The New Year began quietly. The bad weather persisted; a thick mist continued to shroud the whole country. On 3 January Hitler read a long letter from Mussolini suggesting that Hitler take the lead in ‘the restoration of the Polish State’ and refrain from attacking in the West. The Italian leader also objected to the friendship with the Soviet Union, which remained Europe’s greatest threat. I did not see Hitler’s immediate reaction to this letter but I gathered that it annoyed him. He did not reply to it and, although he had not seen Mussolini since May 1938, saw no reason to meet him now. What the letter did prove to him was the Italian Government’s bias towards Britain and France.
Early on 9 January Hitler requested a weather report. The meteorologist indicated the possibility of an improvement from the east: he could provide better details tomorrow. Hitler postponed his decision until then. A high-pressure system of unusual permamence was promised: on the 12th and 13th it would cloud over, but this would be followed by twelve to fourteen days of clear winter weather with temperatures of −10°C to −15°C over the European mainland. X-Day was now 17 January. Should the improvement not materialise the attack would be put off to the spring. There was a tense mood in the Chancellery. In the afternoon Brauchitsch and Halder came. On the 12th or 13th the Luftwaffe would soften up some airfields in the north of France.
January 11 was a black day. On a flight from Fliegerführer 220 (Münster) to a conference at Fliegerkorps I (Cologne) the pilot lost his bearings and, being low on fuel, made an emergency landing near Mecheln in Belgium. He had a courier aboard and this officer had in his attaché case a plan showing the troop deployments for X-Day. Hitler received the news impassively and deferred any action until it was known what documents had fallen into Belgian hands. The German military attaché in Brussels reported that all papers had been destroyed, but Hitler was sceptical. After a few days a new story suggested that the courier had been interrupted while trying to burn the documents: both he and the pilot had been captured and taken to a Belgian military barracks, where a second unsuccessful attempt was made to set the documents alight. The Belgians accordingly took possession of the plans, which they passed without further ado to the French General Staff. Hitler remained calm: as Luftwaffe chief, Göring ultimately bore responsibility for the mishap. But inwardly Hitler was fuming.
After dinner on 11 January, in conversation with the duty military ADCs, Hitler spoke frankly about the negligent manner in which the most secret files were handled by the Luftwaffe. The event prompted Hitler to issue immediately his ‘Basic Order No 1’, which stated that no aspect of a state secret was to be divulged unless absolutely essential on military grounds. It was also forbidden to ‘pass on publications, orders and reports of significant importance’ without due consideration. The order was to be hung in all military offices and orderly rooms.
The fog persisted: the Luftwaffe could not be guaranteed three consecutive days’ flying weather and the enemy had a copy of the current troop deployment plan for the offensive in the West. For these reasons Hitler abandoned the attack for the time being. In any case, he had resolved to amass his panzers for a surprise thrust through the Ardennes to the Meuse between Dinant and Sedan, from where the force would stream out to the mouth of the Somme. The Mecheln affair had made up his mind for him, and he forced through his radical new idea despite all the obstacles OKH put in his way. In the Sportpalast on 24 January Hitler addressed 7,000 subalterns. It was in the previous year that he had initiated the custom of lecturing the most junior officers on the European situation. ‘This Europe,’ he told them, ‘managed by the grace of Britain and France, refuses to grant us the right to exist. No matter what restrictions we become subject to, we will never satisfy France and Britain.… if this struggle for my people cannot be avoided, it is my will absolutely to carry it through in my lifetime.’ He reaped a noticeably greater ovation from his young listeners than in the year before.
On 30 January he stood again on the podium at the Sportpalast. In peacetime the anniversary of the seizure of power had always been marked by a Hitler speech to the Reichstag, but this year he addressed the German people directly. He received a tremendous reception, and during his speech there was repeated evidence of enthusiasm. Of Britain he spoke sharply: ‘Herr Churchill burns with impatience for the second phase. Through his middlemen—and personally too—he hopes that at last the bombing war will begin. And they cry to the heavens that this war will not of course stop short at women and children—when did Britain ever stop short at women and children!’4
The preparations for Operation ‘Weserübung’, the invasion of Norway and Denmark, came suddenly to the forefront when on 16 February an incident occurred inside Norwegian territorial waters which excited Hitler’s interest and wrath. The German motor ship Altmark had been fired on and boarded in Jössingfjord by the British destroyer Cossack. The tanker had been supply ship to the pocket battleship Admiral Graf Spee, which had been scuttled off Montevideo in mid-December, and was carrying about 300 merchant seamen from sunken British steamers. On the final part of her voyage she had been attempting to break through to Germany by way of the Norwegian Indreled. Hitler asked why Altmark had not resisted.
On 21 February Hitler received General von Falkenhorst, whom Jodl had recommended as suited to command the battle in Norway. Hitler gave him the task of planning the invasion. As the greatest secrecy was necessary, no official documents such as maps could be made available to him. Therefore Falkenhorst bought a Baedeker’s guide to Norway, retired to a hotel room for a few hours and presented Hitler with an outline plan the same afternoon. It was accepted: the terrain offered few variations.
Hitler’s main interest remained the offensive in the West, despite the pressure for ‘Weserübung’. The daily situation conferences with Keitel and Jodl often degenerated into involved conversations about the resistance to be expected on the French and Belgian borders. Hitler had had himself supplied with very detailed files about the frontier defences, individual forts and artificial obstructions and on the basis of these reports he made his own plans for the attack. His suggestions and way of thinking brought Halder, when he was drawn into the discussion, to the brink of despair. Halder’s view was that all this was a matter for the commanders and men on the spot, whereas Hitler argued the need for the most important individual operations on the opening few days to be planned minutely in advance. The controversy gave rise to endless argument.
A very important meeting took place between Hitler and Manstein, Rundstedt’s Chief of Staff, in the Chancellery on 17 February. Around the first of the month, Hitler’s senior ADC, Schmundt, had paid a visit to Army Group A, where, during a long talk with Manstein and his adjutant Trescow, Schmundt had realised that the Army Group had very definite ideas, at variance with those of OKH, as to how the Western campaign should be conducted. Since the autumn Manstein had sent papers to the General Staff on several occasions. Halder had rejected them with the assurance that the operation would be conducted in accordance with the OKH plan, and when Manstein persisted, Halder had him appointed commander of the new XXXVIII Korps away from the front. This measure had caused some raised eyebrows, since it was unusual to replace an Army Group commander between campaigns. The OKH had said nothing of Manstein’s opinions to Hitler. Schmundt was astonished at the similarity of views between Hitler and Manstein, and when he spoke to Hitler on his return he found himself pushing at an open door.
Halder’s attitude did not surprise Hitler and confirmed his suspicions. If only he had heard of Manstein’s ideas earlier, while he, Hitler, was still toying with the concept! Instead, only a chance conversation on the occasion of Manstein’s removal had brought it to light.
Hitler pored over Manstein’s plan. It coincided precisely with Hitler’s own: the weight of the attack would fall to Army Group A with the massed panzers and motorised divisions. At once he ordered OKH to prepare the new plan.
After Manstein had left, Hitler spoke harshly to Schmundt against Brauchitsch and Halder. Both wanted to sabotage his plans for the Western offensive: already they had made the task extraordinarily difficult for him, he said. He did not want a change at OKH yet, but once the French were beaten, then he would sort them out.
Shortly afterwards, Hitler’s dissatisfaction with OKH received a fresh stimulus. He had heard complaints from various sources about the supply of weapons and ammunition to the Army. The fault must lie with OKH, he believed: an aged staff set in its bureaucratic ways was responsible. Therefore he considered it necessary to make a change. His antipathy towards OKH motivated him to appoint a civilian minister to oversee the new Reich Ministry for Armaments. Sweeping powers would revolutionise all centres into achieving the highest output. When the General Inspector of German Roadbuilding, Dr Fritz Todt, received the portfolio on 17 March it hit the Army like a bomb and Todt had a big struggle on his hands to create and develop his office. In fact he needed more than a year to establish the lines of communication to the various outposts of his large empire.
On 24 February we drove to Munich, where that evening Hitler addressed old Party comrades in the Hofbräuhaus on the twentieth anniversary of the proclamation of the Party programme. His speech stood in the long shadow of the impending battle in the West, but he spoke frankly of the strong resistance which Britain would offer and also mentioned the influence of the Jews.
