In January Paulus sent two emissaries, General Hube and Hauptmann Behr, from the Stalingrad cauldron to report to Manstein and Hitler. At a situation conference Behr delivered a clear and simple picture of the condition of the Sixth Army. According to him there was no hope. A man fought and fell where he stood. There was no talk of negotiating with the enemy. Supply to the units was no longer possible as there was no means of transportation. It was the absolutely unequivocal picture of a lost battle. I knew Behr, my future brother-in-law, very well and could judge how his report was to be interpreted. Hitler admitted afterwards that only very seldom had he received such a clear and sober view of a situation. Hube presented a broader account, but from his words too it was obvious that events in the Stalingrad cauldron were approaching an inevitable conclusion. Nothing could be done. Nevertheless, on 15 January Hitler asked Milch to make a last attempt to deliver to the Sixth Army a significant quantity of supplies. Despite being severely shaken in a collision between his panzer and a locomotive, Milch set to the task energetically. The bitter winter weather hindered the work on the airfields, and whilst attempts were being made to prepare the aircraft and runways the airfield inside the cauldron was lost and then the supplies could only be parachuted down. Many of these drifted to the enemy. There was no doubt that Milch had been given the job far too late, and Hitler told him as much when Milch made his report to FHQ in early February.16
Whilst the fighting for Stalingrad was still going on, I had the impression that Hitler was considering alternative ways to remedy the catastrophic situation. He was convinced that the Anglo-American and Russian forces were harmonising their measures. Hitler knew that there were at OKW officers who had abandoned hope for a positive end to hostilities. He never betrayed a sign of weakness nor indicated that he saw any situation as hopeless. He considered it necessary to spread confidence in victory, and henceforth he ensured by his attitude, mood and appearance that none of his visitors nor his trusted companions should infer from his demeanour how he really judged the war situation. This led to his adopting an outward expectancy that one day the tide would turn in Germany’s favour. It fascinated me to see how he contrived to put a positive value on setbacks and even succeeded in convincing those who worked most closely with him. Nevertheless, I could no longer share the confidence in victory which he expressed in his New Year speech. On the other hand, I did not believe that we would actually lose the war. I envisaged a sort of compromise European peace solution which, despite everything, seemed to be still attainable with a little goodwill. Everything achieved so far need not have been in vain. From opinions garnered at FHQ it was clear that this point of view was as widespread there as in the Wehrmacht generally.
On 6 January Raeder reported to Hitler; the conversation was held partly in camera. Raeder requested to be allowed to resign his post on 30 January. At first Hitler would not hear of it, but Raeder made a plausible case as to why there should be a change at the top. He said that he was no longer competent to fulfil the high demands of his office and feared that one day his shortcomings would be discovered. He suggested that he be given the title of Admiral-Inspekteur, so that the Press, and particularly people abroad, would not read too much into the change. Hitler consented, not least because the era of the surface fleet which Raeder had championed seemed to be at its close. To succeed him Hitler nominated Dönitz, head of the U-boat arm, with immediate promotion to Gross-admiral. I did not know the background to the change then, although the previously good relationship between Hitler and Raeder had been sour for some time. I assumed that the ‘Regenbogen’ fiasco—the unsuccessful action by the heavy cruisers Admiral Hipper and Lützow and six destroyers in the Arctic against Allied convoy JW.51B at the end of 1942—had something to do with it. Konteradmiral Voss replaced Admiral Krancke as personal representative of the C-in-C Kriegsmarine at FHQ.
In January Roosevelt and Churchill conferred at Casablanca; De Gaulle and Giraud also took part. It was here that the joint decision was made to continue the war until Germany surrendered unconditionally. The conference was surrounded by a great deal of publicity and was not without its effect on Hitler. He mentioned the agreement repeatedly and stressed that any idea of ‘coming round’ would now be completely senseless.
Further bad reports were received from North Africa. Montgomery’s pressure on Rommel had increased, and on 23 January, when Tripoli fell, almost all of Libya was in British hands. To the west, the Americans were camped on the Tunisian border facing the German rear line. North Africa could obviously not be held much longer, but the melting away of the Italians was very disappointing.
On 6 February Manstein visited Hitler at Wolfschanze to discuss the division of command since Hitler had made himself C-in-C, and, in the autumn of 1942, had also taken personal command of Army Group A. Manstein wanted to propose the appointment of a general as C-in-C Army, or at least of the Eastern Front. If Hitler did not think that would be possible, then he might at least consider ending the dual command structure by combining the Army General Staff and Wehrmacht Command Staff under a General Chief of Staff. Calmly and objectively Hitler answered each point of Manstein’s argument. He would not give way. He knew no general in whom he had sufficient confidence to place those powers demanded by Manstein. Thus the situation remained unchanged. Manstein also discussed his future intentions at the front, for which in the main Hitler gave him a free hand.
On 7 February all Gau- and Reichsleiters assembled at FHQ to hear a wide-ranging speech covering the events of the winter. Hitler had designed it in such a way that none of his listeners would have the slightest hint of the catastrophic situation. It contained neither uncertainties nor expressions of disappointment. Without beating round the bush, he admitted the Russian successes and set out his programme for clearing up the mess. I was astonished at how this approach convinced them. He also mentioned the Casablanca Conference and the enemy’s joint declaration for ‘unconditional surrender’. This decision had freed him completely from any ideas of peace negotiations anywhere in the world. His audience left visibly happier and returned home full of enthusiasm for the fray.
Winrich Behr married my sister-in-law on the family estate in Saxony on 13 February. It was all the more happy an affair for the salvation of the bridegroom from his fate at Stalingrad. During the month Hitler spoke frequently with Göring, Jeschonnek, Ribbentrop, Goebbels, Himmler and Speer and with his military advisers at OKH and OKW. On the 16th he promoted von Richthofen to Feldmarschall: I telephoned Richthofen at his HQ with the news.
Manstein was planning to embark on his push to the Donets and Kharkov on 19 February and suggested that Hitler should observe the campaign from his Ukraine FHQ at Winniza. Thus with Zeitzler’s support he flew with a small retinue to Manstein’s Army Group HQ at Saporoshye for two days. The mood was even but tense, as Manstein recorded in his memoirs. Hitler was interested almost exclusively in the operations of Army Group South, as Army Group Don had been renamed at the beginning of the month. The Russians had not so far managed to stem its advance to the south-west: it was breaking a vast area of virgin territory. This advance influenced Hitler’s return to Winniza on 19 February. Both Manstein and Richthofen recommended that he leave Saporoshye because they feared that a Russian battle group might make a surprise raid against the airfield, leaving Hitler stranded. As we left that afternoon, we heard MG and shell fire not far from the airfield. I remember Saporoshye if only because Hitler promoted Engel and myself to the rank of Oberstleutnant there. We also noticed the coldness and reserve of the officers of this command; it was obvious from their demeanour that they were unable to muster much belief in Hitler’s plans.
