27 Male and Female Cities

IF A CITY LIES AMIDST SMALL MARSHES, lacks high mountains and notable valleys, but has moderate sized mounds about its four quarters, it is a “male city” and cannot be attacked.

If an army drinks from flowing water, it is water that will sustain life, and they cannot be attacked.

If before a city there is a notable valley while it has a high mountain behind it, it is a male city and cannot be attacked.

If the terrain within a city is high while it falls away outside it, it is a male city and cannot be attacked.

If within a city there are moderate sized mounds, it is a male city and can not be attacked.

An army that is encamping after being on the march without avoiding notable rivers, whose ch’i has been harmed and determination weakened, can be attacked.

A city with a notable valley behind it that lacks high mountains to its left and right is a vacuous city and can be attacked.

Thoroughly incinerated terrain is deadly ground; an army occupying it can be attacked.

If an army drinks stagnant water it is water that will result in death, and they can be attacked.

If a city lies amidst vast marshes and lacks notable valleys and moderate sized mounds, it is a “female city” and can be attacked.

If a city lies between high mountains and lacks notable valleys and moderate sized mounds, it is a female city and can be attacked.

If there is a high mountain in front of a city and a notable valley behind it, while before it the ground ascends and to the rear it descends, it is a female city and can be attacked.

COMMENTARY

This chapter is extensively cited—including by those who fail to translate it in their modern Chinese editions—as evidence that the scope and concepts of warfare significantly evolved over the century between Sun-tzu and Sun Pin. As is generally known, Sun-tzu had strongly cautioned against precipitously and wastefully attacking cities in a famous passage in “Planning Offensives.” For centuries thereafter his view was frequently but incorrectly simplified to merely “do not attack cities.” However, the passage’s initial section indicates that rather than simply condemning such attacks outright, he advocated the implementation of more effective tactics and reluctantly countenanced urban assaults only when unavoidable: “The highest realization of warfare is to attack the enemy’s plans; next is to attack their alliances; and the lowest is to attack their fortified cities. This tactic of attacking fortified cities is adopted only when unavoidable.”

Furthermore, tomb fragments recovered with Sun Pin’s Military Methods that appear to be an integral part of Sun-tzu’s Art of War expand his view further: “As for fortified cities that are not assaulted: We estimate that our strength is sufficient to seize it. If we seize it, it will not be of any advantage to the fore; if we gain it we will not be able to protect it to the rear. If our strength equals theirs, the city certainly will not be taken. If, when we gain the advantage of a forward position the city will then surrender by itself, while if we do not gain such advantages the city will not cause harm to the rear—in such cases, even though the city can be assaulted, do not assault it.” Sun-tzu thus emphasized calculating the potential advantages and employing methods other than frontal assaults, such as drawing the enemy out so that they will be forced to fight on more advantageous and open terrain.

Sun Pin’s dual categorization of “male” and “female” cities is generally contrasted with Sun-tzu’s reluctance to assault fortified cities and interpreted as reflecting the growth of cities as economic and strategic centers. Unlike in the Spring and Autumn era when campaign armies could move relatively unhindered through sparsely populated open countryside, in the Warring States period they could be thwarted by the fortified strongholds that had concurrently assumed much greater military and economic value. Among these cities the strategically weaker ones, classified as female, could—and by implication—should be attacked, while the stronger or male ones, should be avoided. (However, note that Sun Pin never explicitly stated that the female cities should invariably be attacked or designated them as more than preferred targets.) His classificatory principles appear to be simply topographical; however, other situations similarly categorized for their attack potential have also been intermixed. The latter are similar to those raised in previous chapters, and to the tactical analyses found in other writings, including the Wu-tzu.