From the beginning of March the US Under-Secretary of State Sumner Welles, who, as President Roosevelt’s special envoy, was touring the capitals of Europe, spoke with Göring, Ribbentrop and Hess in Berlin. Hitler had prepared a guideline calling for the greatest caution in conversation. Sumner Welles should do the talking. The relationship between Germany and the United States was not good. If he had been sent with the intention of bringing about a better diplomatic climate, then that would be in the interests of the two peoples. Hitler wanted to emphasise the good relationship he had with Russia. He had made his last offer of peace to Britain and France in October and in return had reaped only scorn. Not until the Anglo-French will to destroy Germany had been broken could one build a Europe at peace. The Reich was determined to end the war victoriously. Hitler received the US special envoy on 2 and 4 March in the presence of Ribbentrop, Meissner, head of the Chancellery, and the American chargé d’affaires Alexander C. Kirk.
On 8 March Hitler dictated a very long letter to Mussolini explaining his stance on various questions. It was important for him to keep Italy on his side whilst Sumner was travelling through Europe. Ribbentrop delivered the letter in Rome on 10 March and satisfied himself that Sumner Welles had not succeeded in influencing Mussolini.
The Duce placed great value on talks with Hitler at the Brenner on 18 March. In the morning situation conference next day Hitler gave Göring, Keitel and Jodl an almost rapturous account of the meeting. He was especially pleased that Mussolini wanted to keep his eggs in the German basket and was ready to commit his forces in the battle against France, although on this latter point Hitler seemed somewhat unconvinced.
Hitler spent Easter at the Obersalzberg. I was duty ADC and flew from Tempelhof with my wife to the Ainring airfield near Salzburg. We spent four very pleasant and relaxed days. Since the outbreak of war Hitler had put a stop to his evening film show and now he spent the evenings with guests around the fireplace at the Berghof great hall. The main topics were Mussolini and Hitler’s architectural plans for Berlin and Munich. On Easter Monday he had a long talk with Dr Todt about armaments and the new Ministry. I was drawn into the conversation on several occasions. His major concern was the OKH. He spent one whole evening discussing plans for field weapons. He considered an anti-tank weapon as a variant of the 8.8cm flak gun as most important. The production of panzers and panzer guns with long barrels occupied him intensely. These conversations often lasted two to three hours while his guests watched films in the skittle alley.
Hitler issued the Directive for ‘Weserübung’ on 1 March. He knew that the British were preparing to occupy Norway and was anxious to get there first. On 5 March he assembled the senior Wehrmacht commanders for a conference at which Göring learned the details for the first time. He was obviously piqued and attempted—in vain—to get himself involved in the planning stage. He was certainly disappointed if not actually offended that Hitler had not entrusted the mission to him.
On 1 and 2 April, after discussing the operation with Falkenhorst, Göring and Raeder, Hitler set 9 April as the date for the occupation. On the 3rd the first transport steamers set out for the Norwegian coast. Hitler was on tenterhooks in case the British invaded first. The large scale Kriegsmarine operation began on the night of 6 April. By 8 April most naval surface units which could float were at sea with troops aboard and heading for Norway.
On the morning of 8 April the French and British Governments delivered notes to the Norwegian Foreign Ministry advising that they had begun to lay minefields in Norwegian coastal waters. There was great indignation in Oslo. However, this helped justify the measures Hitler had set in train and so he welcomed it. Next morning German ambassadors visited the Foreign Offices in Oslo and Copenhagen and presented demands that the occupation of the two nations respectively be acknowledged. The Danes complied. The German demand to Norway also stated that Quisling would take over the government in Oslo. The king of Norway and his ministers would not bend.
The Luftwaffe occupied the airfields at Oslo and Stavanger without difficulty. The invasion of the principal ports from the sea had mixed success. Three cruisers were sunk. There was a disaster at Narvik, where, after disembarking 2,000 mountain troops under General Dietl’s command, ten German destroyers were bottled up in Narvik Fjord by a superior British naval force. All were sunk.
Falkenhorst’s Gebirgsjäger (mountain troops) set out from Oslo for Trondheim but were held up by weather and stubborn resistance. The situation was very worrying for Hitler. The German Army stood poised west of the Rhine awating the order to strike. Hitler was extremely impatient: valuable days for his French campaign were being lost. Nervous and at a loss what to do next, he was inclined to evacuate the area around Narvik and if necessary even abandon Trondheim. If the weather over mainland Europe had improved and a stable system of high pressure had set in, presumably he would have gone ahead in the West at once.
His main conversational partner was Jodl, who knew both Narvik and Dietl. The latter was an energetic leader who would succeed in the inhospitable terrain if anybody could. On 14 April a British force stood 160km north of Trondheim and on the 17th they made landings at Andalsnes, 250km south of the port. Jodl took stock of the situation very calmly. In his opinion the British had no chance.
On 22 April Jodl sent his Army General Staff Officer, von Lossberg, to Norway. At the same time Schmundt decided to fly to Oslo, since he distrusted Lossberg. They were both back in Berlin by the 24th. Hitler spoke adversely about Lossberg, who was arrogant and had found out practically nothing. Schmundt knew his chief better. His detailed report about the fighting on the road between Oslo and Trondheim put Hitler’s mind at rest. On the narrow highway it was difficult to fight effectively. One just kept on hammering away patiently. There was no doubt that this would eventually succeed. The intervention of the Luftwaffe would be decisive, but the weather was keeping them on the ground.
The two British groups had no air support or useful AA weapons. Eventually both were battered by the Luftwaffe operating from Trondheim and suffered heavy losses before pulling out in the first week of May. The stragglers were mopped up as far as Narvik.
Meanwhile the British strengthened their forces elsewhere. Their objective was to cut off the iron ore supply line. It was difficult to reinforce Dietl and air support from Trondheim was not available, but Dietl nevertheless remained confident and worked day and night at building up his defences. Ultimately the beginning of the Western offensive caused enemy troop withdrawals and the siege petered out.
Once the campaign in the West was in full swing Hitler took little further interest in the fighting in Norway. On 19 April, against OKH advice, he had sent Josef Terboven, Gauleiter of Essen, to Norway to head the administration and was evidently relieved on 30 April to be informed by Jodl that communication between Oslo and Trondheim had been restored.
On 10 June Hitler inserted into the draft OKW final report on the battle for Norway, and especially Narvik, the phrase ‘In a two-month long battle, Austrian mountain troops, Luftwaffe detachments and our destroyer crews gave for all time proof of their glorious soldierly qualities’, and on the 13th he sent an order of the day to his soldiers in Norway thanking the commanders and men for their bravery and self-sacrifice by means of which they had helped ‘to save the Reich from a great danger’.
Norway was of great importance for the continuation of the war against Britain. The battle had been a difficult one, and without it the victorious advance through France could not have been achieved so swiftly. Hitler had dreams of a large-scale development of the port of Trondheim, which would become the most northern German city.
The Norwegian campaign highlighted Jodl’s qualities. He had made his views known to Hitler quite frankly and supported him ably during the period of crisis. On the conclusion of fighting, the Führer recognised and praised his role. Hitler valued Jodl as a faithful and devoted staff officer whose suggestions he often followed in the course of the war.
During the battle for Norway Hitler had concentrated his energies mainly on planning the French campaign and once summoned Army commanders to talks in the Chancellery. On account of his grave suspicions of Brauchitsch and Halder, he came close to ejecting the OKH leadership on several occasions. Only the approach of the great task ahead held him back. Brauchitsch and Halder had forecast heavy fighting in France which could last for years. Whether this was actually their belief or a ploy to deter Hitler from attacking I cannot say. Hitler knew that neither could be trusted and inclined to the opinions of Army Group commanders Leeb, Rundstedt and Bock, who wanted to attack immediately.
On 1 May Hitler set X-Day for the 5th. On 2 May he held a conference with Göring and the Luftwaffe leadership about the proposed landings in ‘Fortress Holland’. General Student, with whom Hitler had previously discussed the operations against The Hague and the Scheldt estuary, and Graf Sponeck, commanding the Luftlandedivision drops on The Hague and Rotterdam, also took part. Hitler spoke at length to those officers charged with special operations; as what mattered most to him were the element of surprise and quick successes, he laid special stress on these aspects.
On 3 May the success in Norway and his optimistic view of the French campaign gave Hitler the necessary impetus for his speech in the Sportpalast to 6,000 senior cadets. At the end of it they knew exactly what was required of them.
