The book of Judith presents many ethical problems. In saving her people from near certain destruction, the heroine (her name means “Jewish woman”) flirts with and seduces the enemy commander, tells him lies and ironic half-truths, gets him drunk, chops off his head and has it put on public display, and sets off thirty days of plundering in the enemy’s camp. The book appears to be a case of the end (Israel’s salvation) justifying the means (Judith’s deceit and violence).
The book is best interpreted as a historical fiction. There is no record of any city named Bethu-lia, or anything like the crisis described in the first half of the book, or a woman named Judith who saved her people in this dramatic way. The basic text is the Greek version found in the LXX, though the book may have been composed in Hebrew or Aramaic. Although not very accurate as history, the book is noteworthy for the literary skill with which the story is told—lively characters, complex plot, intricate structure, frequent shifting of scenes, skillful use of irony, and a final hymn.
Its most obvious biblical model is the story of Jael, the woman who in Judg. 4-5 saves ancient Israel by hammering a tent peg into the head of the enemy general Sisera. The irony is that the violence committed by Israel’s enemies is overcome violently by a most unlikely instrument, the hand of a woman. Also central to the story is the biblical principle that Israel will prosper as long as it avoids sin but will be punished severely when it sins (see Deut. 30:15-20).
Judith does not appear until almost halfway
through the book. The first seven chapters describe the crisis facing Israel: whether to remain faithful to the God of Israel or to worship the foreign king. As part of his program to exert sovereignty over many peoples and nations, Nebuchadnezzar (a Babylonian ruling over the Assyrians) commissions his general Holofernes (a Persian name) to bring Israel and its neighbors into line. The campaign is intended to show that Nebuchadnezzar alone is worthy of worship (3:8; 6:2) and so to test Israel’s faith in its God. The people of Bethu-lia in the meantime are engulfed in fear. When Holofernes cuts off their water supply, the only strategy that their leader Uzziah can suggest is to wait five days for “the Lord our God” to act on their behalf (7:30).
God does act dramatically through the unlikely person of the rich and beautiful widow Judith. She criticizes the people of Bethulia for putting their God to the test and assures them that she is going to do “something that will go down through all generations of our descendants” (8:32). In prayer she asks God to make her “deceitful words” bring harm upon Israel’s enemies (9:13). After beautifying herself, she lies her way into the enemy’s camp and leads Holofernes on with ironic promises that he interprets positively but that she uses to disguise her real intentions.
The major theological theme of the book is captured in the phrase “the hand of a woman” (16:6). This is a reversal of expectations about the right of military conquerors to abuse women as part of the spoils of warfare. Judith shows that God can foil Israel’s enemies and bring about good for his people by the most unlikely of instruments, the hand of a widow. The final hymn celebrates Judith’s victory over Holofernes in a graphic way: “Her sandal ravished his eyes, her beauty captivated his mind, and the sword severed his neck” (16:9).
The inclusion of the book of Judith in the Catholic and Orthodox Christian canons of Scripture has led to its frequent use as a starting point for literary and artistic representations. There are many depictions of Judith in illustrated Christian Bible manuscripts, and she has been the subject of films, opera, and poems. Her slaying of Ho-lofernes has attracted the attention of portrait artists for whom the combination of sex, violence, and religion has proved irresistible. In some circles Judith was viewed as a prefigurement of Mary the mother of Jesus. Medieval Jewish midrashim linked her story to Hanukkah, thus anticipating modern scholarly hypotheses about its origin in Maccabean times.
See also Deuterocanonical/Apocryphal Books; Feminist Ethics
Bibliography
Craven, T. Artistry and Faith in the Book of Judith. SBLDS 70. Scholars Press, 1983; Harrington, D. Invitation to the Apocrypha. Eerdmans, 1999, 27—43; Moore, C. Judith. AB 40. Doubleday, 1985; Stocker, M. Judith, Sexual Warrior: Women and Power in Western Culture. Yale University Press, 1998; VanderKam, J., ed. “No One Spoke Ill of Her": Essays on Judith. SBLEJL. Scholars Press, 1992.
Daniel J. Harrington
The Hebrew noun mispat often is translated as “justice” in the OT. Its semantic range, however, is quite broad. It may be translated as “judgment,” “verdict,” “law or statute,” and in the plural it can refer to a code or body of law. Its translated nuance can be determined only in context. Somewhat oddly, there is no real equivalent to this Hebrew term in the Greek of the NT.
All Hebrew nouns are derived from verbal roots and find their semantic foundation there. The verbal root in question here is spt, which has as its basic meaning “to exercise powers of governance.” In the OT it is most often rendered as “to judge,” but its meaning is by no means limited to the judicial or juridical. It can apply to exercise of the processes of governance in civil or religious contexts, in judicial or executive capacity. It is, however, usually linked to offices of governing authority, and these vary in different OT periods. Thus, this verb could represent governing authority for a key figure such as Moses, or an office such as king or judge, or someone adjudicating disputes such as elders at the gate. In the book of Judges, the series of military leaders through the tribal period are said to “judge” Israel, but this is less a reference to judicial activity alone than to leadership in general. There is strong evidence that the verb refers to actions that help restore balance or wholeness (shalom) to community and, when exercised by God, reference a strong divine moral influence in the structure and governance of creation itself.
Major areas of semantic use for the verb spt include the following:
1. To exercise governing power—that is, to act as a ruler. This is, of course, seen of kings (1 Sam. 8:20). It may also be power wielded by the congregation of Israel or by designated individuals in roles of leadership as sdpet (Deut. 1:16; Judg. 16:31; 1 Sam. 7:15-17). '
2. To decide cases of controversy. This may be in civil, domestic, or religious arenas; it may be local, tribal, or national in context. Although bodies of law and statutes exist, these gain authority only as persons exercise authority to give judgment—that is, to exercise governing authority.
3. God, in covenant with Israel as a religious community, ultimately as judge, ruler, and governor of the entire world. Abraham appeals to this role in pleading for Sodom and Gomorrah (Gen. 18:25); God is distinguished from other gods by the ability to exercise authority justly (Ps. 82); even David appeals to God’s role in finally vindicating him before Saul (“May the Lord therefore be judge, and give sentence [spt] between me and you. May he see to it and plead my cause, and vindicate [spt] me against you” [1 Sam. 24:15]).
Far more frequent in the OT is the use of the noun mispat, which is the foundation for understanding Hebrew concepts of authentic, faithful exercise of governing authority. It is found in contexts as varied as the family, judicial structures, the royal court, commerce, and religious offices and institutions. For Israel, all these arenas are governed by God’s exercise of mispat, against which human efforts to embody this governing principle are measured. Thus, by measure against God’s “justice” human exercise of “justice” can be judged faithful or unfaithful in a moral sense.
Many authorities cite more than a dozen distinct usages of mispat, and the English words used to translate it likewise have a wide range. But most suggest that if any one word can be used to represent the concept of mispat in its multiple contexts, it is the word justice. Instead of making a long list of nuanced meanings here, I will attempt a description of two major arenas within which “justice” appears in the OT and suggest meanings that it carries therein.
First, many uses of mispat reflect a judicial or legislative concept. Justice can be used for an ordinance, a statute, or a regulation giving clear guidance regarding social behavior on familial, cultic, economic, or social matters (Exod. 15:25; Lev. 5:10; Deut. 6:1). The plural form (mispatim) can indicate a code of laws or legislation recognized by the community (Deut. 5:1). Since many of these references are found in the legal texts of the Pentateuch, they function to make “justice” or “just ordinances” a concrete manifestation of the demands and obligations made by God’s covenant with the people of God from Israel to the present.
It follows that the appeal is to “justice” when a case of dispute is brought before a magistrate (judge, elder, king, or even God) to render a “just” decision. BDB lists 204 instances of this usage. Solomon asks God to enable him to “hear justice” in a case brought before him (1 Kgs. 3:11). In every period of Israel’s life there were structures for hearing disputes and rendering judgments, and justice is the concept that guards the integrity of such hearings at every level (Exod. 18; 1 Kgs. 10; 2 Chr. 19; Ps. 9; Hab. 1).
The term for “justice” sometimes seems to refer to matters of entitlement or rights in ancient Israel. For example, in Deut. 18:3-5 there is an enumeration of payments and food intended for the support of priests referred to as their mispat. Strangers and orphans, because of their vulnerability, are singled out for special instructions not to deprive them of “justice” (Deut. 24:17 [we will return to this matter with the prophets]). The right of a firstborn son to inherit is his mispat (Deut. 21:17), and Jeremiah exercised his right (mispat) to inherit land (Jer. 32:6-15).
