The winter of 1940/41 was a time for reflection, planning and decisions, and for this purpose Hitler spent much time at Obersalzberg, where he could work in peace. So how did he arrive at his decision to attack the Soviet Union before he defeated Britain? This is, it seems to me, the decisive question of the war. Hitler was convinced that Churchill was waiting for either the United States or the USSR to enter the war against Germany, In Hitler’s judgment, the United States would not be in a position to intervene in Europe until 1943: the Soviet Union would be ready by the autumn of 1942. The Russo-German pact was useless as a guarantee of peace. Stalin would wait for the German forces to weaken sufficiently as a result of their military efforts in the West and then overwhelm Europe with little risk to himself. Hitler intended to prevent this, whatever the cost. Germany could not fight on numerous fronts at the same time, and so it became his design to knock out one enemy after the other either by negotiation or warfare. Secretly he always hoped for an understanding with Great Britain, although he had known since the autumn of 1937 of Britain’s predominantly anti-German policies.
He worried about ‘growing old’—that there was nobody with the capability to succeed him in his work. Of course, his enemies inside Germany called this self-aggrandizement, arrogance, megalomania and so forth. Hitler knew all this and indeed mentioned it frequently in the daily situation conferences.
The year 1941 was to be exclusively that in which the account was settled finally with the Soviet Union. Hitler made his preparations so that he could attack in about mid-May. His plan was for his forces to operate from centres in the north and south and, after the conquest of Leningrad and Rostov, to stream them out on both flanks in a great encircling movement east of Moscow which would, as he believed, so weaken the Red Army that it would capitulate. This would allow him to land the killer punch with all the military might at his command against his last enemy, Britain.
In his New Year speeches to the Wehrmacht and the German people Hitler mentioned the military developments of 1940 and promised that ‘The year 1941 will see the German Army, Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine much stronger and better equipped’, while of the air war he said, ‘Herr Churchill was the man who suddenly discovered unrestricted air raids as the great secret for victory. This criminal has been bombing German cities by night—a horror which, in a military sense, has no more than nuisance value—for three and a half months …’ This presaged a more painful type of warfare, yet it had a mesmerising effect on the people. The patience of the German masses was astonishing. Most said that the Führer knew best what was to be done. They were all harnessed up for war work and simply carried on zealously and conscientiously.
On 8 and 9 January the military leadership assembled at the Berghof for one of the most decisive meetings of 1941. Hitler told them: ‘Spain has dropped out; France is against us. Russia has recently made new demands—Finland, the Balkans and Mariapol. Romania is on our side; Hungary has no obstacles to joining us. In Yugoslavia everything remains open. Bulgaria is very cautious because they don’t want to risk the dynasty.’ Britain wanted to dominate the continent; therefore they would need to defeat us. He intended to be so strong that this objective could never be achieved. British hopes rested on the USA and USSR; ‘But we cannot deliver the final blow to Britain by invasion,’ he admitted. In 1941 the situation in mainland Europe would have consolidated so that we could see our way clear to continue the war against Britain and, if necessary, the United States.
Of the new British Foreign Secretary, Eden, Hitler said that here was the man who wanted to collaborate with the Soviets. Stalin was clever and cunning. ‘He will just demand more and more. A German victory would be intolerable for Soviet ideology. It must be our decision to force Russia under as soon as possible. In two years the British will have forty divisions. This could tempt Russia into a pact. To grapple with the Russian question gives Japan a free hand against Britain in the East. Japan is ready for a serious collaboration.’ Russian equipment was obsolescent; the Red Army had no well-thought out organisation.
For the first time before such a large circle, Hitler mentioned the idea of fighting in North Africa. The possibility of internal political collapse in Italy could not be risked. The problem was that in North Africa the Italians lacked modern equipment. Here Germany would have to assist with a support force.
Hitler stated that he would go to war with the USSR this summer. Originally he had intended to start in the second half of May, but because of developments in the Balkans and North Africa he had now had to postpone the attack date—possibly until June. Those present listened to all this dumbfounded. Not a word of opposition was raised to any of it. Their faces had a set expression. I doubt if any of them saw the need for war against Russia. Only after leaving were the first serious questions asked.
At the beginning of 1941, therefore, I did not view the future with optimism: if matters followed the course outlined, outright victory no longer seemed to me to be possible. I concluded that Hitler wanted to take over the Soviet landmass as a Reich dependency whose purpose was to supply us with the raw materials necessary to continue the war against Britain. This seemed even more important if we were going to have to take on the Americans too at some stage. It was not yet obvious that this would be the case, but the reports from our diplomats in Washington were not promising. Roosevelt’s utterances had lately become considerably more critical and negative towards Germany, and anti-German feeling had begun to gain ground amongst the American people. I guessed that Churchill had won Roosevelt to his programme. Hitler repeated constantly that we had to settle the account with the USSR before the USA came into the war, but presumably this had now gone by the board.
On 11 January Hitler signed Directive No 22, ‘Assistance by German Forces in the Mediterranean Theatre’. In paragraph 1 of this document Hitler ordered the C-in-C Army to set up a blockade zone which ‘by defending Tripolitania’ would render our Italian allies ‘valuable service’. From Sicily Fliegerkorps X would attack British naval forces and shipping. Hitler discussed this directive in detail with Mussolini in Salzburg on 19 and 20 January. Mussolini was very anxious for German troops to arrive in North Africa soon.
In January Fliegerkorps X moved from northern Italy to Sicily in readiness to attack British seaborne targets. OKH had sent General Freiherr von Funck to Italy and North Africa to reconnoitre the operational possibilities for panzers. He returned on 1 February and gave Hitler his report, which read unfavourably, but Hitler distrusted him and in any case the transfer of a light division was imperative because the British were already at El Agheila.
Rommel had been appointed German commander in North Africa and arrived at Tripoli in early February. He was accompanied by Schmundt, who had been acquainted with all the pros and cons of desert warfare. Schmundt returned after a few days and presented Hitler with a clear and sober account of Libya. He considered the outlook for operations in this theatre as favourable and advocated the swift transfer of a substantial German force. As to the military strength of the Italians, he was very tight-lipped: he seemed to think they were almost useless. The German 5th Light Division would be put in the front line in Libya as soon as they had disembarked in order to shore up the hopeless situation the Italians had made for themselves. Rommel was predestined for the task. He enjoyed Hitler’s special confidence, earned by swift and effective leadership in the French campaign. Unselfishly he saw only the job in hand and set about improvising with the few German troops he had until others arrived. The British had had to send men to reinforce Greece and Crete and this eased his initial problems.
Hitler was not so much interested in pulling Mussolini’s chestnuts out of the fire as in keeping his promise to assist the Duce: he believed that a German force in North Africa would help raise the Italian fighting level. However, it forced him to advise OKH that the attack on Russia would have to be put back by a few weeks. This highly disadvantageous delay provoked little reaction from the Army leadership—a fact which surprised me, for at least five months had been estimated as essential for the Russian campaign. Thus, at the end of January 1941, it was already clear that the campaign could not be concluded before winter set in. I spoke to Hitler about this in the Chancellery one evening and discovered that he had reached the same conclusion. He explained that the German Wehrmacht would inflict such catastrophic damage on the Soviet Union during the summer of 1941 that only a short campaign would be necessary to finish them off in 1942. I was by no means comfortable with this reply and told him so. After this conversation I had the feeling that North Africa had not previously featured in his plans but that he had had no choice because of his loyalty to Mussolini.
On 27 January we travelled by train to Munich, where Hitler visited the architects Frau Troost and Professor Giesler and had a long consultation in their studio over his plans to redevelop Munich. At midnight we returned to Berlin, arriving next morning. Next day Hitler was advised of the death of the Reich Justice Minister Dr Franz Gürtner. Although Hitler did not like jurists very much, he thought highly of Gürtner and over the next few days spoke frequently of his achievements.7
In the afternoon of 3 February Hitler had a conference lasting several hours with Brauchitsch, Halder, Heusinger, Keitel and Jodl, the idea being to solicit basic thinking about Operation ‘Barbarossa’. Jeschonnek joined in later. Halder estimated the Soviet forces at 121 rifle and 25 cavalry divisions and 31 motorised mechanical brigades—about 180 groups in all. Against them the Germans would array 104 infantry and 20 panzer divisions, the Kavallerie Division, and thirteen motorised plus a few Romanian divisions. Halder estimated that the Russians had about 10,000 tanks against 3,500 German panzers, but he rated the quality of the Russian tanks as poor, although one should be prepared for unpleasant surprises. Their artillery was numerically strong but mostly obsolete. The German attack was planned with three Army Groups and four Panzer Groups strung along the whole front. Supply was to be fully motorised on account of the shortage of railways.
On the whole Hitler was satisfied with the planning but repeated his idea of how the operation should develop. After the initial battles to overcome the frontier troops, he wanted Army Groups North and South reinforced along the line Pleskau–Smolensk–Kiev so that they could advance respectively to the Baltic as far as Leningrad and in the south to the area around Rostow. Army Group Centre would if necessary delay their attack on Moscow until the 1942 campaign. Hitler emphasised that the primary aim for the year 1941 was the conquest of the entire Baltic area, plus the city of Leningrad. The Army must always keep this objective in mind and ensure that the Russians gave up the Baltic.
He then spoke about various individual problems associated with the first attacks and the problem of supply. An important point for Hitler was the flak situation. It was expected that the Soviets had an air force of note, and Hitler drove home the importance of air raid precautions and flak. He accepted the Luftwaffe operational plan for the campaign in the East. In the first three days German bombers would destroy the Russian fighter force and so enable the panzers to make swift inroads across country.
In the course of this long conversation about how to conquer an uncommonly large area of the Earth I thought it almost impossible that the set objectives could ever be achieved. Before the French campaign, Brauchitsch and Halder had expressed their doubts repeatedly and made clear their opposition to the offensive in the West. Now they accepted Hitler’s instructions to invade the Soviet Union without a word of protest. It occurred to me that they knew that the operation was ultimately doomed but had decided to let Hitler dig his own grave. This idea alarmed me, but I was daunted by the very scale of the Russian land mass. To this had been added in the spring of 1941 the North African adventure to prop up an ally of dubious value. The whole thing seemed very risky.
