CHAPTER EIGHT

MORTAIN

‘‘Wake up! Everybody up! Outta bed!” Orderlies poked their heads into the officers’ pup tents, shaking the lieutenants awake.

With his head still spinning from the previous night’s drunk, Bill looked at his watch—0430 hours. “What?”¹

“Orders. Every officer has to report immediately,” the orderlies said.

The other lieutenants struggled out of their bedrolls and got dressed. Not an easy task, hung over as they were. They hurried over to the battalion CP while the sergeants rousted the enlisted men.

Overnight, the Germans had launched a surprise counterattack against the 30^th Infantry Division and overran the key town of Mortain. Unlike past, localized counterattacks, the Germans struck the eastern flank of the American breakout with four panzer divisions.

General Collins ordered the 4^th Infantry Division to shore up that flank to keep the Germans from driving to Avranches on the Normandy coast, a move that could cut off the entire American breakout. So much for the rest period. To secure the regiment’s assembly area, Colonel Luckett sent the 2^nd Battalion to guard a bridge over the See River southeast of Brecey. Bill’s head still swirled from the vodka consumed the night before as his platoon hustled to load their vehicles. The battalion secured the See River bridgehead by 0847 hours.²

The men of the 12^th Infantry knew that the German counterattack signaled something big but they had no concept of the strategic significance of the Germans’ Operation Luttich. Since mid-June, Hitler had ordered a strategic defensive in Normandy, partly due to his low opinion of the fighting qualities of Allied armies. During June and July, the German high command fed available units piecemeal into Normandy to contain the Allies. Hitler and his general staff (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht—OKW) turned a deaf ear to the complaints of Rommel, von Rundstedt, and, later, von Kluge about the grinding attrition suffered by the Seventh Army and Panzer Group West as long as the Allies seemed to be bottled up in the hedgerows. The sudden breakout and rapid exploitation by the Americans startled Hitler and OKW who now perceived the potential collapse of the Western Front. Hitler decided to gamble by adopting a strategic offensive to pinch off the American penetration and throw them back into the Cotentin Peninsula. On August 2, he issued orders to von Kluge, commander of Oberbefehlshaber West (OB West), to launch a massive armored attack that would split the American forces along the Mortain–Avranches axis. OKW named the ambitious offensive Operation Luttich.

Field Marshal von Kluge had already begun planning a tactical counterattack against the waist of the American breakout in hopes of blunting the onslaught and buying time for a strategic withdrawal to the Seine River.

Von Kluge decided to attack on the night of August 6-7 with the 1^st SS Panzer, 2^nd Panzer, 2^nd SS Panzer, and 116^th Panzer Divisions, all the panzer divisions he dared pull from the line without risking disaster. The strike force looked impressive on paper but these units, depleted by the hard fighting in Normandy, mustered only 100–130 tanks among them. At the last minute, Hitler offered von Kluge more tanks but the field marshal did not want to delay the offensive and refused.³

At 0200 hours on August 7, the 2^nd SS “Das Reich” Panzer Division slammed into the 120^th Infantry Regiment of the 30^th Infantry Division at Mortain, achieving complete surprise. The division’s Deutschland Regiment swept into Mortain around the southern side of Hill 314 and trapped the 120^th Infantry’s 2^nd Battalion on the hilltop. Its Der Fuhrer Regiment tried to enter the town around the northern side of Hill 314 but ran into well-positioned 3” towed anti-tank guns near l’Abbaye Blanche that stopped the assault and forced the Panzergrenadieren to dismount. One kilometer north of l’Abbaye Blanche, the 1^st SS “Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler” Panzer Division, driving up the highway from Sourdeval, reached the vital intersection with the main highway running from Mortain to St. Barthelemy, Juvigny, and Avranches. The panzers turned north at the road junction (called RJ 278 by the Americans) and attacked the 117^th Infantry Regiment at St. Barthelemy. At the same time, the 2^nd Panzer Division struck St. Barthelemy from the opposite direction. The panzers took the small town but their advance stalled under increasing resistance from the American infantrymen. Another column from the 2^nd Panzer Division found a gap in the American defense and pushed west along the See River valley to le Mesnil-Adelée. That attack ended when they ran into a force of tanks from the U.S. 2^nd Armored Division. Farther north, the 116th Panzer Division’s commander, discouraged by what he considered to be poor prospects of success, elected not to participate in the initial attack.

The Germans held Mortain and St. Barthelemy, RJ 278, and the highway leading back to Sourdeval. They also had an American battalion trapped on Hill 314. Even with these local successes, the all-important, last-ditch effort to cut off the American breakout had ground to a halt by noon of its first day. The Germans reverted to a tactical defense, at least until darkness fell. The German tank commanders knew better than to move around in clear weather. When the morning fog burned off, British Typhoon fighter-bombers swarmed the German columns like a flock of seabirds diving on a bait-ball. The British ‘Jabos’ strafed and bombed any German vehicles left on the roads or lacking adequate camouflage.⁴

By the afternoon of August 7, OB West and von Kluge realized Operation Luttich had failed and prepared to withdraw. Hitler, who had an uncanny habit of turning defeat into disaster, ordered von Kluge to double-down on the attack with three more panzer divisions. He directed von Kluge to pull the additional panzer units from the British front and organize a combined strike force under Lt. Gen. Heinrich Eberbach. Because of the time needed to collect the additional forces, Eberbach planned to launch the second phase of Operation Luttich on August 11. This attack failed to materialize because all three panzer divisions got siphoned off to shore up crumbling German defenses elsewhere. The four panzer divisions already committed at Mortain could only defend in place, waiting for a second attack that would never come.⁵

General Collins may have been relieved that the German counterattack had been stopped but the 30^th Infantry Division’s situation still worried him. He decided to attach the 12^th Infantry to the 30^th Infantry Division as a reserve force. Back in Brecey, the Ivy Division alerted Colonel Luckett to get a battalion on the road that afternoon. All of Combat Team 12’s trucks, tanks, and tank destroyers rolled out at 1930 hours on August 7 with the 3^rd Battalion in the lead, followed by 2^nd Battalion.⁶

The convoy passed through Montigny on its way south, fighting traffic the whole time. Tanks, supply vehicles, and other unit convoys crammed the road and broke into the regiment’s march serials. The miserable motor convoy turned into a nightmare when the Luftwaffe showed up at 0150 hours.⁷

Bill heard the German fighter-bombers bearing down on the stalled column. He dove out of his jeep into a ditch then wedged himself into the available cover with twenty other men. “There was enough room for three,” he recalled. The planes roared by with their cannons blazing. Seconds later the bombs hit. One of the Cannon Company’s halftracks, farther back in the column, blew up. It carried a basic load of 105mm artillery rounds. Some of these detonated, tossing more rounds into the air. The exploding ammunition caused an inferno and lit up the countryside. As soon as the German fighter-bombers left, Bill’s march serial continued moving. The Cannon Company and the 1^st Battalion had to back up and take an alternate route to get around the demolished halftrack.