Justice is the principle that guards the integrity of the judicial and administrative order of the land, whether applied to magistrates, leaders, or kings. Favoritism or bribes pervert justice (Deut. 16:18-20) and cannot be tolerated.
The recognition of justice as an expression of governing authority means that it does not always appear as a high moral claim. It may simply recognize who has the power to determine the exercise of authority. Thus, when Samuel, on the instruction of God, enumerates the oppressive practices of kings in 1 Sam. 8:11-18, it is called the “mispat of the king” (in v. 11 the NRSV blandly translates, “the ways of the king”). When David was serving the Philistines and left no one alive to tell the king of Gath that he was double-dealing, it is described as “his mispat all the time he lived in the country of the Philistines” (NRSV: “his practice”).
Justice sometimes, in a legal context, refers to a penalty or a sentence rendered against violators of the just order (Prov. 21:15). Jeremiah 26:11, 16 refer to a “mispat of death,” meaning a “sentence of death.” By the same token, justice can represent the clearance or vindication of someone unjustly accused whose name is cleared, as Job is attempting to do: “I have set out my case [mispat]” (Job 13:18).
Second, justice appears more as a moral principle or ideal in the way it is used by the prophets and in the book of Psalms. Throughout the prophetic books and in the liturgical materials of the Psalter, the term mispat seems to function as a desired commitment to a moral principle that may find expression in relationship to leaders, offices, and institutions but is also generally applicable and directed to the social relationships of the community at every level. Justice functions as an ethical norm to measure and critique the interactions between individuals and social groupings in the Israelite community. Undoubtedly, there is a relationship to the use of justice to describe governance and legal concerns in the Pentateuch, but the understanding of justice has transcended the boundaries of what is required legally or magisterially by formal institutions and offices. Some representative texts are Pss. 9:7-12; 10:17-18; 82:3-4; 106:3; Isa. 1:11-17; 5:7; 10:2; Jer. 22:3, 15-16; Amos 5:7, 21-24; Mic. 6:6-8.
A measure of the broadened use of justice as a moral ideal is the frequency with which the term mispat is used in parallel with the term sedaqa (“righteousness”): thirty-seven times, mostly in the psalms and the prophets. Righteousness relates to wholeness in relationships at every level of human community and is measured by the wellbeing of all parties rather than by adherence to formal rules, laws, or codes. “Happy are those who observe justice, who do righteousness at all times” (Ps. 106:3). “Let justice roll down like waters and righteousness like an ever-flowing stream” (Amos 5:24). Taken together, justice and righteousness represent the moral mandate laid on the community of God’s people to incorporate these qualities into the character of the community so fundamentally that moral action is characterized by these same qualities. Justice and righteousness describe persons and behaviors that seek wholeness and well-being for all, that seek equity in all social interrelationships, and that do not seek advantage at the expense of another’s disadvantage.
Especially in the psalms and prophets, but also true throughout the OT, it is clear that the foundation for any human exercise of justice is the understanding that the identity and the action of God are characterized by justice. One of the fundamental roles of God in Israelite understanding is that God is judge of all the earth. Abraham appeals directly to this role in his effort to plead mercy for Sodom and Gomorrah (Gen. 18:25). God is both the source and the champion of justice by virtue of creating the world and establishing justice as foundational to God’s desire for all creation (Ps. 99:1-4). Justice is one of God’s own attributes. “Righteousness and justice are the foundation of his throne” (Ps. 97:2). Since God is creator, ruler, and judge of all the earth, God’s justice cannot be exercised in terms of narrow interests but rather is universal in its scope. This is part of what distinguishes Israel’s God from the claims of other gods in surrounding cultures. Psalm 82 is remarkable, picturing a heavenly council of the gods in which Israel’s God takes his stand and accuses the other gods of judging unjustly and showing “partiality to the wicked” (v. 2). Israel’s God then proclaims justice as due to even the weakest and most vulnerable of the society (vv. 3-4) and claims that failing to meet the standard of justice means that the gods of other nations are not gods at all and are destined to die like mortals (vv. 6-7). The psalm ends by praising God as j udge of all the earth (v. 8).
It therefore is God’s justice that models the practice of justice in human community Justice is a divine attribute alongside holiness, righteousness, steadfast love, and compassion. “The Lord of hosts is exalted by justice, and the Holy God shows himself holy by righteousness” (Isa. 5:16). “Let those who boast boast in this, that they understand and know me, that I am the Lord; I act with steadfast love, justice, and righteousness in the earth, for in these things I delight, says the Lord” (Jer. 9:24). Even God’s exercise of the role as judge of all the earth characterizes divine judging not by sheer power and authority but by a concern for fairness and equity governed by other divine attributes. “He judges the world with righteousness; he judges the peoples with equity” (Ps. 9:8).
The framework for mediating justice as a divine quality and practice to the human exercise of justice is the establishment of covenant relationship between God and God’s people. The Hebrew word for “covenant” (berit) means “agreement” or “contract,” but it takes on special meaning when applied to the agreement between God and Israel, and by extension between God and God’s people in every age. God initiates the covenant relationship, but covenant implies mutual commitment. That commitment carries obligations, and in the biblical understanding of covenant God models the qualities of that commitment and its obligations. God shows justice, love, compassion, and righteousness to Israel and all creation, and covenant understandings expect God’s people to reflect those same qualities in all their relationships. Law codes and formal obligations for leaders and members of the community may give concrete expression to those qualities, but it is the exercise of those qualities, not formal obligatory practice, that matters most to God. This finds constant expression in the prophets. God is not pleased by formal pious practices of worship and prayer if justice is not present and practiced. “I hate, I despise your festivals, and I take no delight in solemn assemblies. . . . But let justice roll down like waters, and righteousness like an ever-flowing stream” (Amos 5:21, 24). “Bringing offerings is futile; incense is an abomination to me. New moon and sabbath and calling of convo-cation—I cannot endure solemn assemblies with iniquity. . . . Cease to do evil, learn to do good; seek justice, rescue the oppressed, defend the orphan, plead for the widow” (Isa. 1:13, 16-17).
When God’s justice (and other divine covenant qualities) is matched by Israel’s justice (and other covenantally mandated qualities), the result is salom, “wholeness.” Although never fully realized, salom is made visible to the degree that justice is done, righteousness shown, faithfulness demonstrated, and steadfast love returned in response to God.
As the passage from Isa. 1, noted above, shows, God is also portrayed, especially in the prophets and psalms, but also in the law codes, as having a special regard for and care of the poor, the dispossessed, the weak, and the vulnerable (see Ps. 10:17-18). Deuteronomy 15:7-11 builds this special regard for the poor and the needy into the divine mandate of covenant responsibility. In the prophets and the psalms, it is the requirement to do justice that serves as the guardian of this obligation.
Justice for the poor, the weak, and the vulnerable is not a moral demand to grant privilege. The prophets’ call to do justice asks for fair practices, nonexploitation, and granting of full participation in the social order (Amos 2:6-7; 8:4-6). The poor have claims on full participation in the goodness of God’s creation, and God desires that they be treated justly. In this sense, the call for justice for the poor comes close to recognizing the rights of the poor. God’s people are thus critiqued: “They know no limits in deeds of wickedness; they do not judge with justice the cause of the orphan, to make it prosper, and they do not defend the rights of the needy” (Jer. 5:28).
Thus, when there are those who feel exploited by others or denied their just participation in the life of the community, they appeal to God as judge and defender of justice to vindicate them and ensure that justice is done. This is seen especially in psalms of lament where appeal is made to God in time of suffering at the hands of enemies who treat others unjustly. The petitioner often asks that the right to justice be restored (e.g., Ps. 146:7-9). When justice is denied, it is God who can restore it. “From the heavens you uttered judgment [din]; the earth feared and was still when God rose up to establish judgment [mispat], to save all the oppressed of the earth” (Ps. 76:8-9). God’s justice aims to establish a social order in which inequities are replaced by equal regard and care for all. “He raises the poor from the dust, and lifts the needy from the ash heap, to make them sit with princes, with the princes of his people” (Ps. 113:7-8).
A text that captures much of the biblical spirit of justice as a central covenant obligation in partnership with God is Mic. 6:1-8. This passage is set up as a dramatic court scene. God has gone to court with Israel. The prophet recounts the scene as an intermediary in the legal proceeding to confront Israel with its breach of covenant obligation. Creation itself is summoned as judge and witnesses (vv. 1-2). God gives first testimony, claiming to have acted toward Israel with “saving acts” (vv. 3-5). Then Israel’s voice gives cynical testimony, asking, “With what shall I come before the Lord?” and making exaggerated claims that not even “ten thousands of rivers of oil” or the offering of one’s own “firstborn” would be enough (vv. 6-7). The prophet’s answer and the verdict in the mock court case form a classic statement of the moral demand of covenant relationship with God, and a fitting witness to the central role of justice in the moral claims that covenant makes on God’s people: “He has told you, O mortal, what is good; and what does the Lord require of you but to do justice, and to love kindness, and to walk humbly with your God?” (v. 8).
