In his New Year speech to Wehrmacht and Volk, Hitler spoke openly about the war situation. He referred to the international plans to dismantle the German Reich. It remained only for the German people to put up a successful resistance to ‘the attempts of our enemies to strangle us’. He spoke of the attempt on his life, which was a turning point in German history. I was convinced that even in this quite hopeless situation Hitler still had the confidence of a broad cross-section of the people, who simply would not believe that the Reich could be defeated under his leadership. Personally, after the autumn of 1944 I saw his death as the only way out. That he shared my opinion might be inferred from the suicidal thoughts he sometimes expressed.
On the morning of 1 January the Wehrmacht C-in-Cs and the Chiefs of the General Staff assembled at Führer Headquarters to offer their best wishes for a successful New Year—a sentiment which I am sure they all expressed with their tongues in their cheeks. After the situation conference Hitler invited Oberst Rudel into the circle of generals. He spoke a few words of recognition and praise for Rudel’s selfless devotion to duty, presented him with the recently instituted highest award for bravery and mentioned his ‘unremitting and provenly highest heroism … his unique fighting success as aviator and warrior’. What Hitler and Rudel discussed behind closed doors after the midday meal I was never able to discover.
A catastrophe befell the Luftwaffe the same day. Göring had planned a strike by almost a thousand aircraft on the Western frontier against various ground targets. Preparations for Operation ‘Bodenplatte’ were kept strictly secret; nevertheless, the attack was greeted with heavy enemy anti-aircraft fire. On the way back our aircraft flew over accurate German flak, the batteries not having been informed of the operation on the grounds of secrecy. We suffered heavy losses which could not be made good. ‘Bodenplatte’ was the last major operation undertaken by the Luftwaffe.
On the occasion of his 52nd birthday, Göring called at FHQ on 12 January to receive Hitler’s warmest congratulations. That day a massive Russian offensive began in the central sector of the Eastern Front. Behind heavy artillery fire a large mass of tanks smashed through the German front line and headed for Upper Silesia and the Oder. The Red Army took Baranov on the first day and Kielce on the third. Hitler attempted vainly to close the breach by bringing up a corps from East Prussia. He realised that this was the beginning of the end: in the evening of 15 January he travelled to Berlin and, apart from one visit to the front, never left the German capital again.
The great Russian offensive stretched from Baranov to the north of Warsaw and was opposed by exhausted, groggy German units. The Army Group commanders and Chiefs of the General Staff advised Hitler to have his forces fall back to allow a versatile response, but Hitler would not hear of this. He insisted vociferously that the front hold firm and, as so often before, that no ground be yielded. This left our divisions in a desperate situation and frustrated any hopes of an organised defence. Some commanders took it upon themselves to arrange their men as the situation demanded, but Hitler soon detected this sort of independent spirit and removed the offenders. On 15 January Harpe, C-in-C Army Group Centre, gave way to Schörner, on the 26th Rendulic replaced Reinhardt and on the 30th Hossbach stood aside in favour of Müller. Hossbach was a victim of the Party demagogues: the Gauleiter of East Prussia, Koch, sent to Berlin such scornful reports about Hossbach’s leadership that Hitler felt obliged to sacrifice him.
In these first weeks of 1945 the military command was in crisis. Hitler stuck to his old principle—which may have been justified in the winter of 1941 but not now—not to surrender a single square metre. The superiority of the Russians along the entire front was so great, however, that no general could stand up to the steamroller and survive. The entire population of East Prussia had taken flight. The highways were blocked with refugees who obstructed the passage of Army vehicles. It was almost impossible to cross the Vistula into the Reich proper and the Russians forced the civilians to the Baltic coast, where their only hope was evacuation by the Kriegsmarine. The Soviets crushed many such treks. Civilian sufferings were unimaginable and the casualty figure enormous.
At the end of January the Russian southern front forged onwards from south-west of Breslau to the Oder. The consequence of this advance was the loss of the Silesian industrial area. The city of Breslau was encircled but held out with heavy losses until the general capitulation on 6 May.
To halt the Russian advance in the centre. Hitler formed a new Army Group, ‘Weichsel’, commanded by Himmler. It was a ragbag of stragglers and retreating units used as a stopgap to gain time and, needless to say, was viewed with scepticism by military experts. When the Russians reached the Oder they halted along a line south of Küstrin–Frankfurt an der Oder and along the Neisse to near Görlitz while Zhukov attempted to shorten his lines of supply to the rear.
