Retreat to the Elbe
As soon as General Reymann’s troops and the exhausted remains of 9th Army were safely behind XX Corps’ lines, General Wenck gave the order for the withdrawal to the Elbe to begin on the night of 1/2 May. The withdrawal was conducted without pause day and night, the screening divisions taking care to conceal their movement and avoid any conflict that would hamper their progress, the rearguards only fighting delaying actions when necessary. As the artillery pieces ran out of ammunition, they were blown up and abandoned. Tanks, APCs and armoured cars covered the flanks.
At first the Soviets did not pursue too strongly. This was probably due to the after-effects of their May Day celebrations and by the need to re-deploy while 1st Byelorussian Front took over the 1st Ukrainian Front’s responsibilities to release Koniev’s men for the attack on Prague.1
The survivors of 9th Army were in no fit state to continue the struggle. Some were fortunate enough to get rides on a shuttle service of trucks and trains to the Elbe organized by 12th Army, but many had to make their own way, as Helmut Jurisch described:
When Bert Fink and I were dropped off by truck in Ziesar, word was going round that the remains of 9th Army were pushing through to the Elbe and going into American captivity.
We both found somewhere to spend the night in Halbe, clean ourselves up and sleep, as we had not done for so long, in soft feather beds. I even had a bit of luck, as the pretty young woman of the house took a fancy to me.
We set off again next morning, and right after Ziesar we stumbled on a paddock with horses belonging to an abandoned farm, and a friendly nag allowed itself to be caught. Inside the farm buildings we found some harness and a rubber-tyred carriage. Although neither of us had any experience with horses, we managed to get the harness on the lovely animal and hitch him to the carriage. Thus we two tankies reverted to being cavalrymen. The drop in capacity from a tank to a one-horsepower wagon that had to take us from the advancing Russians to Fischbeck/Tangermünde went without difficulty. I took over the driving of our one-horsepower wagon, which soon filled with soldiers as we rolled along through the peaceful landscape towards our survival goal. Several kilometres from Genthin we were stopped by a Waffen-SS soldier, with an automatic rifle at the aim, coming out of a wood. This made us uneasy, but he only wanted to secure a place on our wagon for his comrade, who was very ill and exhausted, and for us to take him on to the field hospital in Genthin. The comrades squeezed up together and the SS soldier was given a proper seat, but our youngest comrade, barely 16 years old, had to ride on the step. We soon reached Genthin, found the hospital and something to eat for ourselves and the horse, and moved on again.
Meanwhile I had got used to driving our one-horsepower wagon, so that the drive went without a hitch. That evening we sought accommodation in a village along our route.
Next day I reached Fischbeck in good form with my crew, and turned the horse loose in the green Elbe meadows. We found temporary accommodation in a barn and spied out the land. We found all that we needed for survival in vehicles abandoned in the Elbe meadows: food, underwear, bits of uniform, and also equipment. Only a few soldiers had come across this ‘army supply depot’ so far, as most were streaming directly to the crossing place, where a mass of soldiers were crammed together. We looked for everything that a soldier going on a journey needed; haversack, blankets, tent-half, underwear, long-life sausage, and so on.
On the morning of the next day, it could have been either 4 or 5 May 1945, we joined a column moving towards the Elbe bridge. Far from the bridge the column became stuck and did not move on for a long time. Using my boy-scout experience, I made a reconnaissance of the place with Bert Fink, and when we reached the Elbe bridge we saw the reason for the hold-up. The bridge had collapsed in the middle as a result of demolition, and a plank spanned the gap between the two sections of the bridge sticking up from the water, allowing only a single file of soldiers to pass. As we were so near to our long-desired goal, we tagged on to the head of the column. We were soon across on the other side in Tangermünde, and once more we had made it!
The American soldiers standing on the roadway received us in friendly fashion. They were interested in our watches and cameras but didn’t force us to give them up. I had to hand over my pistol. After a rest in the station area, the march to Stendal was the next stage to prisoner of war camp.2
Wenck sent Lieutenant-General Maximilian Reichsfreiherr von Edelsheim, commander of XXXXVIII Panzer Corps, to negotiate the surrender to the American Ninth Army, as the Ninth Army Chief of Staff, Major General James E. Moore reported to his commander, Lieutenant General William L. Simpson, in the following memorandum on 7 May (with original spelling errors):
1. On 4 May 1945, in compliance with your verbal instructions, I proceeded to the Command Post of the 102d Division and, accompanied by Major General Keating, Division Commander, and Brigadier General Fox, Assistant Division Commander, I went to Stendal, for the purpose of interviewing General of the Armored Forces Baron von Edelsheim, representing the Commander-in-Chief of German armies at the Elbe and the Havel. Colonel Loren Williams, Regimental Commander in that sector was also present.
2. General von Edelsheim had previous presented to Brigadier General Fox a request on the part of the German Commander for the surrender of his forces and evacuation of civilians as indicated on the attached inclosure. This formed the basis of our discussion.