We resumed residence at the pleasant Winniza HQ for almost four weeks to 13 March while Manstein’s panzers forged ahead. Hitler followed the movements of the attacking divisions very closely. In mid-March they reached the Donets, the goal of the operation. On the 10th Hitler flew out to Manstein and in recognition of his success awarded him the Oak Leaves. It was extraordinary to observe the change of mood within the officer corps of that Army Group since the previous visit. Now they had quite a positive outlook on matters.
On 1 March the RAF bombed Berlin: 250 heavy bombers dropped 600 tons of bombs on the capital, destroying 20,000 houses and making 35,000 homeless. 700 were killed. This prompted Hitler to make a severe outburst against the Luftwaffe. When Goebbels visited a week later on 7 and 8 March, Hitler had long talks with him about the escalation in the British air raids. He struck out in all directions and included the generals for good measure. Even though he attributed the main responsibility for the defeat at Stalingrad to the three foreign Axis armies, he did not exempt the German generals: they did not believe unshakeably in the righteousness of this war; they had no understanding of weapons and equipment; they watched developments at the front full of misgivings. Hitler often became so worked up that he could not be interrupted. Returning to the original theme, he ordered the Luftwaffe to nominate a young, experienced officer as Angriffsführer England, to whom would be assigned a number of bomber crews whose duty would be to make continual concentrated bombing raids on British cities. Twenty-nine-year old Oberst Dietrich Peltz was selected, but as he lacked sufficient aircraft his operations were never really effective.
On 13 March Hitler returned by air to Rastenburg, making an intermediate stop at Army Group Centre HQ Smolensk, where he had a long and optimistic talk with Kluge. He said that one never knew if the Russians might not be near the end of their strength, and in fact he was now planning an offensive in the East. The first objective was to retake an prominent bulge around Kursk. The operation was code-named ‘Zitadelle’ (Citadel).
The second leg of his flight from Smolensk to Rastenburg passed without incident, and not until after the war did I learn that a General Staff Officer of the Army Group, Oberst von Tresckow, an opponent of Hitler, had placed a bomb in the aircraft. During my own return flight over a vast area of woodland—I was piloting an He 111—I remember wondering what would happen if Hitler’s FW 200 crashed into a dense forest without making a distress signal.
The interlude at Wolfschanze passed relatively quietly except for renewed outbursts against the Luftwaffe following heavy air raids on Nuremberg and Munich. As soon as he arrived at the Chancellery on 20 March Hitler tackled Göring about the raids and the uselessness of the Luftwaffe generals. He also accused Göring of incompetence, although this did not affect their personal relationship at all.
On the 21st Hitler made his annual speech at the Berlin Arsenal to commemorate Heldengedenktag. He spoke with reverence of the 542,000 men who at that date had fallen for Germany in this war and said that they ‘lived on eternally in our ranks, the heroes and pioneers of a better age’. Oberst Baron von Gersdorff, a General Staff officer of Army Group Centre, claimed after the war that during this ceremony he was carrying explosive charges in the pockets of his uniform greatcoat for the purpose of making an attempt on Hitler’s life. Hitler’s hasty tour of inspection of the Arsenal had prevented the time fuses being set. I remember Gersdorff. The sartorial elegance of his uniform made him stand out from the crowd. He accompanied Hitler’s retinue like a creeper and held long conversations with Keitel’s ADC von Freyend. However, I do not really think he had explosives on him.
On the Eastern Front it was the muddy season. Neither side could mount a major attack, and a tense inactivity prevailed which gave no clue as to where or in what direction the opening moves would be made. On 22 March Hitler decided to retire to Obersalzberg for a few weeks. This was a taxing and depressing period, but Hitler invited my wife to the Berghof, which helped.
At the end of March I flew to Taormina in Tunisia to see Kesselring. His reports were hard to fathom, for he spoke in a very optimistic vein about holding Tunis but was pessimistic about everywhere else. He told me clearly that Tunisia could not be held much longer. Next morning I flew with him to the Southern Front to meet von Arnim, C-in-C Armee Afrika. He held the same opinion as Kesselring. I spent the hours of darkness with the Hermann Göring Division, where I knew several officers, including the commander, Generalleutnant ‘Beppo’ Schmidt. Schmidt took me to the front line that evening. It was very thinly spread; he doubted it could withstand an American attack. That evening he told me his men’s worries. I replied that compared to the Army units I had seen recently his division was in a fantastic condition. He did not deny this but stressed that, even so, he could not hold off the Americans alone. Next morning I met Kesselring in Bizerta and we flew back to Taormina, where I took the opportunity to ask several of his staff officers if they thought an American invasion of Sicily launched from Tunisia could be countered. Opinions were divided, although they believed there was no possibility of holding it off in the long run.
I gave Hitler a detailed report. He received the bad news calmly and said very little. It seemed to me that he had already written off North Africa. As for Sicily, he thought that Italian forces would fight better when actually defending Italy. I expressed my negative opinion of Italian troops. I did not imagine there was even one Italian division capable of making a stout resistance for any length of time. Above all, the Italian officer corps was not up to it. Hitler was angry when he thought of the uselessness of the Italians. Basically the Italian forces did not want to fight. They would rather throw away their arms and go over to the enemy en masse—and today was better than tomorrow to do it.
King Boris of Bulgaria led the queue of foreign government heads. As far as I was concerned, his visit on 3 April was merely to glean Hitler’s views about the catastrophic situation in Russia. He spoke very frankly with Hitler and held nothing back. But Hitler said he was sceptical that the Russians had anything more up their sleeve. The talks took place in a very tactful and moderate tone, but Hitler told us afterwards that he had been blunt with the king about the Russians and said he did not share the widespread opinion of Russian might.
Next evening we travelled by the train to Linz to visit the Reichswerke Hermann Göring and the Nibelungenwerke at St Florian. Pleiger, the Minister for Coal and managing director of the Reichswerke, met Speer in Linz and accompanied Hitler on his tour of both factories. In the Reichswerke Pleiger had achieved a substantial increase in production and in the Nibelungenwerke the new Panzer Mk III and IV models were beginning to roll off the line.17 Hitler had been waiting a long time for this news and looked pleased. He decided at once to postpone ‘Zitadelle’ to enable his panzer force to be strengthened. The Chiefs of the General Staff were very reluctant to accept this postponement; even Richthofen pressed for the attack to be made. But Guderian, who since the end of February had been General Inspector of Panzer Troops, supported Hitler’s view and the attack was put off until June. I could not understand Hitler’s decision because this delay of almost six weeks was of greater benefit to the Russians than ourselves. If they were not planning an attack, then they would reinforce their defences so strongly that an attack from the German side would be rendered much less likely to succeed. But Hitler could not be dissuaded.
