The first witness called before the Board of Inquiry was Rear Admiral Sidney Raw, Flag Officer, Submarines, at the time of the loss of Affray. Raw had come to the Inquiry armed with a detailed report. He began by telling the Board that in his opinion ‘HMS Affray was sufficiently worked up and in every way in a fit condition to undertake the training war patrol “Exercise Training Spring” for which she was detailed by the Captain, 5th Submarine Flotilla (Captain Hugh Browne).’
Raw made it clear to the Board that although the exercise had been called a ‘training war patrol’ it had been put together
largely for the benefit of the young officers of the training class and it cannot be considered a war patrol in the true sense of the term since everything was done in ‘slow time’ meaning there was no sense of urgency in any of the operation, plenty of margin of time allowed for everything that had to be done, there was no opposition of any sort and the submarine was not intending to carry out any attacks.
He added:
The war patrol is a routine affair designed to accustom training classes to the living and routine conditions to be expected in a submarine in time of war and to give the instructors who accompany them an opportunity of showing them at first hand at sea what they have been taught in the classroom. It has been the custom, therefore, that these routine training patrols are carried out by submarines of the 5th Flotilla, usually a submarine from one of the Reserve Group whose complement is brought up for this purpose. . . . It so happened that HMS Affray, who had only just recently been up with the Home Fleet during the Autumn Cruise, had the great majority of her officers and ratings still in her and she was thus in a more advantageous condition.
Asked to clarify the point that in her orders she had been instructed to ‘carry out dummy attacks on shipping’ Raw replied:
It is normal practice for all submarines to be given permission as a matter of routine to carry out dummy attacks on single merchant ships if the opportunity occurs. Submarines are warned that it is most important that merchant ships should not be alarmed in any way and not be approached too closely.
QUESTION: The Commanding Officer had only been with the ship for one month – do you consider this factor would in any way influence the decision to embark a large training class for a patrol such as that was in fact intended?
REAR ADMIRAL RAW: Lieutenant Blackburn was an experienced Commanding Officer of whom I had a high opinion and who had shown by his previous records that he was steady and extremely reliable. There is nothing abnormal for a Commanding Officer who is fully qualified and experienced to move to a submarine at short notice and take her on a cruise such as a training war patrol. He had expressed his keenness to carry out this particular duty as a good way of working up the majority of his crew. On the day of sailing he said he was entirely satisfied with the state of his submarine and his ship’s company. He also stated that he fully understood and was happy about his orders.
Next to be called was Captain Hugh Browne of the 5th Submarine Flotilla who reminded the Board that the Engineer Officers’ Training Class had completed twelve weeks out of their fourteen week-long submarine course and that all sub-lieutenants, except one, had served ‘three months small ships’ time in submarines’ and completed nine out of their fourteen weeks’ training. Asked how much actual sea experience they had had, he replied: ‘An occasional day at sea.’
QUESTION: Can you give us an opinion on their (sub-lieutenants) competency as compared to the able seamen whom they replaced to carry out the necessary duties in Affray?
CAPTAIN BROWNE: In my opinion they would be every bit as efficient as able seamen and probably more so at this stage of their training.
QUESTION: How are sub-lieutenants likely to have been employed?
CAPTAIN BROWNE: On various duties throughout the ship, such as 2nd Officer of the Watch, 2nd Petty Officer of the Watch and Able Seaman duties. In every case they would be under the supervision of either an officer or petty officer.
QUESTION: What was Affray’s complement?
CAPTAIN BROWNE: Peacetime – 62; wartime – 65/66. She actually had 75 on board.
QUESTION: Were you satisfied that the excess in the complement was reasonable?
CAPTAIN BROWNE: Yes, Sir, entirely satisfied.
QUESTION: Were there any special arrangements made for the messing of the sub-lieutenants?
CAPTAIN BROWNE: They would normally be accommodated in the forward torpedo stowage compartment.
QUESTION: Have either ‘T’ class or ‘A’ class submarines been to sea with ten men more than their normal complement?
CAPTAIN BROWNE: Yes sir, on frequent occasions.
QUESTION: Will you confirm that the complete engine room complement had been on board long enough to be familiar with the submarine?
CAPTAIN BROWNE: I consider they had been long enough on board to know sufficient about the ship to take her to sea for an independent cruise.
