between biblical debt slavery and pagan slavery. He surveys various passages in the Pentateuch and shows the gracious nature of these instructions in comparison with the slavery found in pagan society. Then he points to Philemon as a conclusive biblical statement against pagan slavery. “Alas, despite the clarity of Paul’s statements, many do not believe the Bible ever finally took a stand against all forms of involuntary, that is, pagan, slavery” (42). It is at this point that Webb will sharply disagree with Kaiser.

Doriani defends a complementarian reading of 1 Timothy 2. One must conclude that the prohibition in this text is either temporary (the egalitarian position) or partial (the complementarian position). Doriani seeks to show that the prohibition is permanent but partial. “Women should learn the faith and share their knowledge in some settings, as Paul says in Titus 2:4. But they should not become primary public instructors and defenders of the faith in the local church’s pastoral positions, as Paul envisioned them in his instruction to Timothy. This division of gender roles has been God’s design from the beginning. So there is no reason to go beyond/against the plain sense of 1 Timothy 2 if we seek Paul’s guidance for the role of women in the church” (112–13).

Doriani also compares the question of gender roles to the issue of slavery. He acknowledges that “the Bible does make concessions to cultural realities,” noting that “biblical law regulates and undermines the institution of slavery but does not forbid it” (118). Male leadership, however, is no such concession. As Doriani presents in his survey of biblical history, the principle of male leadership is present throughout the Bible and not a conclusion based on “a mere heap of texts” (118). Earlier in the chapter he also appeals to 1 Cor. 7:21, 23 and Philemon 11–21, concluding (less emphatically than Kaiser) that “Paul’s opposition to slavery is not stated in the form of a frontal assault on the institution, but he clearly wants Christians to avoid or escape it if they can” (83). He then makes the critical observation that the way the Bible addresses slavery and the way it presents male leadership are fundamentally different. They are not parallel, as Webb asserts (and also John Stackhouse, Finally Feminist , which Doriani interacts with briefly). Rather, “the parallel is between male leadership of marriage and parental leadership of children. Both are grounded in creation,” “continue after the fall,” and “are reaffirmed after Christ accomplishes redemption” (83).

Webb, in his responses to Kaiser and Doriani, uses a significant amount of space to critique their statements about slavery. He first takes issue with Kaiser’s stark contrast between biblical debt slavery and pagan slavery. Webb asserts, “Debt slavery was part of the pagan scene, and permanent chattel slavery was part of the biblical scene at least for non-Hebrew slaves” (65). His more important criticism of Kaiser has to do with Philemon. Where Kaiser sees abolitionism, Webb sees nothing of the sort. He presents seven arguments for a non-abolitionist reading of Philemon and then, in a move reminiscent of his book, asks “What if I’m wrong?” with regard to one detail of his argument (68).

It seems that Kaiser finds a solution to the slavery question too simply, and Webb presents it as overly difficult. Webb minimizes the liberating features of these texts, and in doing so appears to strengthen the appeal of his hermeneutical system. If the Bible does not point beyond slavery in the concrete specificity of certain texts, then the redemptive-movement hermeneutic may be our only hope of arriving at an abolitionist ethic. But if texts such as 1 Corinthians 7:21 and Philemon do provide pointers beyond slavery, then we need not move beyond the ethic of the NT. Rather, we can embrace this NT ethic which, itself, points beyond slavery.

In response to Doriani, Webb’s criticisms are similar. He argues against the idea that 1 Corinthians 7:21 provides any support for abolitionism and reasserts the same concerning Philemon. For Webb there is simply no way of getting from the biblical text to an abolitionist ethic without the use of his redemptive-movement hermeneutic. “These texts are not simply there to regulate society, as Doriani suggests. We need to celebrate the incremental redemptive movement of both Old and New Testament slavery texts and permit their underlying spirit to carry us to an abolitionist position—using a logical and theological extension of Scripture’s redemptive spirit found within the slavery texts themselves” (137, emphasis original).