In the West at New Year Anglo-American forces were hoping to beat the Russians to Berlin, and that they failed was due to the strong discipline of the German divisions. Their fate was inevitable and bitter resistance replaced hopelessness.
In January I travelled again to the Harz, to Ohrdruf in Thuringia. This was a military exercise area where a new FHQ was under construction. The works were proceeding only slowly. I could not see any point in having them speeded up.22 The great subterranean factory not far from Nordhausen, in which concentration camp inmates helped manufacture large numbers of V-2 rockets, interested me more. The prisoners seemed well treated and were in good physical condition so far as I could determine, but it was nevertheless a depressing sight to watch this forced-labour workforce, who hoped to purchase their lives by their industry, at work in the extensive underground galleries. In the final analysis it all seemed rather pointless by this stage.
On 30 January Hitler broadcast to the German people for the last time. What else could he ask for than a fight to the last? ‘We will survive even this crisis,’ he said. ‘In this battle, it is not inner Asia that will triumph, but Europe.’ Many of his listeners still clutched at the straw of the ‘miracle weapons’ which would turn the tide at the last minute.
A few days later we received the first reports of the meeting on 4 February of Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin at Yalta which discussed the carving up of the Reich. Hitler was informed about this conference but was still curiously disinterested, rather as if it had nothing to do with him any more.
On 13 and 14 February the United States Army Air Forces and Royal Air Force made two appalling air raids on Dresden. It was not thought at the time that undefended cities overflowing with refugees would be a target for a mass raid of this kind. This was sheer terrorism devoid of any military sense against a defenceless civilian population. The devastation exceeded anything that a German city had suffered previously. More than 12,000 buildings and 80,000 homes were destroyed. The beautiful old city was lost for ever. The death toll was put at between 135,000 and 300,000; the exact number was unknown because of the huge number of refugees.23 It was astonishing how the rescue services managed to continue functioning. With these final heavy air raids on Dresden the German people understood at last the mentality of the Western Allies. After Dresden Hitler said frequently that he was going to renounce the Geneva Conventions, but Jodl always managed to dissuade him from this step.24
Hitler summoned the Gau- and Reichsleiters to the Chancellery on 24 February. Mutschmann, Gauleiter of Dresden, was bombarded with questions about the fate of the city. The Gauleiter for the Rhineland was also at the centre of attention and and spoke of the fighting in the West. Gauleiter Koch of East Prussia did not appear; his Gau was almost completely encircled by the Russians. Hanke was holed up in beleaguered Breslau. Hitler came in for criticism, but when he entered the room, stooped and older-looking than his visitors had seen him previously, he received a sympathetic reception. His speech began with reflections on the Weimar period and the first years after the seizure of power. Finally he came to what his audience was waiting for—the present. He spoke of the decisive hours of this war. The year 1945 would decide the next hundred years. His references to new naval and Luftwaffe weapons made no impression. During lunch Hitler—forced into the Chancellery and death’s hands—attempted to convince his listeners that he alone could correctly judge the situation. But the powers of suggestion he had employed in the past to mesmerise this circle were gone. It was at this meeting that he said, ‘We have liquidated the class warriors of the Left, but unfortunately we forgot to strike out against those of the Right. That was our great sin of omission.’
During February Hitler entertained the fighter pilot Hajo Hermann, who was of the opinion that the time had come for ramming, and suggested to Hitler how this should be done. Yet Hitler still showed no interest in this suicidal method and spoke of the new fighters which would shortly bring in new fighter tactics. He also mentioned Göring’s plan to form the first jet fighter squadron in southern Germany. He expected great things of these pilots. The formation of this squadron, achieved despite severe difficulties, was the result of the long internal squabbling which had culminated in the abysmal Areopag. Under the command of Generalleutnant Galland, the squadron had the best-known and highly decorated fighter pilots of the Luftwaffe—Lützow, Steinhoff, Hohagen, Krupinski, Barkhorn, Bär, Herget, Bob and Eichel-Streiber. Operations were limited to a sphere centred on Riem near Munich, and the great successes expected by Hitler failed to materialise. Lützow did not return from one of its missions and Steinhoff was badly wounded.