QUESTION: Were you fully satisfied that the short time that the commanding officer had been in command presented no difficulties to him taking out a high proportion of passengers who had not been previously embarked in his submarine?
CAPTAIN BROWNE: I am entirely satisfied with this. Lieutenant Blackburn was a very sound and most capable commanding officer.
Commander Edward Stanley, Commander (Submarines) at HMS Dolphin in April 1951, was called to the stand.
QUESTION: Can you confirm that there was sufficient DSEA apparatus on board for everyone?
COMMANDER STANLEY: Yes sir. I know that there were more sets on board than men.
QUESTION: Do you know why the electrical artificer was left behind?
COMMANDER STANLEY: I was rather surprised at him being selected to stay behind, sir. I can only assume that the first lieutenant or commanding officer was very confident of the state of their electrical equipment. About 18 months ago, a trial was made running submarines without electrical artificers. Two submarines in a relatively bad state were selected and it was considered that the extra work which came to the Flotilla Electrical Workshop made it undesirable to dispense with electrical artificers in submarines. An electrical artificer is essentially borne for repair duties and frequently does not have a job on the watch and probably for this reason it was considered he could be dispensed with.
Chief Petty Officer Francis Gordon Selby was next to be called forward. He was asked to tell the Board where the training classes would have been accommodated on board the Affray and he replied that they would have been billeted in the seaman’s mess.
QUESTION: What was your duty at the time of the Affray incident?
CPO SELBY: Instructor to the executive officers’ training class, sir.
QUESTION: Can you give any indication at all of how much practical training in ‘A’ class submarines the class had had?
CPO SELBY: Not a great deal without supervision, sir. They had had instruction on the majority of systems in a submarine, but would not have been allowed to have operated them without someone supervising them.
QUESTION: The class would have been familiar with the layout and workings of an ‘A’; class submarine?
CPO SELBY: Yes sir.
QUESTION: You were taking through this training class, only did not go to sea as you went sick?
CPO SELBY: Yes sir.
QUESTION: Can you express an opinion on the general efficiency or otherwise of this class?
CPO SELBY: Above average, sir. We had anticipated it being one of our best classes since I had been here.
QUESTION: What duties would have been carried out by the training classes once embarked?
CPO SELBY: General duties of the ship’s company with very little evolution work for the first 24 hours. The policy was not to give them anything other than routine work for the first 24 hours, Sir.
Engine Room Artificer John Summers who had served on Affray between June 1950 and January 1951 was called to the stand:
QUESTION: Would it be true to say that in your experience, the Affray was a normal running submarine in which those on board had general confidence?
ERA SUMMERS: Yes.
QUESTION: What were your duties on Affray?
ERA SUMMERS: I was in the engine room.
QUESTION: What was the general opinion of HMS Affray as a submarine?
ERA SUMMERS: I cannot remember anyone who was particularly worried. Everyone was, as far as I can recall, quite content in the boat.
Able Seaman Stanley Crowe, one of the crew sent ashore before Affray sailed on 16 April, was called to the stand.
QUESTION: What was your duty on HMS Affray?
A/S CROWE: I was the gunner – although she did not carry a gun.
QUESTION: What was your job at diving stations?
A/S CROWE: At the wheel.
QUESTION: Have you any suggestions or comment to make about the loss of HMS Affray, observing that you had been in the ship for some time and was one of the last people to leave her?
A/S CROWE: The only thing I have got to say is why did she go to sea in the conditions?
QUESTION: Which conditions?
A/S CROWE: She had not done any dry diving before she went to sea.
QUESTION: But she did dive on 11 April . . .
A/S CROWE: I came back off leave on 15 April and I believe she dived on 11 April for about a quarter of an hour, just enough to wash her casing. That was the first dive she had done since we did one on the way back from Gibraltar.
QUESTION: Would you say the officers and ship’s company were quite happy with her as a submarine?
A/S CROWE: The officers were a grand lot. I had served with the Captain before.
QUESTION: Would you say that the officers and ship’s company had confidence in the boat?
A/S CROWE: Definitely.
Captain Browne was recalled and reminded that in orders he had written for Lieutenant Blackburn he had stated that Affray was required ‘to conduct herself as she would in wartime’. He was asked: ‘What would this involve?’