In the evening of 6 February Hitler travelled to the Berghof, where, except for a few short breaks, he remained until mid-March. February was a very pleasant month on the Obersalzberg. The duties were few and the preparations for ‘Barbarossa’ and to assist Mussolini in Greece were going according to plan. The air war over Britain had slackened on account of adverse weather conditions. Amongst Hitler’s guests were the Yugoslav President Zvetkovich and Foreign Minister Cincar-Markovich. Hitler was determined to persuade Yugoslavia to join the Axis, but despite frank talks the question remained unresolved.
In Munich in the afternoon of 24 February Hitler delivered his Party Foundation Day speech in the banqueting hall of the Hofbräuhaus. Speaking of Mussolini, he stated: ‘Our opponents still do not understand that once I accept a man as my friend, I stand by him and refuse to bargain my attitude.’ He then went on to speak about the achievements of the Wehrmacht and German people and left no room for doubt but that ‘just as in the past this struggle has been blessed by Providence, so shall it be blessed in the future’.
In the evening of 28 February his train brought him to Vienna, where on 1 March he participated in the ceremony at Schloss Belvedere accepting Bulgaria into the Axis. Amongst those present were Ribbentrop, the Bulgarian Minister President Filoff, Count Ciano and Ambassador Oshima. Even while this was going on, German pioneers were at work erecting three great bridges over the Danube, by which German troops in Romania could cross into Bulgaria and march on Greece. This was Hitler’s deliberate riposte to Russia. On his visit to Berlin in November 1940, Molotov had expressed the Soviet Union’s strong interest in Bulgaria. At the time Hitler had not given him an answer. Now he had it.
That afternoon in Vienna Hitler had a very comprehensive conversation with Ciano. He saw it as important to give the Italians a clear idea about the coming war with Greece. He spent the evening with Gauleiter Baldur von Schirach and his wife, both of whom Hitler esteemed highly. He had known Frau von Schirach as the small daughter of his official photographer Heinrich Hoffmann. Early next morning, when our train made a 90-minute stop at Linz, Hitler wandered in the town before the morning traffic set in. Later he discussed his plans for development work along the Danube and the new Nibelungen bridge.
At Obersalzberg the daily situation conferences with Keitel and Jodl began to occupy more time. Hitler received a number of visitors important to him on account of the impending Balkans operation. On 4 March the Yugoslav regent Prince Paul called. Hitler was primarily interested in winning him over to the Axis. A polite official discussion ensued which seemed unsuccessful. Hitler said that possibly in a few weeks Yugoslavia would decide to join, although he did not seem all that confident.
Jodl was working on the Japanese angle. He interpreted General Oshima’s return to Berlin as ambassador as implying the readiness of Japan for a military collaboration if not a close alliance. He suggested that Hitler sign an instruction which considered the possibilities, and accordingly Directive No 24, ‘Regarding Co-operation with Japan’, was issued on 5 March. The first sentence explained: ‘The aim of cooperation founded on the triaxial pact must be to encourage Japan to become actively involved against Britain in the Far East as soon as possible … a common aim of the policy will be the swift defeat of Britain so as to keep the United States out of the war.’ The Directive concluded: ‘No hint is to be given to the Japanese about the “Barbarossa” campaign.’
On the evening of 12 March we returned by the train to Linz, where Hitler visited the Hermann Göring Werke the following morning. He spoke of an increase in the current steel stocks which would be necessary to step up panzer and anti-tank gun production.
Hitler made his annual Heldengedenktag (Remembrance Day) speech at the Berlin Arsenal on 16 March, mentioning attacks by British bombers which portended that ‘in this war the homeland will have to suffer heavier casualties than previously. And it will be not just the men, but above all the women.’ Thus did Hitler warn for the first time of the horror of the impending air war against German cities, as to the extent of which at that time we had had no premonition.
During the intervening quiet period up to 25 March Hitler received Rommel, and, after awarding him the Oak Leaves to his Iron Cross, Hitler discussed with him his plans to regain Cyrenaica in North Africa. Rommel was a great optimist. He foresaw no difficulties and was looking forward to the arrival of the 15th Panzer Division with its entire corps, with which he was proposing to move eastwards at once.8 His manner and energy pleased Hitler, who later praised Rommel highly and saw the development of the situation in North Africa in a very positive light. For the first time the newspapers spoke of an ‘Afrika Korps’. Subsequently Rommel made a surprise attack at Agedabia which set the tempo for his offensive. On 4 April he took Benghazi and shortly would besiege Tobruk.
Hitler arrived in Vienna on the morning of 25 March. The Yugoslavs had announced their desire to join the Axis, although they would not sign until they had obtained from Germany a guarantee of their neutrality. The signing would be celebrated with the usual due ceremony and breakfast at Schloss Belvedere. Afterwards Hitler spent a carefree evening with the Schirachs, happy in the knowledge that the last of the Balkan states had joined the tripartite pact—although he had no great confidence in the durability of the Yugoslav Government.
Two days later diplomat Hewel brought news that Prince Paul and his government in Belgrade had been ousted the previous night: there was unrest throughout Yugoslavia and rioting had been reported in the capital. Young King Peter had assumed the monarchy by decree. Hitler remarked that this putsch had at least come at a convenient point: if it had happened during ‘Barbarossa’ it would have caused him much more anxiety. Now he still had time. So saying, he ordered OKH and OKW to draw up the usual agenda for discussion. At 1300 that day a large number of Army and Luftwaffe senior commanders assembled in the conference room. I also saw Ribbentrop, Göring, Brauchitsch, Keitel, Jodl, Halder, Hoffmann von Waldau, Bodenschatz and Heusinger. Hitler described the known facts and added that Serbia and Slovenia had never been pro-German. He had taken the decision to attack Yugoslavia at once with the aim of dismantling the state. He would not wait for some sort of declaration of loyalty. The operation would be linked to ‘Marita’, the attack on Greece. German forces would head from Sofia towards Skopje, and stronger units would go for Nis and Belgrade. A thrust from the Graz and Klagenfurt areas would have the objective of destroying the Yugoslav Army. The Luftwaffe reported that von Richthofen’s Fliegerkorps VIII was at immediate readiness in Bulgaria, though units of Fliegerkorps X would not ube so until two to three days later. Hitler ordered all preparations set in train and requested that Army and Luftwaffe make known to him their intentions. That same day Jodl committed Hitler’s ideas to paper in Directive No 25. Thus the Balkans campaign entered a new stage. We reckoned with its beginning in just a few days.
In the afternoon of 27 March Hitler welcomed the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka. During the wait Hitler had been in a state of agitation. He was very keen for Japan to take measures against Britain. He did not know how far Japan was prepared to go nor to what extent he ought to let them know of his intentions. He hinted to Matsuoka that the current relationship between the Reich and the USSR could change precipitately and said that war against Britain had been unavoidable on the grounds of Britain’s attitude. As yet he did not foresee the involvement of the United States. Matsuoka remained impassive. I had the impression that it was a fact-finding mission for his part. His travels took him to Rome and back and he broke off his return journey in Moscow to sign a Non-Aggression Pact with the Soviet Union. This was a clearer statement than anything he had said during his visit to Germany.
On his departure from Moscow there was a very impressive scene on the station platform when Stalin made known how much value he placed on the assistance of our military attaché and ambassador and the importance he attached to friendly Russo-German relations.
On 30 March Hitler summoned the Wehrmacht leaders to the Cabinet Office, where he delivered a 2½-hour long speech. ‘Britain is placing all her hopes on the United States and the USSR,’ he began. The maximum armaments output of the United States would not be reached for three to four years. ‘Russia is the last enemy factor in Europe. She must be destroyed during this year and the next. Then we will be in a position as regards matériel and men to control the air and seas. What has to be achieved in Russia is the destruction of the Red Army and Soviet state. It is a war of two world viewpoints. Bolshevism is comparable to an asocial criminal system and offers enormous danger for the future. We much dissociate ourselves from any idea of soldierly comradeship with the enemy. A communist can never be a comrade-in-arms. It is a war of extermination. If we fail to see it in that light, then even though we will defeat him, in several years the communist enemy will rise once more against us. In the war against the Soviet Union what will be important is the extermination of the Bolshevist commissars and intellectuals. The battle is against the poison of degeneration. Our troops must defend themselves by the same means as those with which they are attacked. Political commissars and GPU people are criminals and must be treated as such. In the East, hardness now means mildness for the future.’
Hitler mentioned next the large numbers of Soviet tanks and aircraft, only a few of which met modern criteria. The great Russian continent and the endless expanses of terrain made concentrations at decisive points essential. It was important to amass our panzers and Luftwaffe at decisive spots. After the first battles for air superiority, the Luftwaffe must work closely in support of the land operation. The Russian would fail once he came up against the panzers and Luftwaffe en masse.
After a late breakfast Hitler resumed that afternoon, emphasising the necessity for haste in the Balkans. Even so, the beginning of the Russian campaign had to be postponed by about a month. The Balkans offensive would start, at the latest, in about a week.
It was at about this time that I noted down something of especial significance. Between 1 and 3 March Oberst (Ing) Dietrich Schwenke of the Reich Air Ministry had paid a visit to Russia to inspect Luftwaffe facilities there under the Russo-German agreement. I heard about this trip from various service centres of the Ministry. Unfortunately I did not get to speak to Schwenke personally, but the head of the Foreign Air Forces Section at Luftwaffe General Staff let me have some important points from his report. From these there could be no doubt that Russia was arming on a grand scale. Newly built aircraft factories of an enormous size were nearing completion. A huge number of airfields had been laid down. Everyone seemed to be very busy indeed. When I mentioned this to Hitler, he said that Göring had already told him. One should take this military build-up very seriously. He was firmly convinced that the justification for the war with Russia would be realised at the last moment.