Since 16 January the daily situation conferences in the New Reich Chancellery—when opened in 1939 a superlative edifice of mosaic and marble—now began at three in Hitler’s large study there, the large room in the old Chancellery which had been the the venue since the beginning of the war having serious bomb damage. The Army General Staff was at Zossen, south of Berlin, from where Guderian regularly made the journey to report on the rapidly approaching Eastern Front. The circle attending these conferences had grown larger. Bormann and Himmler were always present, and Ribbentrop and the Chief of Police, Kaltenbrunner, frequently. The conferences lasted for two to three hours and gave Hitler the opportunity to ruminate at length on the precarious situation. The result would be a shuffle of forces which might be scarcely battleworthy, if not imaginary, and his ideas did not often reflect the true situation.
The most painful reports were those concerning the enemy air raids. The British and Americans flew over the western Reich more or less as they pleased, bombing residential areas and attacking the supply organisation, the armaments industry or hydrogen works. They were apparently in possession of the most accurate information about factories. These attacks crippled the production of all kinds of war materials. During March, Würzburg and Nordhausen were reduced to rubble, and Halberstadt on 8 April.
After the daily situation conference Hitler often took tea with his secretaries in a small office of the old Chancellery. I was occasionally drawn into this circle. Hitler would discuss subjects unconnected with the war as a diversion. On one of these breaks he suddenly decided to dictate my wife a letter, which she has kept, recalling our frequent meetings.
At about this time Speer went his own way. He knew that defeat was only a few weeks off. He was on the friendliest terms with Guderian and, escorted by his Army liaison officer, Oberstleutnant von Poser, travelled far and wide throughout the Reich consulting Gauleiters and military commanders on ways to mitigate the order to destroy essential installations. In this way, and at no small personal risk to himself, Speer was able to save many important facilities from destruction. After 15 March he presented to Hitler his final report, ‘The Industrial Situation March–April 1945 and Its Consequences’, which consisted of ten typewritten pages without appendices setting out the situation clearly and frankly and the implications he drew from it. Although Speer’s reports contained only bad news, Hitler would always take them to his bunker to read when alone. Speer stated in this report that we should do everything ‘to enable the people, if only in the most primitive way, to maintain a basic standard of life’, and he continued: ‘We have no right at this stage of the war to ourselves inflict destruction to the detriment of the German people. We have the duty to leave behind us the possibility to start a reconstruction in the more distant future.’ Hitler allowed Speer more rope than anybody else to say such things. In better times they had worked so closely together that Speer was probably the only person who could go so far with Hitler without being in fear of his life.
On 15 February Hitler went to the front for the last time. Near Frankfurt-an-der-Oder he visited Army units and General Busse’s Ninth Army Staff. He had collected himself, disguised his injured arm and made a good impression. But the more discerning amongst his listeners no longer believed what he had to say. It was patently obvious that they had to hold the Oder, and just as certainly they knew that because of the enemy’s clear-cut superiority it was going to be almost impossible to stop the Russian juggernaut once it really got under way. Hitler considered this visit to the front especially important and believed he had bolstered the troops’ confidence.
On 19 March he issued an order to all military commanders—his official ‘answer’ to Speer’s last memorandum. In this so-called ‘Nero Order’ Hitler ordered that all military communications, signals, industrial and supply installations as well as ancillary works within the Reich which might be of use in any way to the enemy immediately or in the forseeable future were to be destroyed. It was not really possible to put this order into effect since the scale of destruction was already enormous enough without having to introduce a ‘scorched earth’ policy.
Events picked up at the end of March. The Americans had evidently decided to steal a march on the Russians. On 22 March they crossed the Rhine at Oppenheim and on the 24th at Wesel. The Ruhr was taken within the next few days. Model’s Army Group became encircled and after its determined resistance ceased on 17 April Model took his own life. The Americans advanced eastwards in numbers, finding only patchy resistance, and on 11–12 April they reached the Elbe at Magdeburg. British forces north of the Americans found only weak resistance on their way through Westphalia and had little difficulty in getting to Bremen and Hamburg. We gained an impression from the reports that the population in the Reich, especially in north-west Germany, accepted the Allies with relief. They had simply had enough. We understood this but Hitler could not. He sharply criticised their attitude but could no longer influence events in western Germany.
Hitler’s last goal was to hold off the Russians’ onslaught and prevent their crossing the Oder. Himmler was replaced as C-in-C Army Group ‘Weichsel’ on 20 March by Generaloberst Heinrici. Himmler had come in for severe criticism from Hitler. Where he had needed to find fault with him—and there was little of a positive nature to say—Hitler had not spared Himmler’s blushes. Finally he had decided to shed the military amateurs. Whether he knew anything at this time of Himmler’s feelers to Sweden about an armistice or peace treaty—an act completely contrary to the SS motto ‘Meine Ehre heisst Treue’—I cannot say, but I do not discount it. In any case, the relationship worsened appreciably from the end of March.
