After years in the doldrums, there is once more wind in the sails of nuclear arms control. U.S. president Obama, in his Prague speech of April 5, 2009, declared—to considerable global astonishment—that America was committed “to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.” He laid particular emphasis on the great moral responsibility of the United States: “[As] a nuclear power, as the only nuclear power to have used a nuclear weapon, the United States has a moral responsibility to act. We cannot succeed in this endeavor alone, but we can lead it, we can start it.” Important aims and proposals of the arms control community, which in recent decades have been worked on by nongovernmental organizations, think tanks, and commissions (Palme 1982, Canberra 1996, Blix Commission 2006, Evans and Kawaguchi 2009)1, are once again an integral part of world politics. During the eight years of the George W. Bush administration the arms control and disarmament process that was launched after the Cold War ended was systematically enfeebled and reversed. A UN commission warned in 2004 that “[we] are approaching a point at which the erosion of the non-proliferation regime could become irreversible and result in a cascade of proliferation.”2
Now pledges have been made. It remains to be seen, however, whether they can be converted into concrete steps toward a world that is more secure, more just, and more peaceful. If this opportunity for an “everything-must-go” clear-out of nuclear doctrines and arsenals is botched, further progress in disarmament is highly unlikely.
The proximate triggers for the renewed interest were the two op-eds written by former U.S. secretaries of state George Shultz and Henry Kissinger, former defense secretary William J. Perry, and former senator Sam Nunn.3 At the beginning of 2007 and again in January 2008, these men, who had done so much to shape U.S. foreign and security policy, garnered worldwide attention with their nonpartisan call for a world without nuclear weapons and the concrete steps they proposed. The American quartet was supported and bolstered by the declarations of high-ranking politicians from Great Britain, Italy, Germany, Norway, The Netherlands, Poland, France, and Belgium.4 Some governments—one might mention the interventions by British prime minister Gordon Brown and German foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier—welcomed the proposals. A parallel “Global Zero” initiative was launched in Paris in December 2008, within a framework in which more than a hundred prominent figures—including former statesmen such as Jimmy Carter and Mikhail Gorbachev—from the political, economic, military, and civil spheres will work on a step-by-step policy plan for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons by 2030.
In the meantime, the debate on whether and to what extent a nuclear weapons–free world is desirable, feasible, or realistic is proceeding all over the world in newspapers, blogs, and conferences. The Four Horsemen, as they came to be called, have compared the aim of a nuclear weapons–free world to a mountain peak that is shrouded in clouds but has to be reached. There are many ways to the summit, and the precise route has not yet been established. Needless to say, there will be bumpy stretches, precarious abysses, and insurmountable slopes along the way, but strength and will must be brought to bear in order to reach the goal.
Nuclear weapons are unusable but deployable tools of war; they destroy cities and countries and are the only weapon that could obliterate modern civilization in short order. The Evans-Kawaguchi Commission put it bluntly: “Nuclear Weapons are the most inhumane weapons ever conceived, inherently indiscriminate in those they kill and maim, and with an impact deadly for decades.”5 In his Prague speech, President Obama warned against raising our hopes too high, however: “I’m not naive. This goal will not be reached quickly—perhaps not in my lifetime. It will take patience and persistence.” In this chapter, current proposals will be presented in the first section, the opportunities and obstacles bound up with them cited in the second section, and further routes suggested in the third section.
The first article by the American “Gang of Four”—George Shultz (secretary of state under Ronald Reagan 1982–89), Henry Kissinger (secretary of state under Richard Nixon 1973–77), William J. Perry (secretary of defense under Bill Clinton 1994–97), and Sam Nunn (U.S. senator, 1972–97)—appeared on January 4, 2007, in the Wall Street Journal as a so-called “op-ed” under the title “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons.”6 It explicitly took up President Reagan’s dream of the elimination of all nuclear weapons. The former president had regarded nuclear weapons as “totally irrational, totally inhumane, good for nothing but killing, possibly destructive of life on earth and civilization.” Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan had almost reached agreement on the total abolition of all superpower nuclear weapons at the Reykjavik Summit in 1986, but Reagan was unwilling to give up the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program and his advisers persuaded him against it. The vision of a nuclear weapon–free world is once more in play because the world is now confronted by a “new and dangerous nuclear era.” The article continues: “Apart from the terrorist threat, unless urgent new actions are taken, the U.S. soon will be compelled to enter a new nuclear era that will be more precarious, psychologically disorienting, and economically even more costly than was Cold War deterrence.”