On 5 April Hitler was advised that the Soviet Union had terminated her Friendship and Non-Aggression Treaty with Yugoslavia. Hitler accepted this report with a certain satisfaction, for it proved that the Russians wanted to go their own way. A few days later the ambassadors of Yugoslavia, Norway, Belgium and Greece were expelled from the Soviet Union since Stalin no longer considered these to be sovereign states.
Our attacks on Greece and Yugoslavia began on Sunday 6 April. Hitler had ordered a very heavy air raid on Belgrade, which came as a complete surprise to the civilian population and caused many casualties. At the same time the invasions were reported in the Reich by a proclamation in which Hitler described his efforts ‘to spare the German people this altercation’. He placed the blame for the situation in the Balkans squarely on the British, who had had a foot in Greece for some time. ‘May people who are blind to the fact recognise that they have to thank for this the worst of “friends”, who for the last 300 years have been occupying parts of the continent’, and in an Order of the Day to ‘Soldiers of the South-East Front’ he reproached the British for ‘making others do their fighting for them’.
Just before Hitler transferred his HQ to the south-east of the Reich, he was surprised in Berlin by a very heavy British air raid. On the night of 10 April the State Opera House, the University, the State Library and the Palace of the Crown Prince were hit. Heavy damage was caused. The Opera House was completely gutted. Hitler was outraged and as a result he had a furious argument with Göring. I heard Hitler’s reproaches about the useless Ju 88 with which the bomber squadrons had been saddled. They would rather have the He 111 back. Göring did not dispute the allegation about the Ju 88 but explained to Hitler that the competent director at Junkers, Koppenberg, had reported to him that the fault had been ironed out in the newest machines and that the models coming off the line in 1942 would have more powerful motors.9 Göring usually had the knack of mollifying Hitler. The Führer gave Professor Speer the job of rebuilding the Opera House.
That night Hitler left Berlin for his FHQ at Mönichkirchen, where we arrived 24 hours later. This small village lay at the end of a tunnel on the main railway line between Vienna and Graz. Makeshift platforms had been erected and a military signals station set up. The train remained in sidings here for the next fourteen days. The campaign was under the control of OKH and went off without any real problems. The only difficulty lay in the inadequate highways.
In a letter I informed my uncle: ‘This time we have our HQ in the train which has been marshalled in the south-east corner of the Reich. From here the Führer directs the operation. Since midday it is quiet on the Yugoslav Front. It is a good thing that we have got it over with so quickly for there is nothing down here worth winning. Let’s hope that it will tail off soon in Greece too. The British are clearing out from there, so it looks like the other side thinks it’s not worth the candle. The battle in Yugoslavia was easier and we had fewer casualties than expected. The only difficulty was the terrain which held up the panzer divisions. The Greeks put up a fierce resistance on their side of the Bulgarian passes (Rupal Pass) and the individual bunkers fought bravely. At the moment our troops are in action on both sides of Mount Olympus. According to the latest reports, however, the British and Greeks seem to be beaten. They are pulling back everywhere. It is good that the Balkans question is being resolved. It was always an uncertain factor. I fear that the arrival of the Italians in Dalmatia will not contribute to peace. The Croats are already saying that they want the Italians out of the Balkans altogether. If they have the weapons they can do it. The Turk seems to be maintaining an honest neutrality. But the British are doing all they can to buy influence. They pay better than we do. We have now only one objective—to reorganise our divisions in readiness for fresh missions. The big question remains to be settled this year, then we can fight the war against the Anglo-Saxon democrats to its bitter end.’
The Greeks fought a brave and tough battle and held up our troops along the frontier; but, ultimately, inexperienced Greeks and Yugoslavs were no match for battle-hardened Germans. Fliegerkorps VIII contributed to a substantial acceleration of operations. The Yugoslavs capitulated on 17 April, the Greeks on the 21st. Their capitulation to the Twelfth Army gave rise to an incident. Hitler had instructed C-in-Cs to ignore the Italians in all questions of armistice negotiations and accept any offer without hesitation. The Italians were still in Albania, where they were making very heavy going of it. The C-in-C of the Greek Epirus Army stated that he would only surrender to the German High Command and not to the Italians. After the armistice had been signed there was a lot of ill-feeling which culminated in the Italians’ declaring that they would only recognise the treaty if they were present at a re-signing. Feldmarschall List refused to go through it all again and so Jodl had to do it instead.
After the surrender of Belgrade I flew there in a Fieseler Storch on 14 April. The city was still in disorder. The air raid two days earlier had caused serious damage. Bridges were down. I obtained a motor-car at the airfield for sightseeing. Most striking was the state of the so-called Government Hill, where the villas of Prince Paul and King Peter were to be found. Both houses were undamaged. The doors were open but nothing had been touched. Personal effects lay around in the king’s villa: it looked as if the occupants were likely to return at any moment. This impressed me very much, for it gave me a clear picture of how war and peace were bedfellows.
The days of the South-East campaign passed calmly at FHQ Mönichkirchen. I concluded from conversations with Hitler that his thoughts were more on ‘Barbarossa’ than in the Balkans. He posed many questions about equipment of the bomber squadrons but weapons and munition stocks of the Flak Korps interested him more. He was expecting heavy air attacks against the invading groups and said that we would not be able to rely on empty skies as in previous campaigns.
The increase in British air raids against the Reich was causing him concern. Göring had apparently promised him that the weaknesses in the German Luftwaffe would be overcome in the winter, although he evidently did not believe these assurances entirely. I had to tell him in all honesty that I had seen no Luftwaffe figures which supported this assertion. The interruption to Ju 88 production seemed too fundamental to be overcome as quickly as claimed. Airmen were saying quite openly that the Ju 88 was an absolute disaster. This conversation pained me, but I could only report the facts as I knew them. I put Bodenschatz into the picture about what I had told Hitler and asked him to advise Göring. Bodenschatz was well aware of the Ju 88 problem and said that he would do the necessary. I found out later that he probably did tell Göring something, although I think he was not as forthright with the Reichsmarschall about the difficulties as he might have been.
During the stay at Mönichkirchen Hitler received several visitors. On 20 April the OKW chiefs called by to offer birthday congratulations. Ambassador von Papen came to FHQ to enquire about the course of German-Turkish relationships at a time of radical change in the Balkans. Hitler told him very clearly that it was not his intention to perturb the Turks. King Boris of Bulgaria and the Hungarian Regent Admiral Horthy came on 19 and 24 April, respectively, both intimating an interest in annexing certain parts of Yugoslavia. In these talks Hitler remained reserved but polite and said he would consider their wishes once the occupation of the territories had been completed.
Another caller was Oberleutnant Franz von Werra, a Luftwaffe fighter pilot shot down during the Battle of Britain. He had been transferred to a prisoner-of-war camp in Canada, from where he escaped to the United States and then to Mexico. Finally he had returned to Germany—undoubtedly an unique achievement. Hitler was delighted to meet him, asking for his experiences and any information he had picked up which might be useful for the war. Amonst other things, von Werra reported a new British anti-submarine search system which seemed to be successful.
Jodl presented Hitler with fresh directives, numbered 27 and 28. The first was dated 13 April and concerned the conclusion of operations in the Balkans, recording that ‘the mass of the groups deployed are being withdrawn for a new purpose’. The other, dated 25 April, referred to Operation ‘Merkur’, the invasion of Crete. Jeschonnek considered this operation essential with reference to the Greek theatre and to make secure Rommel’s position in North Africa.
The train arrived back in Berlin on the morning of 28 April. Once again Hitler was returning from a victorious campaign and in the Chancellery he was feted by a mêlée of curious callers, congratulating him and attempting to obtain more details from Hitler himself about the campaign. But Hitler allowed little time—except at table—to relate events. He had nothing but praise for the Greek Army, which in his own words had ‘gone down fighting’. Accordingly, he had allowed the officers to retain their weapons. As to the fighting quality of the Italians, he remained silent but spoke up for Mussolini on account of his loyal comradeship in the war against Britain. In the same breath, however, he criticised the Italian Army leadership and the royal house, which were pro-British.
All Hitler’s free time was now claimed by the final preparations for ‘Barbarossa’. One evening the opportunity arose to speak to him about the campaign. I told him that earlier in my military service I had arrived in Russia on 5 May 1929. From that time on, as I recalled, I had experienced only dry and fine weather. Therefore I could not imagine why the Wehrmacht should waste two good months on account of the handful of divisions that we were waiting to withdraw from Greece. Hitler listened in silence and announced after some reflection that Halder, with his ‘old-fashioned’ ideas about modern warfare, had learned very little. He would speak to him again. As I later discovered, Halder referred to transportation difficulties and the need to rest the men—reasons which I found unconvincing. However, in practice Hitler would not interfere in Halder’s measures once he had failed to convince the latter of the correctness and logic of his own appreciation of the situation. Apparently Halder had not been impressed, and so Hitler accepted Halder’s programme to bring up the divisions from the Balkans first.
On 29 April Hitler addressed 9,000 Wehrmacht senior cadets awaiting commissions. He described the war successes to date, lauded the bravery of the German soldier and demanded of his listeners ‘never to capitulate … one word I do not know and will never know as Führer of the German people and your Supreme Commander is capitulation, submission to the will of another. Never! Never! And you have to think in the same way.’
On 30 April Hitler discussed with Jodl details of the commencement of ‘Barbarossa’, which Jodl later communicated to the Wehrmacht in his bulletin of 1 May. This set the date at 22 June and meant that the general movement order would take effect from 23 May. Revising the respective ratio of strengths, Jodl reported a substantial increase in Soviet forces along the southern sector of the front. Although the Russians were lately drafting increased numbers of troops to the central area, the German Army still had a strong superiority there. On the basis of OKH estimates, Jodl reckoned that there would be up to four weeks’ fierce fighting along the border. The Russian soldier could be expected to stand and fight to the last. Hitler co-operated in the draft of this communiqué, which amounted to its seal of approval.