Bill’s convoy reached its destination near the hamlet of Fontenay, eight kilometers west of Mortain, around 0400 hours on August 8. Their new masters in the 30^th Infantry Division hardly gave them time to pee before they started issuing orders. They had already detached the 3^rd Battalion from the regiment and sent it to reinforce the 117^th Infantry’s attack against St. Barthelemy. Now, they told Colonel Luckett to seize the crucial Road Junction (RJ) 278 (278 represented the intersection’s elevation in meters) that lay between St. Barthelemy and l’Abbaye Blanche with his two remaining battalions. The division scheduled the attack for 1000 hours. So much for being held in reserve.⁸

The 2^nd Battalion led CT 12’s movement from Fontenay to la Chevalaye. The battalion turned east and shifted into its attack formation. Lt. Col. Gerden Johnson used a standard attack formation of two companies (F and G) up and one (E) back. Bill’s platoon supported F Company. With five kilometers to cross before the objective, Bill would have had his sections in echelon, two machine guns dismounted up front, the other two riding in jeeps. By 1250 hours the battalion crossed a stream 1600 meters east of la Chevalaye that marked their LD.⁹

The advance proceeded smoothly for the first three kilometers with the lead companies following a compass azimuth in the general direction of St. Barthelemy. At 1430 hours the battalion reached a trail crossing atop a ridgeline that the regiment designated “Point B.” It lay 1900 meters due west of RJ 278. Looking ahead, Bill could see low ground with a small stream dribbling southward across the avenue of advance. Once past the stream, the battalion would have to climb a gentle grade to the vital Mortain-St. Barthelemy highway running along a ridge. Colonel Johnson halted the advance while he sent scouts ahead to check out the nearest stream crossing. The temporary halt gave Bill’s platoon a chance to set up its guns to overwatch the open ground ahead. The stream, la Rivière Dorée, did not look like much on the map but only one small bridge—marked on American maps as “Point D”—crossed it along its four-kilometer course. The infantry would have no trouble crossing the stream but Johnson worried about the jeeps and trucks that had to bring forward the battalion’s supplies, as well as the Sherman tanks of B Company, 70^th Tank Battalion.

The scouts returned an hour later with discouraging news. The Germans defended the small bridge at Point D one kilometer to the southeast with twenty-three armored vehicles and dug-in infantry. The trail over the bridge ran between two positions defended by the Der Fuhrer Regiment of the Das Reich Division. The scouts discovered another German defensive position 1,600 meters south-southeast from Point B on a wooded hilltop called Roche Grise.¹⁰ (See Maps VI and VII)

Colonel Luckett modified his attack plan. He ordered Johnson’s 2^nd Battalion to attack east across la Rivière Dorée to the original objective, RJ 278. Luckett then detoured the 1^st Battalion south to hook up with a battalion from the 120^th Infantry. Together, those two battalions would drive toward Mortain, overrunning the German outpost on Roche Grise in the process. Luckett’s decision effectively split the regiment’s two remaining battalions into two separate and non-supporting avenues of advance.¹¹

Bill’s battalion resumed the attack at 1830 hours, without its attached tanks, staying well north of the Panzergrenadieren at Point D. Bill moved forward with two of his machine guns while the other two provided overwatch. As they moved into the low ground, the troops found their boots sinking into the soggy terrain. The men splashed across la Rivière Dorée and continued east through more water-soaked ground. The officers in H Company immediately realized the soft ground could not support vehicles. Bill’s jeeps brought the other machine gun section as far forward as they could. From there the crews carried everything forward.¹²

After the Americans climbed out of the wetlands, they advanced up the long slope through several fields filled with ripening wheat. Scouts crept along rows of tangled hawthorn shrubs and oak trees. Behind them the lead rifle squads stepped across the open spaces, rifles at the ready. Other squads overwatched their buddies until they shuttled forward to take over the lead. Bill’s platoon stayed with F Company on the left (north) flank of the battalion, blending into the cover of la Tourablere’s orchard. G Company hugged the orchard at la Deliniere three hundred meters to the south. Just beyond the two orchards, the infantrymen crossed a north-south trail. While they inched ahead, the men could hear the rattling of small arms and the crump…crump of artillery to the north near St. Barthelemy and to the south by Roche Grise. Both sister battalions had run into fierce fights. The men in F and G Companies wondered how long before they caught hell from the Germans.¹³

Map VI

Map VII

The 2^nd Battalion advanced against only minor resistance because it hit a seam separating the Das Reich Division defending Mortain and the Leibstandarte Division holding St. Barthelemy. The Germans had used the north-south trail as a line of communication between the two panzer divisions. When they spotted the Americans crossing it, they reacted with vigor. The battalion’s lead elements ran into Panzergrenadieren defending the highway, just as they picked up the squeal of incoming shells and dove for cover. Artillery, mortars, and rockets rained down on the exposed infantry. Private Dick Stodghill described the terrifying attack. “The ear-splitting explosions all around and the howling of the Screaming Meemies made a preacher’s threat of Hell seem laughable.” To get out from under the intense barrage, the riflemen had to keep moving forward. The threat from enemy rifle fire and machine guns paled next to the horrific shelling. It seemed better to take chances against an enemy you can shoot. “We had the advantage of fear driven desire to get close to them and stay close to them…The result was a brutal firefight, but now we could return shot for shot…Fire and movement—fire at the enemy, and if you can’t see him then empty a clip at the place where you think he is. Move ahead, fire and then move again.” The two companies crawled within sight of RJ 278, so close to the German positions that the enemy dared not bring artillery on them. “By nightfall each side held grimly onto a section of roadway, but neither could claim it as their own.”¹⁴

