Somme Campaign

On 11 June the commander-in-chief of the French Army, General Joseph Joffre asked Haig if the offensive could be brought forward to 25 June. Rawlinson and his corps commanders thought it was achievable but the timings would be tight. The last battery would be in position on 16 June and the wire-cutting started four days later; the last division would arrive on the 19th. However, speeding up the delivery of the ammunition upset the transport timetable and labour arrangements. It meant the bombardment had to start on 24 June with the assault starting five days later. Foch later asked for a two-day postponement but Haig refused.

There were also compromises over the time for zero hour. Rawlinson wanted 7am but Foch wanted 9am, so their spotters could observe the final part of the barrage. It was set at 7.30am and although the French later asked for it to be put back another hour, Haig refused.

On 12 June Rawlinson discussed the final details of the plan. It had become more ambitious with all five corps advancing together with the army’s left on Miraumont and Martinpuich and the right on Ginchy and Flers. Fourth Army issued its artillery programme and operation order two days later.

On 16 June Haig explained his plan. He wanted the attack to be ‘pressed eastwards far enough to enable our cavalry to push through into the open country beyond the enemy’s prepared lines of defence. Our object then will be to turn northwards, taking the enemy’s lines in flank and reverse, the bulk of the cavalry operating on the outer flank of this movement, whilst detachments should be detailed to cover the movement from any offensive of the enemy from the east.’

The 1st and 3rd Cavalry Divisions would advance to Bapaume under Gough and then head north behind the German lines, once the infantry had relieved them. While Rawlinson discussed the cavalry’s role at the final corps commanders’ conference on 22 June, Haig still had the Messines area in mind. He believed the cavalry could be transferred to Second Army if they could not be used on the Somme.

Rawlinson also discussed the likely German reaction to the Somme attack. GHQ intelligence believed there were thirty German battalions² facing Fourth Army while another sixty-five could reach the battlefield in six days. Rawlinson finally made it clear that the New Army troops were not as disciplined or well trained as regular troops and steps would have to be taken to make them reorganise after capturing each position.

The RFC had to dominate the skies over the battlefield so observation planes could spot targets for the artillery and chart the infantry’s progress. GHQ had 9th Wing and 21st, 27th and 60th Squadrons and two flights of 70th Squadron would attack German planes. Fourth Army had two of 14th Wing’s squadrons while 3rd, 4th, 9th and 15th Squadrons from 3rd Wing were split between the five corps.

Each corps had two contact aeroplanes and one would drop messages and marked up maps at corps headquarters while the other transmitted wireless messages. Each corps had one aeroplane spotting targets for the heavy howitzers while two more searched for German batteries. Sixteen planes worked on close reconnaissance and destructive bombardment missions while nine worked on the destruction of kite balloons and photography. Number 1 Kite Balloon Squadron was split between the five corps while an extra balloon section was allotted to VIII, X and XV Corps.

Third Army had eighteen of 8th Squadron’s aeroplanes and a Kite Balloon Section to cover the Gommecourt salient. In total the RFC’s 185 aeroplanes outnumbered the German air service. Bombers would bomb troop billets, transport, ammunition dumps and headquarters and hit the railways to delay reinforcements.

Fourth Army’s preparations followed the memorandum written by the Chief of the General Staff, General Sir Launcelot Kiggell, called ‘Preparatory Measures to be taken in Armies and Corps before undertaking Offensive Operations on a Large Scale’. It was split into three categories:

Heavy casualties were anticipated and the injured would be divided into five categories; the dead, those unlikely to survive, those to be discharged, those needing a long convalescence and those needing a short rest.

The battalion stretcher-bearers picked up the injured from the battlefield and carried them to the regimental aid posts where the Royal Army Medical Corps took over. The divisional field ambulances set up thirty-nine advanced dressing stations, nineteen main dressing stations and nine walking wounded centres to administer emergency first aid and assess the wounded. They also set up rest centres where men could have a short break before returning to their unit.