On the evening of Sunday 4 May Hitler made the usual speech to the Reichstag at the conclusion of a successful campaign, emphasising the strength and achievments of the Wehrmacht. ‘The year 1941 will go down in history as the greatest year of our revival,’ he said. He was not thinking of the Balkans but of ‘Barbarossa’. Throughout the Reich the impending invasion of Russia was an open secret. The soldiers at battle readiness in Poland; the congregation of supply formations; the conglomeration of signals groups—all this left little room for doubt of Hitler’s intentions. The build-up for the campaign was on such a scale that its purpose could scarcely be disguised.
After the Reichstag session Hitler travelled to Danzig and Gotenhafen, where the new battleship Bismarck and heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen were working up for Operation ‘Rheinübung’, an Atlantic raiding cruise. Hitler spoke to the Fleet Commander, Admiral Lütjens, saw over the flagship and obtained an impression of the ship’s company. On his return he was full of praise for the battleship and her crew. He had complete confidence in the ship and said that the commander would set out on the voyage without anxieties. The only danger which might threaten them in certain circumstances was an attack by aircraft flown off a carrier—his own greatest fear. He told Jodl that in his opinion heavy ships were now superfluous in warfare: they were always at risk from aircraft bombs and torpedoes and there was nothing to protect them against the danger. Thus whilst he had pride in German naval might which Bismarck represented, he kept himself fully informed as to the progress of the voyage and remained very thoughtful. We left Berlin for Obersalzberg, where we arrived late on 9 May. Hitler made the observation that he wanted a few days’ peace and quiet so as to return to Berlin in June fresh and rested for the fray. He wished Keitel and Jodl ‘restful days’ in the lead-up to the attack on Russia.
In the morning of 11 May, Pintsch, one the two adjutants of Rudolf Hess, reported to the Berghof with a letter. Hitler, who was in bed, rose quickly and went into the hall to read it. Then he asked Pintsch if he knew what the letter contained, and he received an affirmative reply. Pintsch and the other adjutant, Leitgen, were arrested at once and taken off to a concentration camp. They had disobeyed Hitler’s orders to maintain a special watch on Hess. Göring, Ribbentrop and Bormann were summoned at once. Göring came accompanied by Udet. There was a long discussion in which Hitler repeatedly expressed the hope that Hess would be shot down. He was furious that Hess must have had the freedom to make the preparations for his flight in minute detail despite the flying ban Hitler had imposed on him personally. He attributed the behaviour of Hess to certain ‘delusions’ under which he was labouring and on 12 May explained the defection of Hess in an announcement, stating that ‘A letter he left unfortunately shows in its confusion the evidence of a mental derangement which leads us to fear that Party Member Hess has fallen victim to a delusion.’ Following this broadcast, the British confirmed the safe landing of Hess in Scotland with the assurance that he was in a good state of health. Hitler reacted by having inserted in the Nationalsozialistische Parteikorrespondenz a footnote to his original statement in which he further explained that Hess ‘was suffering from bodily ills and was motivated to flight on the basis of astrology and magnetism’. The statement ended: ‘Respecting the continuation of the war enforced upon the German people by Britain, it changes nothing.’ And that was the last which the German public heard about the defection and its cause.
On 13 May Hitler gathered all Reichs- and Gauleiters to the Obersalzberg and provided them with a full explanation. Bormann had to read Hess’s letter aloud. Hitler spoke briefly about the case and saw in Hess’s behaviour an abnormal interpretation of the political events of the time. Hitler nominated Reichsleiter Bormann to be Chief of the Party Chancellery under his personal command.
I had known Rudolf Hess for four years through his various visits to Hitler, when I listened to various conversations he had had, and on many other occasions. Had Hess fallen prey to mental delusions? I think that a night flight in a twin-engined Me 110, alone and without a navigator, could only be undertaken by a person in a sound mental state. In my opinion, Hess was sane and in full control of his faculties. His wish to engage in a dialogue with the British about the future of the war between Britain and Germany seemed to me unexceptional. Hess knew Hitler and his ideas about the war, especially the intention to invade Russia. I considered the flight to be a manifestation of his fear respecting the outcome of the war and of his helplessness to do anything about it. I shared these fears, and in subsequent months found out that I was by no means alone in that.
On 20 May paratroops and an air-landed force under General Student began the invasion of Crete. This risky operation lasted until 2 June, when the whole island finally came under German control. We had suffered heavy losses and had to fight for every inch against entrenched British Empire defenders. In the initial few days, when the operation threatened to collapse, Jeschonnek flew to the Peleponnese and took command, ordering the transfer of the entire 22nd Infantry Division to begin at once. This operation cost the Luftwaffe a large number of Ju 52 transports, but our forces on Crete were substantially reinforced within a few days and the enemy evacuated the island shortly afterwards. The success was of significance for the war in the eastern Mediterranean.
I wrote to my uncle on 23 May: ‘Since the 20th the battle for the last piece of Greek soil, Crete, has been raging. Almost two whole divisions were flown in, which should be enough to take the island. The British Fleet turned up but was driven off by our bombers. Crete has shown again that a fleet is at risk if one does not control the air … it is not easy for Rommel at Tobruk. But there is no worry. The conquest of Crete will make it simpler for him … the Führer selected General Rommel for the role personally. The Army had suggested another general.’
On 18 May Bismarck and Prinz Eugen sailed from Gotenhafen and, after having refuelled near Bergen, headed north-about for the Atlantic. They were maintaining radio silence, and we had to wait for reports from enemy sources. On 24 May Bismarck sank the most powerful British warship afloat, the battlecruiser Hood, in the Denmark Strait. Raeder telephoned the Führer to report the success personally. Hitler congratulated him, but after that his mood changed and he became very edgy. Nothing further could be done to influence events, and unfortunately Bismarck’s voyage developed in the manner Hitler had feared. The Home Fleet shadowed the battleship, continually increasing the number of units in the area, which included the aircraft carriers Victorious and Ark Royal. A hit in the forepeak during the battle with Hood had caused some flooding: Bismarck was a little down by the head and had lost a few knots in speed. For this reason Admiral Lütjens decided to abandon the mission and make for St Nazaire. For a while the ship managed to shake off her pursuers, but in the morning of 26 May the British re-established contact and that evening Ark Royal’s torpedo aircraft attacked and obtained a hit astern which jammed her rudder. Bismarck was now only able to proceed in a broad circle and British heavy units closed in for the kill. Shortly before midnight Bismarck signalled: ‘Ship unmanoeuvrable. We fight to the last shell. Long live the Führer.’
Hitler and I sat alone in the small living room at the Berghof and waited for fresh reports. At 0036 a signal was transmitted addressed to the Führer personally: ‘We fight to the last in belief in you, mein Führer, and with rock-solid confidence in Germany’s victory.’ I took down Hitler’s reply: ‘All Germany is with you. What can be done is being done. The fulfilment of your duty will fortify our people in the struggle for their existence. Adolf Hitler.’ I telephoned the text to SKL at once. Then it fell quiet between us for some time until Hitler broke the silence and asked for the strength of Bismarck’s complement. I told him there were 2,300 men. As the night progressed Hitler grew ever more irritable. He said that he would never allow a battleship or cruiser out into the Atlantic again.10 Between two and three that morning he retired to bed. I joined my wife and in a drained mental state discussed with her at length our first major naval defeat of the war. Late next morning SKL reported officially that Bismarck had been sunk.
On 2 June Hitler had a long conversation at the Brenner with Mussolini concerning Hess, the sinking of Bismarck and general military matters. No mention was made of Russia. On the 4th the report was received of the death of the former Kaiser, Wilhelm II. Hitler sent telegrams of condolence to the widow and Crown Prince and assigned the Reich Commissioner for the Netherlands, Seyss-Inquart, and Luftwaffe General Christiansen, Wehrmacht senior commander in Holland, to attend the funeral at Doorn.
On 12 June, in Munich, talks were held with the Romanian head of state. Antonescu said he was very interested in regaining Bessarabia and promised to send Romanian troops to fight alongside the German armies in Russia. Hitler was very reserved when it came to promises like this made by persons of Balkan origin, and made no comment.
The Commanders-in-Chief of the Army Groups, Armies and Air Fleets destined for the Eastern Front were summoned to the Chancellery on 14 June. To avoid the influx of General Staff officers becoming too obvious, a strict agenda of arrival routes, times and car parking was enforced. After a few words of welcome, Hitler invited each commander to report on his intentions for his personal sphere of operations during the opening days of the campaign. This provided an overview of the strengths of the groups, the numbers of panzers and so on. Hitler interrupted rarely and listened attentively. The reports gave an optimistic opinion about the quality and equipment of the Red Army.
After lunch Hitler spoke to the gathering for about an hour. He said that this was a war against Communism. He reckoned that the Russian soldier would fight hard and offer tough resistance: ‘We must expect heavy air raids and take steps to protect ourselves through skilful air defences. The Luftwaffe will win quick successes and thus lighten the load for the Army Groups. We will have the worst of the fighting behind us after about six weeks. But every soldier must know what it is we are fighting for. It is not the teritory that we want, but rather that Bolshevism is destroyed.’ He spoke in bitter tones against Britain, which preferred an understanding with the Soviet Union to one with Germany: these were the politics of the nineteenth, and not the twentieth century. Hitler proved with these words that his alliance with Stalin had been a purely political device to regain Danzig and the Polish Corridor without becoming embroiled in a European war. He continued: ‘If we lose this war with Russia, then all Europe will become Communist. If the British cannot see that, they will lose their leading role in world affairs and with it their Empire. To what extent they will trust themselves to the hands of the Americans remains to be seen. But the Americans are interested in this war only for what they can get out of it.’
In the afternoon Hitler had further talks with the commanders of Army Group South, which would be driving into a vast and expanding area. He said that the mass of Russian troops was expected on the Central Front: once these were defeated, Army Group South would be reinforced from Army Group Centre. Brauchitsch and Halder made no comment.