The Germans launched a hasty counterattack near sunset, spear-headed by two tanks, three armored cars, and six motorcycles. The armored vehicles sprayed the hedgerows with their machine guns and the tanks fired high explosive (HE) main gun rounds anywhere their crews thought the American infantry might be hiding. Without heavy anti-tank weapons, the hapless American riflemen had nothing to fire back at the German armor, yet they held on. Colonel Luckett ordered Johnson to pull back a couple hundred meters from RJ 278, enough so he could bombard the intersection with artillery, hoping to drive off the enemy counterattack. F and G Companies stayed within “danger close” range of the incoming friendly artillery shells that hammered the intersection. The shelling forced the German armor to withdraw, but the enemy infantry clung to RJ 278. Although the Americans did not occupy the road junction, their machine guns still covered the roadway with fire. Stalemate.¹⁵

The enemy devised a new plan to sever F and G Companies from the rest of the battalion. An enemy tank pulled into the north-south lane at its north end, just outside of St. Barthelemy. From there, the trail ran straight south for a distance of nine hundred meters. At the south end of the straight section, a second tank pulled into the lane facing north. Both tanks opened fire with their machine guns, bookending the north-south trail. A machine gun bullet has a flat trajectory for 500-600 meters before it begins a downward arc. The fire from the two German tanks covered the straight length of the trail with an overlapping wall of fire, yet the rounds fell to the ground before reaching the opposite tank.¹⁶

The battalion had a platoon of tanks and a platoon of towed 57mm anti-tank guns but they were stuck on the other side of the stream. That left the rifle companies with only bazookas to use against the tanks. The German tank crews had little to fear from the American riflemen.

The battalion’s inability to knock out German tanks illustrated the relative weakness of American anti-tank weapons in 1944. The Germans had the fabulous 88 that could take out any Allied tank at long range. The Americans’ 57mm anti-tank gun was barely effective against the German Mark IV but virtually useless against a Panther or Tiger. The German Panzerfaust could punch through 200mm of armor whereas the American bazooka could only penetrate 100mm, less than the frontal armor of late model German tanks. Even Sherman tanks and M10 tank destroyers could not stop Panthers or Tigers head-on.¹⁷

Colonel Johnson moved his CP forward into the farmhouse at la Tourablere. With his rifle companies so close to the vital objective, he decided to hold the battalion’s position overnight, tenuous as it was. The 2^nd Battalion suffered the consequences of the 12^th Infantry’s three disjointed attacks. The battalion made it to the objective but the regiment had no reserve force to help them finish the job. The other two battalions were stuck at St. Barthelemy and Roche Grise. None of the three attacks had sufficient strength to succeed, although 2^nd Battalion came closest. Johnson determined that the enemy tanks sitting on the battalion’s flanks posed the biggest threat. He told the companies to shore up both flanks along the north-south trail with bazookas. Bill positioned his machine guns to stop any infantry attack against the left flank coming from St. Barthelemy. He also established sectors of fire and FPLs covering the approaches over the adjacent fields.¹⁸

The Germans shelled the battalion incessantly. The Americans burrowed into their hasty foxholes as enemy 105mm and 150mm shells burst around them and overhead. Shock waves and shrapnel tore through the vegetation and gashed the soil. The air filled with smoke, dust, and falling debris. Bill covered his ears and held his mouth open to relieve the over-pressure from the blasts. Each near miss felt like a punch from Joe Louis. The infantrymen could do nothing but pray that the next incoming round missed their position.

The 30^th Infantry Division’s deputy commander, Brigadier General William Harrison, contacted Colonel Johnson directly to gauge the 2^nd Battalion’s status. Johnson told the general that the rifle companies were isolated and in serious jeopardy. Casualty evacuation and re-supply had to be done by foot over a swamp. Worse, they could not get any tanks or tank destroyers forward to drive off the enemy armored vehicles. General Harrison promised Johnson that the engineers would give top priority to bridging the stream and bog. He confirmed that the attack on the original objective would continue the next morning, presumably after the tanks and tank destroyers joined the rifle companies.

That night Colonel Johnson learned, firsthand, the degree of fanaticism the battalion faced. A prisoner, an arrogant and sullen nineteen-year-old SS Panzergrenadier, was brought in for interrogation. When the colonel asked where he was from, the prisoner said that he had enlisted from Hamburg. “Then, doesn’t it worry you to be up here in Western France fighting us and wondering what is happening back home?” Johnson asked.

“No, why should it?”

The colonel inquired about any family members who might be in Hamburg and subjected to Allied bombing. The prisoner confirmed that his parents and sister still lived in Hamburg. Johnson asked, “Don’t you worry about their safety?”

“No. It’s up to them to look out for themselves. It makes no difference to me.”

“Don’t you feel that you owe anything to your family?”

“No, of course not.”

“Then just who do you think you owe anything to in this world?”

“Hitler. Heil Hitler!”¹⁹

That night, the 4^th Engineers, augmented by the regiment’s pioneer and wire sections, threw themselves into the work but they had more to do than put up a small bridge; they also had to build a path that could support thirty-ton Shermans over several hundred meters of soggy ground. Until this work was completed, the tanks attached to CT 12 could do nothing but wait. One of the tankers observed, “When we pulled up, the fire was everywhere in an arc in front of us. There was a lot of infantry around, and they were really getting shot up. We pulled into a field, put our tanks in a ring, and got them camouflaged. All we could do was sit there and let them shell us for several days.”²⁰

The Battle of Mortain appeared to be the one time in the Normandy campaign in which the Germans matched the Allies, round for round, in artillery. Besides hitting the frontline companies, the enemy pounded American artillery, mortar, and support positions. Even back at the regiment’s CP, the enemy artillery had effect. One of the men in the counterintelligence section, J. D. Salinger, confessed in a letter, “I dig my fox-holes down to a cowardly depth.” The Americans had abundant artillery on hand to suppress the German guns with counter-battery fire, but the enemy guns stayed mostly hidden from the American observers because of the terrain and their effective camouflage. The division devoted much of its artillery fire to protecting the isolated battalion on Hill 314.²¹

As soon as dawn shed enough light, the German observers spotted the American engineers at work in the streambed and called fire on the crossing site. Everyone watched with dismay as the enemy artillery demolished much of what had been done overnight. Without tanks, tank destroyers, or a line of resupply, the battalion now had little chance to take the road junction.²²