On 29 March Hitler got rid of Guderian after several violent confrontations. Outwardly the dismissal was couched in terms of ‘obligatory leave’, initially for six weeks, but the break was final. In past weeks numerous arguments had arisen as a result of the very reasonable proposals Guderian had made and to which Hitler preferred to close his mind. The fact that Guderian remained on good terms with Hitler may have been due in part to a misunderstanding as to how his dismissal had come about: he thought he had been forced out by other interests. His successor was Krebs, in whom Hitler had great confidence and whom he had long esteemed both for his personality and as a qualified General Staff officer. He had first come to Hitler’s notice in the spring of 1941 in the odd scene enacted at the Moscow railway terminus on the occasion of the departure of the Japanese foreign minister, when Stalin had engaged Krebs in a demonstrative conversation. As the last Chief of the Army General Staff, Krebs had less work to do than the commander of Berlin Wehrkreis III. He committed suicide in despair after his first meetings postwar with the Red Army when he saw the type of people they were. That same day Hitler also parted company with his long-serving Press Chief Dietrich. The relationship between them had recently deteriorated. Goebbels had never trusted his subordinate and he merely put up with Dietrich because Hitler wanted to keep him. At last, probably with Bormann’s support—Bormann and Dietrich rarely spoke—Goebbels got his way and Dietrich had to go.
On 5 April I travelled to Nienhagen for the last time to bid farewell for ever to my wife and three children. I knew that Hitler wanted to remain in Berlin, that the war would soon end and that it was unlikely that I could escape from Berlin with my life. There were certainly worried faces in Nienhagen, but the people were well-groomed and composed and lived together harmoniously. Spring had arrived. My wife was expecting our fourth child but let none of her anxieties show. It was a comfort to know that she was well cared for. Next day I made the difficult return journey to Berlin. The sun shone, the countryside slumbered peacefully but I was heading back to hell. Perhaps it was a good thing that we were so stressed in Berlin and had little time for morbid reflection. I was able to phone my wife for a few weeks more until the Americans cut the lines.
At the end of March Hitler was surprised by the arrival of Eva Braun at the Reich Chancellery. She had come of her own free will. Hitler wanted to send her straight back to Munich and gave Hoffmann the job of persuading her. Despite his efforts, she was quite determined that she wanted to be at Hitler’s side and from then on she lived in the bunker in a room adjacent to Hitler’s private quarters and accustomed herself completely to the atmosphere of bunker life. She always dressed carefully and tastefully, was an example to all in her conduct and showed no sign of weakness to the very last. At the time I was lodging in a basement room in the housekeeper’s wing. Towards the end I moved into a bunker room stuffed full of housekeeper Kannenberg’s clothing and requisites.
At the beginning of April Hitler promoted Schörner to field marshal. The Press statement announced that Schörner ‘as scarcely any other German general, is a symbol of the unshakeable steadfastness of Germany’s defences in the East’. In this Hitler was referring to Schörner’s effectiveness as C-in-C of Army Groups in Kurland, Silesia and the Protectorate.
On 13 April Vienna fell. A few days earlier, on 8 and 9 April, the executions of Admiral Canaris and General Oster had been announced. A rumour spread that the Admiral’s diaries had been found, which of themselves gave ammunition enough to condemn him. If this were true, it surprised me that such a careful man as Canaris, an opponent of Hitler from the beginning, should have kept a diary.
It became the custom after the situation conference that Johanna Wolff—Hitler’s private secretary—and Admiral von Puttkamer would come to my room for coffee. We kept up this informal arrangement as a diversion from the hopelessness of our plight. We talked mainly of the past. In the last week of April, during a conversation, Hitler asked me quite suddenly about my future plans and intentions. I replied that as his adjutant I had no choice—I would remain with him in the bunker. He greeted this with the brief observation that in view of the uncertainties he needed to have around him people in whom he could trust.
On 12 April Kesselring visited Hitler for the last time, probably to receive instructions first-hand. Hitler left no doubt that he had not yet given up. Kesselring was obviously not deceived and probably decided that henceforth he would follow his own inclinations. Outwardly he was still the optimist: this was the ingrained way he had to encourage his men, to get them to put their shoulders to the wheel when matters seemed at their worst. He had been to my in-laws’ estate a few days previously and brought news of my wife.