See also Justice, Distributive; Justice, Restorative; Justice, Retributive; Old Testament Ethics; Peace
Bibliography
Barton, J. Ethics and the Old Testament. Trinity Press International, 1998; Birch, B. Let Justice Roll Down: The Old Testament, Ethics, and Christian Life. Westminster John Knox, 1991; Boecker, H. Law and the Administration of Justice in the Old Testament and in the Ancient Near East. Augsburg, 1980; Epsztein, L. Social Justice in the Ancient Near East and the People of the Bible. Trans. J. Bowden. SCM, 1986; Gossai, H. Justice, Righteousness, and the Social Critique of the Eighth-Century Prophets. AUS 7/41. Peter Lang, 1993; Mott, S. Biblical Ethics and Social Change. Oxford University Press, 1982; Wright, C. An Eye for an Eye: The Place of Old Testament Ethics Today. InterVarsity, 1983.
Bruce C. Birch
Justice provides the standard for right behavior in social relationships. “I will use justice as a plumbline and righteousness as a plummet” (Isa. 28:17 NEB). Distributive justice provides the standard for the distribution of the benefits of living in society. Retributive justice, in contrast, provides the standard for the assignment of penalties for violating the standards of the society.
Every society has a conception of justice, but the conception of justice varies between societies and between political ideologies of the same society. Accordingly, the biblical understanding of justice is crucial for those who look to it for moral guidance. The understanding of justice is consistent throughout the various literary genres of the Bible. The NT presupposes the OT view of justice; this is most directly seen in Jesus’ statement that justice is one of the most important parts of the law (Matt. 23:23; cf. 2 Tim. 3:16).
The pervasiveness of justice in the Bible can be veiled by traditional terminology used for the key terms in English translations. The Hebrew sedaqa and its corresponding Greek term, dikaiosyne, often are translated as “righteousness.” Likewise, the Hebrew mispat and the Greek krima or krisis often are rendered as “judgment.” A reliable rule of thumb is that when “righteousness” or “judgment” is found in the context of social distribution or social conflict, “justice” would be a better translation. Often these terms for justice are used in combination, as in Isa. 28:17. In that case, one of the terms can be rendered by something like “what is right.”
Continuity with Love
Not all are agreed that justice is an extension of love. In a tradition in theology that may go back to Philo of Alexandria, justice and love are considered as separate poles. The result often is an interpretation of justice that is predominantly retributive, thus emphasizing justice as impartial; benefit rights are then denied as belonging to love, not justice.
Distributive justice, however, is closely related to loyal love (hesed [e.g., Hos. 10:12]) and love (’ahaba [e.g., Deut. 10:18]). This connection of loyal love to justice applies also to government (Ps. 89:14; Prov. 20:28; Isa. 16:5).
Distribution according to Needs
Theories of distributive justice differ in the standard for the assignment of benefits. They may be distributed according to worth, merit, ability, work, or the agreements that one has made. Biblical justice gives priority to distribution according to basic needs. Needs become rights, since they are to be met by the whole community. In Lev. 25:35 we read, “If members of your people become poor and their power wavers with you, you shall make them strong [Mzaq]” (in the Hiphil, causative conjugation). The basic needs to be met include not only matters indispensable for subsistence (such as food, clothing, and shelter [e.g., Deut. 10:18; Isa. 58:2, 7]) but also the possession and control of the resources that are preconditions for meeting those needs, such as land (as means of production [e.g., Isa. 65:21-22]), secondary means of production (Job 24:3), due process of law (Exod. 23:1-3, 6-8), and freedom from subjugation (Lev. 25:39-42; Deut. 23:15-16).
Justice is repeatedly associated with those from groups characterized by such needs: the poor, widow, orphan, resident alien, sick or differently abled, captive, slave, or wage worker. Their restoration is often to the disadvantage of the wealthy and powerful (e.g., Luke 1:51-53).
Restoration to Community
Distribution according to needs can also be described as a restoration to community, since the human being in Scripture is viewed as one who belongs in community (e.g., Ps. 107:36; Eccl. 4:9-12).
Being deprived of basic needs restricts a person’s ability to participate in community; “their power wavers with you” (Lev. 25:35). The responsibility “to make them strong” again is so “that they may live beside you” (Lev. 25:36). Deprivation of rights can mean falling out of the economic or political community. There are other dimensions of community as well. When people are shunned because of some social characteristic, they are losing their place in the social community (e.g., Prov. 14:20).
Deliverance
Justice is repeatedly associated with the language of deliverance (e.g., Ps. 76:9). Justice describes the deliverance of people from political and economic oppressors (Judg. 5:11), slavery (1 Sam. 12:7), and captivity (Jer. 51:10). Justice is not mere alleviation; it sets people back on their feet, restores them to community, and ends oppression (Pss. 10:15-18; 68:5-10). Justice as deliverance from oppression is demanded of the government (Ps. 72:1, 4; Jer. 21:12; 22:2-3). Such justice is foundational to political rule (Prov. 29:14) and is universally required (Dan. 4:27). It is central to the work of the coming messianic king (e.g., Isa. 11:4-5; Ezek. 34:15-16, 23-24).
Justice as restoration to community and deliverance helps explain why justice language (dikaiosyne) is used for salvation through Christ as a person is restored to the divine community and delivered from sin and death (e.g., Rom. 3:22-26).
Taking Up the Cause of the Oppressed
Justice in Scripture is not described in abstract, ethical language. It comes as a command of God, for whom justice is a chief attribute (e.g., Pss. 99:4; 103:6; 146:5-9). The people of God are commanded to carry out justice because God does justice (Deut. 10:18-19; Jer. 22:15-16).
Justice is such a central duty of the children of God that God’s provision of reconciliation to God will not be provided unless justice characterizes their actions (Isa. 1:11-20; Jer. 7:4-7; Amos 5:15, 21-24; Mic. 6:6-8; cf. Prov. 21:3; Matt. 5:23-24; Jas. 1:27).
See also Covenant; Covenantal Ethics; Justice, Restorative; Justice, Retributive
Bibliography
Birch, B. Let Justice Roll Down: The Old Testament, Ethics, and the Christian Life. Westminster John Knox, 1991; Lebacqz, K. Justice in an Unjust World: Foundations for a Christian Approach to Justice. Augsburg, 1987; Miranda, J. Marx and the Bible: A Critique of the Philosophy of Oppression. Orbis, 1974; Mott, S. “The Challenge of Biblical Justice.” Pages 74-88 in A Christian Perspective on Political Thought. Oxford University Press, 1993; idem.
“God’s Justice and Ours.” Pages 58—81 in Biblical Ethics and Social Change. Oxford University Press, 1982; Snaith, N. The Distinctive Ideas of the Old Testament. Westminster, 1946; Vawter, B. “A Tale of Two Cities: The Old Testament and the Issue of Personal Freedom.” JES 15 (1978): 261—73; Weinfeld, M. Social Justice in Ancient Israel and in the Ancient Near East. Fortress, 1995.
Stephen Charles Mott
The term restorative justice was coined in the 1970s to describe a way to respond to crime that focuses primarily on repairing the damage caused by the criminal act and restoring, insofar as possible, the dignity and well-being of all those involved. From modest Mennonite beginnings in Canada and the United States, restorative justice has grown into an international social movement for the promotion of collaborative and reparative approaches to dealing with offending and its consequences. It has had an impact on judicial thought and practice in many countries, perhaps most notably in New Zealand, where it forms the cornerstone of the entire juvenile justice system.
As it has developed and spread, restorative justice has also diversified. It now embraces a wide variety of programs and processes in the criminal justice domain, some of which have been adapted from reconciliation practices in indigenous societies. The principles of restorative justice have also been extended into other fields of conflict resolution, including school discipline, workplace disputes, neighborhood conflicts, and the resolution of historical injustices and human-rights abuses. The historic Truth and Reconciliation Commission in post-apartheid South Africa was expressly founded on a commitment to restorative justice.
Restorative justice may be distinguished from more conventional approaches to criminal justice in four main ways. First, restorative justice centers on a distinctive process whereby all those affected by an incident of wrongdoing (victims, offenders, and their families and supporters) come together, in a safe and controlled environment, usually with trained facilitators, to share their feelings and opinions truthfully and resolve together how best to deal with the aftermath. The process is dialogical and democratic and is concerned principally with clarifying the harm that has been suffered and determining how best it can be remedied.