April brought more visits by pro-Axis politicans—Mussolini, Antonescu, Horthy, Quisling, Tiso, Pavelic, Laval and Oshima. Mussolini stayed three days at Schloss Klesheim and attempted to influence Hitler to end hostilities with Russia. This was an old bone which Hitler had already rejected. Mussolini was not interested in anything else and was very quiet. It was obvious that he considered the war to be lost and in his opinion Italy had no further role to play. When I gave Hitler my impression he replied that Mussolini could no longer influence operations. He feared that political change in Italy might soon be to our disadvantage.
To Admiral Horthy’s enquiries about the general situation Hitler gave a synopsis with a very favourable slant. I thought that Horthy heard it out in his usual amiable way and did not believe a word of it. Ribbentrop then accused him of dragging his feet about the Jews. There were 800,000 Hungarian Jews who had to be transported to the East. But Horthy would not be drawn. On the whole all visitors this month were not disabused of the misgivings which had been fostered in other countries. They had been shown evidence of the ever-increasing American and Russian build-up and were in no doubt that the major push would begin in 1943. Yet Hitler was still hopeful that the Russians were weak and put his faith in ‘Zitadelle’.
My conversations in April with Hitler about the bombing were extremely worrying. The British were keeping up their horrific attacks on German cities and Hitler was at a loss as to how they could be countered. Almost every evening after dinner he would call me into the large hall, where we would stroll up and down for up to two hours deep in conversation. Hitler recognised the aerial superiority of the British and spoke forcefully about the need to strengthen our flak defences. I gave him my frank opinion that I would not expect too much even from a gigantic flak network. Flak might divert bombers from a straight approach and bomb run, but there was no effective defensive weapon in Germany against night bombing. He did not contradict me and so I assumed he agreed. It was depressing to have to hear his opinions about Göring; he had not forgotten my criticism of Göring in 1940. The bombing gave him renewed cause to criticise Göring’s contribution as Luftwaffe C-in-C. In April 1943, at the Berghof, I gained the impression that Hitler had had enough of him, speaking of him in terms harsh and dismissive. In mitigation I pointed to the way in which the war in the East had developed and the Luftwaffe shortages of aircraft. He acknowledged this, but I had to accept as justified his criticism of the failure to produce new aircraft designs, especially bombers.
He drew comparisons with the U-boat arm. Heavy losses had been suffered in 1942 because of new British locating devices. Dönitz had decided to curtail U-boat activity until he had an effective answer to British radar. The stage would soon be reached when that would be achieved. Kriegsmarine efficiency was worthy of recognition and was a great help for him since he no longer needed to worry himself about naval problems. Earlier he had had no reason to watch over the build-up of the Luftwaffe and had not understood much of it in any case, but here he was having to concern himself with all the details and take a much closer interest in what went on. In the daily round with Göring, however, Hitler allowed no sign of his aggravation with Göring or the Luftwaffe in general to make itself known.
In the last days of April Army Group Centre at Smolensk reported extensively on the discovery of mass graves in the Katyn Forest. The Foreign Office despatched an international medical commission there. It was composed of important judicial forensic experts from the Universities of Ghent, Sofia, Copenhagen, Helsinki, Naples, Agram, Prague, Pressburg and Budapest. By 30 March the corpses of 982 Polish officers had been disinterred. The officers had been murdered by a shot to the back of the head. When Hitler read the report of the commission he gave voice to all his hatred for the Soviet regime and its assassins. He said he would not have expected anything else of the Russians and this discovery merely confirmed his impression of them.
May 1943 brought no great events on land. Hitler’s efforts to increase armaments production and reduce the bombing stood in the foreground. Speer was the active type of minister who knew how to mobilise industry and step up its output month by month. Every fourteen days he reported to Hitler, usually in the company of a couple of industrialists who could answer Hitler’s questions. I recall sessions in which Hitler conversed solely with financiers. He kept the main armaments figures, including the current monthly outputs, in his head. Many industrialists found it hard to answer all Hitler’s questions. From what they said, it was amazing how little real effect the bombing had had on industry. The RAF attacked mainly residential districts because they thought that that was the way to break the will of the people. In 1943 it was noticeable how little success they had doing this: certainly a huge number of families were bombed out of their homes and many killed, but the impression remained that these air raids did not have a demoralising effect.
In the morning of 2 May Hitler left for Munich, where a conference had been arranged for the 4th about ‘Zitadelle’. Kluge, Manstein, Guderian, Jeschonnek and others had been summoned. Hitler discussed it beforehand at the Berghof with Model, who advised him to postpone the offensive for another month to July to allow himself the maximum number of panzers in hand for the operation. Hitler was very much inclined to take this advice and eventually decided to ignore the opinion of his generals in Munich.
We returned to Berlin on 7 May to attend the state funeral of SA Chief of Staff Viktor Lutze, who had been killed in a road accident on the Berlin autobahn. Goebbels led the orations and Hitler added a few words, from which it was apparent how deeply he mourned the loss. After the ceremony he invited the Party, SA and SS leaders to lunch and subjected them to an impassioned discourse about ‘motorway madness’. Then he ordered that the cars of the Party leaders should be adjusted mechanically so that they could not exceed 80kph.
On 12 May we flew to Wolfschanze, where Hitler received next day von Arnim’s report from Tunis that all German forces in North Africa had capitulated. Hitler had seen it coming but had been unable to do anything to help. He criticised the Italian supply organisation which in the final months had got out of control. Between the 13th and 15th Hitler had detailed discussions with Speer and several arms experts and saw a display of new panzers and anti-tank guns. His decision was invited. He conferred upon Speer an honour.
At the end of May I took extended leave with my wife. We had decided to see Prague and Vienna before they were reduced to rubble. We went by train from Berlin to the Czech capital, stayed a week in an hotel on the Wenzelsplatz and quickly forgot the war, although in the first few days we were shocked to read of the British ‘Dambusters’ raid. In Prague we visited the opera and theatre, but most of all we loved the fine old buildings which gave the city its special appeal.
From Prague we travelled by rail to Vienna. The train was packed and in conversations the dominant theme was the war. Our fellow passengers held very critical opinions of events, but all were convinced that Hitler was the custodian of affairs and that the war would end in our favour. In Vienna we were surprised to be met on the platform by Reichsleiter Baldur von Schirach’s ADC, who escorted us to our hotel. I had phoned Schirach previously and asked him if he could assist us as tourists in the city. He treated us with great hospitality.
After sightseeing we saw a presentation of The Merchant of Venice at the Burg Theatre and then in a restaurant discussed the military situation. Schirach shared my opinion that the war could not be won with our present forces. He was very annoyed that Ribbentrop, Keitel and others were not honest about matters with the Führer. I was compelled to contradict him on this point. I mentioned the Casablanca Conference and unconditional surrender. Schirach said one should not take this declaration too seriously since there was always room for a compromise.