At 0750 hours, German tanks and infantry joined the artillery in firing on Bill’s battalion. The situation at the battalion forward CP inside the farmhouse became tense. A tank round knocked down the adjacent building. A few seconds later another tank shell hit the farmhouse, wounding one of the company commanders. The aid station had already accumulated a large number of casualties, including several with combat fatigue. Under this intense fire and faced with the knowledge that he would receive no armor support, Colonel Johnson ordered the rifle companies to pull back behind la Rivière Dorée. At least from there they could evacuate the wounded, reorganize, and rearm before resuming the attack.²³

Bill saw a big problem in moving his platoon back to the streambed. With all his guns on the east side of the north-south trail covered by the German tanks, he had to find a way to cross the dangerous lane. Scouting along hedgerows, he found a spot on the road with a slight crest. The minor hump in elevation offered only a foot or two of masking from the southern end of the trail. If the troops hunched over, they could slip across with minimal exposure to the direct fire coming from that direction. The dust kicked up by the incoming artillery added a veil of concealment from the north end. He scurried to the west side of the trail to test the crossing site. Safely across, he reconnoitered a path back to la Tourablere’s orchard. Bill re-crossed the road, returned to his platoon, and gathered the men. Bill’s crews moved along hedgerows, hidden from the Germans, as he led them to the trail crossing. After getting careful instructions from their lieutenant, the men scampered to the west side. Bill then led them back to the battalion rally point. F Company followed Bill’s platoon along the same path to safety.²⁴

Colonel Johnson pleaded for airstrikes against the Germans to cover the withdrawal but the regiment could not get the mission approved. Major Gorn told Johnson to “use all the artillery you need.” The 42^nd Artillery Battalion, in direct support to the regiment, responded to Johnson’s requests. They took out a tank and self-propelled gun but it only helped a little. German direct and indirect fire continued to pelt the area. Meanwhile, Captain Ware, the battalion surgeon, and his medics mounted a frantic effort to carry out the wounded from la Tourablere. A couple of men, too badly wounded to be moved, had to be left. One of the medics agreed to stay with them and find a place to hide, if the Germans retook the position.²⁵

The withdrawal became a dicey affair. G Company pulled back from its forward position but remained stuck on the east side of the trail. The isolated rifle company told the colonel that they did not know how to get across without taking casualties from the enemy fire covering the trail. At this point, Bill reported to the forward CP that he had succeeded in pulling his platoon back to the rally point. Hearing that G Company was still caught on the other side of the trail, he volunteered to guide them out. Johnson gave his okay then requested an artillery strike with a mix of smoke and HE rounds between the German tanks at the north end of the trail and the designated crossing site.²⁶

Bill dashed across the trail a fourth time then worked his way along the hedgerows until he located G Company. He conferred with its commander, Capt. Fred Sullivan, to plan the extraction. Once again, Bill took the lead. The G Company troops fell in behind him and snuck to the point Bill had found earlier. The friendly HE and smoke rounds were already impacting barely three hundred meters north of their position, well inside “danger close” range. The riflemen slipped across the road using the slight elevation to cover their southern flank and the artillery fire to conceal the other. Bill took them back to the rally point and notified the battalion CP that everyone had withdrawn.

Once he got the word, Colonel Johnson looked at the few men remaining in the forward CP. “We are the only troops left in the area,” he said. Then he laughed, “So, let’s go.”²⁷

The Germans continued to pour artillery and tank fire from a sunken road near Fantay into the 2^nd Battalion as it withdrew. In response, the battalion called for more smoke rounds to help conceal its movement. Not until 1145 hours did Colonel Johnson collect his entire unit on the west side of la Rivière Dorée.²⁸

The regiment and the 30^th Infantry Division squandered the advantage gained by the battalion’s penetration and interdiction of the St. Barthelemy-Abbaye Blanche highway. The disappointing results of this initial attack can be traced back to the inexperience of American officers with combined arms operations. The Americans planned the attack from an infantryman’s perspective. The 30^th Infantry Division had committed the CT 12 in a sector constrained to one small bridge across a boggy lowland, impassable to vehicles. In contrast, the Germans thought in terms of armored warfare. They realized the Juvigny-St. Barthelemy ridgeline and the high ground to the south around Roche Grise and le Neufbourg were the only viable avenues of approach available for American armor. That’s where they concentrated their armor and infantry. The Germans covered the three-kilometer gap between the two avenues with just the outpost at Point D, the small bridge over the little stream. The penetration by the 2^nd Battalion vexed the Germans and forced them to allocate resources to contain it. Yet, they correctly surmised that the Americans could not exploit any success without tanks and support vehicles.

General Harrison arrived at Colonel Johnson’s new CP a short time later. Harrison saw the battlefield the same way the Germans did. He figured nothing could be accomplished by attacking over the swamp, and decided to put 2^nd Battalion to what he considered better use—reinforcing the attack against St. Barthelemy. Although he was only the deputy division commander, General Harrison took a more hands-on approach to managing a battle than the division commander, Major General Leland “Hollywood” Hobbs. Harrison ordered Colonel Johnson to renew the attack but in a new direction, northeast in conjunction with 3^rd Battalion and the 1^st Battalion of the 117^th Infantry. Colonel Johnson called Colonel Luckett to inform him that General Harrison had over-ridden his orders. Luckett immediately called General Hobbs to ask him if the 12^th Infantry still commanded its 2^nd Battalion. Hobbs convened a conference between senior officers at 1300 hours. He reassured Colonel Luckett that he retained control of his 1^st and 2^nd Battalions. He then changed the 2^nd Battalion’s mission to conform to General Harrison’s plan to attack St. Barthelemy. This attack arrayed three battalions abreast (north to south: the 1-117, 3-12 and 2-12). Hobbs did not return the 3^rd Battalion to Colonel Luckett’s control, nor did he give Luckett control of the attack even though the 12^th Infantry now supplied two-thirds of the force against St. Barthelemy. Worse, the revised order, again, split the two battalions the regiment did control (1^st and 2^nd) into two separate missions.²⁹

News of the squabble reached the ears of General Barton. He already had heard reports about his regiment’s heavy losses. In frustration, he pleaded with General Collins to return all of the units detached from his division and let him take responsibility for driving the Germans out of Mortain. The corps commander did not oblige.³⁰

