Psychoanalytic Theories of the Self: A Brief Summary
Theories of the self have led to more confusion than understanding in the development of psychoanalytic thinking. Freud’s ambiguous use of the term ICH to refer to the self both as a whole person—subjective experiential—and to the ego (as translated by Strachey, 1966)—theoretical, more objective and mechanical—led to considerable confusion about the relationship between the self and the ego which persists to this day.
The matter was further confused (according to Bettelheim, 1982) by the abstract mistranslations of Freud’s vital words.
BETTELHEIM ON FREUD
Bettelheim (1982) noted that in his work and in his writings, Freud often spoke of the soul—of its nature and structure, its development, its attributes, how it reveals itself in all we do and dream. Unfortunately, nobody who reads him in English could guess this, because nearly all his many references to the soul, and to matters pertaining to the soul, have been excised in translation. In the 1933 New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, in the chapter titled “The Dissection of the Psychical Personality,” Freud (1964), speaking of the I, the it, and the above-I, describes them as “the three provinces of the apparatus of the soul.” In The Question of Lay Analysis (1959), the phrase is translated as “the three provinces of the mental apparatus (p. 71).” And in conceptualizing the workings of the psyche, distinguishing the conscious from the unconscious, and distinguishing the functions of the I, and the above-I, Freud uses the term “soul” to describe what he regards as the overarching concept that takes in all the others. In various places (1959), he spoke about “the structure of the soul” and “the organization of the soul.” In the translation, these terms are almost always rendered as “mental apparatus” or “mental organization.” Almost invariably, the Standard Edition, like the earlier English translations, either omits Freud’s references to the soul or translates them as if he spoke only of man’s mind. Freud never faltered in his conviction that it was important to think in terms of the soul when trying to comprehend his system.
Where Freud selected a word that, used in daily parlance, makes us feel vibrantly alive, the translations present us with a term from a dead language that reeks of erudition precisely when it should emanate vitality. To refer to the unknown, unconscious contents of the mind, he chose the personal pronoun “it” (es) and used it as a noun (das Es). This was translated as “id.” To mistranslate ICH as “ego” is to transform it into jargon that no longer conveys the personal commitment we make when we say “I” or “me,” not to mention our subconscious memories of the deep emotional experience we had when, in infancy, we discovered ourselves as we learned to say “I.”
In creating the concept of the ICH, Freud tied it to reality by using a term that made it practically impossible to leave reality behind. Reading or speaking about the “I” forces one to look at oneself introspectively. By contrast, an “ego” that uses clear-cut mechanisms, such as displacement and projection, to achieve its purpose in its struggle against the “id” is something that can be studied from the outside by observing others. When I say “I,” I mean my entire self, my total personality. Freud made an important distinction here. What he called the “I” refers primarily to the conscious, rational aspects of oneself. It gives us the intuitive feeling that Freud is right to name the “I” what we feel to be our true self, even though we know that we do not always act in line with that self.
OTHER ANALYTIC VIEWS OF THE SELF AND THE EGO
An additional factor contributing to the confusion was that Freud and the pioneer analysts worked mostly with neurosis and, therefore, with oedipal levels of conflict. This is a developmental level at which the self had already become autonomous and assumed its functions and capacities; as a result, it did not cause enough of the kind of clinical problems that might have drawn attention. It was not crucial for these early analysts to focus on a concept of the self; they could take it for granted as it “worked.” This caused some loss in the sense that not enough attention was paid to the subjective experiential and creative aspects of the self. Not that they weren’t noted, but they were seen more as a byproduct of successful treatment of the neurosis. In other words, these analysts could go about their work comfortably, unhampered by not having a well developed concept of the self. It was not a central issue of pathology in their patients.
However, when analysts turned their attention to patients with psychoses and character disorders, the sense of comfort disappeared. These patients’ development was arrested not at the oedipal but at the preoedipal level and, therefore, their deep difficulties were predominantly with the functioning of the self. The lack of a fully developed concept of the self, which had not previously been an obstacle, now became one.
Freud and Jung
This professional, theoretical issue—how patients with a preoedipal developmental arrest differed from those with an oedipal conflict—was an important factor, in addition to interpersonal conflict, in the conflict that arose between Jung and Freud in 1912 which produced a dramatic schism in the psychoanalytic movement of the time. This schism was further extended and elaborated by others and continues to this very day.
Jung, who had probably had a psychotic attack himself during his own development, was primarily interested in psychotics whose principal conflicts he felt were preoedipal; therefore, he found the classical oedipal theory of the time not as helpful. This led him to his interest in a concept of the self (1973b). He saw psychosis as primarily a conflict involving the self at the preoedipal level, while Freud insisted that it was a regression from an oedipal-level conflict (McGuire, 1974; Jung, 1973b). While Jung was probably closer to the truth than Freud at that time, a more modern view of schizophrenia would stress its organic nature. However, as so often happens with theoreticians, Jung later went on to make the same mistake as Freud by trying to extend his basically preoedipal notion of the self forward developmentally to explain oedipal conflict in neurosis.