In the evening of 12 April Goebbels arrived with news of Roosevelt’s death. He informed the bunker inhabitants that the event signified the turn in Germany’s fortunes. He saw a working of the ‘historical Almighty’ and said that ‘Justice’ was becoming visible once more. Hitler took a more sober view devoid of optimism, although he did not rule out the possibility that the death could have political consequences for us. He reminded everybody that Roosevelt had had a ruthless attitude towards Britain and it had always been his objective to destroy that very colonialism by which Britain had achieved her greatness. Goebbels insisted on clutching at the straw, however, and even influenced the Press to cast Roosevelt’s death in a positive light. He was hoping thereby to highlight the contrasts between the West and the Soviet Union and foment discord. Earlier that day Speer had arranged the final concert of the Berlin Philharmonic. Their hall was still partially intact. Together with Speer and Dönitz I listened to the finale of Götterdämmerung, Beethoven’s Violin Concerto and Bruckner’s 8th Symphony. Afterwards we returned to the Chancellery across the ruins of the Potsdamer Platz.
In order to provide a leader for Germany should the Reich be divided into two halves, north and south, on 15 April Hitler issued a decree vesting leadership in Dönitz and Kesselring respectively. Hitler appealed next to the soldiers of the Eastern Front. He was expecting hourly the Russian attack across the Oder. Recently he had held frequent telephone conversations with General Busse, C-in-C Ninth Army, and made available to him all the weapons he could muster. His last hope was to repulse this Russian attack. He declared: ‘Berlin remains German. Vienna will be German again. Europe will never become Russian.’ Referring to Roosevelt’s death, he concluded: ‘Now that Fate has taken from us the greatest war criminal in history, there will be a decisive change in this war.’ I have no explanation today what this optimistic statement was supposed to achieve, nor what Hitler himself believed, so intermingled were his ideas of fantasy and reality. For myself, I was quite sure. The Russians and the Americans would occupy the German Reich. There was nothing to suggest that they would stop at some point short of taking every single square metre. I never shared Hitler’s belief in a breach of the East-West alliance. His political thinking anticipated events, but I thought that the ideological differences would not take effect until after the war had ended. Any hope of peace on this basis was therefore illusory and an unconditional surrender was inevitable.
The Russian offensive across the Oder began on 16 April with a ninety-minute artillery barrage—one of the biggest in military history. When the Russians attacked, they were held off. Another ninety-minute barrage followed that afternoon, after which the Russians broke through the German lines north of Küstrin on the west bank of the Oder. On the 17th and 18th they crossed south of Frankfurt and began to amass. Shortly after this our whole Oder front collapsed, offering the Red Army the opportunity to reinforce their penetration with armour. During the next few days they combed forward in a line stretching from north of Berlin near Oranienburg to the south of Berlin near Zossen. No military acumen was needed to see that the intention was to encircle the Reich capital. Opposition was patchy. In the south the armies of Busse and later Wenck were forced ever further westwards across the Elbe. To the north of Berlin stood the last German groups under Generalleutnant Heinrici and SS-Obergruppenführer Steiner. But these, outnumbered and exhausted, were soon forced back too. In the days up to 23 April Hitler interfered repeatedly in the conduct of the German defence but saw ultimately that it was futile.
The best situation reports were being delivered by Oberstleutnant de Maizière. As a rule he stayed up at night to draft the day’s events. His style was terse, clear, devoid of pathos and without refinement. Most listeners were very impressed, and even Hitler, who could no longer expect to hear anything agreeable from the Eastern Front, took pleasure in the precise manner of presentation and valued Maizière’s reports, black though they might be.
For the situation conference of 20 April, Hitler’s 56th birthday, Göring, Dönitz, Keitel, Ribbentrop, Speer, Jodl, Himmler, Kaltenbrunner, Krebs, Burgdorf and many others were present: Hitler accepted their birthday wishes and then went immediately to the business of the day. Afterwards Hitler had several private conversations. Göring asked Hitler to be excused since there was something urgent he had to attend to in southern Germany: probably he would only be able to get there by road. With that he took his leave. I had the impression that inwardly Hitler had rejected him. It was an unpleasant moment. Dönitz also took his final leave of Hitler, receiving the brief instruction to take over the government in north Germany and prepare himself for an honourable fight to the finish. Hitler’s words implied great trust in Dönitz. Of others present, such as Himmler, Kaltenbrunner and Ribbentrop, he parted without much ceremony.