On 21 June Hitler dictated a proclamation to the German people describing his policies since the outbreak of war. ‘The reawakening of our people from despair, misery and an abusive disregard is the sign of a pure inner rebirth. This was no threat to Britain. Nevertheless they resurrected their hate-filled policy of encircling Germany. Within that nation and externally there has been a conspiracy between Jew and Democrat, Communist and reactionary, with the single objective of preventing the reconstruction of the new state of the German people, to uproot the new Reich and return it to impotence and misery.’ Despite all friendly conversations Moscow had been preparing systematically for war. The German build-up on the Eastern Front was now concluded. ‘The task of this front is … no longer the protection of individual nations, but the defence of Europe and the salvation of all … May God help us in this struggle.’
In 1941 I was asked repeatedly if the Russians knew of or suspected our intention to invade. At that time I could only answer that I supposed their long-range reconnaissance aircraft must have seen the build-up of our land forces along the border. What they could not know was when and how we would operate these units. Not until long after the war did I discover from an official on the staff of Carl Goerdeler, Oberbürgermeister of Leipzig, that he had been present at private talks in the Hotel Kaiserhof with Molotov in 1940. Apparently they had told Molotov of Hitler’s plan to attack Russia in 1941 but Molotov had not wanted to believe this and would not take them seriously. After his visit to Berlin, however, Russia began large-scale preparations for war. When they invaded in 1941, German troops came across vast new fortifications, new airfields and so forth. The Soviets had been expecting our invasion, but not in 1941. They had decided it would be later.
In the last few days before the commencement of the Russian campaign Hitler was increasingly nervous and troubled. He was garrulous, walked up and down continuously and seemed to be waiting anxiously for news of something. Not until the early hours of 22 June did I hear his first observation about the opening campaign when he said, ‘It will be the most difficult battle which our soldiers will have to undergo in this war.’
I tried to picture the general situation and deduce what confronted us over the next few months. The war with Britain would go on as before. Hitler planned to attack Britain in the summer of 1942. This seemed to me to be wishful thinking. I considered a direct invasion of Britain possible in the autumn of 1942 at the earliest—if by then we had managed to see off the Russians. But I doubted Hitler’s optimistic judgement of the Russian situation. The prognosis looked very complicated to me. Even more threatening was the United States. I feared that their entry into the war could not be too far off. Then we would really have a struggle on our hands. If Hitler failed to obtain a clear victory against Russia before the Americans came in, we would be faced—in the most favourable way of looking at it—with a long, hard war of attrition, the outcome of which was highly doubtful. Accordingly I judged the general situation at the outbreak of war between Germany and the USSR as not in our favour. The only chink of light seemed to be that our enemies, seeing our strength along the Russian border, had decided to wait for the time when they could match us in armaments. That might be years, and in that time, I believed, it might be possible for us to defeat one of our two main enemies and so be free to take on the other.
The Army High Command was expecting a conventional war, but most generals were not in favour of fighting it for the reason that we would now have a war on two fronts which in the long run Germany could neither win nor see through to a satisfactory conclusion. Hitler’s concept was quite different from that of the Army. He saw a confrontation with a hard and ruthless enemy, indicative of this being his ‘Commissar Order’, by which he required German troops to shoot out of hand all political commissars they happened to come across. This order had caused much disquiet and I knew that not all commanders had passed it on. It was the first major opposition to a Führerbefehl I had heard of and probably it was not the first. I had observed, for example, Halder’s oppositional stance to many of Hitler’s instructions and noticed how he had now ceased to argue. I had the impression that Halder had decided to swallow his pride and keep silent, but perhaps he had his revenge by sabotaging Hitler’s orders subsequently. Thus as we embarked upon this truly massive offensive we had not only a disjointed leadership, but some were pulling in different directions, and in this I saw a great danger for the success of the operation.
For his part, Hitler stood in the highest favour with the German people and had the unconditional support of the Party functionaries and membership. He had never lost a campaign and he felt sure he was going to win this one. He even spoke of the United States reconsidering involving itself in the European war. The struggle would be very hard—of that he had no doubt. He expected the enemy to be ruthless and wanted to encourage German troops to be the same. The Commissar Order was a means to this end. Lenin and Stalin had grabbed power and maintained their stranglehold on the Russian people by eliminating their political enemies. Hitler proposed that the political commissars, who were instrumental in this policy, should be eliminated summarily in their turn.
Hitler launched his campaign against the Soviet Union in the early hours of 22 June 1941. At midday on the 23rd he boarded his private train for the new FHQ in East Prussia, where he arrived late that evening. The site, known as Wolfschanze, lay in a small wooded area east of Rastenburg. It had been built the previous winter and was well camouflaged against aircraft. At the heart of the complex were ten bunkers with a two-metre thick concrete roof over the rear section where the sleeping quarters were located. The forward part housed the military planning rooms and offered splinter protection only. The daily situation conferences were held in a large room in Keitel’s bunker. The corresponding room in Hitler’s bunker was set aside for small-scale conferences. In the middle of the camp were the dining barracks with two tables seating twenty and six respectively. We moved into Wolfschanze for an indefinite period and settled down to await the first reports of this great war. Warlimont’s planning staff and the FHQ Kommandant and staff were accommodated in normal barracks with a number of bunkers set a little apart from the camp. The OKH quarters were located a few kilometres to the northeast, close by the Rastenburg-Angermund railway line, while Göring and the OKL were accommodated in trains in sidings near Goldap and in the Johannesburger Heide.
Among the first reports which the Press Chief brought was a statement by Churchill. He had been a lifelong opponent of Communism, he said, but he now allied himself totally to Russia and against Germany. ‘We will never parley with Hitler and his gang,’ he promised. Hitler had expected nothing else from him.
The daily routine in FHQ Sperrkreis I, as the core area was known, differed little from the usual pattern in Berlin. Each day at twelve Hitler would make his way to Keitel’s bunker for the main situation conference, which would normally last about ninety minutes. Once or twice a week Brauchitsch, Halder and Heusinger would attend these briefings. In the afternoons Hitler would have conversations and dealings with non-military callers, but the subject was always to do with the war. The evening situation conference, chaired by Jodl, followed at six. Hitler usually ate punctually at two in the afternoon and at seven-thirty. If no special visitors were expected, he would take his time at table—often up to two hours. In 1941 and 1942 Bormann’s companions Heinrich Heim and Dr Henry Picker took down the text of many of these conversations in shorthand and they were subsequently published after the war in numerous reprints under the title Hitlers Tischgespräche (Hitler’s Table Talks). In these two years at mealtimes Hitler spoke freely on many subjects. It might happen that now and again he would seize on a subject, be it about the passion for hunting or horsemanship or whatever, in order to ‘deal a blow’ to somebody.
Meals were Wehrmacht catering and consisted of soup, meat and a dessert. Hitler had his own vegetarian menu which he drew up at breakfast time. The seating arrangement never varied. Hitler sat in the middle with his back to the windows. To his right sat Press Chief Dr Dietrich, to his left Jodl. Directly opposite him was Keitel, to his right Bormann and to his left Bodenschatz. If there were guests they would sit between Hitler and Dietrich or between Keitel and Bodenschatz. The atmosphere at table was free and unforced. Conversation was spontaneous and there was no kind of compulsion about what could be discussed. On subjects of general interest, when Hitler contributed his opinion silence would be maintained. It occurred occasionally that he would hold the floor, so to speak, for up to an hour, but this was the exception rather than the rule. The extended mealtimes often forced many younger diners to excuse themselves from table for duty. Hitler never took this the wrong way.
In the first week of our stay at Wolfschanze Hitler forbade the broadcasting of Wehrmacht bulletins. The operations on the Eastern Front were going to plan. There was patchy stiff resistance which would have to be smashed by panzers and artillery. It soon became clear that this delaying resistance was directed by specially able officers, NCOs or political commissars who dominated the men under them and made it violently clear that they were there to fight. If these leaders were captured they were summarily executed. However, the overall picture in the first few days was, as expected, variable. A comprehensive letter which I wrote to my uncle on 28 June conveys my impressions at that time:
‘… Reports about the advance and operations have been withheld so as not to provide the Russians with a picture of the situation. The first bulletins will probably start tomorrow. The initial evidence is that Russia has made far greater preparations for this war than we assumed, but probably they did not expect a date before 1943, by when the build-up and arming of their forces would have been completed.
‘The Russian Army made a stand with assault groups and motorised units first around Lemberg, then at Bialystok and finally Kovno. Their defensive installations were still under construction. North-west of Lemberg, near Rawa-Ruska and north-west of Grodno bunker installations were discovered which were laid out on the Westwall pattern. The front line was completed but the two rear sections were still under construction.
‘The ease of our early victories along the whole front came as a surprise to both Army and Luftwaffe. Enemy aircraft were parked in neat rows on their airfields and could be destroyed without difficulty. Four Panzer groups carried the weight of our attack: Kleist from Lublin towards Rowno-Shitomir, Guderian via Brest to Minsk, Hoth from Gumbinnen via Wilna to Minsk and Höpner north of Gumbinnen via Kowno to Dunaburg. A part of Guderian’s group is heading for the Beresina near Bobruysk … the Russian is putting up a good fight everywhere, sometimes so tough and determined that our troops have a fierce battle. The main reason behind it is undoubtedly the Communist commissars who, pistol in hand, force their men to fight until shot dead. The Russian Communist propaganda has succeeded in convincing their men that they are fighting a war against barbaric savages and that no prisoners are being taken. This explains why many soldiers, but especially officers and commissars, commit suicide when faced with surrender. Often they place a primed hand grenade against the chest.
‘Our advance has gone off surprisingly swiftly. On the northern flank in Lithuania and in the centre around Bialystok the enemy is falling apart. Their command structure has failed completely. Individual groups are trying to break out of the cauldron. From Dunaburg our forces are heading to the Peipus Sea to block their escape. The stiffest resistance is in the south. Here the leadership is good. Rundstedt, who is commander there, says that he has not come up against such a good opponent at any time in this war. Since yesterday evening, however, the enemy seems to be weakening. Therefore we are hurrying to form a bag. From northern Romania a German army will meet up with the Romanians and connect up with Kleist.
‘Those are broadly the opening operations. The next major targets will be the Donetz basin, Moscow and Leningrad. The men are saying that the Russian gives a repulsive impression. They are a confused racial mix with Asiatic appearance and manners.