In advocating this approach, the authors call into question any resort to old deterrence strategies: “It is far from certain that we can successfully replicate the old Soviet-American ‘mutually assured destruction’ with an increasing number of potential nuclear enemies world-wide without dramatically increasing the risk that nuclear weapons will be used.”7 The risk that nuclear weapons might fall into the hands of terrorists is increasing, as are the ambitions of a whole new set of countries to acquire nuclear weapons of their own. North Korea and Iran are the most notorious examples. The op-ed called upon the United States—in other words, the Bush administration—to assume a leadership role and to take concrete steps, including the substantial reduction of nuclear arsenals, the withdrawal of nuclear weapons already deployed, and the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
Former Soviet president Gorbachev had his say a few days later, also in the Wall Street Journal.8 In his article, he regretted the downgrading of global arms control treaties, drew attention to the still enormous nuclear weapons stocks of the superpowers, and declared that the current situation was due to a failure of political leadership in the wake of the end of the East-West conflict: “This glaring failure has allowed nuclear weapons and their proliferation to pose a continuing, growing threat to mankind.”
The second contribution by the “Gang of Four”—“Toward a Nuclear-Free World,” January 15, 2008—was far more comprehensive and specific.9 It drew on a conference at Stanford University in October 2007, in which other secretaries of state and experts from former administrations participated. Comprehensive proposals for a “dramatic reduction of nuclear dangers” take up almost two-thirds of the op-ed and specify, among other things, the strengthening of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and improving security standards for the storage of nuclear weapons and nuclear materials. A new demand is to begin negotiations with Russia on a cooperative solution to missile defense. Another important proposal is to scrap the operational and strategic planning of massive nuclear strikes as redolent of approaches based on “mutually assured destruction” (MAD), because the United States and Russia are allies in the war on terrorism. Also remarkable is the backing of several other former U.S. secretaries of state and defense ministers, including Madeleine Albright, James Baker, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Warren Christopher, and Colin Powell. The two op-eds not only exerted considerable influence on presidential candidates Barack Obama and John McCain but also triggered various new disarmament proposals by international organizations and institutions.
During the presidential campaign Democratic nominee Obama stated: “And I will make the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons worldwide a central element of U.S. nuclear policy,”10 whereas Republican candidate John McCain focused more on nuclear security and nonproliferation issues.11 The role of nuclear disarmament was not central in the public phase of the campaign, but the nuclear crises of North Korea and Iran certainly emphasized the need for new policies.
Responses by the different European quartets were meant to support the U.S. discussion on nuclear zero. After the experiences of the Cold War, which involved the massive deployment of nuclear weapons for military use, the European public is overwhelmingly in favor of further nuclear reductions. A poll from 2007 showed that Germany and Italy are more oriented toward nuclear disarmament than the two European nuclear weapon states, Britain and France.12 In a letter at the end of 2008 to UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon on behalf of the European Union, the French president stated:
Europe, two of whose members have nuclear weapons, is particularly concerned. Europe has already done much for disarmament. Keenly aware of the fact that its own security encourages the pursuit of global disarmament efforts, Europe is prepared to do more. Our ambition extends to every aspect of disarmament, for we are convinced of the need to strive for general disarmament.13
Reaction from other former politicians came on June 30, 2008, in Great Britain. Under the title “Start Worrying and Learn to Ditch the Bomb,” three former British foreign ministers—Douglas Hurd, Malcolm Rifkind, and David Owen—and former NATO general secretary George Robertson identified themselves with the U.S. articles.14 The United States and Russia, which have the largest nuclear arsenals, should begin the disarmament process, but “[if] we are able to enter into a period of significant multilateral disarmament Britain, along with France and other existing nuclear powers, will need to consider what further contribution it might be able to make to help to achieve the common objective.” Their aims are similar to those of the U.S. politicians, calling, above all, for the renunciation of new nuclear weapons production developments, as discussed in the United States.