That day it seemed to me that Hitler was wavering about remaining in Berlin. A general spirit of unrest pervaded the bunkers; a portent of upheaval was in the air. Puttkamer was sent with two NCOs to destroy all papers at Obersalzberg. I asked him to burn my diaries which I kept there. He promised to do this and confirmed on his return that they had been burnt, together with Schmundt’s notes. Fräulein Wolf and other members of the personal Adjutantur now prepared to leave the bunker. In the late evening we gathered in Hitler’s small living room for drinks—Eva Braun, Hitler’s secretaries Gerda Christian and Trautl Junge and his vegetarian cook Constanze Marzialy, plus Schaub, Lorenz and myself. The war was not mentioned: Gerda Christian was good at getting Hitler to talk on other subjects.
On 22 April Keitel and Jodl urged Hitler to leave Berlin. He was still undecided when a furore occurred during the situation conference. The reports submitted by the various commanders of the armies fighting for Berlin were contradictory. It seemed that each was putting up his own private fight but that an organised resistance was not possible. Krebs could not resolve the difficulty. It was not clear whether it was a consequence of the Russian superiority or the collapse of our own command structure (if this was still possible). Hitler became very irate. He ordered everybody from the room with the exception of Keitel, Jodl, Krebs and Burgdorf and then unleashed a furious tirade against the Army commanders and their ‘long-term treachery’. I was sitting near the door in the annexe and heard almost every word. It was a terrible half-hour. After this outburst, however, he had at least made up his mind about his destiny. He ordered Keitel and Jodl to report to Dönitz in northern Germany and continue the war from there. He, Hitler, would remain in Berlin and take his own life.
After Keitel and Jodl had departed, Schaub was given the task of destroying the contents of Hitler’s personal safe in the bunker and then make his way to Berchtesgaden to burn any remaining private papers he found there.
Hitler’s close circle was being reduced almost hourly. One noticed how each was preoccupied by private thoughts. There was a peculiar atmosphere abroad that day. Only Goebbels’ State Secretary, Dr Naumann, who had arrived in the bunker a short while previously from the Propaganda Ministry, seemed phlegmatic.
On 23 April Dr Goebbels issued a Press and radio statement that Hitler would remain in Berlin and command ‘all forces assembled for the defence of Berlin’. On this day Hitler transferred all other responsibilities to Dönitz and Kesselring. He kept with him as his only military advisers Krebs, the latter’s General Staff officer Major von Freytag-Loringhausen and the young cavalry captain Boldt, who was in charge of telephone communications whilst these remained possible. Besides these were present Bormann, Goebbels, Hewel, Voss, Hitler’s pilot Baur, Burgdorf with his adjutant Oberstleutnant Weiss, Heinz Lorenz as Press Officer, Johannmeyer and myself from the military Adjutantur, plus Günsche of the personal Adjutantur in the Chancellery bunkers.
That afternoon Göring’s telex arrived, the first copy for Hitler, the second addressed personally to me. I read the text at once: ‘Mein Führer! In accordance with your decision to remain at your battle HQ in the fortress of Berlin, are you agreed that I take overall command of the Reich at once with full freedom of manoeuvre at home and abroad in pursuance of your edict of 29.6.1941 as your representative? If I do not receive your answer by 2200 hours, I shall assume that you have been deprived of your freedom of action, in which case I accept that you award me the provisions of your edict to act for the welfare of Volk and Fatherland. You know what I feel for you but cannot find the words to express in these worst hours of my life. God protect you and despite everything allow you to come here as soon as possible. Your loyal, Hermann Göring.”
I was horrified and feared the worst, since there could no longer be any doubt about Hitler’s uncompromising attitude and his complete break with his former entourage. I went to the Führerbunker at once, telex in hand, and found Hitler sitting with Bormann discussing it in the common sitting room. Hitler saw at once that I was in the picture and said merely, ‘What do you think about it? I have relieved Göring of his post. Are you satisfied now?’ I replied, ‘Mein Führer, too late.’ A long conversation ensued in which Hitler attempted to understand Göring’s intentions. I took the text literally and gave my opinion that Göring actually believed that he could still negotiate with the Western leaders. Hitler condemned this as utopic.