Second, restorative justice prioritizes a distinctive set of values or moral principles in addressing the impact of offending. Of particular importance are the principles of accountability, respect, truth-telling, humility, collaboration, and mutual care. Restorative justice aims to hold offenders accountable, not simply to the law, but directly to those whom they have injured, and to underscore their obligation to put right the damages or losses that they have inflicted. When offenders truthfully confess their wrongdoing, when they listen respectfully to their victims as they recount their suffering, and when they honor their obligation to make restitution, significant steps are taken to restoring the dignity and well-being of the victims.
This leads to a third distinctive feature of ret storative justice: it places a special emphasis on the rights and needs of victims. Historically, the Western criminal justice system has given scant attention to victims. The overwhelming emphasis has been on the punishment of offenders and the preservation of the state’s interests. Victims are almost incidental to the judicial process since, technically speaking, the designated “victim” of the offense is the state, not the actual person injured. Restorative justice, by contrast, makes victims key players in the process. Time is allocated for them to speak in detail of their experience and to clarify what type of reparation or restitution will best help them to recover. Victimization, by its very nature, is an experience of disempowerment; restorative justice seeks to reempower victims by giving them a direct role in the disposition of their case.
Finally, restorative justice has a particular way of conceptualizing crime and justice. Crime is conceived not simply as the breaking of laws, but as the hurting of people and the damaging of relationships. Similarly, justice is understood not principally as the administration of punishment or the balancing of deed and desert, but as the restoring of relationships and the healing of hurts. There is still a valid place for punishment in the justice system, as a mechanism for clarifying society’s moral boundaries, for protecting the vulnerable, and for eliciting repentance from offenders. However, from the perspective of restorative justice, it is not the pain of punishment that ultimately satisfies the demands of justice but rather the vindication of victims, the healing of hurts, and the mending of broken relationships.
There is a deep resonance between restorative j ustice theory and key emphases in biblical teaching on justice, crime, punishment, and reconciliation. At a macrolevel, the metanarrative of the Bible as a whole tells of God’s restorative response to human sin and rebellion. God does not rest content with punishing sin, but works instead, through the election of Israel and supremely through the death and resurrection of Christ, to undo the damaging consequences of evil and to restore peace to the entire created order (Rom. 8:18-30; Rev. 21:1-5).
God’s commitment to restore humanity and the world in this way is, for the biblical writers, fundamentally a demonstration of God’s justice or God’s righteousness (the terms are virtually synonymous). Justice in the Bible is not an abstract norm; it is wholly to do with relationships and with restoring relationships when they are broken. God is shown to be just because God remains steadfastly loyal to his covenant people, despite their faithlessness (Rom. 3:1-9). God’s people display justice or righteousness insofar as they remain loyal to God. This entails obeying God’s law, including its multitudinous injunctions to practice justice and mercy in all their dealings with one another.
Within this overarching narrative, there are many individual stories of restoration as well as countless injunctions relating to repentance, confession, forgiveness, restitution, and reconciliation. There is a pronounced restorative dimension to OT criminal law. For many crimes, the typical penalty was restitution, together with varying levels of compensation depending on the seriousness of the injury and the intent of the offender (Exod. 22:1, 4, 7, 9; Lev. 6:1-7; Num. 5:5-8; Prov. 6:30-31; cf. Luke 19:8). In every case redress went to the victim, not to the state, and the overarching concern was the renewal of shalom, peace, in the community.
The NT teaching on justice has a strongly restorative character. The restoring impulse of divine justice is supremely shown in the life, death, and resurrection of Christ (Rom. 1:16-17; 3:21-31; 5:1), and the beneficiaries of such justice are expected to show a persistent dedication to justice and restoration when wrongdoing occurs in their midst (Matt. 5:21-26; 18:15-17; 1 Cor. 6:1-8; cf. 2 Cor. 2:5-11). “My friends, if anyone is detected in a transgression, you who have received the Spirit should restore such a one in a spirit of gentleness” (Gal. 6:1).
See also Crime and Criminal Justice; Justice, Retributive; Punishment; Reconciliation; Reparation; Restitution; Reward and Retribution
Bibliography
De Gruchy, J. Reconciliation: Restoring Justice. SCM, 2002; Johnstone, G., and D. Van Ness, eds. Handbook of Restorative Justice. Willan, 2007; Marshall, C. Beyond Retribution: A New Testament Vision for Justice, Crime, and Punishment. Eerdmans, 2001; idem. The Little Book of Biblical Justice. Good Books, 2005; Van Ness, D., and K. Strong. Restoring Justice: An Introduction to Restorative Justice. 3rd ed. LexisNexis, 2006; Zehr, H. Changing Lenses: A New Focus for Crime and Justice. 3rd ed. Herald Press, 2005; idem. The Little Book of Restorative Justice. Good Books, 2002; Zehr, H., and B. Toews, eds. Critical Issues in Restorative Justice. Willan, 2004.
Christopher Marshall
Reference to retributive justice is commonplace in both popular and philosophical debates on crime and punishment. Yet the concept itself is dogged with ambiguity and imprecision; it has been described as one of the most misunderstood ideas in criminal jurisprudence. Such confusion is also reflected in discussions on the place of retributive justice in the Bible.
The word retribution (from Lat. retribuere) simply means “repayment”—the giving back to another what is deserved, whether in terms of reimbursement, reward, or reproof. Usually the term is used in the negative sense of punishment for wrongful deeds rather than in the positive sense of reward for good behavior. When the word is used in isolation, it tends to evoke the idea of vengeance or retaliation, and brutal retaliation at that. When it is paired with the word justice, however, it implies a more measured delivery of punishment as due recompense for wrongdoing. Nonetheless, the nuance of revenge is never far from view. Consequently, some ethicists speak of retributive justice with approval, others with disapproval. Those who disapprove of retributive justice regard it as virtually synonymous with vengeance and reject the whole notion as primitive and barbaric. Punishment, some insist, is defensible only on utilitarian grounds (i.e., if it produces better outcomes than does lack of punishment). Those who approve of retributive justice, however, sharply distinguish retribution from revenge and contend that retributive considerations alone are capable of justifying punishment in moral terms and of excluding the possibility of excessive or vicarious punishment.
There are several versions of retributivism as a penal philosophy, but they share at least four fundamental ideas. The first is the notion of “guilt.” Individuals, as free moral agents, are responsible for their actions, and the choice that individuals make to do wrong creates objective moral and/or legal guilt. From this flows the concept of “desert.” Punishment is justified only when it is personally deserved, and, when it is deserved, punishment is all but obligatory to meet the demands of justice. The third idea is “proportionality.” In order to be just, the severity of the penalty must be commensurate with the seriousness of the crime. The fourth idea is “denunciation” or “censure.” The purpose of punishment is not primarily to hurt or correct or deter the offender, but rather to bear witness to the constraints imposed by the moral and legal order and to rectify the moral imbalance created by the transgression.
The singular strengths of retributive justice as a theory of punishment are its capacity to restrict punishment to the guilty party alone and to prohibit disproportionate penalties from being employed (even though correlating punishments to crimes is far from an objective science). Retributivism rightly insists that moral blameworthiness is the sine qua non for the just imposition of punitive pain; there is never a justification for vicarious or collective or exemplary punishment. This point furnishes a significant obstacle to theories of atonement that depend on the notion of substitutionary punishment.
However, retributivist theory also has limitations. Moral guilt may be an essential prerequisite for justified punishment, but it is rarely a sufficient justification, since society deems it neither expedient nor morally imperative to punish every moral infraction. Only a limited (and culturally variable) number of transgressions are singled out for penal redress. This calls into question the retributivist principle that punishment is a requirement of justice if the moral balance is to be restored. Why should punishment be the only kind of repayment that satisfies the demands of justice? Confession, repentance, and restitution are equally capable of vindicating society’s moral standards, and in everyday life these frequently suffice. The analogy of family life is instructive: only abusive parents feel compelled to punish every misdemeanor of their children; a truly just parent recognizes that in most cases a gentle rebuke or an apology or a change of conduct is all that is necessary to restore the right. At a theoretical level, then, retributive justice is better able to tell us when not to punish (i.e., when the party is innocent) than when or why we must punish. The latter cannot be determined solely on moral grounds, but only by taking into account circumstantial and utilitarian considerations as well.