One month later, on July 24, 2008, an article appeared in the Corriere della Sera written by former Italian foreign ministers Massimo D’Alema and Gianfranco Fini, together with leading Italian political intellectuals Giorgia La Malfa, head of the Republican Party and a former member of the European Parliament as well as of the Italian Parliament; Arturo Parisi; and physicist Francesco Calogero, former secretary general of Pugwash.15 The authors called for the swift entry into force of the CTBT and the commencement of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. The United States and Russia would have to improve relations, and “Italy and Europe can and must play their role to foster initiatives and agreements which may help to create the conditions conducive to the goal of eliminating nuclear weaponry.” The remarks are of a very general nature, however: an explicit reference to the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from Europe or Italy is missing.
On January 9, 2009, in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, another cross-party quartet of famous former politicians spoke out. Former chancellor Helmut Schmidt of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), former president of Germany Richard von Weizsäcker of the Christian-Democratic Union (CDU), retired minister of state Egon Bahr (SPD), and former foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher of the Free Democratic Party (FDP), under the title “Toward a Nuclear-Free World: A German View for an Atomic Weapons-Free World,” nailed their colors to the mast of a nuclear weapons–free world and called for drastic reductions in nuclear arsenals.16 They wrote: “All short-range nuclear weapons must be destroyed,” and called explicitly for “all remaining [U.S.] nuclear warheads [to] be withdrawn from German territory,” as well as a renunciation of the “first-use” option by NATO and Russia: “Relics from the age of confrontation are no longer adequate for our new century. Partnership fits in badly with the still-active NATO and Russian doctrine of nuclear first use, even if neither side is being attacked with such arms. A general non-first-use treaty between the nuclear weapon states would be an urgently-needed step.” The then-active American plan for basing missile defense facilities in Poland and the Czech Republic was regarded as a “return to the era of confrontation.”
Only the German op-ed covered the need to address conventional disarmament as well. It pointed to the failure to adapt the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) to reflect the implications of NATO enlargement: an Adapted Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (ACFE), which is seen as a central component of European security, has so far not been ratified by the NATO countries, and Russia has “suspended” the CFE. Many proposals have been presented, but a solution to this problem is unfortunately still not in sight.17 The German op-ed was also the only one to mention Russian president Medvedev’s proposal to establish a comprehensive security system in Europe. The politicians emphasized that German reunification was achieved through détente and cooperation between the former opposing blocs, which made possible “historic progress in disarmament and arms control for the whole of Europe.”
All parties in the German Parliament except the Conservative CDU/CSU now call for the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from German soil.18 The Green Party has long stood for the removal of NATO nuclear weapons from Germany and a world free of nuclear weapons, combined with the phasing-out of nuclear energy. The relatively new Left Party argues not only for the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons but also for abandonment of NATO by Germany.
Moreover, in October 2009 the newly formed Conservative-Liberal government in Germany released its “coalition treaty,” which said that it “will advocate within NATO and toward our U.S. allies a withdrawal of remaining nuclear weapons from Germany.”19 The new German foreign minister, Guido Westerwelle, began a round of visits to discuss with likeminded states the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear tactical weapons (TNW).20 At the Munich Security Conference in 2010 Westerwelle not only explained the influence of the American and German op-eds on the current German policy but he also said: “The last remaining nuclear weapons in Germany are a relic of the Cold War. They no longer serve a military purpose. That is why, through talks with our partners and allies, we, the German Government, are working to create the conditions for their removal.”21 This seems to be the first time that a German government has not only declared itself to be working actively for a nuclear weapon–free world but has advocated removing nuclear weapons from German territory without mentioning the Russian tactical nuclear weapons. This could trigger a decisive debate on the future of NATO’s nuclear weapons, within the discussion of the new NATO Strategic Concept or outside of it.