On the 4th he delayed X-Day until 7 May and finally at Göring’s request until 10 May, but this would be the last postponement, he added. On 9 May Hitler dictated a proclamation to his soldiers on the Western Front which ended with the sentence: ‘The battle which begins today will decide the fate of the German nation for the next thousand years. Now do your duty. The German people gives you their blessing.’ The nearer the fatal hour approached the calmer and more optimistic Hitler became. It seemed to me that he had shed the doubts which had assailed him during the previous six months and was content to allow events to take their course. He was of the opinion that France would give in after about six weeks. It was in fact important that they should do so since he expected that a quick success would persuade Britain to settle; it would be unimaginable for her to risk losing the Empire; therefore, after the German victory in France, she would sue for peace.
On 9 May the day at last dawned when Hitler could take up residence in his new Führer HQ at the front. Speer had had a castle between Bad Nauheim and Usingen refurbished but it failed to meet with the Führer’s approval and he had commissioned Todt and Schmundt to locate and refit a new FHQ in the Eifel area further north. It should be as simple as possible. Eventually Todt found a flak emplacement near Münstereifel which would serve after a few modifications.
Just before five that afternoon Hitler’s special train stood in Berlin-Finkenkrug station, on the main line to Hamburg, a few kilometres west of Staaken airport. He drove there escorted only by plain-clothes detectives and SD men. All other members of the entourage had to get to the station surreptitiously. The train left punctually and set off towards Hamburg. Hitler had announced that we would be visiting troops in Denmark and Norway. I doubt that anybody was taken in by this, for everyone had his private ‘source’. A long stop was made at Hagenow-Land to take in telephone messages, the tracks were switched and the train headed for Hanover. The change of direction escaped nobody and the destination was soon clear. That evening we stopped briefly at Burgdorf near Hanover, where I collected the latest weather forecast. It was satisfactory: Hitler would give his definitive order to open the Western Front next morning.
During the journey Hitler was in sparkling mood, completely confident of victory and devoid of any niggling doubts. The atmosphere at dinner in the buffet car was lively, and he expressed the hope that the preparations in which he had involved himself personally would all go well. In particular he mentioned the Belgian fort at Eben Emael. It was already dark when our train pulled into a small station near Euskirchen. Three-axled Mercedes were waiting to convey us to the well-camouflaged Führer HQ Felsennest, a half-hour’s drive away.
Hitler shared his bunker with Schaub, Keitel and a manservant. A second bunker accommodated Jodl, the three military adjutants, Keitel’s ADC and Dr Brandt. There was additionally a dining bunker and a barracks on a slope a short way off. The barracks had been converted into a situation conference room with quarters for Puttkamer, Jodl’s ADC and a sergeant-writer. The dining bunker contained a long table with twenty places. Everybody ate here. A map of the entire area to be conquered hung on the long wall. The remainder of the retinue and Press officials lodged in a nearby village, where some houses had been requisitioned.
X-Day began quietly and Hitler kept to his bed through the morning. Towards midday the first sparse reports came in. The bridge at Maastricht had been damaged but was being quickly repaired. The bridges over the Albert Canal had mostly been taken intact. The glider landings on Eben Emael had gone off well. Otherwise there was nothing. Later it was reported that the Belgian and Dutch military had expected the attack on 10 May: the date had been betrayed. Nevertheless resistance everywhere was slight. In some places the odd bridge had been demolished. Various artificial obstacles held up the initial advance. Elsewhere the invasion went ahead unhindered. Morale was excellent. Our troops were confident of victory. What the Belgian and Dutch were offering amounted only to delaying tactics. The French Army was in a difficult position: they had expected the attack from the north through Belgium and were having to manoeuvre awkwardly to engage. On the whole the opposition was no match for our panzers and Luftwaffe—this was obvious during the first ten days.
The Dutch Army capitulated on 14 May. Owing to a signals breakdown the planned air attack on Rotterdam could not be aborted and went ahead after the surrender had been accepted. The city received appalling damage, with heavy casualties amongst the civilian population. Belgium gave in on 24 May, the instrument of unconditional surrender being signed four days later. The Belgian king elected to remain with his people.
A deplorable bulletin was issued following an accidental calamity on 10 May. The town of Freiburg-im-Breisgau was bombed. People had been killed and property seriously damaged. The official investigation found that German aircraft were responsible: a squadron had orders to attack a French town west of the Rhine, but two machines had gone astray and attacked Freiburg in error. Hitler was informed and ordered that the matter be kept quiet. Unfortunately the Propaganda Ministry got hold of it and turned the affair into an Allied terror raid.
The German main thrust rumbled down through difficult terrain and by 12 May had reached the Meuse at Dinant. On the 20th the spearhead of Guderian’s 19th Army Corps was at Amiens and Abbeville on the Somme estuary—a spectacular success. Eben Emael had surrendered on the 11th: a special type of explosive had been used for the first time to crack the nut. Hitler invited the victorious team to FHQ, where the two commanders were decorated with the Knight’s Cross, after which they described to him the proceedings in depth.
On 14 May I wrote to my uncle, Otto von Below: ‘The first four to five days of this campaign have been more successful than the Führer, Army or Luftwaffe could have dreamed. Everywhere our bombers have been uncannily successful against the enemy air forces and armies. The enemy air force is already down to 60 per cent of his starting numbers. Our massed motorised units have not been attacked at all. The crossings and bridgeheads on the Meuse at Dinant and Sedan were quickly secured. British troops and parts of the French Army have moved into the Brussels-Ghent-Courtrai area, having failed to divine our intentions or identify the main thrust. The Army is poised to strike its surprise blow. I suggested it to you at Christmas. We have reached the starting point.’
On 19 May the French Government nominated General Weygand, who was in Syria, as successor to Gamelin. His appointment gave rise to a surge of hope throughout France. In the Great War Weygand had been Foch’s right-hand man. He was proven and enjoyed great confidence. However, when he saw the confused situation he was supposed to solve, particularly in northern France, he must have known at once that it was already too late. The panzers of Guderian and Reinhardt on the Somme estuary rolled forwards on 23 May, passed through Boulogne and Calais and pressed on towards the the Belgian frontier. Next day they received Hitler’s instruction to halt on the line Gravelines–St Omer–Béthune. This order caused uproar. Brauchitsch and Halder arrived at FHQ to protest. Hitler knew that the entire British Expeditionary Force, about 300,000 men, was bottled up in an area stretching from Dunkirk to as far back as Lille: it was their intention to evacuate to England through the port of Dunkirk. However Hitler rejected the plea of the two generals. He expected the British to put up a stubborn and protracted resistance . He was concerned that German motorised forces would get bogged down there for days on end when he needed them immediately on a new front facing south. He wanted to conclude the fighting as soon as possible and thus prevent fresh resistance developing in the south of France. On 24 May he did not have intelligence as to what enemy forces were present in France, and in particular he was worried that the British might land fresh divisions though the port of Bordeaux and set up a new front there.
Hitler’s decision on Dunkirk was strongly influenced by Göring, who saw the chance for his airmen to strike a decisive blow against Britain. He persuaded a sceptical Hitler that the Luftwaffe could prevent the withdrawal of the BEF. Hitler relied on this promise, although I must say he did not appear altogether convinced by it. However, it suited his plans, and, undoubtedly strengthened by Göring’s assurance, on 24 May he flew to Army Group A in order to discuss the next step with Rundstedt. The Dunkirk situation was deliberated upon at great length. Hitler’s conviction was for a swift drive towards southern France. The British Army had no relevance for him. Halder wanted to go into the Dunkirk cauldron with all available forces and annihilate the BEF. Hitler thought this would take several days and hold back the thrust towards southern France for too long. In the end he left the decision to Rundstedt, who decided upon the quickest possible resumption of the offensive. Accordingly, the forces on the Somme and Aisne were regrouped. Bock’s Army Group B led from the coast down to about Bethel, Rundstedt’s Army Group A made eastwards for the Saar, and Leeb’s Army Group C remained where it was. The attack of 5 June in which the Panzer Korps of Hoth and Manstein had particular success brought the whole front into motion.
Marshal Pétain was appointed French head of state, but despite French optimism Hitler doubted that Pétain would succeed in setting up a resistance. In a letter to my uncle on 29 May I wrote: ‘The swift crossing of the Meuse came as such a surprise to the enemy that at first he offered no resistance. Our panzers and motorised divisions quickly overcame all obstructions and then raced for the Channel. Our infantry divisions marched to the west at an unheard-of pace and quickly erected an effective defensive front to the south. To their rear in the north the mouth of the bag was calmly pulled tight. The élite of the French divisions had been knocked out here: the British divisions, in a state of exhaustion, decamped to England, leaving their equipment behind. Fifty per cent of our divisions saw no action at all. The Führer himself is very stirred by this great success.’
