12
Killing Officers
“Make rewards and emoluments clear and then the troops will advance without hesitation. If you invariably investigate and implement them, the officers will die. If you kill the officers, then the officers will certainly submit to your awesomeness.
“After you have determined your plans, cause the officers to know them. Knowledgeable officers can be trusted, so do not allow the people to depart from them. Only when victory is certain does one engage in battle, but do not let the soldiers know it. When engaged in battle do not forget the flanks.
“If you treat them deferentially then the officers will die for you. Even though the officers will die, their names will be transmitted to posterity. If you encourage them with fundamental pleasures, they will die for their native places. If you importune them with family relationships, they will die for the ancestral graves. If you honor them with feasts, they will die for the honor of food and drink. If you have them dwell in tranquility, they will die in the urgency of defense. If you inquire about their febrile diseases, they will die for your solicitude.”
COMMENTARY
The remnants of this chapter, identified by a notation on the back of the strips as “Killing Officers,” are too fragmented to permit more than the rather tentative reconstruction provided here. The first sentence advances one of the fundamental principles found in most Warring States writings for effectively implementing rewards and incentives, “make rewards and emoluments clear.” Only when they are extensively promulgated, thoroughly under- stood, and rigorously implemented will incentives motivate people to undertake desired courses of action or soldiers to fervently advance into battle and be willing to die without regret.
The first paragraph’s concluding sentence, beginning “if you kill the officers,” may refer to subjecting any transgressors among the officers to capital punishment as an example to the remainder. When punishment—especially capital punishment—is visibly inflicted upon the higher ranks, subordinates and ordinary troops become fearful. Accordingly, the military writings stress that in administering punishment the great and noble should never be spared, thereby striking awe into the troops, causing them to obey their commands and fight aggressively.
The second paragraph explicitly advances the rarely voiced but certainly assumed principle that “knowledgeable officers can be trusted.” Whether this knowledge refers simply to their personal knowledge of rewards and punishments (and thus to their certain fidelity), or to their command expertise is unclear. However, the thought that subordinates can be relied upon, and that the people should cling to them, is unusual even though ancient Chinese forces all had strong chains of command and clear hierarchical organization. “Do not let the people know it,” starkly contrasts with having knowledgeable officers, but also mirrors one of Sun-tzu’s thoughts: “In accord with the enemy’s disposition we impose measures on the masses that produce victory, but the masses are unable to fathom them.” Sun-tzu also said: “At the moment the general has designated with them, it will be as if they ascended a height and abandoned their ladders. The general advances with them deep into the territory of the feudal lords and then releases the trigger. He commands them as if racing a herd of sheep— they are driven away, driven back, but no one knows where they are going.”
The principle that “only when victory is certain does one engage in battle” summarizes the Sun family approach to initiating combat. In his fourth chapter, which explicates the nature of victory and defeat, Sun-tzu stated: “The victorious army first realizes the conditions for victory, and then seeks to engage in battle. The vanquished army fights first, and then seeks victory.” Sun-tzu further advocated making oneself unconquerable before attempting to conquer the enemy. Consequently, whenever prospects for victory prove uncertain, temporizing and defensive measures should be employed. Furthermore, the ruler should not mobilize the army except under appropriate conditions, a sentiment found in several other important texts from the period.
The concluding paragraph—whose translation represents our best attempt to puzzle out the overall meaning of a series of disjointed, fragmentary strips—dramatically changes the chapter’s complexity. Basically this paragraph entails a discussion of motivation applicable in many spheres, questioning what will stimulate men to act, what they will kill to protect.
Apart from anger, the most prominent factors raised by the military writings encompass shame, rewards and punishments, family, and native place. The various military writings also emphasized that the commanding general should evince an ongoing solicitude for the welfare and physical condition of his men, being certain to set a personal example and share their hardships. Treating them with appropriate courtesy, as Sun Pin indicates, will also accord them the requisite respect.