Op-eds were also published by former statesmen from many other countries. A paper dated April 6, 2009, by former Polish president Aleksander Kwaśniewski, former prime minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki, and former Polish president Lech Wałęsa, called for “urgent steps towards nuclear disarmament” and that the United States and Russia “will begin the process of freeing the world from the nuclear menace.”22 A Norwegian call dated June 4, 2009, came from six former politicians in Norway: four former prime ministers—Odvar Nordli, Gro Harlem Brundtland, Kåre Willoch, and Kjell Magne Bondevik—and former foreign minister Thorvald Stoltenberg, all from the Norwegian Labour Party; and also from Kjell Magne Bondevik of the Conservative Party.23 They stressed the need to combine vision and action, quoting from the U.S. “Four Horsemen” article from 2007: “Without the bold vision, the actions will not be perceived as fair or urgent. Without the actions, the vision will not be perceived as realistic or possible.” The relatively brief declaration asserted that not only nuclear weapons but also production facilities for weapons-grade nuclear materials must be eliminated. New negotiations on reducing nuclear arsenals between the United States and Russia are supported and the inclusion of tactical nuclear weapons called for. Existing arms control agreements, such as the INF Treaty, the CFE Treaty, and the NPT, must be maintained and strengthened. Missile defense, in contrast, would only trigger further rearmament.
The next quartet was French: former prime ministers Alain Juppé (Conservative Party), Michel Rocard together with former defense minister Alain Richard, both from the Socialist Party, and retired general Bernard Norlain released an op-ed on October 14, 2009, with the title “For Global Nuclear Disarmament, the Only Means to Prevent Anarchic Proliferation.”24 The current nonproliferation crisis on North Korea and Iran is seen as very dangerous for the NPT regime: “There is a risk that this phenomenon will snowball, with a mutually reinforcing circle of institutional instability and an increasing number of protagonists. International security is thus at risk.” As obstacles for further reductions, the authors identify “the vested interests in the political and military establishments of the US and Russia, the mistrust of change amongst the Russian and Chinese leaders,” and regional conflicts between India and Pakistan. The authors then see “a special role” for France as a “dynamic and creative actor” in the debate. They call for “appropriate consequences” for “disarmament and its resolution, when the time comes, for France’s own nuclear capabilities.” The call remains vague, but clearly shows that a debate in French democratic institutions is not yet underway, but must be held. President Nicolas Sarkozy in his speech on board the nuclear submarine Le Terrible in Cherbourg on March 21, 2008, promised more transparency, a no-target policy of France, and a reduction by one-third of its nuclear weapons.25
An op-ed by foreign ministers of Sweden Carl Bildt and of Poland Radek Sikorski on February 2, 2010, dealt explicitly with the remaining tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. They called on the American and Russian leadership “to commit themselves to early measures to greatly reduce so-called tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.”26 They also asked Russia (which holds, in their opinion, 2,000 warheads in the western part of its country) to withdraw its tactical weapons, for example, from the Kaliningrad region or the Kola peninsula, and they continue: “The time has come to cover sub-strategic nuclear weapons with an arms control regime, which would look like the one that was established long ago for strategic arms.”
A Belgian quartet, formed by former NATO secretary general Willy Claes, former prime ministers Guy Verhofstadt and Jean-Luc Dehaene, and former minister of foreign affairs Louis Michel, issued a statement on February 19, 2010.27 They strongly supported the other op-eds and Obama’s commitment to move toward the goal of abolishing all nuclear weapons. They clearly stated that “[it] is impossible to continue to deny nuclear weapons to other states as long as we ourselves have them” and requested “a drastic reduction of all deployed and non-deployed tactical and strategic nuclear weapons.” They called on their government “to take active steps within NATO for the rapid removal of these nuclear weapons, as the German government has done” and added that the “withdrawal should not be linked to the missile defense debate.”