For the beginning of the second phase of the offensive, Hitler transferred his FHQ to the southern corner of Belgium at Bruly de Pêche, in search of which Schmundt and Todt had feverishly scoured the countryside. I remember this FHQ well, for it was here that we received news of the French surrender.
Mussolini declared war on France on 10 June; his troops joined the fray next day. Hitler had been awaiting this development with some anxiety since it relieved him of a heavy additional burden in the Mediterranean. On 14 June Paris was declared an open city and surrendered without a fight. Verdun capitulated on the 15th. Hitler accepted the reports in silence: his vivid memories of the Great War affected him strongly. After heavy artillery and bombardment to soften up the defenders, the German First Army eventually breached the Maginot Line south of Saarbrücken on 16 June after two days of fierce fighting: a second breakthrough in the southern sector the same day enabled the Seventh Army to cross the Rhine into France. Some Maginot forts continued to fight for a few days after the French surrender until ordered to desist by a high French military commission.
On 18 June Hitler conceded the French request for an armistice. Overwhelmed by emotion, he advised the French Government through the Foreign Office that he would first have to consult the Italians, and he flew the same day to Munich to meet Mussolini. Hitler was not enchanted at having to hail him as a comrade-in-arms of equal status. Mussolini was in high spirits and promised great successes in the future. Two days later the French Armistice Commission convened in Tours. The negotiations were set to begin at eleven in the morning of 21 June at Compiègne, precisely where, on 11 November 1918, the Armistice documenting the German defeat had been signed by Erzberger, Marshal Foch and Admiral Wemyss. Hitler had dreamed this fantasy many times and was now gloriously fulfilled in this role by history. In the woods at Compiègne the railway coach in which the 1918 ceremony had taken place was pushed from its shed into a clearing in the open. Nominated to take part at the first negotiations were the C-in-Cs of the three Wehrmacht branches of service, plus Keitel, Hess and Ribbentrop. The French delegation was delayed and the negotiations did not begin until three in the afternoon. Hitler strode to the historic coach alone, inspected the paraded honour battalion and then boarded. After a few minutes the French Armistice Commission led by General Huntziger arrived and climbed aboard the car immediately. Once Keitel had read the preamble to the Armistice Commission, Hitler and his retinue departed. Keitel chaired the negotiations, which concluded next day. The Armistice came into effect at 0135 hours on 25 June simultaneously with its announcement by German radio. At the time we were gathered about Hitler in the dining room at FHQ and listened to the bulletin in silence. On its completion, just outside the window a bugler of the Führer’s escort battalion blew Das Ganze Halt. It was a deeply moving moment and the mood remained sombre for some time. We found it difficult to reconcile jubilation and gravity.
In France the tension snapped. The masses of refugees on the highways returned home. Hitler made a number of journeys through occupied France. Following the transfer of FHQ to Bruly de Pêche he had visited several Great War battlefields, Vimy Ridge, Loretto Point and the Memorial to the Fallen at Langemarck; now he drove with Great War comrades to former trenches near Reims where they had served. On 28 June Hitler flew to Paris for an unofficial early morning tour and saw the Arc de Triomphe, the Opera House and Napoleon’s tomb at the Invalides. At the last he expressed the desire that the sarcophagus of Napoleon’s son, the Duke of Reichstadt, should be brought to Paris from Vienna. At the Opera House, in the company of Speer, sculptor Breker and architect Gieder, he explained how it should be done and enlightened his listeners on many points concerning the construction and refurbishment of the monument.
On 29 June Hitler transferred his FHQ to the Black Forest near Kniebis, where Schmundt had had a flak emplacement converted for the purpose. It was noticeable how a great millstone had been lifted from Hitler’s neck. He had a wide range of interests and for a while could involve himself in matters not immediately connected with the war. The proximity of the former French department of Alsace, which was now part of the Gau of Baden, tempted Hitler to spend a few days there sightseeing. Accompanied by Chancellery officials Lammers and Meissner, he visited the cathedral and old quarter of Strasbourg and next day inspected sections of the Maginot Line from the Alsace side. Meissner originated from Alsace and supplied a stream of anecdotes for the Führer’s benefit.
In his Black Forest HQ he sat in deep contemplation of his enemy Great Britain. He did not imagine for one moment that Churchill would be ready for peace negotiations, and as if in confirmation there occurred an event on 3 July characteristic of Churchill’s attitude when a British naval force appeared off Mers-el-Kébir near the French North African port of Oran and demanded the surrender of the French fleet units based there. When the French admiral refused, the Royal Navy opened fire and sank them.
Hitler stated that in the next Reichstag session he would make a fresh offer to Britain even though he did not think it likely to be successful. He wished that Britain would terminate this war in the West because the coming conflict against the Soviet Union was unavoidable and he did not want an enemy at front and rear.
At his Belgian FHQ he had got Brauchitsch to agree the disbandment of twenty infantry divisions and the formation of ten new panzer divisions. The French campaign had brought to light a number of serious questions for discussion, particularly the Waffen-SS losses. A dashing, light-headed and inexperienced leadership had cost the few SS units in the field exceptionally high casualties. Death-defying and admirable, yes, but irresponsible. Hitler wanted this prevented in future. But what amazed the Great War veterans more than anything was the failure of the French Army and its generals. It had surprised even Hitler, although the Führer had never doubted that victory would be his.
Brauchitsch and Hitler had had their first conversations on the subject of Britain at Bruly de Pêche. As I remember, Brauchitsch mentioned almost casually that if Britain were still not prepared to sue for peace it would probably be necessary to invade as soon as possible. Hitler agreed, but preferred to see how things turned out in the short run. Britain’s war policies, he said, amounted to an expression of Churchill’s personal ambitions. These could only be realised through war. Accordingly Churchill had been beavering away since the mid-1950s in the hope of engineering a war and had now found an ally in his endeavour—Roosevelt. ‘I have certainly surprised Britain,’ Hitler said, ‘and Roosevelt cannot yet join in as much as he would like. In America such a programme runs more slowly.’ But Churchill had organised feeling against Germany in the English-speaking world with allegations that Hitler wanted war with the West. If a German invasion of Britain succeeded, it would then be at least questionable whether Britain would be able to carry on the fight from her outposts of Empire as Churchill was now promising in Parliament.
Deep in the Black Forest, at the conclusion of a difficult but victorious operation, Hitler had harsh things to say about the OKH. Fritsch and Beck had made repeated attempts to prevent him beginning a war. Their method had been to sabotage rearmament and argue French superiority. He had never believed this and now he had proof of his correct judgement of the French forces. As Brauchitsch and Halder followed in the footsteps of Fritsch and Beck, it was only right that he should be suspicious of their advice.
Hitler also dealt harshly with the members of former ruling houses who had fought at the front. This was provoked by the death in action of Prince William of Prussia at the end of May. Hitler had received the report with annoyance and after some thought ordered that all princes were to be withdrawn from the front line and given service out of harm’s way. In general this order was not well received since those affected by it felt discriminated against. The real reason was that acts of bravery by the nobility becoming generally known might foster a return to the monarchical spirit in Germany. A more radical solution—in the shape of numerous dismissals—was only forthcoming after the events of 20 July 1944.
At three in the afternoon of 6 July, Hitler’s train pulled into Berlin’s Anhalter terminus, where the entire Reich Government awaited the Führer on the platform. Göring spoke a few over-emotional words of welcome before Hitler inspected an honour guard and was then conveyed to the Chancellery standing in the back of a Mercedes limousine driven at a walking pace, amidst scenes of unbelievable jubilation and acclaim. Countless thousands had filled the Wilhelm-Platz and Hitler was induced to step out on the balcony several times that afternoon to acknowledge the crowd’s delirium.
The Chancellery soon swarmed with visitors—ministers, Reichsleiters and Gauleiters. No generals attended. Throughout that afternoon an air of anxiety prevailed which did not disperse until evening. After the victorious campaign, in Berlin I noticed amongst the so-called educated circles a very pessimistic atmosphere. The campaign in the West left in its wake an odd mixture—fear, condemnation of its folly and a reluctant admiration.