On 14 June I returned to Obersalzberg. When I reported my presence to Hitler at the Berghof, after a few words of greeting he went directly to the main theme, the constant bombing. They had ruined the Ruhr and there was no way of telling when it would end. The Luftwaffe had next to nothing to fight them with. Then he switched subjects to Sicily. He was extremely concerned here because he had no faith in the Italians and was short of German troops to defend the island; he was relying primarily on the Luftwaffe to help out.
A few days earlier, on the 11th, Richthofen had come to the Berghof to receive command of Air Fleet 2 in Italy. This would relieve Kesselring, who until then had commanded it as C-in-C South, for a more comprehensive task, even though at first he would be to some extent a general without men.
The overstretching of resources in Italy at this time is demonstrated by a telegram sent on 11 June to the Command Staff, Air Fleet 2, and of which I have the original: ‘All fighter pilots stationed in Italy are to be informed that they are the most pitiful bunch of fliers I have ever commanded. If by chance they happen to encounter the enemy they allow themselves to be shot down without obtaining any successes in return. Until further notice I forbid any leave in order that I do not have to be ashamed of these miserable personalities in the homeland. Göring.’
That first evening of my return to Obersalzberg I spent hours in conversation strolling up and down with Hitler. He spoke primarily of his fears about Italy. He judged the American moves as very weighty and said that our forces were insufficient. If the Luftwaffe did not succeed in driving off the American landings in Sicily then he had no hope for the entire Italian peninsula. He had great faith in Richthofen and hoped he could pull it off. I took the liberty of reminding him clearly of my opinion of our Luftwaffe, which would never again be the equal of the British, Americans or Russians. He mentioned Göring, who, like himself, could make the impossible possible. I suggested that that might no longer be the case. The 1941 and 1942 aircraft designs were missing and we were still flying more or less the same aircraft types with which we had begun the war in 1939. He did not reply to this, but I noticed that his belief in Göring had returned.
On Corpus Christi, 24 June, Baldur von Schirach came to the Berghof with his wife. He had a long talk with Hitler, the content of which I did not hear until a few evenings later. Schirach had stated his opinion quite unambiguously that, one way or another, the war had to be brought to an end. Hitler said, ‘How can he think like that? He knows as well as I do that there is no way out. I might as well shoot myself in the head as think of negotiating peace.’ He was highly indignant about Schirach and made it quite clear that he wanted nothing more to do with him. That was their last meeting.
On 29 June Hitler returned to Wolfschanze for a conference on 1 July with all senior commanders. He delivered a long statement about the general situation and ‘Zitadelle’, which was scheduled to roll finally on the 5th. He was confident and expected victory. He did not believe that the Russians had the strength to strike a telling blow against our Eastern Front. He feared only for Sicily because he was doubtful about the Italians. On the 5th the Army Groups of Kluge and Manstein attacked from the north and south, respectively, towards Kursk. Before the attack the Russians pounded the German front with a heavy artillery barrage. The date had been discovered.
The same day Hitler gave me an errand in France. I flew to Paris and saw General Koller, Chief of Staff to Feldmarschall Sperrle. We discussed the air war against England. Koller thought that the Luftwaffe should not be used as the Army’s artillery elsewhere. The continuation of bombing against England was very urgent and Oberst Peltz should be given the squadrons he needed. Sperrle was not in Paris but in his summer HQ at St Jean de Luz on the Biscay coast south of Biarritz. It was very remote and Sperrle was attended only by a physician, an ADC and an orderly officer. I arrived that afternoon. The HQ did not look a very military setup. I fulfilled my task by offering him Hitler’s congratulations on the fortieth anniversary of his military service together with a cheque for 50,000 Reichsmarks. We discussed the situation. Sperrle seemed impressed by some of Hitler’s ideas. I stayed twenty-four hours in this small circle to soak up the restful atmosphere.
From the south of France I returned directly to FHQ to find a witches’ brew of toil and trouble. On 12 July the Russians had attacked our advancing front at Orel. Next day Hitler discussed with Kluge and Manstein the continuation of ‘Zitadelle’. Manstein was unconditionally in favour, but Kluge, whose units had taken the full brunt of the Soviet attack and who doubted if he could hold it, wanted the operation called off. After long conversations Hitler decided to abandon ‘Zitadelle’ and thus the last German offensive of the war on the Eastern Front miscarried.
From Italy came reports that indicated a political revolution; the American landings in Sicily on 9 and 10 July had brought it about. Our ‘strong man’ there was Hube, but he had too few troops to defend the whole coastline. The enemy’s air superiority made itself felt. As for the Italians, they abandoned their weapons and made off. One American and one British army took the island during the next four weeks. In this turbulent period Hitler considered it indispensable to speak to Mussolini, and the two leaders met on 19 July at Feltre near Belluno in Upper Italy. Mussolini brought a number of companions with him but they were unable to follow the conversation. Hitler spoke reproachfully to Mussolini but had the impression that the Duce was resigned to his fate. He was in a very ungracious mood on the return flight to Rastenburg as he ruminated with anger and suspicion on the events unfolding in Italy.
At six in the evening of 24 July the Grand Fascist Council convened at the Palazzo Venezia for the first time since December 1939. Reports of what was being discussed were scanty, leaving Hitler in an impatient frame of mind. Ribbentrop, Göring, Goebbels and Himmler all took part in excited conversations. At FHQ on the 26th we learned that the Council had voted by a large majority to request the king to take personal command of the armed forces. A leading figure of this Council was the fomer Italian ambassador to London, Grandi. On the afternoon of the 25th Mussolini had been asked to present himself at the royal palace, where he was informed that Marshal Badoglio had been appointed as his successor. On leaving the palace Mussolini was arrested and taken by ambulance to a carabinieri barracks. For a week we had no news of his whereabouts. Hitler was horrified at the swift and bloodless end to fascist domination in Italy. Nobody had interceded for Mussolini. The Badoglio government announced that it would continue in the Axis alliance with Germany, but Hitler looked on sceptically. He had no faith in Badoglio. His main interest was to find out where Mussolini was being held, and he gave Himmler orders to set the necessary wheels in motion.
At the same time as Hitler was learning of the Italian upheaval on 26 July, Gauleiter Kaufmann reported from Hamburg the first of three fearful air raids on the city. A thousand RAF bombers had covered their approach from radar detection equipment by dropping countless tinfoil strips. Kaufmann spoke of a gigantic conflagration with thousands dead. At next morning’s situation conference Hitler made a violently critical outburst against the Luftwaffe and demanded an immediate build-up in flak defences. He was expecting fresh attacks on Hamburg and in this he was not wrong. In a few days two further such raids followed, leaving Hamburg almost completely destroyed.
