9
Maneuvering the Army

SUN-TZU SAID:

“As for deploying the army and fathoming the enemy:

“To cross mountains follow the valleys, search out tenable ground, and occupy the heights. If the enemy holds the heights, do not climb up to engage them in battle. This is the way to deploy an army in the mountains.

“After crossing rivers you must distance yourself from them. If the enemy is fording a river to advance, do not confront them in the water. When half their forces have crossed, it will be advantageous to strike them. If you want to engage the enemy in battle, do not array your forces near the river to confront the invader but look for tenable ground and occupy the heights. Do not confront the current’s flow. This is the way to deploy the army where there are rivers.

“When you cross salt marshes and wetlands, concentrate on quickly getting away from them; do not remain. If you engage in battle in marshes or wetlands, you must stay in areas with marsh grass and keep groves of trees at your back. This is the way to deploy the army in marshes and wetlands.

“On level plains deploy on easy terrain with the right flank positioned with high ground to the rear, fatal terrain to the fore, and tenable terrain to the rear. This is the way to deploy on the plains.

“These four deployments, advantageous to the army, are the means by which the Yellow Emperor conquered the four emperors.

“Now the army likes heights and abhors low areas, esteems the sunny and disdains the shady. It nourishes life and occupies the substantial. An army that avoids the hundred illnesses is said to be certain of victory.

“Where there are hills and embankments you must occupy the yang (sunny) side, keeping them to the right rear. This is to the army’s advantage and exploits the natural assistance of the terrain.

“When it rains upstream, foam appears. If you want to ford the river, wait until it settles.

“You must quickly get away from deadly configurations of terrain such as precipitous gorges with mountain torrents, Heaven’s Well, Heaven’s Jail, Heaven’s Net, Heaven’s Pit, and Heaven’s Fissure. Do not approach them. When we keep them at a distance, the enemy is forced to approach them. When we face them, the enemy is compelled to have them at their rear.

“When on the flanks the army encounters ravines and defiles, wetlands with reeds and tall grass, mountain forests or areas with heavy, entangled undergrowth, you must thoroughly search them because they are places where an ambush or spies would be concealed.

“If an enemy in close proximity remains quiet, they are relying on their tactical occupation of ravines. If while far off they challenge you to battle, they want you to advance because they occupy easy terrain to their advantage.

“If large numbers of trees move, they are approaching. If there are many visible obstacles in the heavy grass, it is to make us suspicious. If the birds take flight, there is an ambush. If the animals are afraid, enemy forces are mounting a sudden attack.

“If dust rises high up in a sharply defined column, chariots are coming. If it is low and broad, the infantry is advancing. If it is dispersed in thin shafts, they are gathering firewood. If it is sparse, coming and going, they are encamping.

“One who speaks deferentially but increases his preparations will advance. One who speaks belligerently and advances hastily will retreat.

“One whose light chariots first fan out to the sides is deploying for battle.

“One who seeks peace without setting any prior conditions is executing a stratagem.

“One whose troops race off but who deploys his army into formation is implementing a predetermined schedule.

“One whose troops half advance and half retreat is enticing you.

“Those who stand about leaning on their weapons are hungry. If those who draw water drink first, they are thirsty. When they see potential gain but do not know whether to advance, they are tired.

“Where birds congregate it is empty. If the enemy cries out at night, they are afraid. If the army is turbulent, the general lacks severity. If their flags and pennants move about, they are in chaos. If the officers are angry, they are exhausted.

“If they kill their horses and eat the meat, the army lacks grain. If they hang up their cooking utensils and do not return to camp, they are an exhausted invader.

“One whose troops repeatedly congregate in small groups here and there, whispering together, has lost the masses. One who frequently grants rewards is in deep distress. One who frequently imposes punishments is in great difficulty. One who is at first excessively brutal and then fears the masses is the pinnacle of stupidity.

“One who has emissaries come forth with offerings wants to rest for a while.

“If their troops are aroused and approach our forces, only to maintain their positions without engaging in battle or breaking off the confrontation, you must carefully investigate it.

“The army does not esteem the number of troops being more numerous for it only means one cannot aggressively advance. It is sufficient for you to muster your own strength, analyze the enemy, and take them. Only someone who lacks strategic planning and slights an enemy will inevitably be captured by others.

“If you impose punishments on the troops before they have become attached, they will not be submissive. If they are not submissive, they will be difficult to employ. If you do not impose punishments after the troops have become attached, they cannot be used.

“Thus if you command them with the civil and unify them through the martial, this is what is referred to as ‘being certain to take them.’

“If orders are consistently implemented to instruct the people, then the people will submit. If orders are not consistently implemented to instruct the people, then the people will not submit. One whose orders are consistently carried out has established a mutual relationship with the people.”

COMMENTARY

As the title indicates, much of “Maneuvering the Army” focuses upon types of terrain either conducive or inimical to maneuvering and emplacing military forces, with certain specific, if limited, guidelines for different topography such as river areas and wetlands. In general, one should avoid ground which provides the enemy with potential cover, as well as constricted areas that might become killing grounds. (Obviously this has tactical implications for life situations, whether business, legal, or personal defense.) Sun-tzu was probably the first to categorize many of these problematic terrains, although experienced commanders were certainly aware of—and sought to avoid or exploit—them long before Sun-tzu appeared.

Sun-tzu also offers a number of discrete observations potentially useful to fathoming enemy behavior, ranging from physical observations near the battlefield to diplomatic awareness. Among the most famous, relevant to contemporary conflicts as well as historical debates, is “One who seeks peace without setting any prior conditions is executing a stratagem.” Several of his concrete clues, simplistic but doubtlessly the product of careful analysis, provide the essential wisdom lower level commanders must absorb early on if their men are to survive.

The final four paragraphs return to fundamental concepts fraught with far-reaching implications. The belief that troop strength is not the sole determinant of a battle’s outcome is pivotal not only to Sun-tzu’s thought, but Chinese military thought in general, and constitutes the basic premise of maneuver warfare. In fact, throughout history commanders with superior numbers or stronger component forces have frequently slighted their enemies and neglected collateral measures, suffering extremely severe consequences.

The last three paragraphs, which focus on the issue of command and control, are also fundamental to later Chinese military thought. Three essential issues are reprised here: First, the need to balance punishments with measures to nurture the troops’ emotional allegiance, and to apply punishments only after this emotional basis has been fostered. Second, the essential unity of the civil and martial, the former being the realm of virtue, deference, beneficence, and rewards, the latter directness, energy, strict commands, and punishments. Third, integral to every command, certainty in the orders, trust in the directives, confidence in the actions undertaken, all marked by unremitting consistency. As the later military writings indicate, doubts about the commander’s orders must never be permitted to arise; therefore, even though erroneous, orders should never be revised or rescinded—a concept certainly lacking in a contemporary age where statements and directives are reinterpreted, even redefined, virtually moments after being issued.