It is interesting that Webb does not discuss any of the gender passages in his chapter. He does not want his hermeneutical model to be equated with egalitarianism, as he states in his response to Doriani. Webb claims that “there are leading evangelicals who endorse a redemptive-movement hermeneutic approach (contra Doriani) and yet maintain some sort of contextually configured hierarchy, generally of a soft or light version, for today” (133–34, citing Darrell Bock, Craig Blomberg, and Mark Strauss). Nonetheless, Webb has made his views clear in Slaves, Women, and Homosexuals , and it seems to be a fundamental aim of his hermeneutic to uphold egalitarianism and undermine complementarianism.

There are many things I sincerely appreciate about Webb’s work. He is helpful in raising difficult questions that require a sensitive response. He certainly gives any reader much to ponder concerning those potentially troubling passages of Scripture. In addition to this, it is Webb’s desire to provide skeptics with an apologetic for the Scriptures, an intention that is to be commended.

The way in which Webb’s system comes together, however, seems misguided. As Al Wolters points out in his reflection chapter, it is curious that, “according to [Webb’s] scheme, the same text can have contradictory meanings” (307). He is referring to 1 Timothy 2:12, which Webb agrees prohibits women from teaching or having authority over men, at least in the “concrete specificity” of the text. But then the redemptive movement of the text reveals that the opposite is the case: women are free to teach and exercise authority over men. Wolters says, “In this way [Webb] can have his cake (hold to contemporary values) and eat it too (claim faithfulness to Scripture)” (307). This, I believe, goes to the heart of the problem with the redemptive-movement hermeneutic. Webb desires to root his egalitarianism in the text of Scripture, but knows he must avoid the exegetical issues that Kaiser cannot successfully tackle. Thus, he concedes the complementarian exegesis and then moves beyond the “concrete specificity” of what the passage is saying. I believe this move will unavoidably loosen one’s foundation in the text.

Doriani’s response to Webb is helpful in seeing the differences between the redemptive-movement hermeneutic and a nuanced complementarian reading of the slavery issue and the gender debate. The question is not whether there is redemptive movement, but rather how much. “We agree that there is movement in the teaching on slavery and that there is not movement on homosexuality; we disagree about gender roles” (260).

We will have to watch in the years to come to see whether egalitarians will move in a unified way to adopt Webb’s approach, or if many will continue to advance the more “traditional” egalitarian approach represented by Kaiser. The two scholars find themselves on different paths as they seek the same destination. Which path will egalitarianism take into the future?

Corporal Punishment in the Bible:

A Redemptive-Movement Hermeneutic

for Troubling Texts ⁵⁷⁰

Recently, Webb has published a book that applies the redemptive-movement hermeneutic to another hot-button issue—spanking.

Overview

The introductory chapter of the book is titled, “A Troubled Christian Soul.” Webb laments the “unsettling juxtaposition of values” that seems to exist between the Bible and our contemporary ideals. We are appalled by stories of parents beating and bruising and scarring their children, but “the Bible does not view the leaving of marks and bruises from a beating as abusive” (20). In fact, the Bible presents the leaving of marks as virtuous, Webb asserts. From this unsettling juxtaposition arises a troubled soul . . . and a book to wrestle with this tension. ⁵⁷¹

At the end of the introduction, Webb summarizes the central question addressed in the book: “ Should Christians using a grammatical-historical hermeneutic add (or not add) a component of redemptive-movement meaning and application as they read the corporal punishment texts? ” (22, italics original). The claim is that the redemptive-movement hermeneutic is not a new concept at all, but rather can be a helpful “subcomponent” of the grammatical-historical approach.

In chapter 1, Webb juxtaposes the contemporary pro-spanking position with the corporal punishment texts in the Bible, arguing that contemporary advocates of spanking have moved beyond the Bible in their understanding of spanking. In other words, they have unwittingly made a move similar to the trajectory approach by softening the corporal punishment commands. The problem is they haven’t gone far enough. According to Webb, the consistent position is to eliminate all corporal punishment.