After diverting the 2^nd Battalion toward St. Barthelemy instead of RJ 278, General Hobbs combined a tank battalion from CCB of the 3^rd Armored Division with the 2^nd Battalion 119^th Infantry into Task Force 3 (TF 3) and ordered it to seize RJ 278 from the south. TF 3 swung well to the south to bypass the Germans around Hill 285 and Roche Grise. They passed through le Neufbourg and reached l’Abbaye Blanche without encountering any opposition. As soon as TF 3 reached l’Abbaye Blanche, however, the Germans responded with heavy artillery fire that forced the American infantry off the tanks they were riding. TF 3’s tanks pressed ahead without its riflemen but ran into the same Germans who had defended RJ 278 against Bill’s battalion the night before. After losing nine tanks, TF 3 pulled back from the intersection. The failure of TF 3 to take RJ 278 mirrored the 2^nd Battalion’s misfortune. The Germans repulsed, in sequence, an infantry attack without armor then an armored attack without infantry.³¹

While TF 3 languished near RJ 278, the three-battalion attack, overseen by General Harrison, launched at 1600 hours. The 2^nd Battalion immediately ran into German tank, small arms, and indirect fire coming from St. Barthelemy and Leibstandarte’s tanks on the ridgeline near Fantay. F and G Companies advanced only one hedgerow before calling for help from the artillery. The rifle companies got some relief from an air strike that knocked out one of the tanks that had held them up—although it also took out two American tanks. The battalion eked out another two hundred meters and linked up with the 3rd Battalion at 2025 hours. The exhausted troops, pounded by enemy artillery, could do no more than push to the northern end of la Rivière Dorée. Orders came down at 2121 hours to halt the advance and dig in. The poorly coordinated attacks by the 12^th Infantry, 117^th Infantry, and TF 3 had failed to take either St. Barthelemy or RJ 278. Generals Hobbs and Harrison appeared to have worked at cross purposes. Had they concentrated CT 12 and TF 3 on either St. Barthelemy or RJ 278 the results would likely have been much better.³²

In the twilight Bill positioned his squads for night defense. He directed the crews to sight primary targets against the high ground east of the stream, cover the exposed southern flank, and sight FPLs along the rifle companies’ front lines. When he felt satisfied with the platoon’s disposition, Bill headed to his own foxhole. He had been on his feet for forty-four hours straight, most of that time under direct and indirect enemy fire. He collapsed just short of his foxhole.

Bill’s eyelids had barely closed when the Luftwaffe paid the battalion a visit. Five fighter-bombers rolled in to make strafing runs over the American position. Bill craned his neck to the sound of a German plane diving toward him. He was within arm’s reach of his foxhole but could not muster the energy to crawl the remaining two feet to safety. He rolled over and fell back to sleep.³³

New attack orders came down in the pre-dawn hours. The 30^th Infantry Division planned a concentrated attack to seize RJ 278. They returned Bill’s battalion to Colonel Luckett’s control then instructed him to attack from the battalion’s overnight positions to the critical intersection. Once on the objective, it would link up with TF 3. Luckett directed the 1^st Battalion to attack due east from the vicinity of Point B (RJ 264) to seize RJ 278. The 2^nd Battalion’s mission barely changed from August 8. Bill and his men would attack across the same ground and the same stream that had frustrated them earlier to seize part of the highway immediately north of RJ 278. This would be one of the few times during the entire war they had to attack over ground previously covered.³⁴

The attack, scheduled for 0600 hours, kicked off at 0700. Colonel Johnson led with F Company on the right flank, G Company on the left, and E Company trailing. Bit by bit, the rifle companies shoved their way to the orchard that they occupied two days earlier. To everyone’s amazement they found the medic with one surviving wounded man they had left on the scene when the battalion withdrew the day before.³⁵

Just like the attack two days earlier, F and G Companies crossed the deadly north–south trail and E Company covered the rear. Bill’s platoon moved with one of the forward companies. At 0755 hours the Germans counterattacked. Again, tanks on the Fantay-St. Barthelemy ridgeline opened fire on the battalion’s advance. Again, the enemy dumped massive amounts of artillery and mortar fire on the battalion. Again, a German tank appeared at the north end of the lane to sever the forward rifle companies from the rest of the battalion. Three more tanks counterattacked from the east. Again, the American infantrymen hunkered down, absorbing the fire from the tanks and artillery. Again, enemy armor could not drive back the Americans, and the few Panzergrenadieren got nowhere against the battalion’s riflemen. Again, stalemate.

Meanwhile, the work on the critical stream crossing stalled—in part, because the 30^th Division engineer company had wandered from the scene during the night and failed to return. Colonel Luckett complained to the division staff, and General Hobbs intervened to chase down the errant engineers. They finally arrived at the work site at 0930 hours. The engineers from the 4^th and 30^th Infantry Divisions piled gravel over the swampy streambed, straining to complete the vital crossing while the Germans pummeled them with artillery fire. The delay forced the rifle companies to fight without armor support. The situation seemed to play out for the 2^nd Battalion as it had two days before, but this time, it was not fighting on its own.³⁶

The 1^st Battalion crossed the streambed and advanced toward la Delinière, where it ran into stiff opposition and took heavy casualties. By 0935 hours TF 3’s Sherman tanks had driven to within two hundred yards of RJ 278 and drew off the three German tanks confronting F and G Companies.³⁷

The attack ran into more problems. The 1^st Battalion fouled the 2^nd Battalion’s attack when it pushed north of its designated avenue of advance and crossed in front of F Company. Colonel Johnson halted the battalion’s movement to avoid fratricides. He joined the 1^st Battalion Commander, Lt. Col. Charles Jackson, in a hasty conference to sort out the confusion on the ground. The two commanders decided to hold 1^st Battalion in place while the 2^nd Battalion swung around them to the north. The Second would then turn to attack the objective, RJ 278, from the north flank.³⁸

Despite the pressure, the Germans held firm and fought back. TF 3 reached RJ 278 at 1016 hours but Mark V Panther and Mark VI Tiger tanks began picking off its Shermans. The Der Fuhrer Regiment recorded the action. “Individual enemy [American] tanks that broke through were taken out in close combat.” A German outpost in la Dairie orchard continued firing into the 1^st and 2^nd Battalions even though TF 3 had taken the ground behind them. The task force sent an infantry force to link up with 1^st Battalion, only a few hundred meters away, but German fire pinned them down. The Germans could no longer launch large-scale counterattacks but they could still punch back with their remaining Panthers and Tigers in local assaults. By 1100 hours F Company had pushed to within four hundred meters of RJ 278 but still could not link up with TF 3.³⁹

