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Five Criteria, Nine Seizings

OFTEN AN ARMY, finding itself under severe attack, will request the dispatch of rescue forces from far off, but when the rescuers arrive they are also severely defeated. Thus the essential principle for the army is that those fifty kilometers apart do not rescue each other. How much more so is this the case when the nearest are a hundred kilometers apart, the farthest several hundred kilometers. These are the extremes for weighing the army’s possibilities. Thus the Tactics states: “If your provisions are unlike theirs, do not engage them in protracted battles. If your masses are unlike theirs, do not engage them in battle. If your weapons and component forces are unlike theirs, do not contend with them on confined terrain. If your organization is unlike theirs, do not contend with them across a broad front. If your training is unlike theirs, do not oppose them in their strength. When these five criteria are clear, the army will be able to forcefully advance unhindered.

As for the techniques for forcing the enemy to rush about: The first is called seizing provisions. The second is called seizing water. The third is called seizing fords. The fourth is called seizing roads. The fifth is called seizing ravines. The sixth is called seizing easy terrain. . . . . . The ninth is called seizing what he solely values. In general these nine “graspings” are the means by which to force the enemy to hasten about.

COMMENTARY

Only slightly more than one fourth of this chapter remains, with no indication of what the other topics beyond the two clearly expressed in these sections may have been. The beginning reflects an emphasis found in Sun-tzu’s first chapter, “Initial Estimations,” upon ana- lyzing the enemy and calculating the possibilities for victory and defeat. While the terms differ somewhat, the concept of “measuring” is found throughout Sun-tzu and most other military writers, particularly with regard to determining the number of men appropriate to configurations of terrain and campaigns.

The missing portion of Sun Pin’s initial discussion probably cited historical examples of forces being defeated after hasty but ill-conceived rescue efforts, leading to the conclusion that forces only fifty kilometers apart already exceed the possible range for mutual aid. Assuming that one force rushes to assist a separate, embattled unit (rather than both of them racing toward each other, thereby cutting their respective distances in half), the full fifty kilometers could require as long as two days based upon a normal marching speed of thirty kilometers per day. Therefore, depending upon the terrain’s characteristics, the battle site might theoretically be reached in a single day at double pace, just as at the battle of Ma-ling. However, the famous general Wu Ch’i stressed the need for a measured advance in order not to exhaust the men and horses, while among Sun Pin’s measures for wearing out an enemy is a forced double march: “Those who excel in warfare can cause the enemy to roll up his armor and race far off; to travel two days normal distance at a time; to be exhausted and sick but unable to rest; to be hungry and thirsty but unable to eat. An enemy emaciated in this way certainly will not be victorious.” Sun-tzu stated even more explicitly: “If you abandon your armor and heavy equipment to race forward day and night without encamping, covering two days normal distance at a time, marching forward a hundred kilometers to contend for gain, the Three Armies’ generals will be captured. The strong will be first to arrive, while the exhausted will follow. With such tactics only one in ten will reach the battle site. If one contends for gain fifty kilometers away, it will cause the general of the Upper Army to stumble, and by following such tactics half the men will reach the objective. If you contend for gain at thirty kilometers, then two-thirds of their army will reach the objective.”

The fundamental conclusion, expressed in concrete terms by the Military Methods, is simple: do not engage forces for which you are not a match. This embodies Sun-tzu’s basic principle that one must first evaluate the enemy and then implement appropriate tactics, and Sun Pin’s warning not to attack strength with weakness. Directly engaging a potent enemy would also dramatically contravene Sun-tzu’s dictum “If it is not advantageous, do not move. If objectives can not be attained, do not employ the army.” However, Sun Pin addressed the necessity for manipulating superior forces so that they might be successfully engaged in two chapters, “Distinction Between Guest and Host” and “Those Who Excel.” Sun-tzu himself previously provided some basic parameters: “In general, the strategy for employing the military is this: If your strength is ten times theirs, surround them; if five, then attack them; if double, then divide your forces. If you are equal in strength to the enemy, you can engage him. If fewer, you can circumvent him. If outmatched, you can avoid him. Thus a small enemy that acts inflexibly will become the captives of a larger enemy.”

The last part of this chapter discusses some concrete means for manipulating the enemy— literally forcing him to hasten about—virtually identical to Sun-tzu’s own measures. The thrust of these “seizures” is to compel the enemy to precipitously act by seizing what he values, what is essential to him, thereby taking the initiative and ensuring that any engagements will be with a weakened, confused, and tired opponent. In “Ten Questions” Sun Pin stated: “Attack positions that they must rescue.” The list of critical targets, several previously identified in “Those Who Excel,” encompasses such fundamentals as food, water, and strategic points. By striking and capturing them the army not only prevents the enemy from benefiting from them, but also compels them to mount defensive efforts centered on such resources simply to survive.