3. General von Edelsheim informed me that the forces which he represented were the Twelfth German Army and remnants of the Ninth German Army which had been fighting on the Eastern Front. He stated that the strength of the force was approximately 25,000 unarmed soldiers, 40,000 men in battle formations and 6,000 wounded. He also stated that there were approximately 100,000 civilians in the area which he wished to evacuate to the west bank of the Elbe. He stated that they had a considerable amount of transport and about a week’s supply of food in army stores, plus that which was carried on the individual soldier. He also stated that they had adequate field hospitals and medical personnel to care for their wounded.
4. General von Edelsheim gave his order of battle, the following units:
XX ARMY CORPS
Division Scharnhorst
Division Koenei
Division Schill
Division Hulten
48th PANZER CORPS
KG Radtke
KG Koehler
KG Rugner
MISCELLANEOUS CORPS UNITS
39th PANZER CORPS
Division Berlin
KG Brandenburg
KG Ratenow
41st PANZER CORPS
KG Havelberg
KG Jahn
NINTH ARMY REMNANTS OF TWO DIVISIONS
5. General von Edelsheim stated that his army had been directed to move to the north and they had started the movement of their service elements, but the Russian drive which made contact with our left flank, had cut off the combat elements of the army from the service troops. He stated that the [American] prisoners (company patrols from the 102d Division), which he had, had been evacuated to the rear and were probably now in Russian hands.
6. General von Edelsheim was told that the Russians were our Allies and fighting against the Germans with us – that we had all the German prisoners that we wanted and more too. He was told, however, that if Germans appeared on the west bank of the Elbe River with their hands up, or under a white flag, under custom of war they would be accepted as prisoners and they would not be fired on while they were crossing the river. It was made clear, however, that we accepted no responsibility for any action on the part of the Russian forces opposing him and, if they cut him off from the river or fired on his troops while they were crossing, that he would have to meet that problem as best he could. He was told that the means for crossing the river would
have to be provided by the German forces.
7. The critical food situation with respect to the Germans in our area was outlined to General von Edelsheim and he was told to bring maximum food stocks, kitchens and individual mess equipment with his troops. He was also told that we would put his forces in a wired-in enclosure upon their arrival, and that we would expect them to come over by companies or battalions, properly organized and controlled by their own officers. In view of the shortage of housing, he was also told that all men should bring their shelter halves with them.
8. With respect to the wounded, General von Edelsheim stated that he had adequate medical personnel and installations to care for them and requested that he be allowed to bring over all his wounded. He was told that if he brought medical personnel and installations over first, and that it was determined by our forces that they were adequate, he would be allowed to bring his wounded across the river. It was explained to him, however, that at that time it was doubtful if any shelter other than that provided by the German army could be provided.
9. The method of crossing the river was to be over the Tangermunde Bridge which, though partially destroyed, could then be used as a foot bridge. It was also expected that floats or rafts would be used to move kitchens, hospital units, etc., and that some of the men would probably swim the river.
10. General von Edelsheim was told that there would be no movement of civilians from east to west bank of the Elbe River.
11. General von Edelsheim agreed to all the foregoing, thanked me, and stated that he would immediately establish liaison with Colonel Williams in order to control his troops as they came over the river.3
The decision to refuse to receive any refugees was presumably based on the problems of feeding, but would have resulted in their involuntary abandonment to the vengeance of the pursuing Soviet forces east of the Elbe had not the Soviets themselves intervened.
Heinz Küster, an aircrew candidate drafted to a parachute convalescent battalion in the defence of Brandenburg, described the scene on the east bank of the Elbe on the afternoon of 6 May:
The Elbe was in full flood and dangerous, sweeping everything along in its depths. Opposite us the river formed a big bend and was about 350 metres wide. About 250,000–300,000 soldiers and a vast number of refugees were on the meadows between the Elbe dyke and the river. I reckon there were also some 2,000–3,000 horses.
As time went by, the Russians increased their pressure, firing indiscriminately with mortars, field and anti-tank guns. There must have also been some large-calibre tank guns, for horses and people were being blown apart.
Panic caught hold and there were screams from the wounded and men and animals being torn apart. It was hell. The cries of fear from the horses were frightful. Thousands of people were torn away that afternoon and night by the racing, swirling river. We could hear the endless cries for help and see the raised arms of those trying to swim across the Elbe.
At about 1600 hours that afternoon an inflatable boat came across from the American side. Everyone streamed down to the riverbank and the boat was overloaded. But no one wanted to sit on the side and take a paddle. I took my Luftwaffe comrade by the collar and pulled him on the boat, then jumped on the side and took a paddle.
A sergeant-major with a drawn pistol shouted that he was in command of the boat. With steely gestures and a loud voice he made it clear that he would shoot anyone without pity who did not follow his instruction to the letter. Then he demonstrated how to use the paddles and handed out eight of them. We would have to paddle with all our strength, or we would never reach the other side, and the Russians would shoot us down like rabbits. This was my last chance, and I paddled like a world champion.