CAPTAIN BROWNE: Her acting so as not to be sighted by other shipping. This would give practice in periscope and snort mast drill. It would also involve her not being sighted by aircraft. She would, therefore, probably be dived most of the daylight hours and at any time when on the surface by day or night would be in instant readiness for diving. Navigation lights would not normally be burned except in cases where it was necessary for safety. Opportunities were taken of carrying out dummy attacks on shipping encountered.
QUESTION: Have you any idea as to when the folboat exercise was likely to be carried out?
CAPTAIN BROWNE: No sir. The whole idea in the orders was to give the commanding officer as free a hand as possible to carry this practice war patrol for the best advantage in working up his crew and giving instruction to the training class.
QUESTION: Would you agree that it is a reasonable assumption that Affray would be likely to carry out the folboat exercise when approaching the coast of Falmouth?
CAPTAIN BROWNE: I think it highly probable that he would have done so at that time. . . . Weather permitting he would land his Marines on his second night out before his call into Falmouth of 19 April.
Leading Seaman John Goddard, a member of Affray’s crew from mid-March 1951 until 1600 hours on 16 April when he was ordered to remain behind after the submarine had sailed, was asked by the Board if Lieutenant Blackburn had mentioned anything about his intentions for sailing during the first night at sea. Goddard replied:
No sir, he just told us that the patrol was going to be carried out under wartime conditions and said we would be diving at night and act independently and carry out some ‘cloak and dagger’ stuff. He mentioned going into Falmouth on Thursday, I think it was.
QUESTION: You had been in the ship a month, you say, did you hear of any trouble or difficulty of any sort?
L/S GODDARD: Yes, Sir. Once we were in the dockyard, I was living down the after end with Leading Electrician’s Mate Herbert Wood – he was on the boat when it went down. He came aft one night and said there was a possibility of our refit being extended as part of the number one battery tank was faulty and he said in doing rounds had found some water in them and reported it to Lieutenant Foster.
Goddard said that on the day Lieutenant Blackburn addressed the crew and informed them about Affray’s future movements, he had also told them that on returning to Portsmouth ‘we might be going back into dock’.
QUESTION: Did he give any explanation why you might be going back into dock?
L/S GODDARD: No, Sir, I can’t recall any.
Referring to the water found in battery tank number one, L/S Goddard was asked if this was the only trouble in the submarine he was aware of.
ANSWER: Yes, Sir.
QUESTION: Otherwise, what was your opinion of the submarine in general?
L/S GODDARD: The boat itself seemed quite all right, the crew were new and that Monday [16 April] was the first time they had got together.
QUESTION: Anything else?
L/S GODDARD: The week previous when we went to sea, we had to flood seven and eight tubes in order to get the trim and whilst we were in dock there was no maintenance carried out on the ASDIC.
QUESTION: Did you get the impression from the captain’s speech whether the submarine would be on the surface at night or snorting?
L/S GODDARD: Snorting, sir.
QUESTION: When did you get that impression?
L/S GODDARD: As far as I can remember he said we would be snorting most of the night.
QUESTION: Can you say at all whether the watertight doors and hatches were worked in accordance with the weekly routine?
L/S GODDARD: The torpedo hatch was open when we sailed. The after escape hatch was closed from the week previous. I clipped the torpedo hatch shut and put the diving bars on. Also aft there was an extra box for DESA equipment brought on that day.
QUESTION: Do you know when the last DSEA practice trial was carried out?
L/S GODDARD: It was not done during the month I was on board.
Rear Admiral Raw was recalled and was examined for nearly one hour. He reminded the Board that Affray’s orders had been ‘very flexible and she was allowed to proceed on the surface or snorting at her discretion’. He said:
I do not think it is a fair assumption to presume that she would necessarily have surfaced at daylight after snorting for such a short period as about eight hours. It was normal practice (in recent exercises) for submarines to remain submerged as a matter of routine for much longer periods. By her orders, Affray could, in fact, have got as far as Falmouth, have practised her folboat crew and returned to her position for exercises about 0600. Alternatively, she could have gone down to the Channel Islands and Ushant [an island marking the southern entrance to the western English Channel] and again have returned. It was strongly suggested to me that she had, in fact, been practising these folboat operations on the first night, but I discard this as being extremely unlikely.