It is also interesting to speculate on the personal motivations for this conflict between these two giants. Freud had had an affectionate relationship with his father but had felt that his father was not a success in the world and that his own success represented a triumph over his father. He became concerned that others, i.e., his peers, might do the same to him and, therefore, he was a stickler for others adhering to his theoretical views. Jung, on the other hand, with a successful father with whom he was not close, feared that the father would attempt to indoctrinate him with the father’s views. Inevitably, these two dynamic themes clashed in Jung and Freud’s relationship and made their own contribution to the split (McGuire, 1974).
From this basic conflict there emerged two mainstreams of thought with regard to the concept of the self, each of which emphasized one of the two senses in which Freud used the term—either the whole person or as a special part of the mind with its own unique capacities and functions. Those who emphasized ICH as ego tended to be working mostly with neurotics and oedipal conflicts and placed heavy emphasis on the structural theory (ego, id, superego). They tended to emphasize the objective and the theoretical and sometimes could seem quite mechanistic, placing less emphasis on the subjective, experiential and creative aspects of the self.
Those who emphasized the other meaning of the term ICH—the self as the whole person—tended to be working with psychoses and character disorders, and preoedipal levels of conflict and difficulties with the self. They placed less emphasis on the objective and theoretical aspects and more on the subjective, personal and experiential. The emphasis of this group on the self, almost to the detriment of the unconscious and the more theoretical objective aspects of the functioning of the mind, similarly caused a loss in terms of both depth and objectivity.
This latter group who emphasized the self as a whole person further fractionated into a number of subgroups based on varying definitions of the self, its nature and its functions as follows:
Jung (1953, 1973a, 1973b). Jung saw the self as a primordial image or archetype expressing the individual’s need for unity, wholeness and its highest aspirations. His treatment objective was self-realization and self-fulfillment. The unconscious was downgraded in importance by being divided into a collective and a personal unconscious. His treatment was also of short duration, less frequency and less depth.
Rank (1929). Rank focused on the psychological aspects of the emergence of the physical self at birth and emphasized separation anxiety as springing from birth trauma. His treatment emphasized the need to work through the deeply repressed anxiety about the birth trauma; it was generally of short duration, less frequency and, of course, less depth.
Adler (1940). Adler saw the life-style (repetitive patterns derived from early childhood) as a defensive overcompensation for inferiority feelings about the self, therefore blocking the emergence of the real, creative self. His treatment, too, was short, less frequent and of less depth.
Horney (1946, 1950). She postulated an idealized self which produced a pseudo unity or wholeness that blocked the emergence of what she called the real self.
Sullivan (in Mullahy, 1970). He felt that the essence of the self was determined by its functions: (1) the fulfillment of needs; (2) the maintenance of security.
It was perhaps inevitable that the analysts working primarily with a concept of the self as a whole person would become fascinated by creativity because, as the patient’s difficulties with the self were repaired, the creativity would be freed and emerge. Some, for example, such as Jung and Adler, made this a central objective of treatment. It is interesting to note that each of these analysts had one or more pieces of the psychological puzzle correctly.
A reconciliation of both senses of the use of the word ICH or self—whole person and ego—has more recently been undertaken by theoreticians in ego psychology and object relations theory. Hartmann (1958, 1964) distinguished between the self as a whole person, the ego as a system (part of the tripartite structure of id, ego, superego), and the self representation as the intrapsychic representation of the self. He also defined narcissism as the libidinal investment of the self representation. Then Jacobson (1964), in order to work with psychotics, carried the concept further by defining the self representation as the unconscious, pre-conscious and conscious intrapsychic representations of the bodily and mental self in the system ego. Kernberg (1982) used the term character to refer to the self as a whole person and preferred to use the term self to refer to the sum total of intrapsychic self representations in intimate contact with the sum total of object representations in the ego. In contrast to Hartmann, he felt that the self and object representations are both libidinally and aggressively invested.
Kohut
Kohut (1971, 1977), from his work with narcissistic personality disorders, viewed the self as consisting of fused self objects which were invested with narcissistic libido that had its own line of development separate from the development of object representations and object libido. In other words, there was no separation of self from object, but rather maturation of self-objects from primitive to mature forms. The structure of the self was defined as having its own functions, its own development, and its own pathology. I have commented extensively on Kohut’s point of view in another publication (1981) and will only indicate some of my disagreements here.
Kohut’s clinical observations of the psychopathology of the self in the Narcissistic Personality Disorder and his ideas on its treatment have been widely accepted, but this theory of a psychology of the self has met with many objections. His theory competes with object relations theory and seems to run contrary to the findings of child observation research that the self separates from the object. Kohut’s view of an independent line of development of narcissism as expressed in his concept of the bipolar self—i.e., fused self object—which does not separate but matures from infantile to mature forms, leads to conceptual confusions between the self and the object as part of the self, between the various stages or phases of the early development of the self and object representations, and finally between the differences in degree of psychological input into the developing self of the mother’s mirroring function and the father’s idealizing function. These theoretical confusions then lead to clinical confusions about the nature of the transference and what level of emotional conflict is being worked through in the treatment. The most important clinical implication of these confusions is that Kohut views what I call the Borderline Personality Disorder as a Narcissistic Personality Disorder, which leads to inappropriate treatment.