Hitler’s life in Berlin now resumed its usual course. His day would begin at noon with Jodl’s situation report. This would lead to further military discussions, usually with the three Wehrmacht C-in-C s. After lunch there would normally be a number of civilian appointments until Jodl’s evening situation report. Hitler would spend the evening in the circle of his companions-at-table. The film show had been discontinued, but the Propaganda Ministry would often send over the latest prerelease cinema newsreels which Hitler watched without a sound track, commentary being read to him from a script by an orderly officer. Hitler would frequently require changes to the text. The remainder of the evening would then be spent before the fireplace in conversation with his intimate circle.
During the course of 1940 I noticed how Hitler would deliberate and seek exhaustive counsel before making a crucial decision. After he had given an order he could no longer be argued out of it. He looked for special qualities in his advisers and made particular efforts to know new generals. Over the years I had the opportunity to recommend to Hitler a number of able front line officers without General Staff training. These included Hube and Rommel, whom I knew from my infantry training days between 1929 and 1933. Both fulfilled Hitler’s expectations of them.
On 7 July the Italian Foreign Minister Count Ciano arrived in Berlin and was received at once by Hitler. The meeting was not an easy one, for Ciano wanted to talk about Mussolini’s territorial demands upon Malta, Egypt and Somalia. Hitler evaded this with a description of his success in France and announced that Britain was to be attacked next ‘with fire and sword’. These words were for London’s benefit, for Hitler knew that Ciano’s intermediaries would leak the content of the conversation to the British. Probably for the same reason, he invited Ciano on a short tour of northern France to ensure that he saw the extent of German domination there.
In Munich on 10 July, before lunch, Hitler entertained Hungary’s President, Count Teleki, and Foreign Minister, Count Csaky. Both were only interested in advancing their claims to the Siebenbürgen area of Russia. Hitler declined to discuss this matter. That evening we drove up to Obersalzberg, where Raeder arrived next day. He wanted to ascertain Hitler’s intentions towards Britain. Hitler replied that he was deferring his decision until he had sounded the effect from London of his impending speech to the Reichstag. Raeder was not in favour of an invasion of England: he was of the opinion that the U-boat war and air attacks on large cities such as London and Liverpool would eventually bring Britain round. They both agreed that an invasion of Britain should be the last resort; in any case, German air superiority over the Channel and southern England was the essential precondition.
For about an hour on 13 July Ribbentrop discussed with Hitler the problem of invading Britain. I recognised from the way he spoke that Hitler was not keen on the operation, but nevertheless he gave the order for plans to be prepared at once. His understanding of the situation was that Britain was hoping for Russia’s intervention on her side. A collapse of the British Empire did not lie in Germany’s interests but would be advantageous only for the United States or Japan. Hitler preferred to lengthen the front against Britain by co-opting Spain into the European set-up. Ribbentrop must plan for a trip to Madrid.
The OKW prepared Directive No 16, ‘Regarding the Preparations for an Invasion of England’, and supplied it to Hitler for his signature on 16 July. The operation had the cover-name ‘Seelöwe’—Sea-Lion. The first sentence stated: ‘As Britain, despite her hopeless military situation, has still made no sign of her preparedness for an understanding, I have decided to prepare, and if necessary carry out, an invasion of England.’ Hitler signed it and the same day convened a sitting of the Reichstag for 19 July.
From Obersalzberg on 14 July Hitler made a short excursion to the steel works at Linz and the panzer factory at Wels. During his inspection he ordered an immediate expansion of production—a clear indication (together with his special interest in long, heavy gun barrels on the new panzer models) that he had the expansion of his military objectives in mind.
Over the next four days he worked on his draft speech to the Reichstag and wrestled with the thorny problem of whom to promote. The elevation of the Army C-in-C, Brauchitsch, to field marshal was widely expected but in his opinion unjustified. On the other hand, he wanted the Army to receive some form of special distinction. His solution was the simultaneous promotion of the three Army Group C-in-Cs Rundstedt, Leeb and Bock and of the Army commanders Kluge, List, Reichenau and Witzleben.
Hitler wanted the senior commanders of Air Fleets 2 and 3, Kesselring and Sperrle, promoted to field marshal. Göring demanded the inclusion of Milch as well. Hitler’s poor relationship with Milch had nothing to do with his omission: if he promoted Milch he would also have to promote Keitel to field marshal in order that the the OKW C-in-C should not be outranked by the Secretary of State for Aviation. Keitel’s promotion would not be recognised by the Army, but even so he could not be passed over. The question was much discussed between Hitler, Schmundt and Keitel.
The Reichstag sitting had been tabled for seven on the evening of 19 July in the Kroll Opera House. The seats of the six deputies killed in action were left empty and marked by a simple laurel wreath. The front row of the auditorium was filled by Wehrmacht senior commanders. Everywhere the uniforms of the Wehrmacht branches dominated. Hitler was given a rapturous reception. Göring opened the session with a dedication to the fallen, after which Hitler embarked upon a long speech. Following his explanation of ‘the inherently necessary revision’ of the Versailles Treaty he criticised ‘international Jewish racial poison’, for which ‘the war was a welcome means to bring affairs to a better prosperity’. The files of the Allied Supreme War Council discovered at La Charité in France had given a picture of Allied plans. When he had made his peace offer, he had been insulted and offended by Chamberlain and the British warmongers Churchill and Eden. He described the Norwegian campaign as ‘the bravest operation in German war history’, and of the offensive in the West he observed that the welding together of the entire Wehrmacht had resulted in the ‘total annihilation of those Anglo-French forces present’. He went on to portray the operations and successes of the Army and Luftwaffe armies and groups involved and, emphasising the role of the commanding generals, announced the list of promotions with especial reference to Göring, who had been made Reichsmarschall and awarded the Grand Cross of the Iron Cross. Other promotions to Generaloberst included Halder, while Jodl and Jeschonnek became full generals.
Speaking of his alliance with Italy, Hitler offered his personal thanks to Mussolini. He exaggerated somewhat the involvement of Italian units. There followed a rather casual remark for Britain—‘I see no reason which would compel the continuation of this war’—and he rounded off his speech by offering thanks to ‘the Grace of Providence’ which had allowed ‘this work to succeed’.
I was disappointed by the Reichstag speech. Judging by his remarks about Britain beforehand, I was expecting something much more substantial. I wondered if his attitude towards the conflict with Britain had changed: what he had said lacked any concrete suggestion. About an hour after it finished the Press reported the first response from Britain—a short but clear refusal of any idea of reconciliation. Further icy words from London followed overnight and confirmed Hitler in his assumptions.
On 21 July, in the Chancellery, he met the Wehrmacht C-in-Cs. It was still a puzzle to him what Britain was up to: if she were bent on continuing the war, then her politicians were either hoping for a change in the US attitude or for some sort of accommodation with the Soviets. He considered the idea of invading Britain very risky. Stalin had been in contact with London and expressed his interest in holding the political situation in Europe in suspense. Russia must be watching very closely. An attack on Russia had to be planned for, and, in the greatest secrecy, the General Staff would be asked for their thoughts so as to determine the size of the project, its likely duration and its objectives.
After this Hitler went off to the Bayreuth Festival, where on 23 July he attended a performance of Götterdämmerung. This was his only visit of the war to the Wagner Festival: the event was kept going mainly for armaments workers and wounded soldiers.
Over the next few days he received a series of official visitors both at Obersalzberg and in Berlin. The Presidents of Romania, Bulgaria and Slovakia called in to argue for various territorial adjustments. The Balkan question was beginning to loom large, but Hitler chose to make no decisions at this stage, his mind being fixed on events in the Russian arena. He had the newsreels of the Russo-Finnish War screened again to see if he had overlooked something about Red Army motorisation, armament and striking power six months previously.
The Wehrmacht C-in-Cs and the Chiefs of the General Staff attended a meeting on 31 July at which Raeder reported on the current preparations for ‘Sea-Lion’. He was considering a date between 19 and 26 September, although a postponement to the spring of 1941 was preferable. Hitler would not entertain this and decided upon 15 September. Whether the invasion could proceed on that day depended on the Luftwaffe, he said. In the next few days they would be stepping up their attacks on English fighter airfields, ports and naval targets. If these were successful, then we would go ahead; otherwise the date would be put back to 1941.
Hitler also spoke about the Soviet Union, which recently had established new links with London. He thought it likely that Russia would attack from the autumn of 1941 onwards. If she were crushed beforehand, however, a great hope for Britain would be lost. Hitler stated that his decision to invade the Soviet Union in the spring of 1941 was final. Halder was given the job of examing the fundamental questions.