‘Russian tanks and aircraft are poor, much inferior to ours, and tend to be deployed in small numbers. This enables our forces to score highly. They seem to have a good supply of tanks, but our troops are so superior that we can look to the future with confidence.’
These were the first impressions our troops had gained of the enemy. I flew in a Storch to the front to obtain an idea of affairs for myself. In the Lithuanian area, for example, a German unit came across a giant field of corn. There was a lot of shooting coming from within. Gradually we established that the cornfield concealed hundreds of young Russian Asiatics who had been thrown into the fray and left to it. There was fear in their faces since they were expecting to be shot out of hand. It took an age to round them all up.
The month of July found most in an optimistic frame of mind at FHQ. Hitler saw himself confirmed in his judgement. Neither Brauchitsch nor Halder, Keitel nor Jodl had a word to say to the contrary. Whether they all shared Hitler’s outlook I was unable to determine. However, as we know from his published diary notes, on 3 July Halder considered that the campaign against Russia would be won within the next fourteen days if it was not already won.
Personally I did not share this opinion. There was certainly an astonishingly high bag of prisoners—Army Group Centre reported over a quarter of a million on 9 July—but it was a permanent flow, constantly increasing. On 16 July Hitler went so far as to create the Ostministerium covering Russia and the Baltic, and awarded the competent office to Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg. This decision caused a mild sensation and many difficulties were predicted with it—as, indeed, duly came to pass.
That month Hitler awarded to Oberst Mölders as the first Wehrmacht recipient the Swords and Diamonds to the Oak Leaves of the Knight’s Cross; in January 1942 Galland was similarly honoured. The two airman maintained a friendly chase. Hitler took the opportunity to discuss with them in detail problems of the air war in the West. From both I gained the impression that they were anxious to give voice to certain doubts and worries. They spoke frankly and without reserve. Hitler listened attentively. Galland complained of false Press and radio reports and of the condescending and arrogant tone adopted when referring to the RAF. At the conclusion of this conversation Hitler gave Galland to understand—in the winter crisis of early 1942!—that Germany had already broken the back of the Red Army. I can still hear Galland’s question to me afterwards—‘Is that right?’ I did not reply.
In those July days of 1941 it seemed to me that Hitler was overestimating the operational success of the campaign. The number of prisoners taken by Army Group Centre was no doubt impressive, but Russia had an immeasurable reserve of people. Furthermore, as our divisions rolled ever onwards into the vastness of the Russian hinterland, we would encounter greater problems. Above all we would need time. Hitler’s intentions, ever since the initial plans had been first drafted, was to seize all Baltic ports, including Leningrad, and in the south the entire Black Sea coast as far as Rostow. In order to hammer home this point afresh with the military commanders on the spot we flew to Malnava, Army Group North, on 21 July. Generalfeldmarschall Ritter von Leeb had been firmly opposed to the campaign from the start but exuded optimism and saw no obstacles blocking his advance, provided that he received reinforcements from Panzer Group 3. Hitler reminded him of how much importance was being attached to the taking of the Baltic ports and the setting up of a link with the Finns through the port of Leningrad.
OKH and, so it appeared, Army Group Centre had certain reservations about the operation which Hitler did not share. The arguments were still going on at the end of July when Hitler fell ill for a few days. He failed to appear for meals and the daily situation conferences: it was quite obvious from his appearance how miserable he felt. Dr Morell said it was probably a slight apoplexy. Hitler’s heart and circulation were not in good order, but within a short while he would return the Führer to his former self. After a few days there was a noticeable improvement. We were ordered to observe the strictest silence about Hitler’s condition. This was a health crisis with potentially serious consequences, however, and it worried me sufficiently to confide it to my brother on 30 July.
On 3 August we flew to Borissov to see Bock, C-in-C Army Group Centre. Brauchitsch and Halder were also there. Hitler had long talks with them. In the forefront of these conversations was the ratio of strength, opposing troop numbers and the size of the territory to be conquered—twelve per cent of the world’s land surface. All three generals stressed the idea that Army Group Centre should have the single objective of taking Moscow. They were in an optimistic frame of mind, and said that, after a few days to re-equip and re-group, they could go on to take Moscow before the bad weather set in. Hitler did not approve this proposition, referring to the view he had asserted prior to the campaign that Army Group Centre was to halt beyond Smolensk while Army Group North took Leningrad and Army Group South took Rostov. Subsequently the two Groups would stream out from these two centres and drive in the direction of Moscow, the two spearheads meeting up east of the city. Both sides were stubborn and no decision came despite the length of the talks.
I remember Borissov for another reason. Two royal princes whom I knew through my service spoke to me about Hitler’s order that all descendants of the former German ruling houses were not to fight at the front but be placed in positions to the rear. All they wanted was the chance to do their duty as any other front officer. Basically Hitler held the princes in high esteem and recognised their bravery in the field. I have described the political reason for this order and Hitler’s uncompromising stand on it. I was unable to help the princes in any way. They understood this and went off considering themselves second class officers.
On 14 August we received the report that Churchill and Roosevelt had held talks aboard the battleship Prince of Wales and had issued a declaration known as the Atlantic Charter. In paragraph 1 this document states that the United States and Britain renounced any enlargement of state territory. The remaining seven paragraphs contained general but very reasonable sounding concepts about ‘rights of peoples’, ‘world trade’ and the ‘elimination of force’. Hitler flew into a passion of rage and was particularly upset by point six which promised ‘the final elimination of the National Socialist tyranny’. He said that was something they would never achieve.
Hitler advocated single-mindedly his military plan for the East. OKH opposed him with all means at their command. On 18 August Brauchitsch argued, in his memorandum ‘The Further Operations of Army Group Centre’, for the immediate resumption of the drive on Moscow. Panzer Groups Guderian and Hoth needed rest: after they were ready he estimated two more months to achieve the goal. Hitler’s answer of 21 August expressed the opposite opinion: ‘The Army’s suggestion as to the continuation of operations in the East does not coincide with my intentions … the most important goal to be achieved before the onset of winter is not Moscow but the Crimea, the coal and industrial regions of the Donetz, cutting off oil supplies from the Caucasus and in the north the capture of Leningrad and the establishment of a corridor to the Finns.’ Four further points explained what was required of the three Army Groups. Halder described this directive in his diary as ‘decisive for the outcome of the campaign’.
The long argument between Hitler and OKH got on one’s nerves. I remember exactly what Hitler had said before the campaign. Over and over he emphasised his conviction that Leningrad and Rostow were the key cities. He said several times that Moscow need not be taken until the second operation—perhaps not until 1942. Therefore the current controversy went back to the planning stages. Even Guderian was drawn into it. Bock thought it was a good idea to send Guderian, commander of Panzer Group 2, to FHQ to put forward the case for moving on Moscow. He arrived on 23 August, presented the argument and was seduced by Hitler’s counter-argument. Hitler was incensed by the time that was being wasted on the matter.
On 25 August Mussolini arrived at Wolfschanze to inspect Italian units fighting alongside Army Group South. Next day Hitler accompanied him to Brest-Litovsk and then onwards to FHQ South, from where, on the 28th, they dropped in on an Italian division moving up to the front. It was not pleasant. Mussolini had no concept of the Eastern Front and the problems confronting Hitler. After his guest had departed, Hitler expressed his disappointment to his circle of officers. The Italians could offer very little on the Eastern Front. They had no fighting strength worth speaking of. He said wryly that they were here for the purposes of good morale. He spoke often about his long discussion with Mussolini, emphasising that it was still necessary to flirt with the Italians since the fighting in the Mediterranean theatre was not yet over.
The Hungarian Regent Admiral Horthy stayed at Wolfschanze from 6 to 8 September at Hitler’s invitation. Hitler gave him a broad picture of the situation at the front and discussed with him the different problems which the war in general was causing. Horthy also visited Göring and Brauchitsch, and at Marienburg Hitler invested him with the Knight’s Cross—as he explained later, a purely political gesture. At Wolfschanze later I as usual listened with interest to Hitler’s comments about one of his state guests. As far as the war was concerned, Germany was expecting nothing from Hungary, he said, but for peace in the Balkans; good neighbours were important, and, after all, Germany was still dependent on the Romanian oilfields. Thus he was satisfied that the object of the visit had been achieved.
Despatches submitted during August by Army Group South contained reports of the first atrocities committed by Soviet troops. They were so appalling that even Hitler was doubtful, and he sent me to Nikolayev to check with the 16th Panzer Division. I spoke there with General Hube and a very good friend of mine, Udo von Alvensleben. They described to me the discovery of the corpses of more than 100 murdered soldiers of 6/Rifle Regiment 79 (i.e. the 6th Company of the 79th Regiment) at Grigovo station. At another place German prisoners had been drawn and quartered alive. Our troops had responded accordingly. When I explained the facts to Hitler at Wolfschanze he thought about it for some time and said finally that General Staff ought to know: then they might take a different view of the sort of enemy we were fighting against.
When Admiral Canaris called into FHQ at about this time, he made an allegation against me to Schmundt. Canaris had told him that on a certain date before the beginning of the Russian campaign my wife had telephoned one of her sisters at Halberstadt and told her that Hitler would attack Russia on 22 June. Schmundt had been obliged to inform Hitler, who dismissed the whole thing at once with a wave of the hand. Schmundt was very impressed by Hitler’s reaction. I told Schmundt that, if he had discussed it with me beforehand, I could have shown him that when the telephone conversation was supposed to have been made, the date for the attack had not been set and that Canaris’s report was false. I heard nothing more about the incident either from Hitler or from elsewhere.