There is a definite theme of retribution in biblical teaching on justice. At the most basic level, the Bible recognizes that human deeds carry inescapable consequences; there is an inbuilt law of recompense in the universe that “you reap whatever you sow” (Gal. 6:7 [cf. Ps. 7:15; Prov. 1:32; 26:27; Eccl. 10:8]). In addition, the four retributive concepts of guilt and atonement, desert, proportionality, and denunciation or censure are widely attested in the OT legal system and undergird moral and theological teaching in the NT as well (see Marshall 120-27). Similarly, since God is just, and God’s judgments are never capricious, biblical accounts of divine judgment on sin, both within history and at the end of time, may also be regarded as demonstrations of retributive justice. The canonical record ends with an affirmation of the retributive principle of just deserts: “See, I am coming soon; my reward is with me, to repay according to everyone’s work” (Rev. 22:12).
It would be false to conclude, however, that biblical teaching on justice is wholly controlled by the notion of impersonal retribution. Justice in the Bible is not an abstract metaphysical principle; it has an intrinsically relational character. It describes what is needed to create, sustain, and restore healthy relationships in the covenant community. Criminal offending is considered wrong because it breaches covenant commitments and because the wrongful deeds themselves unleash a disordering power in the community that could trigger a chain reaction of ruin and disaster unless it is arrested. One way of arresting this negative power, especially in situations of very grave interpersonal and religious offending, was by redirecting the destructive consequences of the deed back on to the perpetrator by way of judicial or divine punishment. The punishment served simultaneously to dramatize the catastrophic consequences of evil deeds and to “purge the evil from Israel” (Deut. 17:12). When this happened, justice was vindicated not by the act of punishment per se, but by the fact that the community had, by means of the punitive action, been delivered from evil and restored to wholeness.
Yet both biblical law and biblical narrative show that retributive punishment was not invariably required in order to secure or satisfy justice. Repentance, atonement, restitution, and forgiveness are constantly solicited and frequently celebrated in Scripture as alternatives to retribution (Exod. 34:6-7; Ps. 103:3, 10; Ezek. 33:11; Mic. 7:18). Christian believers in particular are expressly summoned to forgo retribution or retaliation in favor of forgiveness and reconciliation and to leave issues of ultimate justice to God (Matt. 5:38-48; Rom. 12:17-21; 1 Pet. 2:21-23). God’s retributive wrath may sometimes be activated providentially through human agents and institutions (Rom. 13:4; 1 Pet. 2:14). But repeatedly in the biblical record, and supremely in the events of the Christian gospel, “mercy triumphs over judgment” (Jas. 2:13) as the means of vindicating justice by restoring right relationships. God’s justice is retributive inasmuch as it is never prejudiced, arbitrary, or impulsive and is always morally attuned to human deeds and deserts (Rom. 2:1-16). But what ultimately “shows” or “proves” God’s justice (Rom. 3:26) is not the ineluctable imposition of retribution on sinners, but rather the restoration of relationship made possible by “his grace as a gift through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus” (Rom. 3:24).
See also Crime and Criminal Justice; Justice; Justice, Restorative; Moral Agency; Punishment; Restitution; Revenge; Reward and Retribution
Bibliography
Burnside, J. “Retribution and Restoration in Biblical Texts.” Pages 132-48 in Handbook of Restorative Justice, ed. G. Johnstone and D. Van Ness. Willan, 2007; Koch, K. “Is There a Doctrine of Retribution in the OT?” Pages 57-87 in Theodicy on the Old Testament, ed. J. Crenshaw. IRT 4. Fortress, 1983; Marshall, C. Beyond Retribution: A New Testament Vision for Justice, Crime, and Punishment. Eerdmans, 2001; Moule, C. F. D. “Punishment and Retribution: An Attempt to Delimit Their Scope in New Testament Thought.” Justice Reflections 8, no. 60 (2005): 1-20; Peels, H. The Vengeance of God: The Meaning of the Root NQM and the Function of NQM-Texts in the Context of Divine Revelation in the Old Testament. OtSt 31. Brill, 1995; Talbot, T. “Punishment, Forgiveness, and Divine Justice.” RelS 29 (1993): 151-68; Travis, S. Christ and the Judgment of God: Divine Retribution in the New Testament. Marshall & Pickering, 1986; Zehr, H. The Little Book of Restorative Justice. Good Books, 2002.
Christopher Marshall
Moral justification seeks to provide good reasons for moral acts or claims. The reasonableness of an act or claim may be shown by making an appeal to principles, rules, virtues, and/or goals, such that the reasons for doing a particular act outweigh the reasons against a particular act. Different people will emphasize to varying degrees and in different combinations these different considerations. Moral justification can also be grounded within a particular moral narrative. In this case, to act inconsistently with the constructed narrative is to act in a morally unjustifiable way. Further, moral justification has two general audiences: justification within a particular moral community and justification to those who stand outside the moral community. Broadly stated, moral justification raises the question of to whom and for what does a moral account need to be given within a particular context. Moral justification can be given and received by way of a combination of relationships including oneself, another person, a community, and God.
The Bible itself can be used as a source for moral justification in connection to these various relationships; however, the Bible holds various levels of authority among ethicists as a basis for moral justification and can be used as a guiding framework or can supply concrete moral solutions, depending on the particular Christian tradition and the specific moral issue. The Bible certainly plays a particularly critical role in moral justification for Protestant ethicists, has maintained an important place among Orthodox ethicists, and has increasingly been an important resource for Roman Catholic ethicists since Vatican II.
Two important aspects of moral justification in relationship to the Bible can be posed as questions. First, is the issue raised directly in the Bible? Second, how much does the historical context differ from the contemporary situation? For example, some moral issues, such as human cloning, are never specifically discussed in the Bible. Other issues, such as care for the poor, are clearly raised. In regard to historical context and contemporary situation, one highly debated question is the issue of homosexuality. Some ethicists argue that scriptural passages are quite clear about the immorality of homosexuality. Other ethicists argue that a more historically critical approach reveals a quite different understanding of sexuality from our own time, justifying homosexuality.
Finally, there is no general consensus on how the Bible relates to other sources of moral justification such as reason, human experience, and tradition. There is a strong integration of the Bible with tradition by Roman Catholic and Orthodox ethicists, and the experience of the marginalized in relationship to the Bible is important for libera-tionist ethicists. Rationality, while significant for ethicists, is increasingly challenged in its ability to justify universal moral claims due to a greater awareness of pluralism.
See also Narrative Ethics, Biblical; Narrative Ethics, Contemporary; Orthodox Ethics; Roman Catholic Moral Theology; Virtue Ethics
Bibliography
Birch, B., and L. Rasmussen. Bible and Ethics in the Christian Life. Rev. ed. Augsburg, 1989; Cosgrove, C. Appealing to Scripture in Moral Debate: Five Hermeneutical Rules. Eerdmans, 2002; Curran, C., and R. McCormick, eds. The Use of Scripture in Moral Theology. RMT 4. Paulist Press, 1984; McDonald, J. Biblical Interpretation and Christian Ethics. NSCE. Cambridge University Press, 1993.
Mark A. Tarpley
Just peacemaking is the recently developed paradigm for the ethics of peace and war, alongside the historic paradigms of just war and pacifism. The older paradigms debate whether war is justifiable; just peacemaking focuses discussion on the proactive practices that prevent war and create peace.
Growing Awareness among Church Leaders After the horrors of World War II many worked to develop practices to prevent a repeat of such devastation or worse, especially with nuclear weapons. Leaders in major church denominations in the United States saw that these practices of peacemaking were working to prevent wars and should be made widely known and supported. In the 1980s four book-length statements by major church denominations in the United States said that just war and pacifism do not provide adequate tools for guiding public debate about war and peace; we need a widely known new paradigm that enables Christians to resonate with one another in public discussion, thereby prodding governments to engage in practices that make for peace.
In The Challenge of Peace, the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops said,
Recognition of the Church’s responsibility to join with others in the work of peace is a major force behind the call today to develop a theology of peace. Much of the history of Catholic theology on war and peace has focused on limiting the resort to force in human affairs [just-war theory and pacifism]; this task is still necessary, . . . but it is not a sufficient response.
A fresh reappraisal which includes a developed theology of peace will require contributions from several sectors of the Church’s life: biblical studies, systematic and moral theology, ecclesiology, and the experience and insights of members of the church who have struggled in various ways to make and keep the peace in this often violent age. (§§23—24)
Methodists (In Defense of Creation), Presbyterians (Peacemaking: The Believers’ Calling), and the United Church of Christ (The Just Peace Church) issued a similar call.