In the afternoon Speer came to the Führerbunker to take his leave of Hitler. They discussed Göring’s behaviour, but Hitler stood firm by his decision to relieve Göring of all his posts and to have him held in ‘honourable house arrest’ at the Obersalzberg. This was an extremely unpleasant and completely unnecessary reaction. Hitler was undoubtedly influenced by Bormann, who sent the enabling telex to Obersalzberg. While speaking privately that evening with Hitler about Göring, I saw that he had some sympathy for his behaviour but was of the opinion that, as his Deputy, Göring had to act under Hitler’s own instructions. There was no possibility of negotiating with the enemy. Hitler ordered me to have General Ritter von Greim summoned to Berlin so that he could appoint him as Göring’s successor as Luftwaffe C-in-C.
On 24 April the enemy ring around the Chancellery was drawn a little tighter. Russian units between the Anhalter and Potsdam railway termini were advancing very slowly and cautiously, taking no risks. This enabled contact to be maintained with the new military commander of Berlin, General Weidling, whose battle HQ was to the west of the city. He commanded LVI Panzer Korps, which had fought a rearguard action to Berlin all the way from the Oder. Weidling attended the situation conference in the bunker every day.
On 25 April Soviet and American troops met up at Torgau on the Elbe. The relief attack of Army Wenck, Hitler’s last hope, had failed near Potsdam. Next day Wenck began disengaging from heavily superior Russian forces to withdraw westwards across the Elbe. The centre of Berlin lay under increasing Russian artillery fire and soon the first shells hit the Chancellery ruins. Also on the 25th the USAAF made a theatrical, meaningless raid on Obersalzberg. Hitler had long expected it, but now, in the last days of the war, thought it unlikely. He knew that there were good air raid shelters for the residents and therefore did not concern himself unduly.
Late in the afternoon of 26 April Ritter von Greim arrived, accompanied by Hanna Reitsch. Greim had been wounded during the flight and had to be treated at once by Dr Stumpfegger. Hitler visited Greim in the first-aid room and had a very frank conversation with him, mostly about Göring. Then he spoke about what lay before the Luftwaffe in the next few days. Hitler expected the Luftwaffe to take part in the final battle for Berlin, even though he knew that there were no battleworthy units left. With this order he reached the high point of his self-deception. He promoted Greim to field marshal and appointed him C-in-C of the Luftwaffe.
Greim, practising forbearance throughout, told me that he would stay here in the bunker to the last; Hanna Reitsch made a similar request to me. On 27 Hitler decided that Greim should leave the city as soon as possible. On the 28th I succeeded, with the greatest difficulty, in getting his Fieseler Storch clear to start, after which Greim and his companion got out of the shambles and reached Rechlin—a very meritable achievement.
During 27 April Hitler spoke to me of my future plans. I told him I had none but would wait and see how things developed before deciding. I knew that my wife and children were safe. Hitler gave me a cyanide capsule in case I encountered a difficult situation with no way out. I put the poison away safely. Hitler then surprised me by saying, ‘I have decided to order the commander of Berlin to break out. For myself I will remain here and die in the place where I worked so many years of my life. But my staff must also attempt to go. Most of all, it is important to me that Goebbels and Bormann should get out safely.’ Thus, after originally insisting on being surrounded by people he could trust to the last, he had now reversed his intention. I asked Hitler whether, in view of the circumstances in Berlin, he believed that this break-out stood any chance of success. He replied, ‘I believe that the situation has now changed. The Western Allies will no longer insist on the unconditional surrender demanded at Casablanca. It appears quite clear from the foreign Press reports of recent weeks that the Yalta Conference was a disappointment for the United States and Britain. Stalin must have made demands which the Western Powers conceded only reluctantly for fear that Stalin would otherwise go his own way. I have the impression that the three big men at Yalta did not leave as friends. Now Roosevelt is dead, and Churchill has never loved the Russians. He will be interested in not allowing the Russians to advance too far through Germany.’ Hitler decided that I should go too, and attempt to fight my way through to Dönitz and Keitel.
I reported this conversation with Hitler to Krebs and Burgdorf at once. Krebs told Weidling of Hitler’s change of view and ordered him to prepare an outline plan for the orderly break-out. We attended this conference on tenterhooks. Reports were all bad. After initial successes, Army Wenck had been driven back by the Russians. Hitler relapsed into apathy as he often did in these final days. Weidling’s plan for a break-out depended on Wenck’s thrust succeeding. As this now seemed unlikely, Hitler said that the idea of a break-out was hopeless.
The same evening Hitler spoke at length with Goebbels, who for some time had been planning to die in Berlin with his wife and five children. Hitler attempted in vain to dissuade him but eventually agreed that the family could move into the bunker.
