Not everyone agreed with the Board of Inquiry’s – or Admiral Power’s – conclusion that the broken snort mast was to blame for the loss of Affray. Senior Admiralty officials were annoyed that the Board had failed to identify a single person – dead or alive – to take their share of the blame for the accident.
Ten days after receiving his copy, A.O. Osley, Acting Head of the Navy’s Law Branch, accused the Board of ‘closing its eyes’ to other possibilities which might have caused the disaster. He wrote in a memo widely circulated to Admiralty personnel:
It [the report] dismisses, for instance, the possibility of battery explosion more readily than the evidence – or lack of it – justifies. It strongly supports what can be conveniently termed the Flag Officer Submarine’s hypothesis . . . The essence of it is that the snort mast snapped while the submarine was snorting near the surface, the water rushed in before anyone could do anything about it and the vessel sank stern down, striking the bottom at an angle of 65 degrees.
This theory has not yet been generally accepted at the Admiralty, because it cannot be readily reconciled with the assessed damage to the submarine and leaves unexplained why the material failure happened when it did. Personally, I have felt for some time that these difficulties could better be resolved by the theory that the breaking of the snort mast was a secondary factor and took place at a much greater depth of water. Owing to some failure of drill (i.e. the opening of a valve) the submarine may have got into trouble, started to sink with the snort mast still up and this eventually collapsed under pressure of water, thereby making the loss irrevocable.
But this is pure speculation by an unqualified layman. Whatever the real cause was, it has been approved for Reclaim to grope for further clues and on the evidence so far available, an open verdict must be recorded.
In another response, the Navy’s Director of Torpedo, Anti-Submarine and Mine Warfare, G.F. Maunsell stated:
As Affray was in dockyard hands from 1 January – 10 April, I consider that a working up period of one day (11 April), which included a dive of only 30 minutes and in which only half the proper crew were on board, is not sufficient for any submarine, even with her normal complement on board.
During a short dive of 30 minutes, very few of the emergency drills could have been carried out and these should have included ‘snorting drill’ and ‘Emergency – stop snorting,’ particularly with a new Commanding Officer . . . I also consider that neither the hull or machinery could have been given fair trial during this period and that, therefore, her CO could not have honestly reported that he was entirely satisfied with his submarine and with his ship’s company.
The report indicates that the disaster was most probably caused by the breaking of the snort mast. Although I admit that this may have been the cause, I consider that there is a considerable volume of evidence against it . . .’
V.G. Shepheard, Director of Naval Construction, also did ‘not concur with the conclusions of the Board’. He said that inspection of the wreck ‘has revealed nothing amiss except the broken snort mast, which may have broken off after the submarine had come to rest on the bottom – in fact, the position in which the mast was found and examination of the fracture suggests that this was so’.
He noted that ‘many possible sources of flooding could never be revealed by internal inspection and it is considered that the evidence against the Board of Inquiry’s conclusions has not been given the weight it deserves’.
Shepheard said there was no evidence as to the state of the valves in the snort induction system, ‘but the Board’s conclusion implies that neither of them was closed. To accept this, the Board have accepted Flag Officer Submarine’s hypothesis “how it happened”. . . . If the hypothesis does not fit the fact, it follows that grave doubt must be cast on the premise.’
While the Board was in session, Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty, James Callaghan, met Admiralty officials to discuss whether or not Affray could be salvaged. This would be Callaghan’s final meeting with the Admiralty regarding the Affray as his Labour Party would soon be voted out of office in a general election which would return the Conservatives – and Winston Churchill – to power.
The meeting generally agreed that raising the submarine was the only way to finally ascertain for once and for all what had caused the fatal accident. It would also allow families of those lost on the submarine to receive their loved ones from their present watery grave and give them a proper funeral and final resting place close to their homes.
Unfortunately minutes of this meeting only identify Callaghan and his questions, but not Admiralty officers answering them or offering viewpoints. When asked if it were possible to salvage the submarine, a senior official told Callaghan: ‘It could not be said that it was impossible. It would certainly be difficult and there would be no guarantee of success. It could not be done this summer and there would be great dislocation to other important work.’
Others sitting around the table that day were against raising the submarine ‘because of the effort involved. If salvage work is not completed in 1952, I calculate that the task cannot be done as each new season means an entirely new start.’ Someone at the meeting stated that ‘the relatives, too, have been against a salvage attempt on the submarine’ while another added that ‘this opinion is not unanimous’. (Author’s note: several Affray relatives have told this author that they were never once consulted about bringing the bodies of their men back to dry land.)
The actual cost of salvaging Affray was never brought up and it would be another four months – and a change of government – before the matter was raised again.
Callaghan was replaced by James Thomas, who took the title of First Lord of the Admiralty. Callaghan shadowed the position in opposition. Churchill took a special interest in all naval matters having served two terms as First Lord of the Admiralty in 1911–1915 and 1939–1940. In November 1951, the Prime Minister asked Thomas to update him on plans to salvage the Affray – and how much it might cost the Navy. Thomas replied:
I have been advised that the task would be extremely hazardous and that it would only be possible to send down divers for a day or two during each slack water period, this accounting for the estimate of the length of the salvage operation. The probability of failure is stated to be extremely high. The cost of the salvage operation would be a minimum of half a million pounds – and the scrap value of Affray no more than £5,000. If the vessel were salvaged and we contemplated further use, there would be very heavy expenditure on refit. In contrast to the above, you will be interested to know that the cost of a new ‘A’ class submarine is estimated to be about £880,000. In the circumstances, I have no hesitation in saying that these considerations weigh very heavily against any inclination to attempt salvage.
Mary Henry, Lieutenant Foster’s widow, was distressed when she heard the news:
Why the devil didn’t they bring the submarine up? The truth about what had happened to her could have been found out. Why couldn’t they? Those of us left behind after Affray was lost felt – and still feel – as if we’ve been swept under the carpet. The loss of the Affray was an embarrassing episode that the Navy wishes had never happened. As far as the Navy is concerned, families of men lost at sea are a nuisance.
Leading Seaman George Cook’s widow, Joy, said she was never approached by the Navy and asked that if she had a choice, would she prefer her husband’s remains to be brought to the surface or remain on the seabed.
It was said in Parliament that the relatives had unanimously agreed that they should stay together in the wreck of the submarine, but that wasn’t true. Nobody asked and nobody wrote seeking my opinion. I wrote to the Navy and told them that my wish was for George to be brought home. But I had to ask them, they never asked me. And then I never heard another word.
While they were still searching for Affray, we had been told that no expense would be spared to raise her once they had located her. After they had found her I naturally expected her to be brought up. Other countries offered to help and provide the correct boats and lifting equipment to raise her, but the Navy didn’t take up their offer. I understand that they could have blown air into her, which would have helped bring her up.
Today, I feel that the Navy didn’t want her brought up. They wanted her to stay down at the bottom of the sea. Was there something about the submarine that they didn’t want us to know?