Accordingly, twenty-three interdisciplinary scholars from numerous denominations, Catholic and Protestant, joined together and worked successfully to develop an agreed new paradigm in 1998, and thirty scholars published the third edition in 2008 as Just Peacemaking: The New Paradigm for the Ethics of Peace and War. They include both just-war theorists and pacifists, who disagree on whether war is ever justified but agree that the ten practices of just peacemaking are effective in preventing many wars and are obligatory for people and governments to support. They agree it is time to do more than discuss whether we approve of a war; we need to gather public discussion around these practices that actually work to prevent war. Subsequently, the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America in For Peace in God’s World, the Christian Reformed Church of North America in the adoption of its report “War and Peace,” the Protestant Church of Germany in Aus Gottes Frieden leben—fur gerechten Frieden sorgen, and the German Catholic Church in Gerechter Friede also shifted the emphasis from whether to justify war to advocacy of just peace and its practices. All are saying that, without a widely known paradigm with agreed practices that make peace and prevent war, public debate is vague and unclear about the effective alternatives to the drive to war.
The Ten Practices of Just Peacemaking The ten practices in the just-peacemaking paradigm are grouped under themes of transforming initiatives, working for justice, and building community:
Peacemaking Initiatives
1. Support nonviolent direct action.
2. Take independent initiatives to reduce threat.
3. Use cooperative conflict resolution.
4. Acknowledge responsibility for conflict and injustice; seek repentance and forgiveness.
Justice
5. Advance democracy, human rights, and religious liberty.
6. Foster just and sustainable economic development.
Love and Community
7. Work with emerging cooperative forces in the international system.
8. Strengthen the United Nations and international efforts for cooperation and human rights.
9. Reduce offensive weapons and weapons trade.
10. Encourage grassroots peacemaking groups
and voluntary associations.
The authors of Just Peacemaking: The New Paradigm for the Ethics of Peace and War urge that, in discussions of just-peacemaking theory, it is important to name practices specifically; otherwise, we fall back into the vagueness of being generally in favor of peace while failing to support the specific practices that make peace. They point out that the ten practices constitute a unified and agreed paradigm, not merely ten chapters by different authors. The ten practices are the result of five years of dialogical work, and the practices as well as the chapters defining them are the unanimous consensus of the diverse authors.
The authors explicitly state that they come to the ten practices of just peacemaking from deeply held faith commitments but also from empirical realism, as the ten practices are showing themselves to work empirically in decreasing wars, which is shown in the research of political scientists as well as the experience of recent history. They appeal to persons and groups of various faiths to join with them in supporting these specific, realistic, effective peacemaking practices. In 2008, thirty leading Muslim, Jewish, and Christian scholars, working with support from the United States Institute of Peace, agreed to this joint statement: “We all believe that Just Peacemaking is the best option to resolve human conflicts and actively work towards the elimination of the conditions that lead to violence. . . . We all agree to mine our own religious traditions to further develop the Just Peacemaking practices” (http://www.usip.org/files /resources/sr214.pdf).
Scriptural Reasoning with Analogical Contextualization The first four peacemaking practices are initiatives based on a discipleship understanding of Christ’s way as the authoritative model for ethical practice, with emphasis on his call to disciples to follow humbly his way of peacemaking. Paul’s letters advocate initiatives for overcoming divisions within churches and divisions between Jews and gentiles. The Gospels see Jesus embodying God’s love for all humankind, and the Sermon on the Mount portrays Jesus’ way of confronting evil not by violence but through transforming initiatives (Stassen, ed., Just Peacemaking, 19-22).
This emphasis on peacemaking initiatives is based especially on the discovery that throughout the Sermon on the Mount the climax of each teaching is always a transforming initiative. Accordingly, a Christian ethic of peacemaking should include not only prohibitions but also transforming initiatives of deliverance from the destruction of war. Therefore, just peacemaking sees peace as something to be achieved not merely by refraining from war, but also by taking peacemaking initiatives. It is rooted in the heart of the biblical understanding of God’s grace, which takes dramatic initiatives in coming to us, speaking in the burning bush (Exod. 3:1-4), pouring love into us in Jesus Christ while we were God’s enemies (Rom. 5:1-21), and bringing God’s delivering presence in Jesus.
In explaining the Sermon on the Mount as transforming initiatives, and referring to Glen Stassen’s 1992 book Just Peacemaking: Transforming Initiatives for Justice and Peace, the authors of Just Peacemaking: The New Paradigm for the Ethics of Peace and War signal that the just-peacemaking ethic was actually first inspired by scriptural interpretation. Stassen’s book grew out of the discovery that the structure and the theme of Jesus’ Sermon on the Mount are not twofold “antitheses” but rather are threefold “transforming initiatives,” and that this is echoed in Paul’s Letter to the Romans. This discovery was first published in a series of articles in the 1980s, and then in the 1992 book on just peacemaking. So the scriptural discovery preceded and led to the ethic of just peacemaking.
For example, Matt. 5:21-26 commands someone involved in a relationship of anger or hostility to go to the adversary and make peace. There is no command not to be angry; the command is to go, talk, and make peace, which was crucial in Jesus’ time of increasing conflict. What is the analogous practice in our context? Just peacemaking answers that the practice is conflict resolution with adversaries. And if Christ is Lord over all of life, this suggests practicing conflict resolution in marriages and families, in church relations, in work relationships, and in disagreements with nations such as the former Soviet Union, North Korea, and Iran. The historical context in 1980 and 1992, as just peacemaking was developing, required practicing conflict resolution in talks with the Soviet Union that helped end the Cold War and decrease the threat of nuclear destruction.
A second example is Matt. 5:33-42, where Jesus commands the transforming initiatives of turning the cheek of equal dignity, giving cloak as well as coat, going the second mile, and giving and lending to a beggar. These are nonviolent confrontations that seek a transformed, more peaceful relationship. What would be the analogous practice in our time? Just peacemaking answers that Mohandas Gandhi’s and Abdul Gaffar Khan’s practice of nonviolent direct action in India’s struggle for independence, Martin Luther King Jr.’s similar practice in the civil rights struggle, and practices of nonviolent direct action spreading worldwide are clear analogies of Jesus’ teaching for our historical context. But there is also the practice of independent initiatives, which worked to achieve a nuclear test ban in the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations and since, and to reduce by one-half the number of nuclear weapons as the Cold War was ending. Scriptural interpretation, combined with the hermeneutical method of analogical contextualization, led to the development of the just-peacemaking paradigm.
Similarly, Jesus’ and Paul’s teaching against judging, but instead taking the logs out of our own eyes, connected directly with the practice of acknowledging our own responsibility for conflict and injustice and seeking repentance and forgiveness. Historically, governments had resisted apologizing for their errors, fearing that it indicated weakness. However, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, directly influenced by his own interpretation of the Sermon on the Mount in his book Discipleship, and then German churches initiated this practice after the Holocaust and World War II. Subsequently, the German government, followed by other governments, has begun apologizing, sometimes initiating reparations payments, as those made to Japanese Americans badly mistreated during World War II. In South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission and in Rwanda this practice has greatly decreased the hostility that might have boiled over into new violence.
The next two just-peacemaking practices are practices of justice. The four basic words for justice in Hebrew and Greek are repeated 1,060 times in the Bible, more than almost any other term. The biblical prophets repeatedly insist that returning to God and practicing justice is the way to prevent the destruction of war. Jesus identifies with this prophetic message and calls those in authority and the wealthy to repent for neglecting justice, faithfulness, and mercy, and for covering their sins with temple sacrifices while neglecting the poor, the powerless, and widows and orphans (he cites Jer. 7:11 as he ejects the money traders from the temple). As Isaiah proclaimed justice based on God’s compassion for those suffering injustice, so also did Jesus.
The final four practices are based on Jesus’ teaching that all on whom God shines sun and drops rain, even one’s enemies, are to be included in the community of neighbors and on his interaction with a Samaritan woman (John 4:5-30) and a Syrophoenician woman (Mark 7:24-30). Love must be understood realistically, not sentimentally, acting in concrete ways to create community interaction and covenant community. In the present context, this suggests participative and inclusive community development at local, ecclesial, and international levels.
See also Conflict; Deterrence, Nuclear; Forgiveness; Imitation of Jesus; Justice; Just-War Theory; Pacifism; Peace; Reparation; Restitution; Sermon on the Mount; Violence; War
Bibliography
Christiansen, D. “Catholic Peacemaking 1991-2005: The Legacy of Pope John Paul II.” RFIA 4, no. 2 (2006): 21-28; Fuller Theological Seminary. “The Long Reach toward Just Peacemaking.” Theology News & Notes (Spring 2009): http://documents.fuller.edu/news/pubs/tnn/2009_Spring /index.asp; Stassen, G. Just Peacemaking: Transforming Initiatives for Justice and Peace. Westminster John Knox, 1992; idem, ed. Just Peacemaking: The New Paradigm for the Ethics of Peace and War. 3rd ed. Pilgrim Press, 2008; idem et al. “Resource Section on Just Peacemaking Theory.” JSCE 23, no. 1 (2003): 169-284; Thistlethwaite, S. “New Wars, Old Wineskins.” Pages 264-79 in Strike Terror No
More: Theology, Ethics, and the New War, ed. J. Berquist. Chalice Press, 2002; Thompson, J. “Humanitarian Intervention, Just Peacemaking and the United Nations.” Pages 83—93 in The Return of the Just War, ed. M. Aquino and D. Mieth. SCM, 2002; United States Conference of Catholic Bishops. The Challenge of Peace: God’s Promise and Our Response. United States Catholic Conference, 1983; United States Institute of Peace, http://www.usip.org/files /resources/sr214.pdf.