The 12^th Infantry and TF 3 had completely ruptured Das Reich’s defensive front but the tenacious SS troops refused to withdraw. American units, including the 12^th Infantry, felt very uncomfortable whenever they lost contact with friendly units on their flanks. The Germans worked differently. They sought opportunities to insinuate themselves between American units, even if it meant they got isolated themselves.⁴⁰

Three American and two German battalions thrashed each other over terrain no larger than a square kilometer, about the size of a municipal golf course. The two sides saturated the area with one hundred plus heavy guns and mortars while small arms fire pinned the other side’s infantrymen in place. The steady percussion of exploding artillery forced sergeants to shout instructions to men huddled next to them. American artillery observers had to duck from incoming rounds, too, and could not get eyes on the enemy guns to suppress them with counter-battery fire. Around 1445 hours the Germans launched rockets at the crossing site. Fortunately, an aerial spotter plane located the Nebelwerfers and brought in fighter-bombers to take out the battery. H Company’s mortar platoon had dug firing emplacements behind la Tourablere. Even then, they had to displace to different positions once the enemy observers called in artillery on top of them. “One artillery shell dropped down a mortar tube, exploding inside and destroying the mortar. The gunner climbed out of his dug-in position, lit a cigarette, and walked away. About twenty seconds after he left the hole a second shell hit in the hole and blew a large crater where it had been.”⁴¹

Not everyone handled the enemy shelling as calmly as the mortar gunner. “Several of the men started cracking up.” As early as August 8, the commander of the 117^th Infantry had complained to the 30^th Infantry Division HQ about the battle worthiness of the sister battalion attached to them. “I think they all have battle fatigue.” By August 10 the regiment’s aid stations had collected a sizable number of combat stress cases.⁴²

Bill watched one of his men “crack up.” Some of his men were crossing a field when an enemy machine gun opened fire. One soldier took cover behind a dead cow, the most common bovine variety in Normandy that summer. The cow had been dead for a couple of days. Its hooves pointed skyward from the buildup of gas inside the carcass. A few seconds later a shell landed nearby. The shrapnel punctured the dead animal’s skin, and the carcass exploded. Cow guts spewed in every direction, drenching the soldier in decomposing entrails. The sight, the smell, and the slime overpowered him. He went nuts. The man began screaming in horror. Other troops hurried over to the crazed soldier before he exposed himself and started running around in his frenzied state. The platoon managed to evacuate him until he could come to his senses.⁴³

The 12^th Infantry desperately needed tanks to reinforce its drive but the attached armor remained on the other side of la Rivière Dorée. The regiment queried the 2^nd Battalion throughout the day for updates on the engineers’ progress: 0947 hours—“should be finished in 15 min,” 1013 hours—“tanks should go across shortly,” 1139 hours—“using more gravel to enable tanks to cross,” 1246 hours—“tank bogged down trying to cross,” 1254 hours—“now 2 tanks bogged.” By early afternoon the regiment realized that more work had to be done before the tanks and tank destroyers could make it over the streambed. Colonel Luckett ordered the 1^st and 2^nd Battalions and TF 3 to continue the attack without the additional armor. Bill’s battalion struggled north at 1610 hours while the other two units supported by fire.⁴⁴

F Company now led the attack, followed by G Company and E Company. The troops crept along hedgerows to a small trail that cut east-west. The sunken lane gave the riflemen a little cover as they approached the main St. Barthelemy-Mortain highway from the west. The advance ended when a German machine gun opened fire from a hedgerow, two hundred meters to their west, pinning them down.⁴⁵

TF 3 sent a platoon of tanks north along the highway to augment the 12^th Infantry, but German defenders managed to keep the tanks separated from the 1^st and 2^nd Battalions.⁴⁶

By 1900 hours the American attack reached its culminating point. The steady crump…crump of artillery shells sounded across the battlefield. Casualties mounted to an alarming level. Ammo bearers carried cans of .30 cal. rounds forward and stretchers of wounded back. TF 3 reported the loss of twelve tanks. Bill’s battalion had lost 160 men, the rough equivalent of an entire rifle company, over the previous thirty-six hours. With diminished strength in its rifle companies, the 2^nd Battalion’s attack ground to a halt and reverted to a hasty defense. Colonel Johnson re-deployed E Company on a line extending behind F and G, facing north to cover an exposed flank. TF 3, 1^st Battalion, and 2^nd Battalion had seized portions of the St. Barthelemy-Mortain highway but failed to link up with each other or clear the objective.⁴⁷

True to form, the Germans launched a counterattack from the north aimed at forcing the 2^nd Battalion to withdraw. E Company spotted troops in American uniforms slipping south along the lowland. Suspecting they were SS troops up to their old tricks, E Company opened fire and drove them back.⁴⁸

At 2105 hours on August 10, the regiment instructed its two battalions to dig-in for the night. The heavy casualties of the past three days forced the rifle companies and H Company’s machine gun platoons to stretch out just to cover their frontage. TF 3 pulled its tanks back five hundred meters where, in accordance with American armored tactical doctrine, they formed a defensive “lager” to refuel, rearm, and perform maintenance. These nightly withdrawals made sense for the tank crews, but they also ceded any ground won during the day.⁴⁹

As to the Germans, the commander of the Der Fuhrer Regiment admitted, “Our own casualties were considerable.” While they had lost much of their combat power, they stubbornly hung on to their outposts at Roche Grise, St. Barthelemy, la Dairie, and RJ 278. Individual German tanks stayed forward with their infantry. The enemy kept the pressure on the 2^nd Battalion throughout the night of August 10 with incessant artillery fire and probes.⁵⁰

One German Tiger tank came barreling down the north-south trail into E Company’s position. Private Michael Burik grabbed a bazooka, loaded a round, then bravely walked into the lane, challenging the German tank to a duel. Burik pulled the bazooka’s trigger but nothing happened. He had forgotten to release the safety. By the time he armed the bazooka, the tank was nearly on him. He quickly fired at point blank range. The 2.36-inch rocket bounced harmlessly off the Tiger’s 120mm armor plating. The tank crew replied by firing its massive 88mm main gun at the lone American rifleman. The shell missed, but the blast sent Burik toppling backwards head over heels. Undismayed, the private reloaded, kneeled, and fired a second time. Again, the round pinged off the Tiger with no effect. The Germans again fired the main gun at Burik, turning him into a human tumbleweed. Wobbling from the blast, the infantryman refused to back away. He loaded and fired a third rocket into the Tiger. The round did nothing to the tank, but the crew had enough of the crazy American bazooka gunner and retreated. After helping another soldier take cover, Burik called for more bazooka ammunition. Before he could fire a fourth time, he succumbed to shock. Sadly, he later died from his wounds.⁵¹