There were eight pairs of casualty clearing stations (CCSs), one for serious injuries and one for light injuries, as well as two advanced operating centres behind the Somme front. Motor ambulances carried the severely wounded, while lorries and buses carried the lightly wounded. The CCSs carried out emergency treatment and all but one camped next to a railway siding so ambulance trains could carry patients to the coast. Those who needed a short rest were taken to convalescent centres and, when ready, put though a physical exercise programme. Those who were going to be discharged or needed prolonged treatment were taken to England on hospital ships on the Le Havre to Southampton route. They were then taken by train to a hospital, usually one near their home.

Rawlinson wanted assembly trenches digging 200 metres from the enemy front line, to reduce the width of no man’s land, but some corps commanders objected because it would warn the Germans.³ The commanders were allowed to decide and while some divisions dug new trenches, many were not as close as Rawlinson desired. The majority of assault troops would instead move into no man’s land during the final stage of the bombardment, ready to advance at zero hour.

On 8 May GHQ issued a memorandum on ‘Training of Divisions for Offensive Action’ and it raised concerns about the New Army divisions.

‘The officers and troops generally do not now possess that military knowledge arising from a long and high state of training which enables them to act promptly on sound lines in unexpected situations. They have become accustomed to deliberate action based on precise and detailed orders. Officers and men in action will usually do what they have been practised to do, or have been told to do in certain situations, and it is therefore the more necessary to ensure that a close understanding should exist among all ranks as to what action is to be taken in different situations that may arise in battle.’

While GHQ wanted the infantry to practise, they did not have time to practise and there were insufficient instructors to teach them, so they were issued definite instructions instead. The accepted rule of thumb in the attack was that a single line failed, two lines generally failed, three lines generally succeeded and four lines succeeded. The attack orders called for an advance ‘in successive lines, each line adding fresh impetus to the preceding one when this is checked, and carrying the whole forward to the objective’. While Haig raised the question of advancing in small detachments during a conference on 15 June, Allenby,⁴ Rawlinson and Gough wanted a uniform advance in waves so the German machine-guns could not concentrate on isolated groups.

The memorandum reminded divisions to practise passing waves through each other so fresh troops could continue the advance, a practice known as ‘leap frogging’. They had to guard against crowding the assault columns and to consider how they could provide mutual support. It also warned divisions to allocate enough troops for ‘the clearing up and consolidation of a position passed over by the assaulting columns’, a process known as ‘mopping up’. Emphasis was put on officers to pass back information and conserve reserves. Finally, the memorandum stated: ‘troops must push on at all costs till the final objective is reached and all must be prepared for heavy casualties’.

While GHQ did not have a training section, Fourth Army issued a booklet of tactical notes to all officers down to captain level on 17 May. The infantry would advance in lines 100 metres apart with men at two or three pace intervals while ‘the ideal [was] for the artillery to keep their fire immediately in front of the infantry... battering down all opposition with a hurricane of projectiles’. The artillery set the pace as ‘experience has shown the only safe method of artillery support during an advance is a fixed time-table of lifts to which both the infantry and artillery must rigidly conform’.

But there were no special instructions for the inexperienced New Army soldiers; there was no mention of crossing no man’s land at a good pace; there was no mention of co-operating with or helping other units; there was no mention made of bypassing strongpoints and exploiting breakthroughs. While the corps commanders were left to decide how to achieve their objectives, Haig and Rawlinson visited units to discuss training and preparations.

There had been a few changes in artillery tactics since the offensive at Loos in September 1915. The artillery had to deal with the German artillery before it could concentrate on the targets facing the infantry. Fourth Army prepared the artillery plan (the first issued in the British Army) and then the corps developed their own programmes from it. Each corps allotted batteries to Heavy Artillery Groups, creating mixed groups ready to deal with all types of targets. Fourth Army issued a daily ‘Active Hostile Battery List’ during the bombardment and each corps filed a progress report so it could be updated.