This statement alludes to the fact that after the new Obama plan for deploying missile defense in Europe was released, the argument shifted to emphasize that U.S. land- or sea-based medium-range interceptors could/should be hosted in Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria. These countries are also looking for the deployment of U.S. forces to strengthen their national security needs in the neighborhood of their big neighbor Russia. Interestingly, the Belgian prime minister, Yves Leterme, underlined in a press release on the same day that his government supports the overall nuclear weapons–free vision. He also noted that Belgium would work with a number of other NATO members to take the nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation agenda forward during the review of the Alliance’s Strategic Concept.28
These various declarations, including a statement by four Canadian statesmen on March 26, 2010,29 have given rise to global political as well as expert debates, debates that should have been held by decision-makers and policy planners in the 1990s after the end of the Cold War but are now unavoidable due to the undermining of the arms control architecture and the incipient dangers of proliferation. Most of the proposals are on the pragmatic side and call for the revival of arms control dialogue.30 A nuclear weapons–free world is regarded as desirable, but only as a distant goal on the horizon. The path now taken is crucial, since it determines the ultimate goal of a world free of all nuclear weapons. The precise conditions of a nuclear weapons–free world require further discussion. Nevertheless, it is remarkable that former nuclear pragmatists, such as Henry Kissinger and William J. Perry, regard a nuclear weapons–free world as desirable and feasible, and the strategy of deterrence as inadequate and outdated. This has kindled renewed interest among the public, politicians, and government officials, which is long overdue, given the growing nuclear threat.
A number of governments, nongovernmental organizations, and political parties responded positively to the former politicians’ interventions. The Obama administration will be measured by the extent to which it is able to implement its proposals. Other nuclear weapons states have begun to come about to take up the course that has been laid. The French government, for example, has promised a further reduction of its nuclear arsenal, and it has already closed its nuclear test site along with its plants to produce fissile material for weapons.31
British activity has been notable. British prime minister Gordon Brown, in a speech delivered in New Delhi in January 2008, emphasized the need “to accelerate disarmament amongst possessor states, to prevent proliferation to new states, and to ultimately achieve a world that is free from nuclear weapons.”32 Three former high-ranking generals from the UK stressed in a supporting statement in January 2009 that “nuclear weapons have shown themselves to be completely useless as a deterrent to the threats and scale we currently, or are likely to face—particularly international terrorism.” They argued that the UK “deterrent has become virtually irrelevant except in the context of domestic policy.”33 The British government has proposed a conference of experts from the nuclear weapons states to examine the challenge of verifying nuclear disarmament. As early as 2007, British foreign minister Margaret Beckett suggested that Great Britain might serve as a “disarmament laboratory.” Defense Minister Des Browne stated on March 4, 2008, before the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, that “the UK [will become] a role model and testing ground for measures that we and others can take on key aspects of disarmament.”34 At the Special UN Security Council Meeting “Nuclear Non-proliferation and Nuclear Disarmament” on September 24, 2009, in New York, Prime Minister Gordon Brown said, “Nuclear-weapon States must pursue active disarmament with a credible road map that will command confidence of all non-nuclear-weapon States,” and he stressed what is mostly missing: a credible time scheme for “active and irreversible disarmament.”35
Other calls have been more conditional. Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh declared, at the opening of the conference “Towards a World Free of Nuclear Weapons” in New Delhi in June 2008, that “India is fully committed to nuclear disarmament that is global, universal and non-discriminatory in nature.”36 A former coordinator of the Indian Pokhran nuclear test in 1998, however, has said that due to national security concerns, India must conduct further tests and therefore cannot sign the CTBT—obviously a maneuver to derail further arms control steps in the region.37 Russian prime minister Vladimir Putin remarked, at a meeting with German foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier in June 2009, that the Kremlin would consider giving up its nuclear arsenal if other countries did the same.38 But a crucial act of commitment by these countries would bring the debate decisively forward. UN secretary general Ban Ki-moon, in a speech given on October 24, 2008—the first speech addressing nuclear disarmament by a UN secretary general for a long time—presented a Five-Point Plan, which, among other things, called for heightened research and development efforts by governments in relation to verification, as well as greater transparency, provisions of international law, security measures, and the prospect of commencing negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention.39