That same day, 28 April, the BBC announced that Himmler had offered capitulation to the Allies. According to this report, he had met the Swedish Count Bernadotte in Lübeck on the 24th and set out his ideas. At about this time Fegelein rang me. He told me of the goings-on and in response to my enquiry as to his own whereabouts he said that he was ‘in the city’. I did not take this amiss at the time and only thought it strange after hearing the BBC bulletin about Himmler’s dealings. The latter Hitler dismissed with contempt and it had obviously annoyed him. Probably he had expected it of Himmler, and during the day his bitterness at Himmler’s activities increased. He ordered Fegelein to report to him, but he could not be found: an SS squad discovered him at a flat on the Kurfürstendamm dressed in civilian clothes. He was brought to the Reich Chancellery, where a drumhead court-martial was held. After a short hearing Fegelein was found guilty of desertion and sentenced to death. The sentence was carried out immediately.
During the day numerous reports made clear that the remaining German forces had been forced out of Berlin, were dispersing or had been thrown back across the Elbe into the Western sector. Berlin could no longer be relieved, and Hitler accepted this fact.
After the evening meal Hitler sent for a registrar to marry him to Eva Braun. We congratulated the couple and Eva Hitler accepted our best wishes in full knowledge of her role and imminent death. We filed into his living room for a short celebratory drink. All residents of the bunker participated and we made the effort to think of old times. It was a rather eerie situation. Hitler’s marriage at this hour, at the end of his life, was to thank Eva Braun for coming of her own accord to be with him during the last hours of the Third Reich and to share his fate.
Hitler now dictated two testaments, one political and the other private, and signed them at 0400 on 29 April. I was very surprised to be invited to witness the private testament with Bormann and Goebbels. Considering his approaching demise, the political testament was a depressing certificate of self-deception. The various anti-Jewish sentiments expressed were an embarrassment. I also found odd and completely meaningless the testamentary settlement of succession and the installation of a new Reich Government. The unlucky incumbent would have had little freedom of action. The private testament began with an emotional offer of gratitude to his wife, who was determined to die with him. There followed a disposition about his art collection intended for Linz and general bequests for family members and collaborators. Bormann was nominated as trustee.
Hitler had virtually entered seclusion, although he kept himself informed during the day of the fighting. He no longer interfered in the proceedings. The hitherto normal mood of hopelessness in the bunker sank to a new low. Sorrow, depression and despair spread and the masks dropped. Each asked what he could do after Hitler’s death. Hitler’s mood was unstable and one could not easily follow his thinking. The time was long gone when we maintained an ‘official’ attitude of respect in speaking of him. All expressed their opinions frankly. We recognised Hitler in all honesty as a great man—not in the moral sense, of course, but as a political revolutionary, for whose achievements we would always have respect and from whom we still maintained a correct distance. Spiritually the flame in him still burned brightly.
At midday on 29 April I asked Hitler if he would allow me to attempt a break-out to the West. He considered this straightaway and said only that it would probably be impossible. I replied that I thought the way to the West would still be free. As to the danger of my intention, I had no illusions. Hitler gave me written authority to go and said I should report to Dönitz. That afternoon I made my preparations and decided to take ‘light gear’—haversack and machine pistol. I took part in the evening situation conference and reported to Hitler afterwards. He gave me his hand and said only ‘Alles gute’—best of luck. What happened in the bunker subsequently I know only by hearsay.
Together with the old man of the Adjutantur, Mathiesing, I went through the subterranean corridors of the Chancellery to the eastern exit near the garages and left at midnight on 29 April, the last of the military adjutants and Hitler’s close military entourage to emerge alive.
As I stepped out of the Chancellery I saw before me an absolute inferno. A confusion of cables, rubble and tram wires lay around—ruins, bomb craters and artillery craters. There was a serious fire in the Potsdamer Platz area. The whole city was enveloped as far as one could see in a mixture of smoke and fog from the many fires crackling on all sides. I wondered what was worse—to be here under Russian bombardment or awaiting death in the bunker. We headed north along the Hermann Göring Strasse to the Brandenburg Gate, bore left towards the zoo, along the East–West axis, past the Victory Column to the railway embankment, made another left turn and after a few steps reached the large municipal air raid shelter.
On this walk through the burning and mostly destroyed city I felt an enormous relief. With every step it became clearer to me that I had nothing left to do. It was all the same to me whatever happened now. I was free at last of all the responsibility and depressing burden of the Hitler years.25