The Russian attack against Orel and Byelgorod was successful and we lost both cities. The Soviets remained on the offensive without respite from now until October and forced back sections of our front by 200 kilometres. Our lines at the beginning of the October muddy season stretched from the Sea of Azov through Saporoshye, along the Dnieper through Dnyepropetrovsk, Kiev and Gemel to Vitebsk. Hitler was more preoccupied by events in Italy than in the East, and by transferring several divisions to Italy he completely drained the Eastern Front of reserves. The Russians had now gained the initiative along the whole front and were unlikely to let go. I saw our main worry in the number of fronts we were having to maintain: a growing number of divisions in Italy; a defensive front against invasion along the French coast; and occupation troops tied down in Greece and Norway.
In August 1943 I drew Hitler’s attention to a problem within the Luftwaffe leadership. Since the beginning of January the differences between Göring and Jeschonnek had multiplied and could no longer be bridged. Göring had added a number of younger officers to his personal staff and was practically conducting affairs without reference to the General Staff—an obviously intolerable situation. In early August Jeschonnek’s ADC invited me one morning to breakfast. I found Jeschonnek in a state of anxiety and despair. Göring had blamed him for the continually increasing British air raids: he had been intolerable, immoderate, biased and unjust. I spoke quietly with Jeschonnek and asked him to attend that day’s situation conference to discuss his problem with Hitler. The Führer agreed to hear Jeschonnek’s complaint after I had outlined the facts. However, he would not allow him to resign under any circumstances since he knew of no other person who could replace Göring if need be. Jeschonnek was closeted with Hitler for nearly two hours over lunch. On leaving he thanked me for my mediation but added that he had to continue to co-operate with Göring. The differences seemed unresolved, but I could do no more.
In the morning of 19 August the ADC rang me to say that Jeschonnek had shot himself. I was taken completely by surprise. Göring arrived at Rastenburg from Berchtesgaden before the morning conference. I fetched him from the airfield. He gave me two letters which Jeschonnek had left for me and asked if he had given me any hint of his intention. I could deny this with a clear conscience. Göring also wanted to know the contents of the letters. I declined and put them in my pocket. I read them later when I was alone. Jeschonnek had set down his complaints about Göring—his continual abusive telephone calls about the British air raids and other things for which Göring had unjustifiably made him the scapegoat. He described his own abortive attempts to build an effective Luftwaffe. I was very moved by these letters and informed Hitler of the contents that evening. He said that Jeschonnek’s suicide had solved nothing but only brought about personal consequences. I had the impression that Jeschonnek’s intention to expose Göring’s weaknesses by his suicide had been turned by Göring to his own advantage. The funeral took place a few days later near Luftwaffe HQ and Göring nominated Korten as Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff.
Jeschonnek’s death just about summed up the state of the Luftwaffe and the constant overtaxing of its resources. After the Battle of Britain it had had no operational role to play and neither did it have the capacity for major operations. The high standard of its pilots stood in stark contrast to its material failure to progress. As a ground-attack force supporting the Army it was still achieving a great deal, but in the West—as became abundantly clear in the summer of 1944—and over the Reich, it was hopelessly inferior. Pitted against the rising number of Russian frontline aircraft, the better quality of our pilots proved significant for some time but in the long run they were bound to be claimed by wear and tear. Later, when sufficient aircraft were rolling off the production lines, a different situation arose, in which the lack of fuel led to pilots with insufficient flying hours being thrown into combat to fall an easy prey to British and American fighters. Jeschonnek had had scarcely any capital to play with: Korten, Kreipe and Koller applied their different temperaments to administering the bankrupt estate. Korten took the broad view of his office and did not burden himself with too many details.
For a while Kreipe and Koller were both Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff. Kreipe got on well with Göring and realised that nothing could be done, while Koller suffered visibly at the uselessness of what he was supposed to be attempting with hardly any battleworthy units at his disposal. To make matters worse, Koller did not see eye to eye with Göring and this weighed on him heavily once middleman Kreipe had stepped down. In the course of the next few months it was galling to observe how the Luftwaffe, in which at the outset such great expectations had been placed, burned itself out through a wide variety of errors and omissions.
In August 1943 the British carried out many more terrible air raids. Seven hundred persons were killed in an attack on the rocket development establishment at Peenemünde. The Americans were now flying from Sicily against factories in Austria and southern Germany—the aircraft works at Wiener Neustadt, then the ball bearing factories at Schweinfurt and the Messerschmitt Werke at Regensburg.
From 17 to 24 August Roosevelt and Churchill met at Quebec in order to agree their common objectives. Hitler recognised from Ribbentrop’s note that Roosevelt was the big noise. Roosevelt was of the opinion that, after the defeat of the Axis, Russia would control Europe. Therefore it would be important to establish and maintain friendly relations with the Soviets. Churchill agreed and thus the traditional politics of the ‘balance of power’ on the European continent tilted in favour of Stalin. Hitler took the results of this conference very seriously and expected a further hardening of their attitude. Taking the lesson of developments in Italy, Hitler decided that he ought to tighten internal control at home just in case. In a reshuffle, Reich Interior Minister Dr Frick became Reich Protector in Prague while Himmler was given the Interior Ministry.
At the end of August Hitler was saddened by the death of King Boris of Bulgaria. His instincts told him that the Italian royal house was behind it. King Boris’s queen was a daughter of the Italian king. Her sister Mafalda, the wife of the Prince of Hesse, had lived a long time in Sofia. Hitler had no proof, but German physicians attending the king stated that they would not rule out poison.
Towards the end of August the Soviet Army stepped up its pressure. Kluge and Manstein fought desperately to hold the front together. Hitler concluded from this situation that Stalin was deriving comfort from the situation in Italy, guessing that Hitler would have to transfer substantial forces there from the Eastern Front. The German movement was exposing the Donets Basin, which Hitler wanted to retain at all costs.
On 8 September we returned to Winniza for a conference with Manstein. The Russians had attacked at the seam where the two Army Groups met and had made a deep penetration. The front could only be held by a retreat. Hitler saw that he had no choice but to agree.
Upon our return to Wolfschanze we found a tense atmosphere. Indirect reports from Italy that their armed forces had capitulated were confirmed on 6 September. This was the signal to mobilise all German forces in Italy for the occupation of the country under the code-word ‘Achse’. This succeeded and the disarming of Italian troops began. When units of the Italian Fleet broke out, the battleship Roma was sunk by a glider bomb and her sister ship Italia damaged. Patchy resistance was encountered, and in some places troops of the former ally were given a ruthless response. Rome capitulated on 10 September, Luftwaffe General Stahel being given command of the city, and a few days later the mainland peninsula was in German hands. Himmler appointed SS-Obergruppenführer Karl Wolff as ‘Special Adviser for Police Affairs in Italy’; Gruppenführer Fegelein took over his role as SS liaison officer to Hitler at FHQ.