QUESTION: You do not feel that the presence of a number of men relatively unused to submarine conditions and ten in excess of complement would be a factor in deciding that commanding officer to surface at dawn?
REAR ADMIRAL RAW: Definitely not. It is true he might decide to do so . . . to toughen up trainees he might well decide to keep them down to impress upon them some of the discomfort of submarine life. He would have no physical reason for having to surface at dawn.
QUESTION: Where would you have expected Affray to carry out her compressibility trial (a deep diving exercise to test water pressure on a submarine’s hull) as stated in paragraph 10 of her orders?
REAR ADMIRAL RAW: The possibility of Affray carrying out these trails in the Hurd Deep was discussed before formulating the probability area and discarded. The only time she could have carried out those trails which require a great deal of accurate observation and calculation was on her first night run down the Channel and this was considered an extremely unlikely contingency. Her patrol area South of the Lizard and Scilly Isles gave her ample water to carry out these trials at any time later during the cruise.
Raw was asked to take the Board through the entire hour-by-hour search operation for Affray and on reaching the point where hull tappings and SST signals had been picked up by submarines Sirdar and Sea Devil and indications that Affray had been found, Raw stated:
In the early morning of 18 April, Sirdar at 0010 and Sea Devil at 0014 both reported SST. Sirdar also stated that she had gained ASDIC contact and had heard what appeared to be the letters A and M which means ‘am stuck on the bottom’. This was followed at 0034 by Sea Devil and Trespasser who also reported hearing loud transmissions. So definite were these reports that they led to the firm belief at my headquarters that Affray had been found and I informed the Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth, to this effect and he, in turn, informed the Admiralty.
I would like to emphasise that there was at this time no doubt in the mind of everyone at sea in the searching force or conducting operations from Fort Blockhouse that Affray had, in fact, been located. Almost simultaneously Sea Devil reported that she was still receiving SST signals and that they were loud and close and HM submarine Ambush reported hull tappings in this vicinity.
The Board heard that more hull tappings had been heard at 0605 and that a twelve-charge signal had been fired instructing survivors to make good their escape – but no members of Affray’s crew were seen on the surface.
A signal addressed to Sirdar, Sea Devil and Trespasser asking them to categorically confirm they had established communication with Affray was described by Raw as ‘perhaps one of the most important signals during the search’. It had produced affirmative responses from the first two vessels and confirmed that ‘signals too feint to read’ from the third. Raw said:
Although hopes were fading at Submarine Headquarters, the general confirmed impression remained that Affray was somewhere in the vicinity of the diving position. It is of interest to note that this impression held for many weeks after the initial search . . . and this impression still remained despite the fact that detailed analysis after the return of the searching submarine to harbour had shown that it was unlikely that in fact their reports of SST were correct.
Lieutenant-Commander Reginald Clarke, Captain of HMS Artemis – a submarine ‘as near as possible the same as Affray’ – and with five years experience of snorting, told the Board about an occasion while snorting in rough weather:
A certain amount of water was continually coming into the snort induction and then into the engine room bilge. With the boat rolling slightly from side to side, the water in the bilge swished from one side of the boat to the other, making it very difficult to control. This made the trim of the boat rather difficult to control due to the free surface and the boat eventually took a stern-down angle which was increased when the water ran off.
Asked by the Board how much water he thought might have entered Affray through the hole created by the broken snort mast, Lieutenant-Commander Clarke said:
Assuming no action was taken to shut the snort induction valve for 10 seconds, approximately 10 tons of water would have entered the submarine . . . this water would flow rapidly aft as a result of the consequent stern-down angle given by the sudden entry of 10 tons of water . . . If the snort exhaust valves were not shut, the engines would flood immediately and considerable water would find its way through into the engine induction system and hence into the engine room.
The question of whether a snort mast being separated from the hull of a submarine could actually be heard in an engine room was met with a mixed response from experienced submariners. Chief Engine Room Artificer Ronald Manning, with more than sixteen years’ experience in submarines, told the Board that the sound would not be heard, while Engine Room Artificer Kenneth Finney, with seven years’ experience, said, ‘Yes, definitely’. Lieutenant Leafric Temple-Richards, commander of Affray from April–December 1950 said, ‘I should imagine so.’