Also in August Goebbels appeared for the first time—at Hitler’s wish—in FHQ. In the two days of his stay he had private talks with Hitler on several occasions. It seeped out eventually that the Jewish question had been discussed. Goebbels and Heydrich were pressing for a solution. Goebbels wanted Hitler’s permission to expel Berlin’s remaining 70,000 Jews. Hitler was not yet ready for this but agreed that Jews should be distinguished by a special badge. On 1 September a Police Decree published in the Reichsgesetzblatt ordered that henceforth all Jews were required to wear prominently a yellow Star of David on their clothing. It appeared that the problem would not be finally resolved until after the conclusion of the Russian campaign and then in grosszügiger Weise—on the grand scale. I did not understand the cynicism of this remark until after the war, when, in the summer months of 1945 and later at the Nuremberg Trials, the extent of the Jewish Holocaust became known. The Berlin Police Decree was the intial stage of preparation for the Final Solution in which Göring, in his police function, had a significant involvement. Personally I had no knowledge of the activities of the SS and Police Einsatzgruppen responsible for the murder of large numbers of Jews in the occupied territories, nor did I know of the transportations of Jews to death camps in the East after 1941 from a catchment area comprised of all conquered European countries. I also knew nothing of the Wannsee Conference of 20 January 1942.
After the war, particularly from many conversations when in custody, I was able to put together certain circumstantial pointers which really ought to have given me cause to reflect towards the war’s end on the significance of Hitler’s increasing anti-Jewish sentiments or on some incidental remarks made by senior SS officers. Along with many others, I believed the explanation for the rumoured Jewish deportations to the East that they were required there as a labour force for important war factories. In view of the increasing use of domestic and foreign forced labour at the time, this was not implausible. I know now of course that I was the victim of a wicked deception.
I find it extraordinary that it was possible to conceal this genocide behind a veil of secrecy. My family and my wife’s family had no Jewish friends or acquaintances and during the war we lived in a certain isolation. Neither my family, nor any of our relations, friends or service comrades, received knowledge by direct means. Führerbefehl Nr 1 had been effective here. In a system such as that of National Socialism, with an efficient secret police which spied on civilians and military alike, certain themes were taboo—even in our circle. In any case I am absolutely convinced, even in the absence of documentary evidence, that the extermination of the Jews resulted from Hitler’s express order, since it is inconceivable that Himmler and Göring could have operated an independent policy without his knowledge. Certainly Himmler would not have informed him as to the individual details, but in this matter Himmler acted with Hitler’s full agreement and approbation.
Despite the bickering with OKH, Hitler still took a positive view of the war situation in the summer of 1941. He was of the opinion that during September Stalin would be forced to bolster the front with his last reserves. If these could be bled white, resistance would cease and our units could roll onwards. This outlook lasted for some time until the receipt of fresh reports which spoke of tough resistance and heavy fighting. Thus it seemed that the Red Army retreat was either organised or ragged depending on location.
The question as to whether the attack on Moscow should be carried out this year or next was finally settled when Hitler gave in to the Army’s entreaties, and on 6 September Jodl issued Directive No 35 that ‘the operation by Army Group Centre against Timoshenko is to be prepared in such a manner that the attack can be mounted early [at the end of September]’, and not until the expected victory over the mass of Timoshenko’s Army Group had been achieved ‘can Army Group Centre set out in pursuit towards Moscow’. Jodl was convinced that this battle would deprive the Russians of any real potential to defend their capital, and he repeated this opinion in subsequent situation conferences.
On 2 October Hitler travelled to Berlin for the opening of the Winter Relief Programme and in his speech harangued Great Britain as usual. Of the Russian campaign he observed that we had come as close as a hair’s breadth not only to the destruction of Germany ‘but of all Europe’. He continued: ‘I can say today that this enemy has been broken and will never rise again. He had been building his strength against Europe, something of which most had unfortunately no suspicion and many today still have no suspicion. It would have been a second Mongol invasion by a new Genghis Khan.’
On the conclusion of this speech Hitler returned to Wolfschanze at once. The events on the Eastern Front preoccupied him. The twin battle of Briansk-Wiasma between 2 and 12 October was expected to create a favourable centre for the advance: in the event, over 660,000 prisoners were taken and many tanks and field guns captured, and it seemed that an open road to Moscow lay before us. But then came the rains, earlier than normal, and with them the mud. Many units stuck fast in the morass. Our troops tired. The enemy used the time to regroup, block the gaps and structure new resistance, and with that the advance came to a halt. Pessimism began to gain ground, fed by false rumours and gossip; some of it percolated through to FHQ and Hitler himself.
A much-discussed change at the end of September was the replacement of Baron von Neurath by SS-Obergruppenführer Reinhard Heydrich as Reich Protector for Bohemia and Moravia. Heydrich, a capable and determined SS functionary, presented himself in advance of the official call and set out at once to cut down the Czech resistance movement. Although he was a radical and uncompromising National Socialist, he carried out his mission in Prague with great skill and not solely by the use of police brutality. He succeeded in subduing the region, kept the armaments factories working and paved the way for a positive development of the relationship between Germans and Czechs.
In North Africa, meanwhile, Rommel had been beaten back. The British had been strengthened and the relationship with the Italian ally was not good. There had been serious problems of supply. Thus not much had gone right for Rommel in the summer of 1941, and he had been forced to let the British drive him back. Hitler was not too concerned: he knew Rommel well enough to realise that eventually he would return to the offensive, even without much in the way of reinforcements.
Since the beginning of the Russian campaign I had actually been without special duties. The Luftwaffe had transferred its rested units to the East, where, in the opening days of the offensive, they had destroyed huge numbers of Soviet warplanes on the ground. Afterwards, their activities were reduced to a support role for the Army. Here von Richthofen’s Fliegerkorps VIII distinguished itself. The general spent all day aloft, mostly in a Storch, flying from one hot spot to another, and was correspondingly often better informed about the ground situation than most senior Army commanders. His advice led to considerable debate on occasion, but generally he got his way. In the summer weeks I spent a good deal of time with Luftwaffe units and gained the impression that the Army did not make the best of its opportunities. This was due in part to the great distances involved and the tendency of many Army commanders to rush things. In general, however, the Luftwaffe showed little understanding either.
Jeschonnek’s door was always open to me and he kept me informed of affairs. He was in despair at the renewed postponement of the Luftwaffe aircraft production programme. He said we could not afford to lose any more time because in recent weeks aircraft losses at the front were not being made good. He wanted a substantial increase in production immediately, since the deployment of the Luftwaffe along the Channel coast remained crucial. He said that if Hitler would not allow the programme to go through, this alone could prevent us ever winning the war against Britain.
I broached the subject with Hitler. He knew about the problem but said the Army had priority. This state of affairs would change in the spring of 1942: then he would switch all production capacity to the Luftwaffe. I also mentioned to him that although for the present the British appeared content to mount relatively minor air raids on our cities, we had to reckon with an escalation in due course. He agreed, but believed that the Luftwaffe could bridge the gap. I could not accept this opinion and contradicted him. He nodded and said he would discuss the question with Göring.
My duties as Luftwaffe adjutant began to have a larger dimension. There was no set schedule for me to follow and I arranged my tasks to suit myself. Until now Hitler had interested himself almost exclusively in the numbers of operational aircraft. Questions were now being put about when such-and-such squadrons were going to be equipped, when aircraft requirements would be met and the like. Therefore I had to keep myself permanently supplied with statistics and update my own records accordingly.
Obtaining details about flak was not a job which I did with much relish, but it was essential because Hitler laid value on it for a special reason. On the Eastern Front large numbers of Russian tanks were appearing which were better armoured that anything we had come up against previously, and these could only be knocked out with the 8.8cm flak gun. Hitler hammered the point hard that the Flak Korps on the Eastern Front was to be equipped exclusively with the 8.8cm in order to be able to engage these tanks and take part in the land fighting.
On 1 November, at OKH, an exhibition of Army winter uniforms was put on display. The Quartermaster-General, Wagner, assured Hitler that work on winter clothing was in hand and that sufficient quantities would be made available to men in the field. Hitler took note of the report and appeared satisfied. On the 7th he went to Munich to make his annual speech to the 1923 veterans. On the 9th he addressed the Reichs- and Gauleiters before returning immediately to Wolfschanze.
I parted from Hitler at Munich to take the cure at Constance. My wife accompanied me. A special diet was prescribed for my nervous stomach condition. The four weeks preceding 8 December passed without special incident. From what I could make out, all movement on the front had stopped. There were few fresh reports in the Press. I was shaken to read of the deaths of Udet and Mölders. Udet’s death on 17 November was supposed to have occurred in a flying accident, but I thought this unlikely and established from telephone enquiries to Berlin that he had committed suicide. I felt the loss keenly. I knew him well from my flying days. He was a person of rare likeability. Göring had appointed him Generalluftzeugmeister. The post handled aircraft production and supply, and Udet considered it a step down. He was a bachelor who enjoyed life, always surrounded by a circle of good friends. They offered him support but he saw things differently and could not be influenced. His death affected the whole Luftwaffe. Mölders was killed on 22 November on the way to Udet’s funeral when the aircraft in which he was a passenger crashed while making an intermediate stop at Breslau. His death was a serious blow, especially for the fighter arm.
My wife and I arrived at Berlin Anhalter station early on 9 December. Loudspeakers urged all passengers to hurry since the platform was needed urgently. I knew that this was the particular platform alongside which Hitler’s special train usually drew and assumed that he was returning to Berlin. From my apartment I telephoned the Chancellery and found that Hitler was expected. I dressed in my uniform and was driven there. I had no presentiment of how the political situation had changed nor of what lay ahead in the next few weeks.
I reported to Hitler. He was very friendly and asked me how the cure had gone. I had myself informed as to recent events, the most important of which was the Japanese attack against the US naval base at Pearl Harbor without a declaration of war on 7 December. Hitler had interpreted this event as the signal for Germany to declare war on the United States.
I was appalled at his unworldliness and innocence as to an industrial potential which just over twenty years previously had been decisive in the Great War. It exposed the amateurism of his foreign policy and his deficient knowledge of the world beyond Europe. He was relying for the foreseeable future on the hope that the conflict between the USA and Japan would keep the Americans out of the European theatre. He was convinced that his ‘Weltblitzkrieg’, as the historian Andreas Hillgruber calls it, in which all enemies are vanquished swiftly one after the other, would be successful. Presumably this also meant that he would hasten to the aid of Japan, since he spoke repeatedly of the need for closer German-Japanese military cooperation. If so, I thought this would not be a good move. At the time his preferred foreign policy conversational partner was Hewel, but ultimately Hitler’s extra-European political ideas were based more on his wishes than on reality.
