7
Eight Formations

SUN-TZU SAID:

“When someone whose wisdom is inadequate commands the army it is conceit. When someone whose courage is inadequate commands the army it is bravado. When someone does not know the Tao nor has engaged in a sufficient number of battles commands the army it becomes a matter of luck.

“To ensure the security of a state of ten thousand chariots; to bring glory to the ruler of ten thousand chariots; and to preserve the lives of the people of a state of ten thousand chariots, only a general who knows the Tao is capable. Above he knows the Tao of Heaven; below he knows the patterns of Earth; within the state he has gained the hearts of the people; outside it he knows the enemy’s true condition; and in deploying his forces he knows the principles for the eight formations. If he perceives victory he engages in battle; if he does not perceive it he remains quiet. This is the general of a true king.”

Sun Pin said: “As for employing the eight formations in battle: in accord with the advantages of the terrain use appropriate formations from among the eight. Employ a deployment which segments the troops into three, each formation having an elite front, and each elite front having a rear guard. They should all await their orders before moving. Fight with one of them, reserve the other two. Employ one to attack the enemy, use the other two to consolidate the gains. If the enemy is weak and confused, use your picked troops first to exploit it. If the enemy is strong and well disciplined, use your weak troops first in order to entice them.

“The chariots and cavalry that participate in a battle should be divided into three forces, one for the right, one for the left, and one for the rear. If the terrain is easy make the chariots numerous; if dif- ficult, make the cavalry numerous. If constricted then increase the crossbows. On both difficult and easy terrain you must know the ‘tenable’ and ‘fatal’ ground. Occupy tenable ground, attack on fatal ground.”

COMMENTARY

This chapter—one of the few preserved intact—largely represents a continuation and explication of tactical principles first advanced by Sun-tzu in the Art of War. It begins by noting Sun Pin’s own observations on the general’s character and qualifications, although presented in terms of problems posed by three major deficiencies. Wisdom, courage, and knowledge of the Tao are commonly found among the military writers; Sun Pin uniquely ties the latter to battle experience. When a general lacks both combat experience and the requisite knowledge, the army’s fate becomes a matter of luck. “Knowledge of the Tao,” previously mentioned and in common with most military writings, includes that of natural conditions; the desires of the people; the enemy’s true situation; and the principles of military deployment. (Sun Pin apparently allowed for gaining such knowledge through means other than battlefield experience; otherwise, there would be no need to couple them.)

Perhaps the most significant characteristic that qualifies generals or other leaders to actually undertake command is the ability to refrain from engaging in battle when victory is not apparent. In other words, external pressures, fear for reputation, and similar factors should not be allowed to affect the objective analysis of the enemy nor force the army into action. The underlying thought of Sun-tzu’s Art of War is that combat should be undertaken only when victory is apparent. To this end he advised that generals might have to ignore their ruler’s commands and concluded: “If it is not advantageous do not move. If objectives can not be attained do not employ the army.” Furthermore, the Six Secret Teachings states: “In military affairs nothing is more important than certain victory. One who excels at warfare will await events in the situation without making any movement. When he sees he can be victorious he will arise; if he sees he cannot be victorious he will desist.” In the Wei Liao-tzu an even broader principle governs: “The army cannot be mobilized out of personal anger. If victory can be foreseen then the troops can be raised. If victory cannot be foreseen, then it should be stopped.”

Although Sun Pin differentiates and characterizes ten formations in chapter sixteen (entitled “Ten Deployments”), whether the “eight formations” in the title and the text refer to eight different formations, such as the circular, square, and angular; the outer eight positions of a nine space square (three horizontal, three vertical); or simply comprise a general rubric has stimulated considerable discussion. From the context it appears that eight different formations are intended, each being chosen as appropriate to the configuration of terrain. However, definitive evidence is lacking, and later discussions cannot be reliably projected back into antiquity.

In this chapter Sun Pin again advises segmenting the army into three forces, employing one as an active strike force while keeping two of them in reserve. Although the character he employs also means “defense,” and their role in defending the army’s primary position should not be slighted, no doubt their intended function is the execution of ever evolving tactics and providing a flexible response to battlefield developments, such as through the implementation of the unorthodox measures Sun Pin discuses extensively in chapter thirty. Sun Pin appears to have been the first to employ the “subtracted reserve” in his campaigns, and this chapter provides the first systematic articulation of the concept and its tactical realization.

The chapter also points out the importance of conforming the formation, the disposition of the force components, to the terrain’s configuration. Although Sun-tzu classified commonly encountered configurations of terrain by their defining features, and suggested appropriate tactical measures for engaging the enemy, he did not discuss the types of formations, nor do the historical records from the period contain more than a few cursory references. While Sun Pin applies Sun-tzu’s concepts, his insights into force and weapon specialization represent an advance. However, compared with the late Spring and Autumn period, armies in Sun Pin’s age were marked by a greater diversity in battlefield elements, the crossbow and (probably) the cavalry having appeared, and the role of the infantry having been extensively broadened.

The final sentences expound the fundamental principle for surviving and exploiting terrain: “On both difficult and easy terrain you must know the ‘tenable’ and ‘fatal’ ground. Occupy tenable ground and attack an enemy on fatal ground.” In this sentence “easy” and “difficult” terrain implicitly subsume all types of terrain; therefore the principle is simply that the general must know what positions are tenable, which positions inherently fatal. “Tenable terrain” (which originally appears in the Art of War) is literally terrain that will sustain life, often identified by the commentators with heights and the sunny side of mountains, although it obviously encompasses any terrain which can easily be held to advantage. Furthermore, it is generally ground which does not contain, nor lie near any of the dangers and pitfalls which can endanger and destroy an army, such as ravines, rivers, and marshes. “Fatal terrain” (or ground) is defined in the Art of War as: “where, if one fights with intensity he will survive, but if he does not fight with intensity he will perish.” Sun-tzu strongly believed that soldiers would attain maximum fervor when confronted by imminent, apparently inescapable death, forced into an impossible situation on fatal ground: “Cast them into hopeless situations and they will be preserved; have them penetrate fatal terrain and they will live.” This of course suggests that the final, ambiguous injunction “to attack on fatal ground” should be understood as taking the offensive and mounting an attack whenever one finds oneself on fatal ground, assuming it is not possible to escape intact. This differs significantly from the common—and certainly tactically equally valid—assertion that it refers to targeting any enemy that ventures onto fatal terrain.