The following day Hitler signed Directive No 17, ‘The Prosecution of the Air and Naval War against Britain’, promising, ‘In order to create the conditions to defeat Britain, I intend to carry out the air and naval war against the British homeland more keenly than previously.’ The Luftwaffe must ‘cut down the British Air Force as soon as possible with all means at their disposal’. The date for ‘sharpening the air war’ was 5 August. This instruction was necessary. I had observed that the Luftwaffe formations in the most northern area of France had been arranged in battle order and readied for the aerial assault on Britain, but no indication had been supplied as to when the operation was supposed to begin, if at all. Jeschonnek told me that he had given the operational orders to Göring a few days previously and as far as he knew Göring had put them in a safe. He had had a number of conversations with Göring in the last four weeks, primarily about bombing England, and the Reichsmarschall seemed to have the impression that nothing further would come of it. He was thinking only about 1941 and the coming attack on the Soviet Union. Directive No 17 took him by surprise, and he had to inform the Air Fleets immediately.
On 5 July the weather was unfavourable and it was not until the 8th that the first fighter attacks could be made. Göring went to Cap Gris Nez to direct operations personally. In the first few days our fighters claimed to have inflicted heavy losses on the RAF over Kent and the Channel. These successes were difficult to substantiate. The daily reported figures were amazingly high. On 11 August we had destroyed 90 British aircraft for 21 of our own, on the 12th 92 for 24 and on the 13th 132 for 28. Göring reported this fantastic success rate to Hitler: he calculated that the British must already be scraping the bottom of the barrel for aircraft. But Hitler seemed unimpressed. In September, at his request, I asked the Luftwaffe General Staff for the British fighter strength. According to them the RAF had 600 fighters in front-line squadrons and 600 older types in reserve. I presented these statistics to Hitler, who discussed them with Göring at the next opportunity. Göring was appalled and asked me where I had got them. When I told him he rang the Luftwaffe General Staff at once and was given the same figures but told Hitler that the information was wrong. This was not the end of the affair. Göring ordered the General Staff to show statistical material intended for the Führer to himself before despatch. It was not long before Hitler asked me for some other aircraft figures. It was towards midnight. I rang Göring, who had retired for the night. Testily he referred me to the duty officer at General Staff. Next day Bodenschatz told me that I had annoyed Göring. Apparently the instruction had now been rescinded. Göring never spoke to me about this, however, nor showed me any irritation.
During August the RAF made their first air attacks on Berlin. They caused little damage but were a nuisance because they drove us for a few hours each night into the cellar. The raids were so relatively innocuous that Hitler interpreted them as a calculated insult and told Göring to take counter-measures. This was the motivation for the air raids on London, and Göring went at once to northern France to explain what was required to Sperrte, Kesselring and the bomber commodores. The attacks on the British capital began on 7 September. Whereas this escalation of the Battle of Britain caused substantial damage to property and losses amongst the civilian populations of London and other cities, the objective of the bomber war was not achieved. The weather did not permit heavy raids to be made every night. The British fighter and antiaircraft defences grew steadily stronger: sometimes the fighters were up in such numbers as to divert a formation from its target or frustrate the odd attack altogether. The fighting strength of the German groups declined little by little. Demand for replacements outstripped supply. Most effective were the ‘terror raids’ against London, and on 14 November the night attack on Coventry. Elsewhere in southern England the raids had little more than a nuisance value, although in some there were serious civilian casualties. They had no influence on the determination of the British Government. If it had been possible to keep bombing one city night after night, week in week out, I suppose this might have had some effect, but we did not have the necessary strength to do it. It was found impossible to achieve a military victory by air attack alone. Hitler was one of the first in the German leadership to recognise that the air war against England had neither achieved its objective nor was likely to. Nobody was party to his frequent conversations with Göring at this time, but from his observations I took it that he did not share Göring’s continuing optimism about the bombing of Britain. If the fighting across the Channel was not successful and the RAF remained viable, Hitler would have to seek an alternative solution. He knew that very well.
Whilst the battle over the Channel was raging in August, there was no outward indication that Berlin was a city at war—provided one overlooked the few British nuisance raids. On 14 August Hitler received Göring and the Army field marshals and presented then with field marshals’ batons in his study in the new Reich Chancellery. Thanking them for their services to date, he emphasised the obligations which the rank imposed upon them. The three Luftwaffe field marshals were away at the Channel coast. On 4 September he granted batons to Kesselring, Sperrle and Milch and that same afternoon opened the 1940/41 Winter Relief Programme with a speech in the Sportpalast, thanking the German people for their forbearance during one year of war and calling upon them to give the world ‘a demonstration of our indissoluble sense of community’.
On 30 August the Second Arbitration of Vienna ordered Romania to cede half of the Siebenbürgen to Hungary. This decision forced King Carol II to abdicate in favour of his son Michael. General Antonescu, a fervent nationalist, took over the government on 6 September; shortly he would ally Romania on the side of Germany. Although Romania still had to hand over southern Dobrudscha to Bulgaria in compliance with the terms of a mutual treaty, Hitler was of the opinion that the Balkan border disputes were now resolved. He mentioned this situation quite frequently since he intended to obtain control of the Romanian oilfields at Ploesti. He had despatched a brigade to Romania to secure the area, but the British controlled the eastern Mediterranean and might have an interest in the oilfields too—a suspicion which caused him some discomfort in the coming months.
On 13 September, after dining with the Wehrmacht C-in-Cs and their Chiefs of Staff, Hitler discussed with them certain technical questions, particularly tanks and anti-tank weapons. Next day the theme was ‘Sea-Lion’. Nobody believed in the operation any longer, but Hitler commended a successful ‘Sea-Lion’ as the best current solution for victory against Great Britain; the advance plans for the landings had been finished and now only four to five days of calm weather were required. This was necessary to assist the Channel crossing of the small naval units, which had only limited seaworthiness. For the time being the Luftwaffe was engaging RAF fighters from dawn to dusk. However, the weather situation was very unstable. Hitler stated that he was not calling off the operation at present: the British had to be left in uncertainty. He opposed a Luftwaffe request for a free hand to bomb residential districts on the grounds that attacks on military targets were more important. Bombing to cause mass panic should be undertaken only in the last resort; the danger of British retaliation against German cities was too great.
I had the impression from this statement that Hitler had even given up hope of a successful invasion of England in the spring of 1941. It was in the autumn of 1940 that he shrank back in the face of the imponderable—an improvised crossing of the English Channel.
On 22 and 24 September, respectively, Mölders and Galland were invited to meet Hitler to mark their 40th aerial victories. At his request they spoke frankly about the air war. From this Hitler realised that the RAF was stronger than the Luftwaffe Staff had admitted. Additionally, the weather had been so changeable that it had not been possible for aircraft to get up any four days in succession. There was nothing to choose between British and German pilots, but the former had the incomparable advantage of flying over their own territory. If a British pilot had to bale out, he was available immediately for a fresh mission. German pilots were lost to the Luftwaffe. This conversation impressed Hitler deeply and reinforced his intention not to risk ‘Sea-Lion’ unless he held all the cards.
From Hitler’s comments at the situation conference after a private talk with Raeder on 26 September, I inferred that Raeder was against war with the USSR and in favour of an operation in the eastern Mediterranean from Egypt through Palestine and Lebanon as far as Turkey. Hitler replied that, whereas he could see the reasoning for this, he would have to sound out the Spanish first. The most important place in the Mediterrean was Gibraltar. Once Gibraltar was in German or Spanish hands, one could then look more closely at the eastern end of the Mediterranean.
On 27 September Hitler attended the ceremonial signing of the tripartite pact involving Germany, Japan and Italy, and after the formalities dined with the guests in his apartment. He was keen for this treaty signing to come to the world’s attention, especially in the USA and USSR. He considered the Japanese forces to be the most important military factor in the Pacific. All his efforts in these autumn months of 1940 were directed towards welding a powerful and effective alliance against Britain. Ribbentrop was asked to draft a letter to Franco to get him interested in the idea of the common front. Ribbentrop saw the arrangement as beneficial for the stable political relationship with the Soviet Union that was his personal desire, but Hitler told him he was not optimistic: Russian machinations in recent weeks in Romania, together with the radical sovietisation of the Balkan States,5 had made him very doubtful. I noticed again and again how he dwelt on the problem of Russia. As Luftwaffe ADC these were difficult weeks for me. Our bomber squadrons flew the Channel to bomb targets in England every night when the weather permitted, while in Berlin all the Führer could think of was how he could overcome the Soviets in the shortest possible time. He had not yet answered my question as to his intentions since he had not yet made his decision, but as the weeks went by it was obvious that the Russian question was going to be answered soon.