Meanwhile Hitler had found out that Mussolini was being held in a ski hotel at Gran Sasso in the Appenines and set up a major operation to kidnap him. Luftwaffe General Student was asked to plan a landing on Gran Sasso from the air. This was done in cooperation with SS-Hauptsturmführer Skorzeny, who eventually stole the show. The operation started and finished on 12 September. Glider troops landed on Gran Sasso near the hotel, paratroops freed Mussolini and Skorzeny made off with the Duce in a Fieseler Storch to the nearest airfield, where a larger machine was waiting to fly him to Vienna. From there Skorzeny rang FHQ and reported the success. Hitler awarded him the Knight’s Cross. Two days later Mussolini arrived at Rastenburg, a broken man. I had the impression that he was finished with politics. Hitler sent him off to Munich with a new role. He left without a spring in his step: his time had run out. But Hitler remained his loyal friend.
In these weeks of permanent crises the idea was circulated for a compromise with one enemy. Ribbentrop and Goebbels were behind it and attempted to win Hitler over. What they had in mind was an agreement with Stalin. Hitler said that basically he was so inclined but it would only be possible from a position of strength. He thought a breakdown in the enemy alliance would be better. Any agreement with the Western powers was out of the question, however. Churchill was his enemy from innermost conviction and would not rest until Germany was destroyed, even if he lost the British Empire in doing so. He could not go for a compromise with the Soviets, for the Communists were the enemy of the Reich. Thus his attitude towards separate peace negotiations in the autumn of 1943 seemed disjointed. I do not think that he dismissed them entirely but rather held to the view that victory only came to those who fought for it. Eventually he alone thought this. German troops were retreating on all fronts. Confidence in victory had evaporated: only the belief that Hitler would find the way out remained unbroken. This certainty increased his concept of mission. He could not believe that all the efforts, the enormous casualties in the air raids and the sacrifices at the front were in vain. In the autumn of 1943 I observed how Hitler was filled with a profound sense of mission, and even seemed to expect a miracle. The longer the fighting in Russia went on, the more unrestrained became his hatred of the Jews. He had no sympathy whatever for them. In his conversations with Goebbels and Himmler he left no room for doubt that he was not in the least concerned about what happened to the Jews. Incidentally, Goebbels seemed to me the most radical of the National Socialist leaders, whilst Himmler had an eye increasingly to the future in all that he did.
About this time people began to ask me how we could still win the war—a very difficult question for me to answer. I did not let anybody think that I believed personally in total victory. The catastrophic situation in which the Luftwaffe found itself made defeat certain unless a miracle happened. In such conversations I left no doubt however that I considered a change of fortune in our favour possible by the introduction of the new technical weapons. Here I was thinking of the new jet fighters and the development of the V-1 and V-2 at Peenemünde. Actually I did not believe in this myself. I was sure that these weapons had no significance in the final analysis. I accepted that the war would end in 1944.
I was also asked if there was no way in which a stop could be put to Hitler—in other words to assassinate him. I had to deny this for myself outright. I had now served as his adjutant for six years and had seen his trust in me grow steadily. It would have been impossible for me to have turned against him. I was determined to fulfil my obligations irrespective of what might happen. To bring about the change, others would have to do that if they considered it to be the answer.
At the end of September 1943 Hitler dispensed with the services of Army adjutant Engel. He had dropped a hint about this a year or so earlier but I had thought nothing more of it. I was therefore very surprised when Engel told me one day that Hitler had released him for ordinary Army service. From Engel’s reaction I saw that he had been taken completely by surprise. To leave our Adjutantur came as a severe blow to him. I suspected that General Zeitzler had had a hand in it. Engel’s successor had already been found. Contrary to the previous terms of reference for the position, a 33-year-old General Staff officer, Major Heinrich Borgmann, had been appointed, and he took up his duties in early October. Borgmann was not at ease in the job and seemed to be constantly on the lookout for something else. He was seriously wounded on 20 July 1944 and was incapacitated for some time afterwards.
In the autumn of 1943 the war entered a ferocious stage. The morale of the German front soldier was admirable. Of the millions who wore Army uniform, only a relatively small number were involved in the immediate fighting at the front. Supply and catering formed a considerable part of the Army’s function. Hitler regularly issued instructions to comb through the support services and reserves for young men to put at the front. I do not know why these efforts to find large numbers of young replacements only ever had moderate success. All Army front-line units were under strength. Battalion commanders were happy if they commanded 200 to 300 men. If there was an action, the numbers were quickly cut. But the morale of the men, their readiness and their will to fight, were constant, and Hitler’s role as Führer was undisputed. Many men were absolutely convinced that Hitler had weapons in preparation which would pave the way to victory. Those such as myself who had an overview of the situation knew to the contrary—that defeat was just a question of time.
In September 1943 the Allies landed in southern Italy. They moved up northwards relatively quickly as far as Naples and Foggia. The latter seemed very important to them: there were airfields there and favourable terrain to lay down more. This they accomplished in a few weeks. In October the Americans flew their first major air raid from Foggia against the Messerschmitt factories at Wiener Neustadt which turned out the Me 109. Hitler sent me there at once in order to obtain clarification of the conflicting reports submitted by the flak units and Homeland Air Defence organisation about the strength and success of the attack. I had already experienced the impenetrability of the secret world of air defences. The responsible commanders here had not seen very much of what went on since there was no protected observation point where an air raid could be watched from beginning to end.
By the beginning of October almost 300,000 Italian soldiers had been transported to Germany as prisoners-of-war and put to work. The Allied land forces took their time coming up from southern Italy and Kesselring, C-in-C South-West Army Group, was not only able to marshal his few forces for a spirited defence but became so firmly established that he allayed Hitler’s fears about the Italian Front. Eventually the theatre was left in his hands and Hitler hardly ever interfered there.
The Reich was becoming more and more the hapless target for British air raids. On 7 September Hitler asked Professor Messerschmitt how things stood with the Me 262, and, to everybody’s surprise, if it could also be used as a bomber. Messerschmitt said that it could, and added that Milch was always making difficulties and not putting a sufficient workforce at his disposal. This struggle between Messerschmitt and Milch had been smouldering for years. Explaining the problem to Hitler, I told him that Messerschmitt had already exceeded his entitlement having regard to the stage his developments were justifying. He had a knack of presenting individual achievements in such a way that it seemed he was ready to mass-produce. I requested Hitler to discuss the question again with Milch.
Hitler’s main preoccupation at this time was anti-aircraft defence. He racked his brain day and night for new ways to reduce the effects of the bombing. Earlier he had left this job to Göring, but even the latter was now dissatisfied with results. Therefore Hitler consulted only the Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff on Luftwaffe questions and ignored Göring, who began to appear more infrequently at daily situation conferences. The air raids increased. On 2 October the fighter factory at Emden was seriously damaged, on the 4th the industrial area of Frankfurt and on the 10th Münster and Anklam in Pomerania. On 14 October the Americans carried out a heavy raid on Schweinfurt which virtually paralysed ball-bearing production. On this occasion the bombers suffered heavy losses. After this latter German success, which was due primarily to Hitler’s persistent criticisms, the daylight attacks stopped. The British night attacks against cities continued, however, and Hanover, Leipzig and Kassel also received attention.