Flash-spotting and sound-ranging were in their infancy during the summer of 1916. Flash-spotting involved observers noting the time and direction to a gun flash. The results were compared and the gun battery position was estimated by trigonometry. Sound-ranging used low frequency microphones to estimate the range to batteries. While there were daily supplies of RFC photographs, the art of reading them was in its infancy. Estimating adjustments for wind and atmospheric conditions was also in its early days. But the best way was for the spotter planes to find targets and then adjust a battery’s fire for maximum effect.

The preliminary bombardment was planned for five days, U, V, W, X and Y-Day, with the infantry assault on Z-Day. The first two days were dedicated to registration while the destructive bombardment would last three days. On 20 and 21 June Haig asked Rawlinson about shortening the preliminary bombardment to three days, to reduce the wear and tear to the guns and to conserve ammunition, but there was no change.

The heavy guns and howitzers targeted trenches, strongpoints, machine-gun posts and observation posts by day and billets, roads and tracks at night. There was also plenty of counter-battery work. Heavy trench mortars hit villages and strongpoints while 2-inch mortars and Stokes mortars targeted the front trenches. Wire cutting operations by the field guns and 2-inch mortars covered all five days. The 18-pounders targeted villages and woods while the 4.5-inch howitzers hit communication trenches and machine-gun emplacements; in many cases their shells were not heavy enough to silence them.

The bombardment programme was carried out in two-hour periods with eighty minutes of shelling and forty minutes standing down time to rest the crews and let the guns cool. The bombardment on Z-Day was only going to be sixty-five minutes long in the hope of fooling the Germans. The culmination of the bombardment would be signalled by an intense barrage on the enemy front trenches while the infantry crept into no man’s land. At zero hour the guns would lengthen their range to the next trench and the infantry would advance.

Both Haig and Rawlinson made it clear the artillery set the speed of the advance and Rawlinson told his corps commanders ‘nothing could exist at the conclusion of the bombardment in the area covered by it’. While the barrage would provide protection for the infantry, it was a very rigid affair with each battery working to a timetable, firing on a definite lane from zero hour through to the final objective. Artillery commanders could not change targets, even if the infantry commander asked them to do so. Forward observing officers (FOOs) would go forward with the assault troops to report progress and artillery liaison officers and infantry brigadiers could then discuss changes. But while each battery had its own observation posts (OPs), they were a long way from the front line. Any order to shorten the barrage range had to come from corps headquarters and even then, new bombardments would only be thirty minutes long.

Fourth Army had one field gun every twenty-one metres and one heavy gun every fifty-seven metres along the 25,000 metre front:

But many of the 4.7-inch guns and 6-inch howitzers were obsolete while only a few of the 6-inch howitzers could fire 10,000 metres.⁶ The 8-inch howitzers were re-bored coastal guns with shortened barrels and they had a range of 10,000 metres. Fourth Army also had 288 medium and 28 heavy trench mortars supplied with 800,000 rounds of ammunition and 35,000 smoke bombs.

The ammunition began arriving on 8 June and deliveries increased when it was believed Z-Day might be moved forward. After a herculean effort, the forward dumps and railhead stocks were ready by 20 June. Fourth Army’s main ammunition allotments were:

Fourth Army fired 1,732,873 rounds in eight days, and while that was nearly seventy rounds for every metre of front, the figure is not so impressive when you consider the final objective was sometimes 1,500 metres away. It is even less impressive when you consider only 600,000 shells were larger than 4.5-inch; only twenty-four heavy shells for every metre of front. The daily allocation of rounds was:

There were heavy rainstorms on 24 June and while the wire-cutting and shelling of the trenches began, the counter-battery work could not start until evening. After dusk the bombardment of billets, roads and tracks began but gas releases were cancelled due to a lack of wind. When 25 June dawned clear the registration began in earnest, with over 100 German batteries engaged, and several ammunition dumps were hit.

June 26 was showery and the destructive bombardment began with the heaviest period between 9am and 10.20am. A cease-fire was called at 3.30pm so observation planes could assess the damage. The wire cutting was going badly so the 18-pounders were allowed to fire an extra 400-500 rounds per day but shrapnel was still not the ideal ordnance. June 27 was misty and then heavy showers stopped aerial observation. While the number of rounds were increased, they could not compensate for observed fire.

