13
Expanding Ch’i
“When you form the army and assemble the masses, concentrate upon stimulating their ch’i. When you again decamp and reassemble the army, concentrate upon ordering the soldiers and sharpening their ch’i. When you approach the border and draw near the enemy, concentrate upon honing their ch’i. When the day for battle has been set, concentrate upon making their ch’i decisive. When the day for battle is at hand, concentrate upon expanding their ch’i.
“The commanding general assembles the troops and promulgates the mission statement in order to overawe the warriors of the Three Armies, the means by which he stimulates their ch’i.
“The commanding general reassembles the troops and issues his orders, the means by which to sharpen their ch’i.
“The short coat and coarse clothes, which encourage the warriors’ determination, are the means by which to hone their ch’i. Prior to striking out for the engagement the commanding general issues orders to have every single man prepare three days’ rations. As for the state’s soldiers, their families are honored and the men motivated.
“When about to engage in combat, sever all communications to cut off hope for life. Emissaries do not come from the state, officers from the army do not go forth in order to make the troops’ ch’i decisive. The commanding general summons the commander of the camp security forces and informs him: ‘Do not stint the men’s food or drink in order to expand their ch’i.’
“When encamping upon easy terrain you must be numerous and esteem the martial, for then the enemy will certainly be defeated. If their ch’i is not sharp they will be plodding. When they are plodding they will not reach their objective. When they do not reach their objective, they will lose the advantage.
“When on campaign, if their ch’i is not honed the soldiers will be frightened. When they are frightened they will mass together. When they mass together they will be unable to respond to the enemy’s assault.
“When their ch’i is not decisive then they will be slack. When they are slack they will not be focused and will easily disperse. If they easily disperse, when they encounter difficulty they will be defeated.
“If their ch’i is not expanded, they will be lazy. If they are lazy it will be difficult to employ them. If it is difficult to employ them they will not be able to converge on their objective.
“If they are not exposed to hardship, they will not know to constrain themselves. When they do not know to constrain themselves affairs will be overturned.
“If the members of the squad of five lose a member and fail to rescue him, they themselves will die and their families will be exterminated. The commanding general summons his subordinates, exhorts them, and then attacks.”
COMMENTARY
This intriguing chapter preserves the outlines of a psychology of battlefield motivation conceptualized in terms of ch’i, the essential spirit or pneuma of life, one that equally characterizes human endeavors in all fields and especially contemporary times. The ancient military writers were acutely aware that an army’s performance in battle—irrespective of its equipment, training, and general condition—would depend mainly upon the motivation and commitment of its soldiers. Numerous concrete measures were therefore systematically employed to direct their preparation for combat from the earliest training stages through the final drumming of the advance and the actual engagement. Remnants of these are recorded in the Seven Military Classics, together with comments upon their effectiveness and manipulation. In “Expanding Ch’i” Sun Pin has described the normative sequence of ch’i states that must be realized, although the actual techniques for attaining them remain unknown because of the damaged condition of the strips.
Even though the Military Classics were composed over a span of two centuries or more during which concepts and tactics evolved significantly, the extant texts generally recognize and agree upon the basic assumptions and underlying role of ch’i. The early Ssu-ma Fa contains an oft-quoted sentence: “In general, in battle one endures with strength, and gains victory through spirit.” Later the Wei Liao-tzu explicitly identified ch’i as the decisive component: “Now the means by which the general fights is the people; the means by which the people fight is their ch’i. When their ch’i is substantial they will fight; when their ch’i has been snatched away they will run off.”
Realizing that a loss of ch’i renders an army susceptible to defeat, the astute general focuses upon formulating strategies and tactical principles to manipulate the enemy, causing his forces to suffer just such a loss. This was one of the main thrusts of the Art of War, for Sun-tzu emphasized being active, rather than passive, controlling the development of events rather than being compelled into movement by others: “The ch’i of the Three Armies can be snatched away, the commanding general’s mind can be seized. For this reason in the morning their ch’i is ardent; during the day their ch’i becomes indolent; at dusk their ch’i is exhausted. Thus one who excels at employing the army avoids their ardent ch’i, and strikes when it is indolent or exhausted. This is the way to manipulate ch’i.”
