1
Initial Estimations
SUN-TZU SAID:
Sun- “Warfare is the greatest affair of state, the basis of life and death, the Tao to survival or extinction. It must be thoroughly pondered and analyzed.
“Therefore, structure it according to the following five factors, evaluate it comparatively through estimations, and seek out its true nature. The first is termed the Tao, the second Heaven, the third Earth, the fourth generals, and the fifth the laws for military organization and discipline.
“The Tao causes the people to be fully in accord with the ruler. Thus they will die with him; they will live with him and not fear danger.
“Heaven encompasses yin and yang, cold and heat, and the constraints of the seasons.
“Earth encompasses far or near, difficult or easy, expansive or confined, fatal or tenable terrain.
“The general encompasses wisdom, credibility, benevolence, courage, and strictness.
“The laws for military organization and discipline encompass organization and regulations, the Tao of command, and the management of logistics.
“There are no generals who have not heard of these five. Those who understand them will be victorious; those who do not understand them will not be victorious.
“Thus when making a comparative evaluation through estimations, seeking out its true nature, ask:
Which general has greater ability?
Who has gained the advantages of Heaven and Earth?
Whose laws and orders are more thoroughly implemented?
Whose forces are stronger?
Whose officers and troops are better trained?
Whose rewards and punishments are clearer?
“From these I will know victory and defeat!
“If a general follows my methods for estimation and you employ him, he will certainly be victorious and should be retained. If a general does not follow my methods for estimation and you employ him, he will certainly be defeated, so dismiss him.
“After estimating the advantages in accord with what you have heard, put it into effect with strategic power supplemented by field tactics that respond to external factors. As for strategic power, it is controlling the tactical imbalance of power in accord with the gains to be realized.
“Warfare is the Tao of deception. Thus although you are capable, display incapability to them. When committed to employing your forces, feign inactivity. When your objective is nearby, make it appear as if distant; when far away, create the illusion of being nearby.
“Display profits to entice them. Create disorder in their forces and take them.
“If they are substantial, prepare for them; if they are strong, avoid them.
“If they are angry, perturb them; be deferential to foster their arrogance.
“If they are rested, force them to exert themselves.
“If they are united, cause them to be separated.
“Attack where they are unprepared.
“Go forth where they will not expect it.
“These are the ways military strategists are victorious. They cannot be spoken of in advance.
“Before the engagement, one who determines in the ancestral temple that he will be victorious has found that the majority of factors are in his favor. Before the engagement one who determines in the ancestral temple that he will not be victorious has found few factors are in his favor.
“If one who finds that the majority of factors favor him will be victorious, while one who has found few factors favor him will be defeated, what about someone who finds no factors in his favor?
“If I observe it from this perspective, victory and defeat will be apparent.”
COMMENTARY
The focal thought of this chapter—the inestimable importance of warfare—has already been discussed in the Introduction. However, the more general lesson to be learned is the need to prepare thoroughly, contemplate potential courses of action carefully, and initiate only those movements that have a realistic possibility of success. This requires thoughtful self-scrutiny, but even self-analysis in itself remains insufficient because extensive, detailed knowledge of the enemy (or competitors or target markets) alone will reveal the realm of possibility. In essence, Sun-tzu advocates a path of conscious determinism rather than intuitive immersion, premising the possibility of survival and success upon the true wisdom that can only be sintered from thoroughgoing knowledge.
This chapter also introduces two of Sun-tzu’s famous concepts—deception as the essence of warfare, and the fundamental principle of manipulating the enemy. For these concepts Sun-tzu garnered the condemnation of hypocritical literati who cloaked themselves in Confucian garb even though they were themselves assiduous practitioners of deceitful techniques in their daily court lives. However, throughout the Art of War Sun-tzu stresses the need to conserve resources, preserve lives, and wrest victory at the lowest cost. Therefore, deceiving the enemy is critical, as modern military forces tardily discovered only during the past century. Furthermore, deception underlies and furnishes the very possibility of manipulating the enemy, preying upon their weaknesses, compelling them through their desires, exploiting their expectations, and then striking when they have become exhausted and disordered.
While ethical concerns should discourage the employment of deception in many spheres, certainly in matters of self-defense and competitive sports the adroit execution of feints and misleading moves may provide the key to victory and survival. Moreover, even in business misleading one’s competitors (but not customers) hardly merits condemnation, although such practices may become unmanageably complex because of their possibly negative effects on market positioning and strategy. Nevertheless, skilled ruses should be expected from one’s competitors and opponents, always pondered as part of a thoroughly analytic approach.
Finally, it should be noted that Sun-tzu’s dictum “Attack where they are unprepared, go forth where they will not expect it” became the watchword of Chinese military science, entering common language and becoming known by virtually everyone throughout China over the past millennia.