By November 1951 the time had come for the Royal Navy to begin apportioning blame for the loss of Affray in the quietest possible way. Strangely no one else – not even politicians or the press – were demanding heads of the culprits to be brought before them on a platter. By the end of the year, Affray had disappeared from newspapers and passed into the mists of time in the British public’s consciousness. The tragedy was hardly forgotten, but other things had come along to occupy their minds – the Suez situation had worsened, there was growing tension between Jews and Arabs over Palestine, more atom bombs were tested by the Americans in the Pacific and British Foreign Office official and double-spy Guy Burgess had caused a sensation by defecting to Moscow. Seven months after the accident, only widows and children, parents and friends of the dead crew members, Admiralty top brass and submariners in ‘A’ class submarines, still had the Affray on their minds.
James Thomas’s Parliamentary statement had managed to destroy the confidence ordinary submariners had in their boats. Up until that time, crews were happy to accept that the breaking of Affray’s snort mast had been a ‘one-off’ and unlikely to happen again. All snorting had stopped while investigations were carried out and masts minutely examined by experts. Steps had been taken to alter interior valve controls and crews were happy that everything possible was being done to ensure safety in their boats. But when it was announced in Parliament that Affray’s loss had not been established and that a battery explosion or some other reason might have caused the accident, crews felt they were sitting on top of a volcano waiting to explode. Despite assurances from naval engineers that submarines were safe, the process of restoring crew’s confidence in their vessels had to start all over again. Fewer men wanted to serve in submarines, even if it did mean earning an extra daily half-crown in their pay packets.
On 7 November, the navy’s Head of Military Branch wrote to Admiralty colleagues:
Investigations into the loss of Affray have revealed a most serious lack of care and thought on the part of those responsible for arranging for the officer’s training course to go to sea in a submarine. Naval staff divisions concerned have remarked on this aspect . . . and to the layman it is unbelievable that despite the many other important tasks for which operational submarines are needed, a fully worked up one could not be spared for a week or so for the training trip.
The document reminded recipients that the Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth (Admiral Sir Arthur Power) had earlier praised the manner in which the Board of Inquiry, under Admiral Dick, had conducted their ‘long and difficult’ investigation. It stated:
Ordinarily this might well have resulted in some favourable comment from the Board (of the Admiralty). My feelings, however, are that the Admiralty have not been so impressed with the work of the Board of Inquiry as to justify favourable a comment and I suggest that no action need be taken on the Commander-in-Chief’s suggestion.
It continued:
It is within the Admiralty that we encounter an expressed opinion that Affray should not have been sailed on the mission in the circumstances and manner that obtained. On balance, I agree that Captain of the 5th Submarine Flotilla [Captain Hugh Browne] should not have sailed Affray when and as he did. Equally, I would remark that judging by the firmness of Answer No. 758 by Captain Browne, should I be in his shoes and of his mind and subsequently received his Lordship’s displeasure, I should ask for a Court Martial in an honest attempt to clear myself of the blame imputed.
Answer No. 758 had been given to the Board of Inquiry by Captain Browne on 31 July – the final day of questioning to witnesses – when asked if he had any additional comments to add to earlier statements.
He had told the Board that the decision to send Affray to sea ‘with the crew as it was’ had been carefully weighed beforehand and reminded the Board that the principal officers – including the two training officers – were experienced submariners and out of the forty-four crew members on board thirty-eight were thoroughly experienced in a submarine similar to Affray.
Browne had stated that before Affray had put to sea, both he and Lieutenant Blackburn knew about the standard of training undertaken by the crew and on the morning before sailing Blackburn had expressed himself ‘perfectly satisfied with both the submarine and the crew and stated that he was looking forward to working them up into an efficient team’. As Browne left the Board of Inquiry that day, he must have felt a lead weight in the pit of his stomach. He had answered questions put to him as honestly as possible. But now it looked as if the organisation he had honourably served for so long was out to make him a scapegoat, ultimately responsible for killing seventy-five men and the loss of one of His Majesty’s submarines.
In December, a top naval lawyer wrote to the Admiralty stating:
there is no doubt that the officer responsible (Captain Browne) for sailing Affray in such circumstances is deserving of censure . . . The sailing orders for Affray were issued by Captain Browne in a memorandum dated 3 April. The submarine sailed on 16 April in circumstances considered by naval staff to have been unacceptable. Flag Officer Submarines (Rear Admiral Raw) received a copy of these orders and so did the Admiralty.
The orders may have been seen by Flag Officer Submarines personally, but the responsibility for ensuring that the submarine was in a fit state for sea and her crew properly worked up for the operation ordered rests with Captain Browne.
The terms of censure, if it is agreed that censure is required, and the method by which they are conveyed, need careful consideration. It is proposed that the Head of Naval Law should draft a letter in light of Board comments.
It took the Navy two and a half months to draft the letter and send it to Captain Browne. By now Browne had left HMS Dolphin to take up a new position at London’s Imperial Defence College organising advanced courses for senior officers from all the armed forces. Browne had been waiting for the letter for a long time and here it was at last. His hands might have trembled as he opened the envelope. Would it summon him to a court martial? Would it spell an end to his naval career? Was disgrace waiting around the corner? The letter, marked private and confidential, was signed by J. G. Long from the Naval Law Branch and stated:
Sir, I am commanded by My Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to state that they have had under examination the circumstances surrounding the loss of Affray. Although there is no definite evidence as to the cause of the loss, My Lords consider that you made an error of judgement in sailing Affray with a training crew and folboat party embarked on a training patrol before she had been given opportunity for the working up which was clearly desirable after her protracted refit and the many changes in her crew.
Copies of this letter are, in accordance with My Lords’ directions, being sent personally to the Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth, and to Rear Admiral S.M. Raw, the late Flag Officer Submarines.
I am, sir, you obedient servant,
J. G. Long.
And that was it. No mention of a court martial or any official announcement stating that the Admiralty had censured a high-ranking officer. The letter basically meant that Captain Browne would have a black mark on his service file – and nothing else.
Captain Browne was implicated in the death of seventy-five men and the loss a valuable submarine – but only a handful of the Admiralty’s top brass knew about it. No politicians were advised or statement made to the press with a view to closing the case of Affray for once and for all. The information has never made public – until now.
With that, the Royal Navy quietly closed its files on the mysterious affair of HMS Affray.