Glen H. Stassen
“Wage” refers to the payment given or received for work performed. “Just wage” refers to payment given and received in a timely fashion that is proportionate to the work done. Both the OT and the NT include numerous texts that demand just wages for workers and condemn employers who fail to provide them. Although these texts cannot legitimately be used without qualification to support a specific economic system or civil law regarding wages in contemporary societies, they do provide Christians with an important biblical concern—the just treatment of workers—that can be used to evaluate economic systems and laws regarding wages.
Wage as Metaphor for Divine Action
Some biblical passages use the word wage metaphorically to describe God’s response to the action of humans. Hence, Paul says that death constitutes the payment humanity receives for its sinfulness: “The wages of sin is death” (Rom. 6:23). The parable of the laborers in the field depicts God’s unmerited grace by referring to wages that exceed expectations (Matt. 20:1-16). Elsewhere, Paul says that those who sow in the mission field “will receive wages according to the labor of each” (1 Cor. 3:8), clearly referring to divine reward rather than monetary earnings. Wage or recompense can also refer to something tangible given by God to those whose actions merit reward. For example, God gives the land of Egypt to Nebuchadnezzar as “the wages for his army” and “the payment for which he labored” (Ezek. 29:19-20).
Just Wage as Compensation for Labor
The Bible contains numerous passages regarding the giving of fair wages by employers to their workers. Mosaic law, for instance, includes the demand to pay wages at the end of each day to protect laborers, including immigrants, from abuse and to help them survive (Lev. 19:13; Deut. 24:14-15). There are also pronouncements of judgment in the OT against those who do not give fair wages (e.g., Jer. 22:13). In the NT, the writer of James says that the very wages that were unjustly withheld from workers cry out along with the harvesters who were cheated (Jas. 5:4). One text admonishes wage earners (specifically, soldiers) to be satisfied with their wages (Luke 3:14); however, since this admonition is set alongside concerns for treating people justly by sharing food and clothing, for not collecting more than the required taxes, and for not extorting money through false accusations, the admonition cannot be rightly understood as telling people to be satisfied with poor wages. The OT and the NT are consistently concerned with treating laborers fairly by paying a just wage. In fact, the familiar claim that “the labourer is worthy of his hire” (Luke 10:7 KJV) summarizes the message in both Testaments regarding fair wages: a worker should be given a fair wage in proportion to the work done.
Contemporary Debates regarding Just Wage
None of these passages from Scripture, taken individually or collectively, can lead Christians to say definitively that one economic system (e.g., socialism versus capitalism) or that a particular law (such as one that promotes the concept of a minimum wage) is supported by the Bible. Although the Bible speaks of God’s concern for economic justice, it does not teach economics per se. Furthermore, the various economic systems familiar to ancient Israelites and to the early church were often vastly different from what we encounter in contemporary societies today. Nevertheless, Christians can be informed by the Bible when evaluating the effectiveness of a particular economic system or law. Christians may differ regarding which types of laws or economic systems best serve to provide a just wage to laborers. What is not debatable, however, is that the Bible exhorts Christians to care about laborers and that they receive a just wage. Indifference on this issue is clearly unbiblical.
See also Business Ethics; Capitalism; Economic Ethics; Exploitation; Justice; Work
Bibliography
Glickman, L. A Living Wage: American Workers and the Making of Consumer Society. Cornell University Press, 1997; John Paul II. On Human Work. United States Catholic Conference, 1981.
Nancy J. Duff
The expression “just war” refers to a two-thousand-year-old continuing tradition of Western moral reflection concerning war and peace. In the just-war tradition “war is always judged twice” (Walzer 21). First, there is judging the justifications for, or the justifiability of, going to war—whether waging war is the right thing to do. Second, there is judging the justifications for, or the justice of, the means for fighting in war—whether war is conducted rightly. The Latin phrases for these two judgments are jus ad bellum (“justice to war”) and jus in bello (“justice in war”). Over the course of time, the just-war tradition has developed ethical criteria for making these moral judgments, which seek to constrain might according to standards of right.
Moral Criteria for Judging War While there is no official, single index of moral criteria, ten commend themselves, and these are named in parentheses in the two lists below. The first eight judge jus ad bellum, and the last two judge jus in bello.
Waging war is justifiable:
1. when it is in response to the perpetration of a real injury (just cause);
2. when it is declared by legitimate public authority (legitimate authority);
3. when the legitimate authority prosecuting the war has righteous intentions (right intention);
4. when the goal of waging war is to restore a situation of peace with justice (goal of peace);
5. when war is undertaken only after exhausting other reasonable means of peaceful settlement (last resort);
6. when the overall damage caused by war will not exceed the original injury suffered (proportionality of ends);
7. when there is a reasonable hope that the purpose for going to war can be successfully accomplished (probability of success);
8. when there is a public declaration of the reasons for waging war (public declaration).
The conduct of war is justifiable:
1. when war does not target noncombatants (noncombatant discrimination);
2. when war uses only means proportional to the value of the target (proportionality of means).
The moral criteria for waging and conducting war, while varied, have a certain coherence about them. Still, important questions surface. How do the criteria conflict with one another in the real world? If so, what then? Do any criteria have priority over others? How completely must each or all of the criteria be met? What happens, for instance, with right intention when faced with mixed motives, which is surely an all-too-human occurrence? What happens when people do not have enough information to assess whether criteria have been met? What happens when those with knowledge about a situation lie, deceive, or are simply mistaken? Who holds whom accountable to the criteria? What happens when one party to a conflict does not follow just-war criteria? Since the just-war tradition has developed within Western civilization, what is its value and standing within other great global civilizations and within international law?
A Tradition of Judging War
The criteria for judging war are important, and yet the just-war tradition cannot be reduced to criteria alone. Traditions develop over long periods of time and are full-bodied, with characteristic ways of thinking, feeling, speaking, acting, and relating with peculiar attitudes, beliefs, loyalties, and habits of mind and heart. The just-war tradition is a prudential moral tradition requiring experience, wisdom, and practice to weigh matters of varying moral densities, and thus it steers a middle way between absolutism and relativism. Relations between peoples, nation-states, and social movements are messy, and complexities arise. It is tempting, but not wise, to expect more precision out of this prudential moral tradition than the complex matters at hand permit (Cook 32).
There are ambiguities associated with the just-war tradition due to the different contexts and time periods out of which it has developed and because different terminologies have been used. Most important, however, there are ambiguities “because of the expectations of many persons today regarding war, expectations that are transferred to the just war idea” (Johnson xxi). These transferred expectations have largely come from three other influential traditions dealing with questions of war and peace: war realism, holy war/ crusade, and pacifism. The expectations that have been transferred from war realism and holy war/ crusade have led to serious misunderstandings of the just-war tradition and how it judges war. The just-war tradition holds a strong presumption for peace. It seeks to restrain war, and it therefore holds certain things in common with the varieties of pacifism. It is important to consider how a unified theory and tradition of just peacemaking and just war might be forged (Simpson 33-36, 79-90).
Classical Footsteps of the Just-War Tradition
Marcus Tullius Cicero (106-43 BCE) left the first footprint of the just-war tradition. He made a brief case for just war in On Duties when he rebuked his own state, Rome, for too often waging war for the unjustifiable reasons of establishing supremacy and gaining glory. He placed war within the natural law of self-preservation in the face of another’s violent aggression. The natural right to repel force with force in order to secure peace is “the only righteous grounds for going to war” (Simpson 40). He also criticized Rome for waging war without first exhausting discussion, thus inaugurating the criterion of “last resort.” Finally, he cited many examples in which conducting war using proportional means contributed to an eventual sustainable peace.
Bishop Ambrose of Milan (339-97 CE) read Cicero extensively, considered him a righteous pagan, and passed on his key moral insights to Western Christianity. Ambrose stressed that defending the weak and the oppressed is a key aspect of justice in his famous maxim, “Whoever does not ward off a blow to a fellow man, when he can, is as much at fault as the striker” (Simpson 41). By emphasizing the failure to protect as the moral equivalent of war, he influentially extended the natural law principle, “Do no harm.”