The day of my return was one of turmoil. Many visitors gathered in the Chancellery in the hope of obtaining from the horse’s mouth the latest about the war situation, but the matter was not for discussion. After lunch Hitler spoke with Ribbentrop, Himmler, Todt and Göring. The rooms emptied. Schmundt supplied me with the business of the day. Then I was left alone with Hitler and we talked. In the evening we strolled the winter garden. He was wrestling with the question of the Army High Command. He had had no confidence in Brauchitsch for some time and was looking for a replacement. Schmundt had recommended that he assume supreme command of the Army himself, at least temporarily. Hitler had bristled at the very suggestion, but after the declaration of war on the United States he saw a new situation developing and began to incline more and more towards Schmundt’s suggestion. Hitler was of the opinion that many generals needed to be rested. He had sent Rundstedt on leave on 1 December and was worried about Guderian, who was totally ‘drained’. He had given Army Group South to Reichenau, whom he trusted implicitly.
Hitler was very concerned at the situation with Army Group Centre. He assumed that the Russians were planning a major counter-attack. Kluge spoke of nothing but drawing back. ‘How far back does he want to come?’ Hitler asked. ‘We have no prepared positions to the rear. The Army must stop where it is.’ Then he reproached the Army supply organisation. The Army had no winter clothing, no protection against the bitter cold and no efficient means of catering. Hitler was outraged. How could the Army not have prepared for it? The Luftwaffe had managed to provide its units with all their winter requirements.
Hitler said that the Russians were now attacking everywhere in large numbers with the T-34. The Army had no effective anti-tank gun against it: even the short-barrelled Panzer Mk IV found it a handful. ‘If we didn’t have the Luftwaffe 8.8cm flak, these Russian tanks would go where they liked,’ he said. In the T-34 the Russians had a weapon of note, and he did not yet know in what numbers it was being supplied. It would soon be confirmed in 1942 that it was arriving at the front in constantly growing numbers. Our own panzer production was satisfactory, but we needed to accelerate the pace. Hitler also mentioned American supplies to the Russians. He knew for certain that they had been supplying lorries and provisions to the Soviets for some time because German units had identified them. He was mentally at the front and always trying to imagine ways to help the men in the field. But he kept repeating, ‘They must stand where they are—not a step backwards!’
Hitler convened the Reichstag for three o’clock on the afternoon of 11 December. He made a long and comprehensive speech about the whole political situation without working up to any special high point. Upon our return to Wolfschanze on the morning of 16 December the situation at the front was confused and worrying. That night Hitler decided at last to assume command of the Army; he had been thinking about it for several days. Schmundt welcomed his announcement, if only because it brought to an end the daily struggle with Brauchitsch. Hitler had considered entrusting the High Command to Manstein or Kesselring, but Manstein was unsuited by temperament and Hitler needed Kesselring as Luftwaffe C-in-C in the Mediterranean because he did not want to unsettle the Italians with a surprise change.11 On 18 December he replaced Bock with Kluge as C-in-C Army Group Centre. The day had begun with a number of urgent telephone conversations, all of which requested permission to pull back Army Group Centre under the weight of the Soviet counter-offensive. Hitler would not concede a step and insisted that they stay where they were. At Kluge’s request Guderian was sent on leave for Christmas and New Year. The two generals could not stand each other.
Hitler and Halder were spending hours each day in conference. It was always the same theme: to stay put or draw back. Meanwhile the front was being shored up by reinforcing the sections under the heaviest threat and throwing in the last reserves. Just before midnight on 30 December Hitler began a two-hour long telephone conversation with Kluge, who wanted to retreat 35 kilometres. Hitler refused and told him to stand his ground. This undoubtedly saved the situation, although serious crises still lay ahead over the next few weeks.
After the declaration of war on the United States, we knew that now we faced virtually the whole world—knowledge which made it difficult for me to continue to believe in victory. In Germany opinions began to shift. The vast majority of the people remembered Hitler’s successes and either did not or could not believe that the man who had restored German prestige in the world could be taking a false path. Amongst them were many who no longer expected outright victory but who said that such a great man would find the way to maintain the welfare of the Reich. Other people of this group—and there were many—had no opinion at all and were happy to let events take their course. There remained a small, even a very small circle who perceived clearly Germany’s great misfortune, who discussed it and who were even prepared to risk everything to destroy it—individuals from the churches, landed gentry, diplomats, government officials and military officers. The Gestapo knew all about them. They had most of the names in their card indexes. They took no action for the number was small and there was no evidence to go on. Himmler kept Hitler advised, and the latter knew the names of most of the active opposition. Since even in early 1941 Hitler had spoken out vehemently against critical trends, it was not surprising that opposition should increase at a time of winter setbacks.
At the time I believed that the Soviet Union, which since June had been taking very heavy punishment, would find it impossible to recover quickly. I thought there was still a chance to strike at Russia before America, with all her enormous potential, entered the fighting proper. As far as I could judge, this was also Hitler’s view. He was certain he would defeat Russia in 1942.
Ribbentrop was advising Hitler to seek a peace treaty with the USSR. He believed he had got to know Stalin very well in 1939 and considered that not all possibilities had yet been exhausted. He argued his case in depth but Hitler said that a peaceful solution was impossible.
In his New Year statement to the German people and an Order of the Day to the Wehrmacht, Hitler admitted the difficult situation in which Germany found herself in these winter months, but he left no doubt that he would regain the initiative and continue the struggle for Lebensraum: ‘Whoever fights for the life of his people, for their daily bread and for their future, will be victorious. But whoever by this war, with its Jewish hate, seeks to annihilate the people, will fall,’ he exclaimed. His Order of the Day concluded with the words: ‘The blood spilled in this war will be—this is our hope—the last in Europe for generations. May the Lord God help us therein in the coming year.’
In the autumn and winter months of 1941 Hitler experienced for the first time how a retreat fanned enemy resistance into flame. His assumption of supreme command of the Army was a successful move since it prevented the catastrophe into which a withdrawal would have degenerated. Instead, the German soldier found new reserves of strength and confidence from the knowledge of his superhuman achievement in holding off a superior enemy sometimes twenty times his own strength.
Hitler would not countenance withdrawals to gain freedom of manoeuvre or to spare his forces. His burgeoning mistrust of the generals—a sentiment of which he was never to rid himself entirely—cramped him, since he insisted now on reserving to himself even the most minor tactical decisions. The lack of fresh, rested divisions (Hitler had thrown all 41 available divisions into the front) was the reason for the reckless deployment of men. He had no reserves worth speaking of. The Russian land-mass was too big for the German Wehrmacht. It was almost 2,000 miles from Leningrad to Mt Elbrus in the Caucasus. At the outset of the campaign Hitler assumed that he would quickly break the enemy’s back as he had in former invasions. But Russia was different. The enemy had inexhaustible reserves. Over the winter of 1941/42 it became apparent to Hitler that his Army was too small. As we know today, Stalin was able to leave his far Eastern Frontier unprotected because the Communist spy Richard Sorge in Tokyo had shown him that the Japanese did not want war with Russia. This knowledge, together with American assistance, gave Stalin strength to withstand the German attack, to put Hitler’s armies on the defensive and, in the winter of 1941/42, to push them to the edge of the abyss.
This was the great turning point of the war. Hitler’s optimism in his war against the world remained unimpaired, for he still believed that Britain, if faced with losing her Empire, would rather abandon the war against Germany. This was a slim hope, but Hitler saw Britain relying increasingly on the United States and from this he inferred the central importance of the USA.
Hitler still considered that he could strengthen and consolidate the German position in the spring of 1942. In the event the Red Army attacked repeatedly all along the German front. They achieved limited success, but even though they broke through the German lines in some places a really significant penetration eluded them. The encirclements at Demyansk and Cholm proved how it was possible to make a heroic stand when adequately supplied from the air.
Despite Schmundt’s efforts, an improvement in Hitler’s relationship with the generals was scarcely to be hoped for. When speaking with Bormann, Göring or Himmler about them, Hitler was often dismissive or harsh in his condemnation. Few of the generals who came into contact with Hitler knew him sufficiently well. They behaved correctly, and were inhibited about informing Hitler of problems or difficulties. As adjutants we used to speak to these visitors beforehand, suggesting that the best approach was to be unselfconscious. A few succeeded. Most natural were the young officers who came to receive the Knight’s Cross or other decorations from Hitler’s hand. In my experience these were always Luftwaffe officers, and there was scarcely one who lost his tongue in Hitler’s presence. He could be told unpleasant truths and in fact he valued receiving bad reports as early as possible. The manner in which they were presented was naturally important.
In the Luftwaffe a basic change resulted from the death of Udet: Hitler and Göring transferred to Milch responsibility for all Luftwaffe production and supply. Göring did this reluctantly, but Hitler willed it and probably Göring saw no other solution. Milch was robust, inconsiderate, demanding, radical and hard with himself. He was appalled at the disorder in which he found the office of Generalluftzeugmeister and determined to put things straight. His priority was to increase the monthly production of aircraft. For 1942 he wanted to double the December 1941 figures from 250 to almost 500 machines monthly. He would not go so far as to authorise the changeover to four-engined bombers at this stage. He saw as his principal task an increase in fighter aircraft. He knew about current British aircraft production and their huge bomber programme. Against these Milch would need primarily fighters and flak. At the end of January 1942 he presented his ideas at FHQ. Hitler made his stock reply that for the time being the Army took absolute precedence. This was understandable, but nevertheless I took the opportunity to bring up again the subject of Luftwaffe difficulties. I foresaw, as did Milch, British air raids escalating without there being sufficient air defences to combat them. Hitler pointed to the end of 1942 when Russia would be broken. I did not believe that, but said nothing. The fact was, Hitler had always turned out to be right in the end.