On 5 October Hitler discussed with Göring and Korten how the day attacks could be ended permanently. Hitler said that the major part of the fighter force ought to be concentrated to oppose the enemy bomber fleets. It was important to prevent the destruction of our production centres. After every air raid Hitler received reports from the appropriate Gauleiter. He was therefore in the picture about the completely inadequate Air Raid Defence organisation. Often during the day attacks it was next to useless. When fighters could not get up because of bad weather or were occupied elsewhere, this made Hitler especially irate. What made it worse was when bombers protected by enemy fighters were not engaged by our fighters because of poor direction techniques. At situation conferences Hitler was able to present detailed reports about individual air raids and was swift to jump to conclusions based partly on his misunderstanding of air defence and partly on the conflicting reports submitted.
Hitler had been made aware of the Japanese kamikaze phenomenon, which had been advocated repeatedly in Luftwaffe circles on the premise that the sacrifice was justified if victory resulted as a consequence. He was not of this view. He thought that inspired, selfless commitment for the Fatherland was right, but this price was too high. The names of volunteers were noted, however, in case the need for German kamikazes should ever arise in the future.
On 7 October the Gau- and Reichsleiters were summoned to Wolfschanze to be instructed as to the unfavourable situation and the future difficulties to be overcome. Hitler emphasised that the will of the people and ‘unremitting perseverance in pursuit of the goal’ must remain constant, continuing: ‘Your warrior spirit, your energy, your firm resolve and utter readiness give the people backbone and steadiness to withstand above all the violence of the bomber war.’ He closed with words expressing his unshakeable confidence in victory and succeeded in convincing his devoted listeners, who then returned to their Gaue in the firm belief that he had in preparation certain weapons which would yet win this war for Germany; his ‘Decree Respecting Preparations to Reconstruct Bomb-Damaged Cities’ reinforced their hopes.
Hitler foresaw threatening developments on the Eastern Front earlier and with greater clarity than his military advisers, but he was determined with great obstinacy not to accede to the requests of his Army commanders to pull back fronts, or would do so exceptionally only at the last minute. The Crimea was to be held at whatever cost, and he refused to entertain Manstein’s arguments in the matter.
In October Saporoshye and Dnepropetrovsk were lost. On 6 November Kiev fell and fierce fighting continued in the bend of the Dnieper, yet Hitler informed Zeitzler and Jodl that our first priority was the Italian Front and the bomber war. He viewed the Russian victories on the Eastern Front with a certain equanimity and was resting his hopes on a new offensive in the New Year and on the new weapons which would then be at his disposal. Zeitzler did not believe a word of it but Jodl still cherished certain hopes for the success of the new weapons.
On 3 November Directive No 51 was issued. It said: ‘The danger in the East remains but a greater threatens to the West—the Anglo-Saxon landings. In the East, in the worst scenario, the vast size of the territory allows a loss of ground even on the large scale without delivering us a mortal blow. But it is different in the West! If the enemy breaks through our defences here on a broad front, the short-term consequences are unforeseeable. Signs indicate that the enemy will launch an invasion of the European Western Front at the latest by the spring, but perhaps even earlier. I can therefore no longer allow the West to be further weakened in favour of other theatres. I have decided to strengthen its defences at the place where we will commence the long- range battle against England. For it is there that the enemy has to attack, there—if we are not deceived—that the decisive landing battles will be fought.’ Although drafted by Jodl, it was completely Hitler’s style. He was only wrong about when. He expected the Normandy invasion at the beginning of 1944.
On 5 November Hitler appointed Rommel as C-in-C Special Purposes and the responsibility for fortifying the invasion front devolved on him. He had full responsibility for the security of the French coastline. At the time Rommel was still an unconditional follower of Hitler and obeyed his orders without protest. Accordingly he threw himself wholeheartedly into his new task.
When Manstein, beset with grave anxieties about the Kiev region and Crimea, discussed the subject on 7 November, Hitler, who was not open to reason regarding the Crimea or Nikopol—on account of its manganese ore mines—released three divisions involved in the shipments with instructions that they were to be used on the Crimean front and not in the fighting for Kiev. Thus he was accepting a high risk on the Eastern Front.
Air raid defence remained in the foreground. ‘Aviation’ was the decisive keyword for 1944., and Hitler considered the fast bomber to be the most important factor entering the equation. Repeatedly he asked how the Me 262 was coming along: he was impatient on account of the long delivery date for the aircraft.
On 8 November Hitler addressed Party veterans in Munich. As usual he spoke very frankly to this circle, mentioning the extraordinary severity of the fighting in Russia and the impressive achievements of our soldiers there. But he also referred to ‘the bestial bombing raids’ on German cities and the sufferings of German women and children and added: ‘This war may last as long as it will but Germany will never capitulate.’ The help of Providence was certain and would send us victory.
Despite the continuing adverse reports from the Eastern Front and about the air raids, a restful week was spent at the Berghof afterwards. The horizons were different, and one noticed of Hitler how relaxed he was in the old familiar private atmosphere.
When we returned to Wolfschanze on 16 November, Ambassador von Papen was waiting for Hitler. Papen knew that a few days previously the enemy Foreign Ministers had met in Moscow; Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin would meet again shortly. Papen had long been carrying on a successful struggle to prevent the Allies drawing Turkey into their camp. Now he had a highly secret report to communicate: in Ankara the manservant of the British ambassador was supplying him with secret documents for cash. Papen had with him the first information about Operation ‘Overlord’ but few details at present. He saw the diplomatic situation as poised on a knife edge and said that the Crimea must absolutely remain in German hands if Turkish neutrality were to be maintained. Every fresh Russian victory endangered stability. Hitler concurred.
The ability of our front to withstand really massive attacks never ceased to amaze me in the late autumn of 1943, but eventually the Soviets succeeded in driving a corridor 150 kilometres deep through the lines of the Second Army and Fourth Panzer Army between Kiev and Gomel. Places such as Shitomir were recaptured, but generally the Russians did not capitalise on it. Their attacks against Army Groups North and Centre also faltered. In the south, against Army Group A, they crossed the Dnieper and pushed forward their front along a line Cherson–Nikopol–Krivoi Rog–Kirovograd. The penetration from Melitopol to the Dnieper was especially damaging. The Russians were very adept at identifying and attacking at the join between Army Groups.
On 20 November Hitler flew to Breslau to address senior cadets of all Wehrmacht branches in the Jahrhunderthalle—since the destruction of the Sportpalast this annual speech could not be held in Berlin—and the current officer intake took to heart his grave admonition that ‘the Volk, if we lose, ends its existence’. Therefore every German soldier must be aware that ‘this gruelling war, which our enemies accuse us of starting, but which they wanted, and have forced us into, can have no other ending than a German victory. In order to achieve this victory, everyone must be filled with a single unshakeable belief in our eternal Germany.’ Keitel concluded the address with a recognition of Hitler, who left the hall to a storming ovation and shouts of Sieg Heil! from the cadets. He was not unimpressed by this echo.