Bishop Augustine of Hippo (354-430 CE) is the most important figure in the historical development of the just-war tradition. He placed the first three moral criteria within the overall goal of establishing peace anchored in justice. He also stressed right intention by arguing that wars of desire are unjust, and only wars of necessity are justifiable. Even wars of necessity are limited in what they can be expected to accomplish, and they should not be waged in order to create the city of God here on earth. He was a prodigious interpreter of the Scriptures and carefully used common distinctions between self-defense as private citizens and public officials defending others to help Christians understand how followers of Jesus, who had told his disciples to turn the other cheek, may participate in a just war. Augustine rooted his moral reasoning in love and compared a just war with a father who in love disciplines a son who persists in wrong.
Augustine, however, also opened a crack in the conceptual door of the ethics of war and peace that centuries later would be pried open farther to argue for the Crusades. As bishop, he had to deal with numerous Christian heretics, including the Donatists, who at times violently persecuted other Christians. He advised the ruler Boniface that it was within his political office to wage war not only to secure the love and protection of neighbor commanded in the second table of the Decalogue but also to secure the love of God commanded in the first table and thus to defend right worship and doctrine.
Johannes Gratian (mid-twelfth century) gathered together thousands of authoritative theological, moral, legal, and civil statements that often seemed quite disconnected from one another at best and mutually contradictory at worst. He arranged them into a comprehensive, ordered whole, The Concord of Discordant Canons, or the De-cretum. He produced the Decretum because a law is not really a law until it has been promulgated. He made Augustine’s moral reasoning on war and peace the centerpiece of the just-war tradition. Gratian’s collection of canon law (ecclesiastical law governing the Roman Catholic Church) was the standard text until the twentieth century and served both church and government during medieval times, when often they were seamlessly joined.
Thomas Aquinas (1225-74) was a university theologian who gave the tradition its scholarly status. In Summa theologiae he took Augustine’s thinking, honed on the streets of a working bishop who offered practical moral counsel to political rulers, and worked it into a brief, ordered, and authoritative text for the university.
Thomas considered war under two topics: first under charity, whose principal action is to love, and second under religious orders. After defining charity, he dealt with the vices that oppose charity, including war. He begins his examination of war, as he begins every topic in the Summa, by posing a question: “Is it always sinful to wage war?” He thereby presumes war’s sinfulness; any other judgment regarding war would have to meet rigorous criteria. He then enumerates legitimate authority, just cause, and right intention, with accompanying quotations from Augustine, as the three necessary moral criteria that establish the bar in order for a war to be considered just. Thomas’s list set these three criteria in stone as the mainstay of the tradition from this time on.
By setting the topic of war also under religious orders, however, Thomas Aquinas legitimated the Crusades. First, he agreed with Augustine that temporal authority can be used to maintain right worship. Second, he argued that the church under the pope and bishops can bear the sword through the soldiering of religious orders, something that Augustine did not contemplate. Third, he took the book of 1 Maccabees to provide the biblical framework. Finally, he argued that military crusading can be a legitimate religious penance for wrongdoing.
Transforming Footsteps of the Just-War Tradition Martin Luther (1483-1546) brought the just-war tradition into the thinking of the Protestant
Reformation by using Augustine’s distinction between wars of desire and wars of necessity, and he advised that even just wars of necessity should be waged “with repentance.” He used the distinction between law and gospel to argue against a reemerging pacifist interpretation of Scripture. Importantly, he also criticized Augustine’s legacy of promoting the use of the sword by political authorities to restrain heresy, although in 1543 he himself would atrociously backslide when it came to the Jews in Germany, who rejected Jesus’ divinity. He criticized any crusade against the Muslim Ottoman Empire as “idolatry and blasphemy” (Simpson 57). Finally, he supported what today is called “selective conscientious objection,” whereby a soldier may refuse to serve in a particular war because it is manifestly unjust. In such cases, “We must obey God rather than any human authority” (Acts 5:29).
Francisco de Vitoria (1483-1546) was a Spanish Roman Catholic theologian who founded the School of Salamanca. Emperor Charles V sought Vitoria’s advice regarding the “discovery” and military rule of the so-called New World. First, Vitoria viewed the native people as indeed being the owners of this “new” world, and therefore Spain had no property rights of discovery. Second, according to the criterion of just cause, he argued that Spanish imperial expansion violated just war. Third, he rejected holy war and the proposition that the pope has temporal authority to use the sword to convert the native people. “Difference of religion is not a cause of just war” (Simpson 60). Fourth, he introduced a new insight into the criterion of legitimate authority. While the legitimate sovereign has the right to declare a justifiable war, others also have a right to discern whether the sovereign ought to declare war, since notoriously sovereigns always think that they have a just cause. Finally, Vitoria gave considerable attention to the situation of noncombatants and to the treatment of prisoners of war and thus paved the way for the further development of jus in bello criteria, even though today people would not agree with him on each of his judgments on these matters.
Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) was a Dutch jurist who anticipated the coming era of international relations and is often called the “father of international law.” He wrote On the Law of War and Peace during the Thirty Years’ War (1618-48), paving the way for the Westphalian era. He placed just-war reasoning firmly on a natural-law basis while minimizing the reliance of the just-war tradition upon Scripture, Christian faith, and the church fathers. Famously, he sought an argument for just war “even if we should concede that which cannot be conceded without the utmost wickedness, that there is no God” (Simpson 63). Following Cicero, he made his appeal to natural law through the mediation of the law of nations—jus gentium—a common recognition among many or all nations of some fundamental moral insights. These commonly accepted moral insights signaled, but did not guarantee, that the insights disclosed natural law.
Grotius focused just cause on self-defense, although he included two other traditional just causes: the recovery of property or debt, and deterrent punishment for a committed offense. He located legitimate authority in the association of free persons who make up a state. This modern concept of sovereignty depends more on the quality of public procedures than on the personal moral character of the ruler under God’s judgment. He redefined the purpose of the public declaration of war to be less about warning the enemy and more about placing a state’s rationale for waging war up for public scrutiny and accountability by the community of nation-states. He sought to hold powerful nations more internationally accountable for meeting just-war criteria. Such public accountability places a very high bar on preemptive war, puts a check on so-called preventive wars whereby “the possibility of being attacked confers the right to attack [which] is abhorrent to every principle of equity” (Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace 2.1.17), and strengthens the obligation of selective conscientious objection. Finally, Grotius united in a single work the criteria of jus ad bellum and jus in bello with extensive analyses of proportionality of means and noncombatant immunity of civilians. He concluded his analysis of jus in bello with a treatment of the natural law of good faith even between enemies in order to bring about a lasting peace, and even when one party exercises bad faith.
The Just-War Tradition
and International Humanitarian Law
The work of Grotius and his followers led to the development of the “international humanitarian law” of war and peace beginning in the midnineteenth century. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) highlighted the right of soldiers to medical attention and the right of medical and relief personnel to noncombatant immunity. In 1863 the United States created the Lieber Code, which first codified in law the jus in bello criteria even though it was only a US code. In 1864 Switzerland convened twelve states in Geneva (the United States chose not to participate) to adopt the first Geneva Convention regarding jus in bello. The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 were convened to adopt jus in bello criteria and also ratified the Geneva Conventions.
In 1945 the United Nations Charter confirmed the Westphalian principle of sovereign, equal, and inviolable nation-states, included the just-war criterion of just cause restricted to defense alone, and declared the planning, preparing, initiating, or waging of war of aggression to be “crimes against peace.” In 1949 the United Nations convened four Geneva Conventions and their three Additional Protocols. These form the core of international humanitarian law and jus in bello, establish the fiduciary and protective role of the ICRC, and set the international benchmarks for “war crimes” and “crimes against humanity.” The question of humanitarian intervention has intensified since the 1990s, and the United Nations is developing the “Responsibility to Protect” protocol in order to respond collaboratively to conscience-shocking situations.
See also Deterrence, Nuclear; Force, Use of; Holy War; Just-Peacemaking Theory; Military Service; Pacifism; Peace; Violence; War
Bibliography
Cook, M. The Moral Warrior: Ethics and Service in the U.S. Military. State University of New York Press, 2004; Elshtain, J. Women and War. Basic Books, 1987; Johnson, J. Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War: A Moral and Historical Inquiry. Princeton University Press, 1981; Simpson, G. War, Peace, and God: Rethinking the Just-War Tradition. Augsburg Fortress, 2007; Walzer, M. Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations. 3rd ed. Basic Books, 2000.
Gary M. Simpson