The truth was that no one had actually been in a submarine in which the snort mast had suddenly, unexpectedly and violently been torn from the hull and lived to tell the tale. Those questioned could only speculate from their own experience and the answer should really have been that they simply didn’t know. Asked if anyone might have an idea what might happen in the event of a snort mast suddenly being ripped, jolted or torn away, Lieutenant Temple-Richards replied:
They would know very quickly that water was coming in because you would feel the change in pressure. I think you would feel something in your ears that would tell you something was happening.
QUESTION: Observing that you commanded HMS Affray for a year, have you any suggestions or comments that you would like to make?
LIEUTENANT TEMPLE-RICHARDS: She was quite sound. I never had any doubt about her myself. I think we had rather more small defects than other submarines that I have been in, but none of them gave me any worry at all and they were definitely very small defects, which are, I should say, not relevant to this accident.
QUESTION: Can you say whether your confidence in HMS Affray was shared by the remainder of the officers and ship’s company?
LIEUTENANT TEMPLE-RICHARDS: Yes, I think so, Sir. The engineer officer (Chief Petty Officer David Bennington) was the type of man who is easily depressed and quite often used to say that we were getting too many defects, but he was what I’d call a ‘natterer’ and I did not attach any particular importance to it, because the defects we had were nearly all engine room defects and in no way affected the safety of the ship. I would like to add that he was a most competent officer and I had every confidence in him.
QUESTION: Can you state that up to the time of leaving the ship in December 1950, you received no complaints or reports of misgivings as regards the ship from any officer or man on board?
LIEUTENANT TEMPLE-RICHARDS: Yes sir. I can confirm that.
QUESTION: Did you have any main engine failure while at sea or did any other serious defects develop?
LIEUTENANT TEMPLE-RICHARDS: Some of the defects that I mentioned appeared while we were at sea and one of them did entail stopping the engine and not using it again until we returned to harbour.
QUESTION: Was it necessary for the engine room staff to work very long hours making good these defects so as to carry out the exercise programme?
LIEUTENANT TEMPLE-RICHARDS: They worked long hours but not particularly long and a great deal of assistance was given us by the Gibraltar dockyard.
QUESTION: It has been stated that on one occasion during the autumn exercise Affray had to go to sea with only one engine in working order. Also, on another occasion, one engine broke down while at sea and that the other failed upon arrival in harbour. Do you agree with this statement?
LIEUTENANT TEMPLE-RICHARDS: As regards the first one, Sir, one engine could not be started due to some small defect on the fuel pump and it took some four to five hours to discover what the defect was, but once discovered it was very easily put right and the engine was started. Yes, one engine did break down at sea when a piston cooling pipe fractured and on return to harbour was, as far as I can remember, a separate defect on the other engine . . .
QUESTION: It has been stated that the Affray leaked like a sieve and when doing a deep dive, water poured into the engine room faster than it could be kept out, so that the submarine had to surface at once. Would you comment on this?
LIEUTENANT TEMPLE-RICHARDS: The whole of that is quite untrue, Sir. In nearly all of our exercises, we went to at least 300ft every time for some hours and I don’t remember any leaks at all. We never had to surface in a hurry because of water coming into the ship.
QUESTION: Can you think of any occasion, which might confirm this story of water leaking in?
LIEUTENANT TEMPLE-RICHARDS: No, Sir. We frequently had quite bad weather and in bad weather when on the surface quite a lot of water came down the conning tower hatch, as it always does in any submarine. There was one occasion when we surfaced in a hurry, but it was nothing to do with water coming into the ship. It was due to one of the telemotor pump starters which fused at plant and it was during an attack and you use a great deal of telemotor pressure and we were not able to keep our depth properly and I was particularly anxious not to be hunted by a destroyer which was about to start hunting me and I fired a grenade and surfaced.
QUESTION: A further statement was made about water and oil pouring everywhere and everything falling over. Would you like to comment on this statement?
LIEUTENANT TEMPLE-RICHARDS: I can only say that is an exaggeration of what it is like in a submarine under normal conditions.
Engine Room Artificer John Summers was recalled and asked if, during the previous year’s exercise in the Atlantic and Mediterranean, he ‘got the impression that HMS Affray developed any more defects than is usual in a submarine in similar circumstances’.
ERA SUMMERS: Yes, Sir, we had rather more defects that I have been used to on a boat.