The Russians fired at us in the middle of the river, but about ten to twenty metres too short. Incredibly, we got across untouched. There were forty-eight men in the boat and eight paddling; the water level was only five centimetres below the boat casing. The sergeant major said he would row back again and wanted us to row back with him, but the 64-year-old NCO and myself took off. We were both soaked through to the skin and freezing in the ice-cold wind. The sun peeked through the clouds from time to time, but we were freezing.4
At about noon on 7 May, Soviet tanks broke through to the Elbe about five kilometres south of the Tangermünde railway bridge and started shooting at the crossing points. The Americans fired flares to mark their positions, but the Soviets continued firing, killing one American soldier and wounding three others. As a result of this, the Americans withdrew their troops two kilometres back from the river, and the Germans seized this opportunity to get civilians across. There was a similar occurrence at Ferchland, where the Soviets brought the west bank under mortar fire; once again the Americans withdrew and the German civilians were able to cross.5
The evacuation of 12th Army from the east to the west banks of the Elbe was successfully completed on the night of 7/8 May. General Wenck later gave a figure of over 100,000 soldiers and about 300,000 civilian refugees. General von Edelsheim reckoned 90,000–100,000 troops, of whom 40 per cent were unarmed. General Moore recorded 40,000 fighting troops, 25,000 unarmed soldiers, 6,000 wounded and 100,000 civilians.6
However, on the morning of 8 May a number of American tanks and armoured cars surrounded the prisoner of war camp opposite Ferchland and announced that the prisoners were to be handed over to the Soviets. Panic broke out and many prisoners committed suicide and others were killed or wounded. The units involved were:
• The whole of the Friedrich Ludwig Jahn Infantry Division;
• Part of the Ferdinand von Schill Infantry Division;
• Part of the Potsdam garrison;
• Five officers and 65 men of the 243rd SPG Brigade;
• Part of HQ Battery, 1170th SPG Brigade;
• The last ten officers and men of 541st Volksgrenadier Division;
• Female Flak and Signals auxiliaries;
• Probably also some members of XXXXVIII Panzer Corps.7
The inclusion of the female auxiliaries is astonishing in view of the record of Soviet troops, but one must presume that this was not known to the Americans, or they would not have done this.
The prisoners who remained in American captivity had a rough time. The discovery of the Nazi concentration camps so enraged the Americans that they obliged their prisoners to remain in open fields, resulting in a high death rate. Those who were handed over to the French and Belgian authorities to assist with the post-war recovery also had a hard time, being obliged to work and live under severe conditions. The lucky ones were handed over to the British, who tended to allow the German units to administer themselves until such time as they were able to release individuals by their civilian categories to meet the demands of restoring the German economy.
On 2 May 1st Ukrainian Front reported to Moscow:
1. On 1 May 1945 the front’s troops finally concluded the destruction of those encircled elements of the enemy’s 9th Army in the area east, north and north-west of Luckenwalde.
On 30 April 1945 the encircled elements of the enemy’s 9th Army, with a combined strength of up to 25,000 men, were at first split into three groups and then completely destroyed or captured during the course of the day. Individual enemy soldiers were captured in the woods. During the course of the day 18,500 prisoners were brought in, mainly from the encircled groups.
2. The main forces of 3rd Guards Army, together with elements of 28th Army, destroyed the enemy east of Luckenwalde during the course of the day …
During the day the army brought in up to 9,000 prisoners and captured 58 tanks, 100 guns and 600 vehicles.
4th Guards Tank Army
10th Guards Tank Corps and 5th Guards Mechanized Corps conducted fighting with part of their forces and eliminated the encircled enemy south-east of Beelitz and north of Luckenwalde. During the course of the day they brought in up to 4,000 prisoners.
13th Army, with four rifle divisions, fought to liquidate the encircled enemy north-east and north of Luckenwalde, as a result of which the enemy was destroyed. During the course of the day up to 4,500 prisoners were brought in.8
According to Soviet accounts – there are no German ones available – 60,000 dead were left behind in the fighting south-east of Berlin, and 120,000 took the difficult path into captivity, including seven generals. All the army’s equipment was lost.
There are no details available on Red Army losses in the fighting for the reduction of the Halbe pocket, but during operations from 16 April to 8 May, 1st Ukrainian Front lost 113,825 men killed, wounded and missing; 1st Byelorussian Front lost 179,490 in the same period.9
NOTES
1. Gellermann, Die Armee Wenck, p. 105.
2. Helmut Jurisch in correspondence with the author.
3. Gellermann, Die Armee Wenck, pp. 186–8.
4. Küster, Geschunder Leibe, pp. 155–7.
5. Gellermann, Die Armee Wenck, p. 119.
6. Ibid., p. 111.
7. Ibid., pp. 121–2.
8. Lakowski/Stich, Der Kessel von Halbe 1945, pp. 133–5.
9. GPW, p. 385; Lakowski/Stich, Der Kessel von Halbe 1945, p. 138.