James Dobson and Focus on the Family are cited in this discussion, but Webb says that his “strongest disagreements lie with biblical scholars such as Andreas Köstenberger, Al Mohler, Wayne Grudem and Paul Wegner, who have recently published on this subject” (27). The rest of chapter 1 deals with seven ways in which spanking advocates have moved beyond what the Bible says. They are as follows: “(1) age limitations,

(2) the number of lashes or strokes, (3) the bodily location of the beating, (4) the resultant bruising, welts and wounds, (5) the instrument of discipline, (6) the frequency of beatings and offenses punishable, and (7) the emotive disposition of the parent” (28). In each of these areas Webb draws a stark contrast between what the Bible teaches and what contemporary pro-spankers teach.

Chapter 2 explains the redemptive-movement hermeneutic and uses the slavery texts as a means of doing so. Some of this material is adapted from the discussion in Slaves, Women, and Homosexuals . Chapter 3 makes the case for a redemptive-movement interpretation of the corporal punishment texts. To do so, Webb describes how corporal punishment was exercised in ancient Egypt, ancient Babylon, and ancient Assyria. He then compares this with ancient Israel and illustrates the redemptive movement that has taken place in the biblical commands. Two other important facets of this chapter are abstracted meaning and purpose meaning. These points were also discussed in Slaves, Women, and Homosexuals .

Webb then asks the question in chapter 4, “What about adult corporal punishment?” He examines the “heavy knife” or “meat cleaver” text of Deuteronomy 25:11–12. These verses describe a unique situation in which two men are fighting and the wife of one of them tries to rescue her husband by seizing the other man by his private parts. In such an event, the woman’s hand is to be cut off. Webb contrasts this with corporal mutilation in other ancient Near Eastern cultures, seeking to demonstrate that even Deuteronomy 25:11–12, as harsh as it may sound, is an example of redemptive movement. The redemptive movement, however, is only incremental. “In no way do the concrete specifics of what we encounter in Deuteronomy 25:11–12 represent an ultimate ethical application in terms of how to treat human beings within a fallen-world context where punishments are necessary” (114). We must continue the trajectory of this incremental movement in order to arrive at an ultimate ethic. Webb suggests applying this in terms of finding penalties that provide some kind of restitution to those who have been wronged. “Punishments that can in some way lessen or redeem damages are far better than punishments that create more damage within an already damaged world” (114).

Webb’s study of corporal punishment concludes with the practical question of whether or not parents should spank their kids. He elaborates on the question this way: “ Having already journeyed beyond the concrete-specific teaching of the Bible about ‘beating with the rod’ (the seven ways) to a gentler and kinder form of discipline (two-smacks-max)—a journey that embraces the redemptive spirit of Scripture—should that same redemptive spirit logically carry Christians to use alternative-discipline methods only? ” (119, italics original). Many of the arguments in this final chapter have to do with the assertion that noncorporal forms of discipline are more humane. Webb makes a significant hermeneutical point by comparing the corporal punishment question to the abolition of slavery. Slavery should be abolished, not merely softened. “In a similar way, a logical extension or trajectory of the redemptive spirit with the corporal punishment texts means the abolition of physical beatings and bodily mutilations altogether. Softer and gentler beatings are good but do not offer the fullest expression of redemptive movement” (127).

A lengthy and very helpful postscript to the book shares the “unplanned parenting journey” of Webb and his wife, Marilyn. This is the practical outworking of the hermeneutical conclusions. It was moving to read of the Webbs’ experiences in their own family, and it was extremely helpful to read of the wise methods they have used for training up their children.

Webb’s Helpful Insights

On that note, let me mention the things I appreciated about this book. I have enjoyed reading all of Webb’s books and articles because he forces me to ask difficult questions that I might otherwise be inclined to ignore. He challenges my assumptions and therefore forces me to think more deeply about those assumptions. I am in debt to him for spurring me on in this way.