On 4 October Hitler met the Duce at the Brenner pass. I could find out little about this conversation except that the Führer spoke more about France than Britain. Apparently he wanted to discourage the Duce from invading anywhere new. From the Brenner we drove to Obersalzberg, and we did not return to Berlin until the 8th. It was in this period that Hitler agreed to postpone ‘Sea-Lion’. Although he expressly reserved to himself the final decision regarding the invasion of England, henceforth nobody in the Wehrmacht believed it possible and thus ‘Sea-Lion’ sank without trace.
Hitler was again at Obersalzberg from 16 to 21 October His guests included the Italian crown princess, a sister of the King of Belgium. She made an impassioned plea for her brother. There was an unsettling domestic drama during her stay. Hitler’s house manager Willy Kannenberg wanted to complain to Hitler about several young SS orderly officers. Apparently it involved a string of mostly trivial incidents. Hitler’s senior personal ADC, Wilhelm Brückner, had got wind of it and attempted to persuade Kannenberg not to bother the Führer with these trifles. His efforts were in vain and Kannenberg got his hearing, with the result that Hauptsturmführer Wünsche was sent back at once to the Leibstandarte. Brückner took Wünsche under his wing, criticised Kannenberg and was dismissed immediately from Hitler’s service for his trouble. Schmundt intervened unsuccessfully on Brückner’s behalf. Eventually all that could be done was to get Brückner accepted into the Army as a Hauptmann in occupied France. His departure signified a real change in Hitler’s circle. In the military Adjutantur his authority was widely acknowledged. Since no replacement was appointed we assumed that one day he would be reemployed, but he never returned. Both Martin Bormann and Eva Braun were obviously glad to see the back of him, and so perhaps that explained it.
On 21st October Hitler set off for France to have separate meetings with Franco, Pétain and Laval which he thought promised a greater understanding between the three nations during the war. Next morning I boarded the special train at Aachen, arriving that afternoon at Montoire, a small station in unoccupied France. Here Hitler received the French representative, Prime Minister Laval, in the presence of Ribbentrop, who had come down from Berlin in his own train. Virtually nothing about these talks was made known. On the 23rd our train moved out of Hendaye station as far as the Spanish border stop where the meeting with Franco was to be held. Franco’s train was an hour late and Hitler passed the time strolling the platform in bright sunshine with Ribbentrop. The Caudillo was accompanied by his Foreign Minister, Serrano Suñer. The conference was supposed to conclude with an early luncheon in the German dining car, but it dragged on instead for more than two hours. It was almost dark when Franco took his leave. Hitler’s train retired for the night to the security of the railway tunnel at Montoire.
At dinner Hitler spoke about the talks. He was very dissatisfied with the outcome. He had offered Franco an alliance and suggested a joint operation to conquer Gibraltar. For the future in this war he expected no less than brotherhood-in-arms. Franco had received these suggestions more or less impassively; he had given no firm agreement other than an assurance to communicate his position on all aspects within a few days. Hitler expected a clear refusal.
Towards dusk next day the Vichy head of state, Marshal Pétain, arrived at Montoire station. Hitler walked towards him on the platform and led him into a saloon car. The purpose of the talks was to see if France could be induced to participate in the war against Britain. Laval had been offish; Pétain was taciturn and dismissive. He gave no answer throughout, but his manner said it all. Despite his disappointment, Hitler paid the elderly head of state due respect on his departure.
The return to Berlin from Montoire was a lengthy procedure because travel was restricted to daylight hours for security reasons. Hitler had a number of talks with Keitel and Jodl. He was now more convinced than ever that Russia would be in the position to attack Germany in 1942 and he confirmed that the war against Russia would have to begin in 1941, the period in mind being May to September, when it would be still quiet in the West. By 1942 he must have his hands free again to grapple with Britain. This statement came as no surprise to me. In recent weeks I had heard him speak along these lines on several occasions.
During our return a letter from Mussolini was delivered aboard. He wrote about an intended invasion of Greece. Once across the German border, a report from the embassy in Rome confirmed the Italian intention. Hitler believed there was still time to talk Mussolini out of the idea and he had Rome contacted immediately to arrange a meeting with the Duce in Florence for the morning of 28 October. Thus we travelled from Aachen to Florence via Munich, arriving at our destination at eleven. Mussolini greeted his visitor at once with the news that Italian troops had crossed the border into Greece that morning. He effused optimism and, certain of victory, was even now awaiting the first reports of successes. Hitler seemed composed and did not betray to Mussolini how gravely he judged this adventure. The conversation followed its usual very friendly course and Hitler gave no hint of his annoyance. Mussolini presented him with Hans Makart’s painting The Plague in Florence. Hitler knew that this picture was owned by the Italian state and had once confided to his private circle his wish to purchase it. The gift should have been a joy to receive, but not in the circumstances.
At six that evening Hitler boarded his train for Berlin, where, on his arrival, he had a series of talks with the OKW, Brauchitsch and Halder. He still considered the capture of Gibraltar from landwards extremely urgent. This was to be a matter of special importance for the planning staff. Naturally it depended on Franco’s agreement.
The embroilment of the Italians in Libya was a worry. They did not need German assistance in North Africa, but Hitler was anxious in case the British should gain a strong foothold there. OKH had sent General von Thoma to reconnoitre, and on 3 November he submitted to Hitler a sober and concise report of his findings that a German action in North Africa was pointless and had no prospect of success. Thoma highlighted the difficulties of supply through Italy and the Mediterranean.
At the beginning of November, before the visit of Russian Foreign Minister Molotov, Hitler remained indecisive, casting a baleful eye at the British in Egypt, from where they were well able to venture towards the Balkans or Libya. In the Balkans were the Ploesti oilfields upon which he had designs.
Hitler stayed over in Munich for the Party anniversary of 9 November after speaking the previous evening in the Löwenbräukeller. His words were full of portent and he left no doubt but that this war had to be fought to its victorious conclusion. How this would be done he left open. The people should realise that the great struggle still lay ahead. As an example he quoted the continuing air war over Britain, which, in his own words, Churchill had brought upon himself by his pathetic air raids on Berlin that summer.
Hitler returned to Berlin in the morning of 10 November, the itinerary for the journey having been planned so as to avoid arriving in the capital during the usual hours of the British nuisance raids. In the large situation conference room the subject was Russia. Jodl said that the Army ought to be told something since it was only six months to May. Hitler replied that a decision about Russia would not be made until after Molo-tov’s visit and ordered a directive to be drafted listing in a condensed form all Axis plans currently under consideration. On 12 November the Wehrmacht Planning Staff issued Directive No 18 tabulating Spain and Gibraltar, the Italian offensive against Egypt, the Balkans, the possible German occupation of Greece and the Soviet Union. Even the abandoned ‘Sea-Lion’ was mentioned. The most ominous was point 5, the Soviet Union, confirming that ‘all verbally ordered preparations for the East’ were to be carried through.
Directive No 19, Operation ‘Felix’, followed shortly afterwards. This contained detailed particulars for the stationing of German troops at readiness in Spain and Portugal so that an attack could be ordered on 10 January 1941. On 12 December, however, the directive was rescinded and all plans for the Iberian peninsula scrapped when Franco notified Hitler that he intended to remain neutral. Hitler had sent Admiral Canaris, head of the Foreign Abwehr section, to Madrid to explain Hitler’s intentions. Hitler trusted Canaris and did not blame him for the failure of his mission. Personally I would have had my doubts about using using Canaris to elucidate policies on Spain: his position seemed questionable to me.
Molotov had his first talks with Hitler in the afternoon of 12 November. He had brought with him from Moscow clear and unequivocal questions touching on all problems which had developed in recent months between the Soviet Union and the Reich. Commencing with Finland, they covered Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey. Molotov gave Hitler to understand that these states belonged within the Soviet sphere of influence and had, so to speak, nothing to do with Germany. It was difficult for Hitler to skirt round all this in conversation. Next day Molotov pressed for specific answers to his questions but received nothing firm. In the evening of the 13th he had a long meeting with Ribbentrop, who believed sincerely in keeping the Non-Aggression Pact alive.
Hitler discussed the Kriegsmarine with Raeder next day. Raeder did not think that the Russians were planning for war with Germany in the next few years and suggested that if there were to be an attack against them—something he was very much against—then it should not be begun until after Britain was defeated. Hitler said he would think about it.