QUESTION: Large or small defects?
ERA SUMMERS: Well, we had one or two large ones, but they were mainly small defects.
QUESTION: Did you have any main engine failures while at sea, or did any other serious defects develop?
ERA SUMMERS: Our trouble with the main engine room was caused by the breaking of bridge-end bolts and we had some trouble with the water system which subsequently we had to remove when we arrived in Gibraltar.
QUESTION: Did any of these make it necessary to return to harbour immediately?
ERA SUMMERS: No, Sir.
QUESTION: It has been stated that on one occasion during the autumn exercises HMS Affray had to go to sea with only one engine in working order. Is this so, or did you know what happened?
ERA SUMMERS: I can’t remember going to sea with only one engine, Sir.
QUESTION: It has also been said that on one occasion an engine broke down while at sea and that the other failed upon arrival in the harbour – is this correct?
ERA SUMMERS: Well, we had one or two occasions when one engine did fail at sea.
QUESTION: And the other breaking down in arriving at harbour?
ERA SUMMERS: I can’t remember that, Sir.
QUESTION: It has also been stated that HMS Affray was being used so much during the exercise that there was no time to keep her in good running repair.
ERA SUMMERS: Yes sir. That is true. We had two occasions when we had to stay in harbour and miss exercises in Gibraltar for about five days to a week.
QUESTION: From your last answer, I understand you mean that it was not so much that a ship had to go to sea with repairs uncompleted, but that on a couple of occasions because the repairs were not completed the ship remained in harbour so as to bring herself to seagoing efficiency?
ERA SUMMERS: Yes, Sir.
QUESTION: Also, another statement made said that the ship leaked like a sieve and when doing a deep dive, water poured into the engine room faster than it could be kept out, so that the submarine had to surface at once.
ERA SUMMERS: We had several occasions when this happened . . . but we did not consider ourselves to be in danger. There was a valve left open on the water system which we could not trace soon enough to stop the main engine relief system. The group exhaust was the other big trouble and we remained in harbour to have this done.
QUESTION: What was the precise trouble with the group exhaust channel?
ERA SUMMERS: We had trouble in this system which caused the exhaust jackets to become hot and on one occasion we had to leave the door open on the jacket which let out some more steam, which probably gave the impression that the interior leaked like a sieve.
QUESTION: A further statement was made about water and oil pouring everywhere and everything falling over. Can you explain this?
ERA SUMMERS: I would say that it was an over statement, Sir.
QUESTION: To sum up your replies, you have mentioned various defects, which are large and small, and with all these in view, would you confirm your general opinion about the ship?
ERA SUMMERS: What I have said so far, in my opinion, is quite correct, but all defects that I know of on HMS Affray would not cause any serious harm to the ship. We had rather more defects than I have been used to on a boat, but we all worked to get this ship in a seaworthy condition and on both occasions when the ship was not considered fit to go to sea, we remained in harbour.
Asked about the consequences of a battery explosion in Affray, Lieutenant Robert Camplin of HMS Acheron told the Board that if the main fuses blew ‘you would lose all essential services, lighting and electrical power. There would be a fair amount of smoke but you would not get chlorine until you mix salt water with your batteries.’
The Board took this point a stage further when it called Acting Interim Surgeon Commander William Davidson from the Royal Naval Medical School to give evidence. Davidson was asked what the physiological effect would be if the submarine was at a depth of 290ft with some compartments open to the full pressure of water. He replied:
Crew who are untrained in high pressure would suffer from nitrogen narcosis (putting the crew in a drunken-like state). The action of this is similar to the early stages of an anaesthetic. The men would be incapable of carrying out even simple tasks. This condition would arise very rapidly on equalisation of pressure.
QUESTION: The effect of this nitrogen narcosis would be that in a matter of seconds after the equalisation of pressure, any man who had been unable to get into a DSEA and who was in the compartment affected would be incapable of thinking about carrying out any duties?
COMMANDER DAVIDSON: Yes, Sir. When the pressure was equivalent to 180ft, the nitrogen narcosis would begin to affect the crew. Even those with DSEA sets would die unless they escaped within ten minutes, because of oxygen convulsions.
QUESTION: What would be the early effects of nitrogen narcosis starting at 180ft?