It is also helpful to see the redemptive nature of Israel’s laws in contrast with the harsher punishments of other cultures. I am grateful to Webb for the research he has done regarding these things. It is very enlightening.

And as I just mentioned, the postscript is immensely practical and useful for parents. Although I do not agree with his hermeneutical conclusions, there is a lot of practical wisdom for parenting here. This has stimulated my thinking about various methods of discipline we use in our own home with our three young children.

Critique from Other Scholars

The main critique that has been brought against Webb on this issue is that he does not adequately account for differences of genre in Scripture. Andreas Köstenberger, in the second edition of God, Marriage, and Family , responds to a paper that Webb presented on this topic. ⁵⁷² In Webb’s book, he includes an appendix that interacts with Köstenberger’s critiques. One of Köstenberger’s three critiques is as follows:

Webb failed to account adequately for the genre distinctions between legal Torah texts and wisdom literature, treating these different types of texts on equal terms. However, while both are part of sacred Scripture, one should not interpret a legal text from Deuteronomy or Leviticus in the same way as a passage in Proverbs or Psalms. The proverbial nature of wisdom literature does not require strict literalism but rather provides universal principles about the disciplining of children. In contrast to certain legal stipulations, OT wisdom is perennially relevant rather than something to be relegated to a now-passé stage in the development of biblical ethics. ⁵⁷³

Walter Kaiser responds similarly in Four Views on Moving Beyond the Bible to Theology . In his response to Webb’s chapter, Kaiser writes:

Webb takes a handful of spanking texts from the book of Proverbs but forgets the well-known hermeneutical instructions for interpreting proverbial types of literature. . . . To take a proverb and demand that it is to be understood as a literal word with no exceptions, but universally applicable to all in all situations is to run counter to the literary genre and its own rules of interpretation. . . . However, once again Webb searches the Bible topically (not staying with chair-teaching passages in context) and gathers teachings on all sorts of corporal punishment, from Exod. 21:20–21 (slave passage) to punishments meted out by judges in the courts (Deut. 25:1–3), and lumps them (not to mention apocryphal material from Sirach) all together with proverbial material on raising and disciplining children. This is no way to do Bible study! ⁵⁷⁴

Daniel Doriani also raises the question of genre:

[W]hile I appreciated Webb’s remarks about the progress of the OT compared to its culture, about the purpose of discipline, and about the “abstracted meaning” of the texts (reminiscent of Kaiser’s principlizing), I had two questions: Had Webb sufficiently accounted for the fact that many of his CP texts are civil/penal code, not family law? And is “redemptive movement” most suited to serve as the dominant paradigm for analyzing CP?” ⁵⁷⁵

Webb conducts a fascinating study of many passages that can be very troubling, indeed. However, his conclusions are suspect because of the lack of clarity regarding various genres of Scripture. This seems to be another example of Webb wanting to have his cake and eat it too (see Al Wolters’ quote above). He desires to embrace the popular values of our time (anti-spanking) and also maintain fidelity to the Bible. Again, there is danger in this hermeneutical system which loosens our foothold in the authority of Scripture.

The Seven Ways

I agree with the critiques given by Köstenberger, Kaiser, and Doriani. I think they put their finger on one of the key weaknesses in Webb’s whole system. He lumps passages together without accounting for the different parts of Scripture in which they are found. He also misconstrues the proverbial material. ⁵⁷⁶ These problems are very evident in chapter 1 of Webb’s book, where he identifies seven ways “that pro-spankers go beyond the specific teachings about corporal punishment found in the Bible.” ⁵⁷⁷

Webb deals first with age limitations. Those today who advocate spanking also recommend guidelines for how and when to administer spankings. This includes suggestions of the age range of children for whom spankings are appropriate. Webb, however, counters with the observation that the Bible gives no age limitations for corporal punishment.

