9
Preparation of Strategic Power
“Now being endowed with teeth and mounting horns, having claws in front and spurs in back, coming together when happy, fighting when angry, this is the Tao of Heaven, it cannot be stopped. Thus those who lack Heavenly weapons provide them themselves. This was an affair of extraordinary men. The Yellow Emperor created swords and imagized military formations upon them. Yi created bows and crossbows and imagized strategic power on them. Yü created boats and carts and imagized tactical changes on them. T’ang and Wu made long weapons and imagized the strategic imbalance of power on them.
“Now these four—formations, power, changes, and strategic imbalance of power—are the employment of the military. How do we know that swords constituted the basis for formations? Morning and night they are worn but not necessarily used. Thus it is said, deploying in formation but not engaging in battle, this is how the sword constitutes the basis for formations. If a sword has no edge, even someone with the courage of Meng Pen would not dare advance into battle with it. If a formation has no elite front, anyone without the courage of Meng Pen who would dare command it to advance does not know the essence of military affairs. If a sword lacks a haft, even a skilled officer would be unable to advance and engage in battle. If a formation lacks a rear guard, anyone who is not a skilled officer but dares command it to advance does not know the true nature of military affairs. Thus if there is an elite front and rear guard, and they mutually trust each other and are unmoving, the enemy’s soldiers will invariably run off. Without an elite front and rear guard, the army will be worn out and disordered.
“How do we know that bows and crossbows constituted the basis for strategic power? Released from between the shoulders they kill a man beyond a hundred paces without him realizing the arrow’s path.
Thus it is said that bows and crossbows are strategic power.
“How do we know that boats and carts constituted the basis for tactical changes? . . . . .
“How do we know that long weapons constituted the basis for the strategic imbalance of power? In attacking they neither need to strike from high nor from below but still shatter the forehead and destroy the shoulders. Thus it is said that long weapons are the basis for the strategic imbalance of power.
“In general, as for these four—those who gain these four survive, those who lose these four die. They must be complied with in order to complete their Tao. If one knows their Tao then the army will be successful and the ruler will be famous. If someone wants to employ them but does not know their Tao, the army will lack success. Now the Tao of the army is fourfold: formations, strategic power, changes, and strategic imbalance of power. Investigating these four is the means by which to destroy strong enemies and take fierce generals. What is seen up close but strikes far off is the strategic imbalance of power. In the daytime making the flags numerous, at night making the drums many is the means by which to send them off to battle. Now these four are the employment of the military. People all take them for their own use, but no one penetrates their Tao.
“One who has an elite front is extremely cautious in selecting troops for the formations.”
COMMENTARY
This relatively well-preserved chapter envisions combat as an inherent aspect of human and animal behavior, and therefore inevitable. Although Sun Pin was not the only military thinker to believe the origin of warfare is to be found in the very roots of antiquity, his attribution of four fundamental military concepts—formations, strategic power, changes, and strategic imbalance of power—to the ancient cultural heroes credited with creating the elements and artifacts of civilization is uncommon. However, two subsequent philosophical works contain similar views and even virtually identical passages, with one of them even perceiving man’s weakness in the face of natural and human threats to be the basis for social order, stimulating the formation of groups to protect the individual. Moreover, Hsün-tzu, a late Warring States philosopher best remembered for his assertion that human nature is inherently selfish and thus tends to evil, believed that since desire is the root cause of conflict, only the imposition of governmental restraints will resolve it.
Most of the military writings justify military activities only to defend the state against aggression and rescue the people from the inflictions of brutal oppressors. However, even in them two somewhat contradictory depictions of society under the guidance of the ancient Sages appear. One view holds that it was an ideal age: the realm was tranquil, the people at peace in their occupations. Accordingly, violence and perversity arose only after a precipitous decline in the ruler’s Virtue, the ensuing disorder having to be quelled through forceful military measures. This interpretation of history as a devolvement from a golden age tends to characterize warfare as essentially evil, frequently echoing Lao-tzu’s famous dictum, “the army is an inauspicious implement.” Therefore, conscientious moral rulers can undertake punitive military actions only with great reluctance, in the full recognition that Heaven abhors such violence. The Three Strategies states: “The Sage King does not take any pleasure in using the army. He mobilizes it to execute the violently perverse and to rectify the rebellious. The army is an inauspicious implement, and the Tao of Heaven abhors it. However, when its use is unavoidable it accords with the Tao of Heaven.” Clearly “the Tao of Heaven abhors it” dramatically contradicts Sun Pin’s view in this chapter, “this is the Tao of Heaven, it cannot be stopped.”
The second view, associated here with Sun Pin, perceives the Sages and cultural heroes as having arisen in response to the world’s chaos, dramatically acting to quell disorder and cre- ate security for the people. Most of the military writings, including Sun-tzu’s Art of War, stress the deadly importance of military campaigns, while some emphasize that the ruler must cultivate his moral worth and initiate military actions directed toward reducing the people’s suffering. However, the Military Methods is less concerned with such objectives than with actual theory and the science of military art.
The concept that fighting is the natural result of anger has its counterpart in the military theorists’ motivational psychology of warfare. In general, most of them discussed measures designed to stimulate the men’s spirits, nurture their ch’i, and coerce them into fervently engaging the enemy. Sun-tzu had earlier said, “What motivates men to slay the enemy is anger.” Based upon this chapter Sun Pin would certainly agree because anger is the root cause of conflict.
As for the four essential military concepts, three were previously raised by Sun-tzu, with only the topic of formations not receiving any significant discussion until later works. In Sun Pin’s interpretation of history, all four originated in the minds of the Sages who derived them from concrete weapons and inventions, rather than from abstract images. Thus, having fashioned the first sword, the Yellow Emperor modeled the concept of formations upon the concrete sword, rather than creating swords in concrete imitation of some nebulous image. Similarly, bows and crossbows, which act at a distance and provide the user with a critical distance advantage, were the basis for the concept and realization of the strategic configuration of power. Boats and carts, which provide mobility and make it possible to suddenly shift a deployment or race to a position, were the basis and means to realize change. And finally long weapons and especially missile weapons, which facilitate striking from a relatively safe distance while closing with an enemy, convey a temporal tactical advantage when wielded against short weapons, and thus underlie the concept and provide a basis for the strategic imbalance of power. When the four are fully understood and analytically employed, the astute commander can dominate the battlefield, being active rather than passive, and effect the essential tactical principles advocated by both Sun-tzu and Sun Pin.