Wu-tzu, for whom ch’i was one of the four vital points of warfare, believed it “ebbed and flourished,” and therefore also advised a policy directed to snatching away the enemy’s ch’i. Moreover, troops far from home, who are physically tired and mentally exhausted, furnish easy opportunities that should be exploited. However, if the enemy remains vigorous and spirited, two other possibilities can be either awaited or created: doubt and fear. About the former the strategists constantly warned: “Of disasters that can befall an army none surpasses doubt.” Therefore, launching an attack when the enemy is beset by doubt, when the commanding general is puzzled, was suggested by virtually all of them.
Fear causes even greater paralysis in an enemy, rendering them easy prey. The T’ai Kung cited fear among the perceived opportunities for mounting an attack, advising that “taking advantage of their fright and fear is the means by which one can attack ten.” The Ssu-ma Fa similarly states: “Attack when they are truly afraid, avoid them when they display only minor fears.” Wu-tzu frequently suggested measures designed to harry and frighten enemy troops, advancing to strike them when they grew fearful.
Within this context the commanding general—and leaders confronted with disciplinary and motivational challenges in many realms—had to wrestle with the difficult question as to how to instill spirit and develop courage. While much of the military theorists’ motivational theory was founded upon the draconian implementation of rewards and punishments, a policy that essentially caused the soldiers to fear their own officers more deeply than the enemy, there were several other measures designed to stimulate their ch’i, their spirit, at the appropriate stages. Sun Pin’s chapter “Expanding Ch’i” provides the most systematic overview found in the extant ancient writings, even though the techniques themselves are lacking.
As background it should be noted that the Ssu-ma Fa expressly contrasted the basic, underlying attitude distinguishing the civil and martial spheres: the former is the realm of propriety and deference, whereas the latter is the realm of action and straightforwardness. Thus the true warrior’s demeanor radically differs, and his ch’i is appropriately constrained. However, ch’i is explicitly understood to be a subject for manipulation, and there are appropriate techniques for raising it, for “when the heart’s foundation is solid, a new surge of ch’i will bring victory.”
The solution to the age-old question of what motivates individuals to fight in military engagements—or even to strive in their life roles and job functions—and measures to ensure that each man’s effort is maximized, were founded upon the basic perception that courage, which is a manifestation and function of ch’i, is the key. Assuming that life under arms has instilled the basic discipline and attitude, fostering an intense commitment which will not admit any possibility but fighting to the death is then required. Two analytical illustrations found in the Military Classics vividly depict the nature of this commitment. In the earlier one, Wu Ch’i speaks about a “murderous villain”:
Now if there is a murderous villain hidden in the woods, even though a thousand men pursue him they all look around like owls, and glance about like wolves. Why? They are afraid that violence will erupt and harm them personally. Thus one man oblivious to life and death can frighten a thousand.
Nearly two centuries later the Wei Liao-tzu echoed it:
If a warrior wields a sword to strike people in the market place, among ten thousand people there will not be anyone who doesn’t avoid him. If I say that it’s not that only one man is courageous, but that the ten thousand are unlike him, what is the reason? Being committed to dying and being committed to seeking life are not comparable.
Although the Ssu-ma Fa discusses numerous measures for stimulating and nurturing spirit and resolve, and the other Military Classics also offer scattered suggestions, only the Wei Liao-tzu briefly characterizes the idealized progression of the soldiers’ mental states as they advance into battle:
Soldiers have five defining commitments: for their general they forget their families; when they cross the border they forget their relatives; when they confront the enemy they forget themselves; when they are committed to die they will live; while urgently seeking victory is the lowest. A hundred men willing to suffer the pain of a blade can penetrate a line and cause chaos in a formation. A thousand men willing to suffer the pain of a blade can seize the enemy and kill its general. Ten thousand men willing to suffer the pain of a blade can traverse under Heaven at will.
Against this background which, although spanning nearly two centuries, outlines the common conceptions of motivation and ch’i in the ancient period, Sun Pin’s chapter may be clearly interpreted. In the initial period when a campaign army is being formed and the troops assembled, an attitude of seriousness and constraint would be required. The soldiers’ willing commitment, their initiative and voluntary participation, must be stimulated. As the other writings note, baleful omens, fears, and doubts must be prevented. However, unbridled courage would be equally disruptive, leading to excessive displays of bravado and a tendency to unruliness.