The instructions for beating children in Scripture do not stand alone; they intersect with at least three other spheres of corporal punishment: slaves, fools, and Torah violators. For each of these categories the adult application of the rod or whip was a normative biblical virtue. The Deuteronomy text that establishes physical beatings as a broad-based punishment for Torah infractions (Deut. 25:1–3) was in all likelihood applied as early as twelve to fourteen years of age. The Exodus text that supports beating slaves (Ex. 21:20–21) may well have applied to all slaves regardless of age. ⁵⁷⁸

He also cites verses from Proverbs that speak of corporal punishment for the “fool,” and asserts that these could include children as well as adults.

Pulling all of these texts together in this way is unwarranted. Webb is correct in observing that the Bible does not give us explicit age limitations for the use of corporal punishment with children. But he is incorrect to suggest that individuals would be disobedient to the instructions of the Bible if they were to limit spankings to certain ages. This is what Webb asserts. “Given this larger biblical context, the idea of primarily spanking preschoolers, tapering off from there and eliminating all spankings for teenagers, while appearing reasonable to contemporary readers, is simply not biblical at the level of what the Bible explicitly teaches.” ⁵⁷⁹

If we interpret these passages correctly, however, we must acknowledge that the Bible does not teach anything explicitly regarding the specific question of age limitations. It could be helpful if those who advocate spanking make a distinction here. The use of corporal punishment in the discipline of children is taught in the Bible. But many of the specifics are not explicitly taught. Therefore, recommendations regarding some of the details of spanking are based more generally on the wisdom we glean from the whole of what the Bible says about parenting. ⁵⁸⁰

Webb goes too far in the other direction, giving the impression that obeying the clear instructions of Scripture would mean administering harsh beatings to our children all the way into their adulthood. If we are convinced by his portrayal of the biblical landscape on this issue, then it becomes plain that we must somehow “move beyond” what the Bible says. But what do Deuteronomy 25:1–3 and Exodus 21:20–21 have to do with corporal punishment for children? Very little, in my opinion. They may have superficial aspects in common, but the passages from the Mosaic Law should be interpreted in their own context, whereas the passages from Proverbs should be understood within the genre of wisdom literature. And even within Proverbs, we must consider the distinction between disciplining the “fool” and disciplining one’s own child. There is the overlapping matter of corporal punishment, but we are dealing with two very different situations.

The second issue Webb addresses is the number of lashes or strokes. He refers to the pro-spanking position as “two-smacks-max.” In contrast, the Bible sets the limit at forty. “Within a broader theology of corporal punishment the maximum limit on strokes or lashes is clearly set at forty (not two) strokes for Torah infractions (Deut. 25:3).” ⁵⁸¹ Again, the comparison is unhelpful and confusing. Deuteronomy 25:3 is dealing with a legal matter among adults in the context of the Mosaic Law. The verses in Proverbs concerning parenting do not give all the specifics for how to exercise corporal punishment. For godly and knowledgeable teachers to make certain recommendations about these details seems to be perfectly legitimate and not outside the bounds of biblical teaching. Webb makes it seem like the Bible gives crystal-clear answers to these questions. But he can only import these answers from irrelevant contexts. In reality, the Bible is silent on age limitations and number of lashes.

The arguments are similar in other categories. Webb discusses the “bodily location of the beatings” and “resultant bruises, welts and wounds.” He draws from verses that do not speak directly to the situation of parents disciplining their children, and he concludes that the back (not the buttocks) is the biblical place for administering corporal punishment with children and that the Bible advocates leaving bruises on children. ⁵⁸²

This same confusion is seen in the chapter on adult corporal punishment. The chapter focuses on the “heavy knife (hand amputation) text” of Deuteronomy 25:11–12. Here we have another passage from the Mosaic Law, but Webb makes us feel like we would have to enforce this instruction if it were not for the redemptive-movement hermeneutic. Redemptive history is a more important consideration on this point than redemptive movement . ⁵⁸³

Webb does raise many fascinating questions with which we must wrestle. I certainly have not addressed them all in this short response. But one should read Webb carefully and critically to discern whether his assertions hold when he describes what the Bible teaches. Each corporal punishment passage should be understood in its context, and the Proverbs should be read in light of their unique genre.