Air raids on 22 and 23 November caused substantial devastation to the heart of Berlin. The Gauleiter of Berlin, Dr Groeb, reported personally to Hitler and made particular mention of the outstanding morale shown by the people of the city over the two nights. Hitler was again filled with rage and anger against the Luftwaffe, which was never able to stop a raid taking place. He repeated these criticisms in bitter terms on 26 November at the impatiently awaited aircraft exhibition at Insterburg airfield. All those in some way responsible for aircraft production were present—Göring, Milch, Speer, Saur, Messerschmitt, Galland, Vorwald and others. In my opinion the Luftwaffe had repeated the error here of setting out mostly those models which were not yet ready for service. Hitler passed very calmly before the long line of aircraft, which included the newest version of the Me 109, the Me 410, Ar 234, Do 335 and Me 262. Milch accompanied him with full specifications to hand. Hitler was seeing the Me 262 for the first time and was very impressed by the look of it. He called Messerschmitt over and asked him pointedly if the aircraft could be built as a bomber. The designer agreed, and said that it would be capable of carrying two 250kg bombs. Hitler said, ‘That is the fast bomber’ and gave orders that the Me 262 should be built exclusively as such. Milch intervened at once to explain that only a number of the aircraft coming off the production line could be released to the bomber role, but Hitler insisted. Even Göring, when attempting to have Hitler’s decision reversed a few days later, was rebuffed sharply. As it turned out, however, the Luftwaffe could only offer the type as a fighter-bomber because a true fast bomber would need extensive redesign for bomb carriage, release gear and sights. Hitler was forced to accept this. On our return to Wolfschanze I tackled him on the subject in the hope of saving the Me 262 for its fighter role. He replied that in principle I was right and he wanted as many fighters as possible for the Reich, bearing in mind the existing problems—the worst of which would be the Allied landings in France. We had to do everything to prevent this.
The Teheran Conference took place on 28 November. Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin spent a week there with a large staff of officers and politicians. The results of this conference seeped through gradually, mainly through Papen’s source in the British Embassy at Ankara. There had obviously been serious difficulties at Teheran, particularly on the subject of where the landings would take place. Roosevelt had got his way over Churchill for northern France; Churchill wanted to go for northern Greece. Hitler decided from this that Churchill wanted to drive a wedge between the Germans and Russians. The Russians would not agree to this as it would tend to rob them of the influence they wanted in the Balkans. Hitler assumed from Papen’s reports that the invasion was still some way off and ordered a build-up of defence units on the Channel coast.
December on the Russian Front was less active than feared. The bombing of the Reich had also slackened while the British concentrated on picking off the 96 V-1 launch ramps. They knocked out a quarter but these could be replaced. Apparently they worried the British and this gave Hitler a reason to step up production of these flying bombs. He regretted only that they were not immediately available for use.
In December Hitler ordered the setting up of a National Socialist Command Staff at OKW. General Reinecke was appointed Chief of Staff. The intention had been in the wind for some time and had been much discussed in Army circles. Hitler had been convinced of the need by Himmler, Bormann and many SS officers that his internal opponents were spreading anti-National Socialist propaganda through the fighting fronts. Most dangerous were the ‘Seydlitz officers’, who disseminated propaganda urging officers and men to give up fighting. Reinecke was instructed to form and train a National Socialist Command Officer Corps for the front. This went ahead in 1944. The organisation found some recognition since these NSFOs were active in the welfare field, but many commanders would not have them around. The way in which the war developed prevented the institution from realising its full potential.
In 1943, for the first time in the war, I spent Christmas at home with my family. I was confronted by the realities upon my return to Wolfschanze. On 26 December Dönitz reported the sinking of Scharnhorst. The battleship had sailed out alone to attack an eastbound convoy in the Arctic and had been intercepted by a superior enemy naval force. Hitler was blameless here: for some time he had condemned the use of heavy units against enemy convoys as senseless.
The Russians had resumed their offensive on the Eastern Front; the first impressions suggested that a major offensive was brewing. Hitler spent New Year’s Eve alone in his private rooms with Bormann. What was discussed between them is not recorded.
In 1943 the Russians had driven us back from the Don to the Dnieper and an Army Group Centre section from the gates of Moscow to the other side of Smolensk. It was difficult to divine Hitler’s real beliefs about the situation. I attemped to form a picture composed of all the pros and cons. I had a number of conversations with him and noticed how often he contradicted himself. The Russian victories of 1943 had not worried him too much. The German front lines stood well in advance of our borders. There was still plenty of space in which to operate. The great danger, besides the increasing Russian pressure, seemed to be our failing strength. I was not sure if he was seeing things correctly. In my opinion we stood in a very much worse position altogether that at the end of 1942.
The Army Group commanders consulted him much more frequently, usually seeking leave to bring the front back to spare their forces and build up urgently needed reserves. But Hitler would rarely agree. The result was a severe blood-letting. The senior commanders had come to the stage where they despaired of ever understanding his leadership. For his part Hitler could not understand why the senior commanders had lost confidence in him. Yet he would fight on, for there was really no other way. Defensive successes of very short-term value reinforced his confidence, yet he hardly noticed the catastrophic casualty lists. The prospect of rest and replacement was so remote that most had given up hope of it. Despite all this, if the mass of fighting men looked with confidence to the New Year, this was due entirely to their belief in Hitler. To the extent that the commanding generals had lost their unconditional belief in Hitler, to that same extent the simple German soldier trusted in his unerring leadership. I had no doubt that this fact alone was responsible for the fronts holding together.
During 1943 the importance of the Waffen-SS had increased. At the beginning of the war, and more so since the beginning of the Russian campaign, Hitler had built up these divisions systematically. They embodied all his ideas for a fighting force. Division after division was formed, privileged as to its personnel and matériel. Thus there had slowly emerged a fourth arm of the Wehrmacht which by 1943, and more so in 1944, was put to especially endangered sectors of the front. Hitler was extraordinarily proud of these SS divisions and trusted in them and their commanders utterly.
At the year’s end I reflected most frequently on how the bomber war would progress. It was quite obvious that we could never make up the leeway between the Luftwaffe and the Allied air forces. Hitler believed that the fighter groups would have new aircraft during the coming spring or summer. I told him that I considered this unlikely. I hoped only that the efforts of Milch to increase the production figures for the old well-known types such as Me 109 and FW 190 would be successful so that our squadrons would have at least have material replacements to be going on with. Nothing more could be expected for 1944. For some time I had not believed in victory, but neither did I foresee defeat. At the end of 1943 I was convinced that Hitler could still find a political and military solution. In this paradoxical belief I was not alone.