A NEW DEFINITION OF THE SELF
This brief historical review brings us to the current situation and raises the question as to why it is necessary to bother with more theoretical baggage? Why more efforts to define a concept of the self? Borderline and narcissistic patients’ problems crucially involve the self. Therapists working with these patients are in the very forefront of observation of these difficulties. Mahler, from the perspective of the development of the self, said, “The development of the sense of self is an eminently personal internal experience that is difficult, if not impossible, to trace the beginnings of by observational studies or reconstructions in psychoanalysis. It reveals itself by its failure much more readily than by its normal variations” (Mahler & McDevitt, 1982, p. 847).
The therapist working with these patients is in a unique position to observe these difficulties with the self. Beyond that, as these difficulties are repaired in treatment, this unique vantage point of observations is enhanced as the therapist observes the patient acquire the capacities of his or her real self (including creativity). This is probably the reason that most therapists who work in this area eventually become interested in creativity: the ultimate of real self expression.
My own theoretical perspective on borderline and narcissistic disorders derived from a developmental object relations theory which had placed major emphasis on the link between the gradual unfolding of the separation and individuation process and the growth and maturation of the self and object representations. In the borderline patient particularly, the focus was on therapeutic confrontation of the defense mechanisms against the abandonment depression. This led to overcoming the defenses and the working through of the abandonment depression, which attenuated or overcame the developmental arrest so that the separation individuation process could resume its developmental path. The point of view as reflected in the terms used was heavily weighted towards object relations theory, with a notion of the self implied in the terms separation and individuation. What is it that separates and individuates but the self? However, the emphasis was more on the ICH in the sense of ego rather than on the self.
As the patient worked through his abandonment depression, a consequent event shifted my attention more to notions of the self. The patient would develop a new interest or activity (self-activation or individuation). This activity would again stimulate the abandonment depression even though it appeared that most of it had been worked through. Beyond that, interpretation now was of no help. It appeared to me that this new effort at self expression or activation required something else.
I began a type of intervention that I came to call communicative matching—a term derived from Mahler’s term refueling (1975, 1982)—her description of how the mother provided refueling or support for the child’s individuative efforts through responding with nonverbal cues of support to the child’s assertive explorations. I used the term in the sense of an effort to discuss with the patient from my own experience a new fantasy and feeling, interest or activity in which he or she was now engaged.
This communicative matching helped to further attenuate the patient’s abandonment depression so that the patient’s self-expression was reinforced and flowered. At the same time, therapeutic objectivity was maintained and regressive rewarding unit defenses were not activated. In retrospect, it seemed that the acknowledgment and effort to share the self-expression had enabled the patient’s self to better integrate and activate new interests and capacities. A refueling of the patient’s emerging real self had occurred and new capacities had emerged.
AN ADDITIONAL DIMENSION: A FOCUS ON THE REAL SELF
This led me to focus my attention more and more not only on the abandonment depression and its defenses but also on the difficulties in functioning of the self such as self-image, self-acknowledgment, soothing, self-entitlement, self-assertion, etc. As I did so, it seemed to me that these difficulties in functioning of the self were as important a consequence of the abandonment depression as the ego fixation with its ego defects and primitive mechanisms of defense. There was as much an arrest of development of the self as there was of the ego.
The emerging real self precipitated the depression; the need to defend against that depression prevented the real self from growing and assuming its normal capacities. In psychotherapy, as the abandonment depression was worked through, the real self emerged and slowly acquired its capacities along with the maturation of ego functions, defenses and object relations.
For example, follow-up studies of treatment of borderline adolescents (Masterson, 1980) demonstrated that in those who improved there was progressive incremental improvement in the functioning of the self, which acquired new capacities.
These observations could easily tempt one to take the route of earlier workers who defined the self as the whole person and focused on that to the exclusion of the intrapsychic dimension, object relations, ego defenses, the unconscious, etc.
However, this additional dimension of a focus on the self (defined as an intrapsychic entity), when kept in concert with the other perspectives of developmental object relations theory, can lead to a broader, more inclusive and comprehensive concept of the borderline and narcissistic disorders as disorders of the self.
This view reconciles both definitions of ICH—the self and the ego—bringing together the personal, subjective experiential with the objective, mechanistic theoretical.
Beyond that, in clinical work the use of the concept of the self and its difficulties in functioning seems to me to be a more precise, economic, efficient and useful tool to bring to the patient’s attention that it is his own efforts at self expression and activation that bring on the depression that activates the defense. It is remarkable to note the extraordinary degree to which we all unconsciously assume that self-expression is naturally positive, gratifying and nonconflictual—in other words, a denial of crucial conflicts that we have about self-expression.
In addition, a concept of a normal autonomous self with its own development and its own capacities helps to cast in bold relief the psychopathology of the self produced by borderline and narcissistic disorder patients, i.e., the deformed formations of the self representations used to defend against the separation anxiety and abandonment depression experienced by the activation of the real self. The next chapter describes the structure, functioning, and development of the real self.