Other Publications

Webb has cited another book of his that is forthcoming, Brutal, Bloody, and Barbaric: War Texts That Trouble the Soul (IVP). So we will all have the opportunity to see the redemptive-movement hermeneutic applied to yet another controversial topic.

The redemptive-movement, or trajectory, model has also been evident in books from a couple of other authors worth noting. Kenton Sparks advocates trajectory theology in God’s Word in Human Words: An Evangelical Appropriation of Critical Biblical Scholarship . ⁵⁸⁴ He speaks of “trumping the Bible,” but in a biblical way. “When we legitimately trump the Bible with newer insights, as the church did in the case of circumcision, and as was eventually done in the case of Galileo’s astronomy and in the case of slavery, we should recognize at once that this need not involve disrespect for the Word of God.” ⁵⁸⁵

Sparks mentions Kevin Giles, William Webb, R. T. France, and I. Howard Marshall as advocates of this approach. He interacts with Marshall’s book Beyond the Bible: Moving from Scripture to Theology and also the response by Kevin Vanhoozer found in that volume. Sparks clearly sides with Marshall. He summarizes Vanhoozer’s objections in this way: “Vanhoozer is not at all keen, for instance, on Marshall’s argument that the Canaanite genocide, or the biblical slave laws, or the imprecatory psalms, reflect sub-Christian ethical viewpoints.” ⁵⁸⁶ Sparks responds,

[T]o my mind the real difficulty with Vanhoozer’s objection is that it simply does not come to grips with the profound ethical and theological diversity in the canon. In my opinion, if there is a basic and fundamental theological division emerging among evangelical scholars at this juncture in history, it is the division between those like Marshall who recognize this diversity, and those like Vanhoozer who more or less want to deny it. ⁵⁸⁷

This shows the significance of this discussion, not only for the gender debate, but for the ramifications it will have on the future of evangelical theology. Sparks points out that,

Although Vanhoozer offers numerous and pointed criticisms of his book, in the end he affirms that Marshall’s work is within the orbit of evangelical theology. Moreover, Vanhoozer confesses that the church must discover a theological approach that can go beyond the Bible biblically . This task is perhaps the most important theological challenge that faces contemporary evangelical theology. (italics original) ⁵⁸⁸

Paul Copan also promotes the redemptive-movement model in his recent book, Is God a Moral Monster? Making Sense of the Old Testament God . ⁵⁸⁹ He refers approvingly to Webb’s book, Slaves, Women, and Homosexuals , and he summarizes the points regarding all three issues. “While such a redemptive movement operates for women and servants/slaves in Scripture, the same cannot be said for homosexual activity. This action is consistently viewed negatively—a departure from God’s creational design-plan.” ⁵⁹⁰ Copan’s use of this model shows its apologetic attractiveness for evangelicals. Copan is writing in response to the New Atheism, which takes shots at the atrocities of the God of the Old Testament.

Webb, in his Corporal Punishment book, cites this as one of the reasons for using only noncorporal methods for children. Our Christian witness is at stake. In the face of the New Atheists, we must help them to see the Scriptures in light of redemptive movement.

The new atheism movement and its high-profile representatives like Richard Dawkins have made it their business to discredit Christians through casting high-beam spotlights on certain unsightly passages in the Bible. We must introduce non-Christians to a redemptive-movement understanding of the biblical text and help them read the corporal punishment texts through an ancient-world lens. Such a witnessing act gives them a deeper opportunity to believe that God may have in fact had something to do with the writing of Scripture. ⁵⁹¹

In these various ways, the discussion concerning redemptive movement continues. Over time we will begin to discern more clearly the fruit of this hermeneutical model.