In the latter part of November Hitler spent a few days at the Ober-salzberg on the occasion of a visit by the Bulgarian King, Boris, and raised the question of Russian guarantees to Bulgaria which could cause Germany great difficulties in the Balkans. Hitler wanted to win the monarch over to the Axis. King Boris took a negative stance on all questions, although he was very friendly and expressed his personal opinion quite frankly.
On 19 November the King of Belgium came to plead for the return of two million Belgian prisoners-of-war and to establish Hitler’s vision of the future Belgian-German relationship.6 He went away having achieved nothing.
The Romanian head of state, Marshal Antonescu, made his first official visit to Berlin on the 23rd, where he impressed Hitler with his charisma. He spoke at length on his country’s problems and vilified neighbouring Hungary. The entry of Romania to the tripartite pact was celebrated in the Chancellery, followed by a banquet. Hitler said of Antonescu that he had found in a him a friend of Germany.
A very significant measure had been undertaken in the autumn when Hitler despatched Todt, Schmundt and Engel to the east to look for a site for a Führer HQ. The most suitable spot suggested was a parcel of land near Rastenburg. Hitler ordered construction to be begun at once, with April 1941 as the deadline for completion. Specifications stipulated that it should be bomb-proof and have sufficient area to accommodate the entire HQ. This decision seemed to me to bring the Russian campaign a major step closer.
On 5 December Hitler discussed with Brauchitsch and Halder various aspects of the European situation, primarily Britain and Russia. Hitler said that the cessation of daylight attacks had saved the British fighter force. The attacks on British industry were minimal. However, whereas losses of material could only be made good by importing from the United States, this should not be overestimated: ‘The RAF will be no stronger in 1941 than it is now. In the spring the Luftwaffe will be substantially stronger.’ Regarding the Soviets, he was of the opinion that the Russian soldier was inferior and the Red armies leaderless. In an attack on the USSR the danger of forcing Russian armies back en masse must be avoided. The attacks must be organised so that the Red Army would be broken down into sections for its men to be rounded up. Attacks must be commenced from selected strongpoints, from where large encircling operations could be launched. Hitler expected that these great successes would culminate in a certain moment when total disorganisation would set in amongst the enemy forces. For Hitler everything was finalised.
On 10 December, in a speech to workers at a Berlin armaments factory but which was intended for all armaments workers throughout the Reich, Hitler emphasised that the most difficult days still lay ahead: eight days later he placed before the Wehrmacht C-in-Cs Directive No 21, Operation ‘Barbarossa’.
When the new Japanese ambassador Oshima presented his credentials on 22 December, Hitler greeted him especially warmly. Oshima had been recalled to Japan when Hitler concluded the pact with the Soviet Union in 1939: the time now seemed ripe to return him to Berlin. It must have been rumoured that Hitler was revising his attitude towards Moscow.
This was Hitler’s last official business in Berlin before the Christmas holidays. On 23 December we arrived in the special train at Calais, where Hitler visited the army and naval long-range batteries which regularly shelled the English coast. Hitler had taken a keen interest in this artillery since the summer. That afternoon he inspected Kriegsmarine units at Boulogne and on Christmas Eve two fighter squadrons, where he spoke very appreciative words about their operations of recent weeks. That evening, in the special train, Hitler promoted Engel and myself to the rank of major in advance of seniority—for us both a very pleasant surprise. On Christmas Day he inspected a bomber squadron and that afternoon received in his train Admiral Darlan, the representative head of the French Government, who had been appointed as successor to Laval a few days earlier. The talks left Hitler dissatisfied and irritated. He criticised the removal of Laval, which he attributed to anti-German elements on Pétain’s staff. I could discover no further details of this conversation.
On 26 December, after a morning with an infantry regiment, Hitler sped by train to Metz, where the SS-Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler were quartered. Amongst these men he was always in good spirits. In his speech he gave this feeling visible expression. The SS-Leibstandarte must always expect to be deployed to the hottest spots of the battle, he said: ‘It is for you who are honoured to carry my name to stand at the forefront of the struggle.’
Next day in Berlin he had a long talk with Raeder, who spoke out very forcefully against war with Russia—which now looked very likely in the light of Directive No 21—before Britain was vanquished. Hitler replied that the blow against Russia would also hit Britain severely. Escalating Russian rearmament, which would put Russia into a position to attack Germany some time in 1942, had made it a necessity.
Raeder made a request for increased U-boat production. At present only twelve to eighteen boats per month were coming off the slips. In the light of the decision for war with Russia, this exposed a serious dilemma. Hitler had ordered Todt to give priority, with all the means at his disposal, to armaments for the Army with a view to war in 1941; Kriegsmarine requirements had been deferred. Once Russia had been defeated, the whole question could be reviewed. I discussed this with Jeschonnek, who had been following the development with the greatest concern. Luftwaffe losses resulting from the Battle of Britain in recent months had risen constantly. The current production scarcely covered these losses. It was not possible to form new bomber groups because the production of the Ju 88 was still posing difficulties.
I gave Hitler a note of Luftwaffe aircraft numbers and requested him to discuss the matter with Göring: I saw a big question mark here for the future. Hitler admitted that maintaining the Luftwaffe was important, but he needed all available production capacity for the Army for the spring of 1941. The matter could be looked at again after the summer. However, he would speak to Göring about it. I was very disturbed by this answer. I knew that the RAF was becoming much stronger and saw in this impending two-front war a great danger for the Reich. Jeschonnek agreed and had a very serious talk with Göring but did not succeed in getting Dr Todt’s orders amended. Göring had given in to Hitler against his better judgement.
During that winter of 1940 I began to hear more frequently in leading military and civilian circles adverse opinions being uttered about the direction of affairs. These opinions varied between harmless criticism of the leadership to pure defeatism, such as ‘We cannot win the war’. Hitler himself was criticised for being too emotional and taking what the British did and said too personally. Now he was going to embark on a two-front war without production capacity and raw materials in sufficient quantities.
Such critical voices were in the minority, but one could not ignore them, for the sentiment was stated soberly and emphatically. Not that I was convinced by it at all. Despite some reservations, my personal view was that Hitler calculated every step in a cautious manner so that there was no possibility of a catastrophe. In my opinion these mostly highly placed critics and doubters were guilty of a basic error of assumption. They looked down contemptuously on Hitler, withheld their positive co-operation or in some cases worked against him from within on the premise that that would in some way help to uproot him. They failed to see that the people were behind Hitler, and this fortified him. Negative opposition seemed to me to be a false path after I had seen how one could talk to Hitler and convince him of an error if the argument had some substance and was presented properly. Frequently I looked on as generals and such like would fail to adopt the right approach to Hitler. He had heard the opposition to his plans within the Army before the Polish and French campaigns and had then been vindicated. Afterwards he was inclined to condemn senior officers’ criticisms as defeatism. He said to me, ‘When a man selects the career of a military officer, I cannot understand why it should not be his most cherished wish to practise at least once his chosen vocation. Prussian officers always had this outlook. If a soldier, a general, sets out to deter me from war by faulty planning and delays in armaments, that is sabotage. What we should have is the situation where the generals want war and the politican restrains them. But it seems to me that the generals here quake before the enemy. Do they think I am so stupid that I cannot judge correctly the strengths and weaknesses of the enemy?’
In the winter of 1940 I often found such evening conversations very stimulating. Hitler might deliver a comprehensive monologue on the problems of running the war, for example. The Balkan peninsula and the threat to the Romanian oilfields interested him intensely. The question of Great Britain and the American Presidential elections in November also featured regularly. I never perceived in Hitler any mental inflexibility or arrogance. In the main it was always possible to advance a counterargument in an attempt to change a view he held, although it would have to be sound and convincing. It might be that he would want to reflect on it, but he always admitted the validity of an argument once he accepted that it proved him wrong. His memory was very good and his knowledge of many subjects such as music, history and the natural sciences above average. He was self-taught, but this self-education had been continuous over decades and had an unusually broad basis. Even if many of his scientific or historical assertions would not bear academic scrutiny, nevertheless he could argue in depth over a far wider range of subjects than most. He was not often contradicted, however, for few experts in any field were to be found in his intimate conversation circle, in which good listeners preponderated. In conversations generally I admired Hitler’s calm manner. I never found him to be an unpleasant person. On the contrary, for me he was an aesthete, and his open-mindedness, tolerance and chivalrous manner were the reasons why all people who came into really close contact with him found him human and congenial.