TheWei Liao-tzu, a military classic probably composed in the century following Sun Pin’s death, specifically discusses the importance of cities and notes the economic importance of their markets for sustaining the armed forces. The text further states that “land is the means for nourishing the populace; fortified cities the means for defending the land; combat the means for defending the cities.” Consequently, it identifies cities as primary targets, particularly if “the cities are large and the land narrow”: “Thus, in general, when the troops have assembled and the general has arrived, the army should penetrate deeply into the enemy’s territory, sever their roads, and occupy their large cities and large towns. Have the troops ascend the walls and press the enemy into endangered positions. Have the several units of men and women each press the enemy in accord with the configuration of the terrain and attack any strategic barriers. If you occupy the terrain around a city or town and sever the various roads about it, follow up by attacking the city itself.” Thus a clear historical progression is witnessed from Sun-tzu through Sun Pin to Wei Liao-tzu, from viewing assaults on cities as the lowest tactical option to emphasizing the need to defend and attack them as the highest.

Sun Pin’s principles for categorizing the cities in this chapter are less apparent. In antiquity it was axiomatic that one should “value high terrain and disdain low ground.” Thus the T’ai Kung said: “Occupying high ground is the means by which to be alert and assume a defensive posture.” Sun-tzu himself said, “Do not approach high mountains, do not confront those who have hills behind them.” In addition, as a general principle he stated: “To cross mountains follow the valleys, search out tenable ground, and occupy the heights. If the enemy holds the heights, do not climb up to engage them in battle. This is the way to deploy an army in the mountains.” Clearly, since it is decidedly disadvantageous to mount an uphill assault, to rush against an enemy directing its fire downward or taking advantage of gravity in wielding their shock weapons while benefiting from the attacker’s rapid exhaustion brought about by the greater exertion necessary to ascend heights, it would be even more foolhardy to cross a deep valley and then attempt to storm the walls. Not only would the troops be tired, but the terrain would constrict the number that might be focused upon the walls, making it difficult to achieve the historically attested ratio of about four to one for the assault to prevail.

Whenever a city incorporates higher terrain (such as moderate sized mounds) that will allow missile weapons to be directed downward while forcing the attackers to direct their fire upward, the city should be considered strong, and therefore not easily approached and overwhelmed. Even if the walls are penetrated, the interior terrain will provide natural vantage points for mounting a collapsing defense.

Less clear is the relationship of mountains located to the sides of a city. Mountains to the rear would seem to prevent the employment of large numbers of men, just as marshes would, but at the same time—if undefended—allow an enemy the possibility of height advantage. Merely being able to employ incendiary arrows would endanger the city from above; this sort of tactical thought perhaps motivated Sun Pin to classify “a city lying between high mountains” as a female city. However, the mirrored relationship of the third and last classifications raises questions: “If before a city there is a notable valley while it has a high mountain behind it, it is a male city and cannot be attacked. . . . If there is a high mountain in front of a city and a notable valley behind it, while before it the ground ascends and to the rear it descends, it is a female city and can be attacked.”

In the second case, if all the defenses were directed toward the front—an incredible and therefore unthinkable blunder—an effective downward assault on their fixed arrays would be possible. However, front and rear, while reflecting the city’s orientation, simply represent a rotation in perspective for an attacker. A city with a high mountain behind it would seem to be equally easy prey for assault forces raining missiles downward, particularly if the defenders had not established preemptive defensive positions upon it. While Sun-tzu advised against having valleys, gorges, and similar depressions behind one’s forces, and stressed maneuvering the enemy so that he would find himself constricted by them to the rear, as a tactical principle it applies to field forces, not fixed citadels. Unfortunately, the reasoning here remains unclear, perhaps awaiting the discovery of further texts on topography and configuration.

The presence of mounds appears to be the distinguishing factor in the first male city (situated amidst small mashes), for further below Sun Pin explicitly states that a city with moderate sized mounds is a male city. Accordingly, a city lacking them and other natural defenses, even though protected by marshes (which all the military writers warned would impede progress and enmire vehicles, as previously discussed) falls under the female classification.

The remaining situations, which may have been included by later compilers, overlaying a core discussion about “male and female cities,” indicate the importance of potable water to the army’s survival and suggest the problems posed by thoroughly savaged ground which is unable to sustain any life at all. Finally, there is one passage noting the plight of those exhausted from working their way along or across large rivers, who are exhausted and suffering from a loss of morale and determination, making them easy prey.