COMMANDER DAVIDSON: The first effect would be to remove any worry from the minds of the individual. . . . the effect would get progressively worse as the pressure increased, until the men would be completely incapable of carrying out even the simplest tasks or even giving routine orders. . . . The chances of escape becomes greatly reduced at depths in excess of 150ft.
Commander Davidson added:
On the assumption that the accident happened at night, the majority of the crew would have been asleep. This, coupled with the conditions I have described, would, in my opinion, lead to great confusion and men would be less likely to carry out their duties as they would under normal circumstances. As pressure increases, the voice becomes nasal due to the altered vibration of the vocal chords and the denser air. This causes a squeaky effect and adds to the general unusualness of the situation.
Commander Stanley was recalled and asked by the Board to give his impression of Affray’s hydroplanes – the movable ‘wings’ on the stern, which control the angle of the dive – set at ‘hard to rise’, meaning the boat was making an effort to surface.
COMMANDER STANLEY: Either she was going down on an even keel or they had been put to rise by someone in a panic not thinking very clearly.
QUESTION: Would you agree that if the submarine were sinking relatively rapidly by the stern, that it was incorrect to have the planes at hard to rise?
COMMANDER STANLEY: Yes, I would agree, Sir.
QUESTION: How would you expect the planes to be?
COMMANDER STANLEY: Amidships, Sir.
The final witness to be summoned had already been called before the Board of Inquiry on three previous occasions and made more appearances than anyone else. Captain Hugh Browne, Captain of the 5th Submarine Flotilla, was asked if he had any final comments to make. He had.
He stated that ‘the decision to send Affray to sea with the crew as it was, was carefully weighed beforehand’ and reminded the Board that the principal officers were all experienced submariners. Captain Browne also said that that the two training officers on board were also experienced and out of the forty-four crew members, thirty-eight were ‘thoroughly experienced in this submarine or on HMS Alaric, which was identical’. Of the remaining six ratings, only one had been in submarines for many years.
He reminded the Board that Affray had been sent to sea to take part in an independent exercise ‘similar to those she would have carried out had she been newly commissioned with a crew who had not been to sea together before’.
The Board heard that sub-lieutenants and engineer officers, taken in lieu of certain ratings sent ashore, ‘were by no means new to submarines’. He said that engineer officers had been
right at the end of their training and within a week or two would have been appointed as engineer officers of submarines. Of the sub-lieutenants, all except one had had three months’ submarine experience while doing their small ships training; four of them had had this experience in ‘A’ class submarines. Three sub-lieutenants were nearing the end of their training; they were, therefore, considered to be quite as useful, knowledgeable and intelligent – and probably more so – than the junior ratings they were replacing.
Captain Browne told the Board:
I wish to emphasise that in the exercise Affray was to carry out, there was no sense of urgency or hurry, evolutions could be carried out as slowly as the Commanding Officer wished and I have no doubt that for the first few days everything would have been carried out in a very slow time, in the same way as working up exercises would be carried out by a newly commissioned submarine. . . . Before Affray proceeded to sea I knew, and Lieutenant Blackburn knew, that standard of training and work up of his crew. He knew about all the drafting changes that were taking place and when they were taking place.
On the morning before he sailed he expressed himself perfectly satisfied with both the submarine and the crew and stated that he was looking forward to working them up into an efficient team. He looked upon this period of independent exercises as an excellent way of working up the majority of his crew for the time when Affray would become fully operational.
QUESTION: Would you not consider it preferable for the submarine to go to sea once with her ship’s company on board, if that is possible?
CAPTAIN BROWNE: I would consider it preferable, but not necessary.
On 7 August, Admiral Power submitted the Board’s finished report in full – more than 900 pages with appendices – to the Secretary of the Admiralty with a covering note stating:
I am convinced that this theory (the broken snort mast) still presents the most possible solution to the accident and fits most nearly with those facts which have become available. There are certain points which remain unexplained, but on balance there is more supporting evidence and probability about the theory put forward than about other ideas.
The three members of the Board of Inquiry were now allowed to return to their normal jobs within the senior service, but placed on forty-eight-hour call for re-assembly in case last-minute evidence came to light.
Admiral Power concluded: ‘I wish to take this opportunity of emphasising the admirable manner in which Rear Admiral Dick and his Board have conducted a long and difficult investigation.’