Under intermittent artillery fire throughout the night, the engineers graded a path atop the swampy ground and reinforced the bridge over the stream. This allowed wheeled vehicles, ambulances, and jeeps to bring in supplies and carry out casualties. That helped, but what the battalion really needed was armor. As dawn broke the engineers’ work had progressed to the point that the regiment planned on getting the tanks and tank destroyers into the fight. Luckett ordered a new attack at midday. First Battalion would launch the main attack to RJ 278, supported by 2^nd Battalion and TF 3. Colonel Johnson could only muster 270 men—36 percent of the battalion’s authorized strength—for the attack.⁵²

The battalion’s executive officer had been wounded a couple days earlier and Johnson neared exhaustion trying to run the battalion on his own. Luckett sent Major Ken Lay from the regimental staff to assist him.⁵³

At 0934 hours on August 11, four tanks and two tank destroyers finally made it across the streambed. More were on the way. Eventually, the rest of B Company, 70^th Tank Battalion along with tank destroyers and the regiment’s towed 57mm AT guns, crossed la Rivière Dorée. Getting the armor through the hedgerows proved troublesome. The tanks had a “Hell of time getting into position.” The two battalions coordinated their attacks for 1330 hours, beginning with a fifteen-minute preparation by the 42^nd Field Artillery Battalion.⁵⁴

Finally configured as a combined arms force, CT 12 attacked the minute the artillery finished firing. Each battalion jumped off and advanced one hedgerow before running into stiff German resistance. Bill and his machine gun crews returned fire as the infantry platoons tangled with the enemy from one hedgerow to the next. Colonel Johnson and Major Lay stayed with the lead platoons to help coordinate the efforts of the tanks and infantry. One of the first things Major Lay noticed as they advanced were the bodies of dead 2^nd Battalion infantrymen that had been left on the field over the course of the past three days. The stench of moldering flesh added to the din of exploding shells to further torment the soldiers’ senses.⁵⁵

During the exchange of fire, an F Company rifleman spotted troops in American uniforms acting like they were trying to infiltrate the friendly position. He opened fire and wounded a few of the suspicious troops who turned out to be SS Panzergrenadieren. At this point in the melee, a German medic waved a Red Cross flag and asked for a truce to allow some of the wounded to be evacuated. The Americans consented and the slaughter paused in this part of the battlefield. The killing promptly resumed the moment the two sides cleared their casualties.⁵⁶

F Company pressed toward the highway with G Company following. Men ducked as enemy machine gun bullets snapped overhead and flinched each time a howitzer shell exploded nearby. Moving in short spurts, they worked their way along the hedgerows with the help of the attached tanks. Colonel Johnson reported the action. “Of [the] two remaining tanks, one concentrated on knocking out machine-gun nests in a stone house on the left flank while the other placed its fire on the dug-in positions holding up the advance of the 1^st Battalion.” Johnson and Lay were not the only senior officers leading from the front. One rifleman staggered back through a gap in a hedgerow after getting hit by machine gun fire. When he looked up he saw Colonel Luckett moving forward with another rifle platoon. Luckett ordered the lieutenant with him to watch the wounded rifleman then led the platoon forward. F Company’s platoons used the sunken east-west trail to reach the St. Barthelemy-Mortain highway. Two intrepid sergeants succeeded in taking out a couple of machine gun positions with hand grenades to clear the way. The battalion had finally severed the highway five hundred meters north of RJ 278. Now it had to hold while the 1^st Battalion and TF 3 attempted to seize the road junction.⁵⁷

Sensing enemy pressure building along his left (northern) flank, Colonel Johnson requested assistance from the 3^rd Battalion. The regiment replied that the 117^th had already committed the sister battalion to a fight near St. Barthelemy. As Johnson feared, the Leibstandarte Division in St. Barthelemy responded, just as it had on August 9 and 10.⁵⁸

The 2^nd Battalion brought up a couple of anti-tank guns towed by halftracks to shore up the north flank. At 1552 hours a German tank coming out of St. Barthelemy hit the two halftracks while they crossed the north-south trail. One halftrack driver, Private First Class Vierse McWilliams, refused to abandon his vehicle. The German tank hit the halftrack two more times before he finally bailed out. Fortunately, the 57mm guns were still serviceable and the crews positioned them to fire back at the Germans. Right after taking out the halftracks, the tanks supported a Panzergrenadier counterattack out of St. Barthelemy. Bill’s squads unleashed a torrent of bullets, adding to the intense fire from mortars and rifles that stopped the enemy cold. That did not stop the German tanks from firing at will into the Americans.⁵⁹

Throughout the afternoon, Bill’s guns suppressed enemy machine guns and helped drive back German infantry. The short distances in hedgerow country forced the heavy machine guns to rely more on direct fire to drive back the enemy. With enemy activity ranging from the southeast to the northwest, Bill had to continually re-position the squads.

Colonel Johnson observed an enemy tank firing at his command group from behind a hedgerow. He turned to the Anti-Tank Platoon Leader, Lieutenant Morgan Welch. “Welch, there’s a tank aiming at us. Take a bazooka team and knock him out.” Welch and his team began stalking the German tank. They crept up close to the tank, hidden by a hedgerow. His team loaded the bazooka round and the lieutenant rose above the shrubs to aim at the tank, a Mark VI Tiger. Welch fired at point blank range but the round bounced off the turret. To their horror, the team of Americans watched the 88mm gun turn in their direction and fire. The shock wave knocked them senseless. Lieutenant Welch came to flat on his back. The next thing he heard was plop…plop-plop…plop. It took him and his team a few seconds to realize the strange sound was caused by their helmets falling from the sky to the ground. As the team cleared their heads, the Tiger drove away. Apparently, they convinced the tank to withdraw even though they could not take it out.⁶⁰

Others besides Lieutenant Welch had difficulty knocking out German tanks. One of the attached tanks from B Company, 70^th Tank Battalion moved forward a couple hedgerows during the action. Its commander, Sergeant Carl Rambo, spotted a German tank facing south against the 2^nd Battalion flank. “I picked up a German tank sitting sideways to me. I told my gunner to ‘hit him low.’ We threw three rounds into the belly, and smoke rolled out of that tank.” Excited by the kill, Rambo shouted, “We got him.” The tank commander then turned to engage other targets until his main gun jammed from over-heating. Later, another tank commander burst his bubble when he told him that he had not taken out the German tank. “Man, that thing just drove off!”⁶¹