As the army advances into the field, “order,” understood as military discipline and the strict governance of the army’s hierarchical organization of responsive units, must be maintained. Simultaneously, the soldiers’ anticipation and commitment should be made sharper. This sharpening might best be understood as nurturing their general enthusiasm and commitment to the military enterprise because it would be detrimental for their ch’i to become too “sharp.” As the Taoists point out, what is too sharp will easily become blunted and broken, especially if such sharpness is not wielded in action.
Once the day for battle has been set a commitment to dying, the decisiveness described above, has to be created. All vestiges of fear must be eliminated, with the soldiers manifesting the desperate resolve that Sun-tzu elicits by thrusting them into hopeless situations. As the Ssu-ma Fa states: “When men have their minds set on victory, all they see is the enemy. When men have minds filled with fear, all they see is their fear.” (Or, much expanded in contemporary terms, people committed to their activities lack the leisure for doubt to affect them; they are too focused and absorbed to lose confidence or allow anxiety to paralyze them.)
Finally, when they enter battle focused on the grim task of dealing death and dying themselves— rather than simply being swept along by high-spirited enthusiasm—the general must “expand their ch’i.” Sun Pin’s analysis emphasizes this distinction between ebullient, unrealistic enthusiasm and the decisive, committed to “death as if returning home” attitude required as the foundation for violent combat. He apparently recognized the danger of bringing men to this ultimate point which, while absolutely necessary, may prove too brittle. Such fervency might be quickly dissipated by the initial moments of battle, perhaps following the first concerted thrust at the enemy, or even result in the sort of impulsive action which Wu Ch’i brutally condemned. Therefore the general’s final task is to expand their ch’i so that their courage will be sustained throughout the day’s conflict, rather than broken precipitously. It is perhaps a fundamental aspect of the “new surge of ch’i” that will bring victory already noted above.
Unfortunately, the details of Sun Pin’s methods have been lost; only glimpses remain. Rewards and punishments, made the foundation of the ruler’s and commander’s awesomeness in the Military Classics, are the basic tools for stimulating the troops. Their clothes, which clearly offered little protection against the cold and doubtlessly even less comfort, coupled with the general hardship of military service, clearly “honed” their ch’i just like a whetstone sharpening a blade through slow grinding. Furthermore, issuing minimal rations would compel them to aggressively wrest needed supplies from the enemy, and they could not defer taking the initiative on the battlefield.
The dangers posed by any lack of courage have also been extensively noted above. Sun Pin points out that an absence of sharp ch’i results in defeat. When men are dispirited, they perform poorly and without vigor, presenting the enemy with an astounding opportunity. Furthermore, when their ch’i has not been honed, they are susceptible to becoming frightened and even an unperceptive enemy will rush to take advantage of the situation to terrify and attack them. The Wei Liao-tzu captured these two aspects: “Those from whom the initiative has been taken have no ch’i; those who are afraid are unable to mount a defense.” Similarly, when other requisite ch’i states are not appropriately realized, disaster can be expected. As Sun Pin notes, when their ch’i is not decisive, they will easily be scattered by enemy pressure, whereas when they are lazy (probably because their ch’i is not stimulated), they will not respond to their orders. Being unresponsive, the troups will be impossible to command to initiate attacks or converge upon designated targets in accord with Sun Pin’s basic doctrine of segmenting forces and Sun-tzu’s principle of segmenting and reuniting to concentrate mass upon weak points. Finally, without constraint and proper measure the army will not only lack order and discipline but also wastefully dissipate its energy. Although unstated, the resulting inability to wage sustained battles will ultimately result in defeat.
The last paragraph gives evidence of Sun Pin’s ascription of overarching stimulative power to the implementation of punishments. Clearly the members of each unit, whatever the level— although likely the squad of five was the basis—were bound by being mutually responsible for each other. Other works preserve regulations for a squad suffering the death of a member in battle; this chapter is unusual in probably referring to the capture of a unit member or possibly the unit leader. Men were thus coerced into fervently fighting by what has probably been the prime motivation over the millennia, their relationship with their fellow soldiers. Although the military writings generally discuss this coercion in terms of the threat of capital punishment, sometimes supplemented by great rewards, many of the ancient thinkers also understood the power of shame in motivating men to fight. Further reinforcing the duress of personal punishment was the constant threat that an individual’s family, equally at risk, could suffer for his failure. Punishment incurred by battlefield transgressions could only be remitted through outstanding individual and squad performance in subsequent combat.