The weather did not improve and a two-day postponement was agreed on the morning of 28 June; the extra days would be called Y1 and Y2 while the new Z-Day would be 1 July. But the extension meant Fourth Army had to economize on heavy gun and howitzer ammunition. Future bombardments would be weaker and part of Fourth Army’s ammunition reserve would be used.

The weather brightened up on 29 June and the observer planes resumed their work. Clear skies prevailed the following day and 171 enemy batteries were spotted. The final barrages were doubled in intensity in the hope of breaking the Germans’ morale.⁸

The infantry carried out raids to test the German reaction, take prisoners and check the bombardment’s damage at first hand. Four raids on the night of 25 June had mixed results; 8th Division and 34th Division reported the trenches at Ovillers and La Boisselle were full of men while 18th Division and 30th Division found few in the trenches they entered.

Three gas-cylinder companies and three smoke companies released gas and smoke at random intervals on 26 June; they discharged a lot more the following day. The German artillery responded each time and the British observers noted their locations. There were ten raids overnight and they reported on the state of the trenches and the wire; two groups of prisoners were also taken.

On 27 June Haig moved to his advanced headquarters at Chateau Valvion, Beauquesne, close to Rawlinson’s at Querrieu and Gough’s at Toutencourt. His first task was to order the two-day delay but while the infantry were soaked by the rain, the raids and patrols still went out during the night. Yet again some reported more activity while others reported abandoned trenches; wire damage also varied.

At noon on 28 June Fourth Army issued an order for the infantry to exploit any breakthrough and push forward while 49th and 19th Divisions would join Gough’s cavalry advance. But raiding parties were finding more Germans in the trenches and they were alert, as if expecting an attack. Tensions were mounting and the Germans stood to each time smoke or gas was released. A prisoner taken near Mametz reported his comrades expected an attack although there had been no formal warnings.

More patrols were sent out the following night so as not to arouse suspicion but the Germans were on full alert. Parties also inspected the wire and cleared gaps but their reports were varied. The wire opposite XV Corps and XIII Corps had been virtually destroyed. Large gaps had been torn in other places but the troops would have to bunch up to get through. In some places, particularly on the steep slopes of the Ancre, the wire had hardly been touched.

On the morning of 30 June battalions paraded and heard messages of encouragement before the first companies marched off. The rest of the men fell in at nightfall in fighting order,⁹ with their steel helmet, entrenching tool, groundsheet, water-bottle, two gas helmets and tear gas goggles, a field dressing and haversack filled with personal items. Officers and NCOs carried four flares so they could signal the contact planes.

The columns of men moved forward past dumps, picking up 220 rounds, two Mills grenades for the bombers and two sandbags. The assault companies also collected picks, shovels and wire cutters, and the consolidating companies took additional tools and sandbags. In total each man carried around sixty-six pounds (thirty kilograms), stopping him from running; it would also be difficult to climb in and out of trenches, lie down and get up.

Hundreds of columns of men marched forward guided by tapes, posts and lanterns under a moonless sky. There was little enemy artillery fire so a lot of movement was out in the open and only the final stretch was through the trenches. The first troops reached their assembly positions by 2am and the last troops were in place by 5.15am. Gaps in the wire were cleared and the jumping off tapes laid, all there was left to do was wait for zero hour.

The bombardment had smashed the wire in places, battered some trenches and destroyed various strongpoints, but by no means all of them. There was also a belief that the bombardment had seriously undermined the German infantry’s resolve, but the majority were still in their deep dug-outs, uncomfortable and weary but alive. They were just waiting for the attack to begin.

At 6.25am on 1 July, the final bombardment began. At 7.25 thousands of men clambered out of their trenches, walked to their jumping off tapes in no man’s land and lay down. Thousands of others waited to climb over the parapet. At 7.30 the guns lifted their range and then the waves of infantry stood up or clambered over the parapet and began the long walk towards the German front line.