While Welch and Rambo sparred with German tanks, Colonel Johnson and Major Lay moved over to one of E Company’s platoons as it crossed another shell-pocked wheat field. A German machine gun opened fire at the exposed Americans, sending everyone scurrying behind a hedgerow. The platoon sergeant had to yank some of his soldiers over the top of the bushes to safety. While the infantrymen hunkered down, a Sherman tank approached. Johnson organized a local combined arms attack, ordering the tank to suppress the enemy machine gun while the infantry charged across the field. The colonel stood up to direct the tank’s fire but spotted a German vehicle next to a building. He gave the tank commander the new target information then got the rifle platoon ready for its assault.⁶²

The Sherman pushed forward on Colonel Johnson’s signal and opened fire on the German vehicle that quickly pulled behind the building for cover. Just as the American assault got underway, three German Panthers appeared and opened fire. Their opening salvo landed in the middle of the command group. The blast killed two radio operators and wounded both Johnson and Lay. The colonel suffered severe wounds to his face, arm, and legs. He required immediate evacuation. For the third time in nine weeks, the 2^nd Battalion had to cart off its commander. At least this one was headed for a hospital instead of a grave. Major Lay stayed forward, despite his wounds, until Lt. Col. Franklin Sibert arrived from the 1^st Battalion to take command.⁶³

The loss of Johnson and Lay took the steam out of the battalion’s attack. Most of E and G Companies’ officers had become casualties. F Company had no officers left. The unit did not have enough leaders on hand to direct an attack, but, it could—and did—stand its ground and repelled the German counterattack. The troops even managed to knock out one of the three Panthers with a lucky shot from a bazooka. Colonel Luckett called a halt to the attack at 2025 hours. Both 1^st and 2^nd Battalions pulled back to their positions of the previous night while the 42^nd Field Artillery blasted RJ 278, yet again. The regiment had little to show for the day’s attack other than plenty of casualties. Once again, CT 12 failed to clear and hold the vital intersection, though it finally had armor assets forward of the streambed.⁶⁴

The attack did serve its purpose—the Germans threw in the towel. The Der Fuhrer Regiment’s commander later wrote, “The enemy drove into the regiment’s flank with tank support. Under artillery fire and continuous strafing attacks, our positions west of the Mortain–St. Barthelemy road had to be pulled back.” It was time to leave. The Das Reich Division covered the withdrawal of the other panzer divisions from north of Mortain as the Germans tried to escape the jaws of Patton’s Third Army closing in behind them.⁶⁵

Lieutenant James Piper led a patrol across the main highway after dark to explore high ground west of the la Sablonniere orchard. The patrol moved to their objective without running into any Germans. Piper continued patrolling down to RJ 278 then northeast for a short distance up the highway leading to Sourdeval. He discovered that the Germans had vacated their forward defensive positions and regrouped. The battalion took advantage of the situation to send forces across the highway onto the ridgeline. This minor advance marked one of the few times the American infantry followed up a nighttime patrol by seizing ground during the hours of darkness.⁶⁶

A little before midnight, the regiment issued orders to resume the attack on August 12. The regiment tasked the 1^st Battalion to seize the now-familiar objective, RJ 278. With only fourteen officers and 196 enlisted men left, the 2^nd Battalion would hold the north flank while the 1^st Battalion took the road junction.⁶⁷

Shortly after the regiment’s attack order came down, the eastern sky lit up. German artillery deluged the 12^th Infantry’s area like a Kansas thunderstorm. To the American infantry hunkering down in their foxholes, it seemed that every enemy gun within range was firing at them. The regiment described the strike as “the heaviest arty fire yet felt in this sector.” Fortunately, most of the enemy shells fell between the rifle companies and the support elements.⁶⁸

A spot report from E Company provided a clue why the Germans had fired the massive artillery barrage. From their position on the high ground east of the St. Barthelemy-Mortain highway, E Company could see a long line of German vehicles, bumper to tail, heading northeast on the highway to Sourdeval. The German used the artillery to cover their withdrawal from Mortain. The 42^nd Artillery Battalion responded with interdictory fires along the Sourdeval highway.⁶⁹

The attack kicked off at 0800 hours on August 12. The Germans left a screening detachment in the area to slow the American advance but it lacked the firepower and zeal of previous days. The 1^st Battalion pushed through enemy small arms fire on its way to the objective. The 2^nd Battalion’s troops knocked out a Mark IV tank near St. Barthelemy with a bazooka. With better observation on the higher ground, the American forward observers could finally target the enemy with some degree of accuracy. A 1^st Battalion 81mm mortar destroyed a Tiger when it dropped a round right through the tank’s hatch. The 42^nd Artillery Battalion killed four more tanks. The 1^st Battalion occupied RJ 278 by 1023 hours. The 2^nd Battalion dispatched more patrols to locate the German defensive line but they found nothing nearby. The 117^th Infantry, with the 3^rd Battalion, entered St. Barthelemy at 1230 hours. An hour later the regiment received word from the 30^th Infantry Division to consolidate around RJ 278. The isolated battalion on Hill 314 had been relieved and the mission accomplished.⁷⁰

At long last the 117^th Infantry returned the 3^rd Battalion to Colonel Luckett. That evening the entire regiment clustered around the vital intersection it had fought so hard to control for five days. The Germans continued to lob artillery and 88mm rounds at them, reminding everyone that more hard fighting lay ahead.⁷¹

At 1000 hours on August 13, the 117^th Infantry relieved the 2^nd Battalion at la Sablonniere. The battalion’s survivors marched six kilometers by foot to an assembly area a little south of Juvigny. Two things greeted them when they arrived. First, they got official word that the 12^th Infantry had been placed back under General Barton’s control. Second, trucks stood by to carry them from Mortain to a bivouac site. The trucks hauled off only 28 percent of the men they had dropped off August 8.⁷²

When asked, Bill always said that the most savage fighting he ever saw was at Mortain. He and the other exhausted survivors may not have realized it but Mortain marked a major milestone. The failed Operation Luttich, followed by the slaughter of the Falaise Pocket, effectively destroyed the fighting prowess of the SS Panzer divisions. Though the 12^th Infantry had many months of tough fighting ahead, from this point on, they would fight with greater skill and grit than their opponents.