Various international coalitions of nongovernmental organizations have, for decades, proposed concrete steps toward a nuclear weapon–free world. The Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1995, issued an Eleven-Point Program on their 50th Anniversary in 2007.40 These steps range from implementing de-alerting and a no-first-use policy, removing nuclear weapons from forward-basing, and accelerating the dismantlement of nuclear warheads, to drastic reduction of nuclear forces and making a “nuclear weapon convention” a reality. The Middle-Power Initiative and its Article VI Forum, as well as other groups, such as the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, Mayors for Peace, Abolition 2000, and International Engineers and Scientists against Proliferation, have developed extensive proposals and materials at the level of civil society. Center stage in this context stands the establishment of a nuclear weapons convention that, similar to the conventions banning biological and chemical weapons, would globally ban the production, testing, possession, and deployment of nuclear weapons, covering all states.
Naturally, criticism, skepticism, and disapproval of the various op-eds have not been lacking. Democrat defense experts Harold Brown and John Deutch, both former Defense Department luminaries, wrote that “the goal, even the aspirational goal, of eliminating all nuclear weapons is counterproductive.”41 U.S. senator Jon Kyl, a Republican, said that “the national security of the USA—and that of all our friends and allies—will not permit a nuclear weapons–free world in the foreseeable future.”42
These assertions broach some of the fundamental arguments of opponents of global nuclear zero, arguments heard mainly in the NWS themselves. They include keeping nuclear weapons in readiness in order to protect friendly nations (“extended deterrence”), and the ambiguity of nuclear weapons as a last resort against all possible threats, including from states and groups that do not possess nuclear weapons themselves. In many non–nuclear weapons states, the nuclear zero initiatives are regarded with some skepticism and, to some extent, as propaganda or mere rhetoric.
We may, nevertheless, assume that the goal of bringing into being a nuclear weapon–free world is generally regarded as desirable. The exact route and prevailing constraints for a nuclear weapon–free world have, however, barely been outlined so far. Only the first phase—namely, the clearing out of horrendous nuclear arsenals and deployment doctrines—could be embarked upon at present. Additionally, a working and verifiable FMCT regime can lay the foundations for effective identification, notification, and control of fissile materials, and an implemented CTBT would not only prohibit nuclear testing by new states but also constrain vertical proliferation. The hope remains that an enhanced debate will bring humanity closer to the ultimate goal.
More than twenty years after the end of the East-West conflict there are still around 23,000 nuclear weapons in the arsenals of the nuclear weapons states, more than 90 percent of them held in the United States and Russia alone. Around 9,000 are operational, and several thousand American and Russian warheads are on high alert. Furthermore, the number of so-called tactical nuclear weapons on both sides is not precisely known. Some former high-ranking generals are arguing that a new policy of forward-based nuclear weapons is required, which also has to include nuclear sharing arrangements.43 NATO continues to support the deployment of around 150 to 240 American warheads in Europe, while Russia justifies its estimated 2,000 or so tactical warheads—albeit in storage facilities on its own territory—on the basis of NATO’s conventional superiority.44 The nuclear doctrines of both sides are based on first-use of nuclear weapons in a political environment in which the deployment of such weapons for military purposes is now inconceivable. The appallingly large arsenals of the two nuclear powers are the result of the Cold War’s first- and second-strike scenarios. A study by the CISAC Committee of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences in 1997 proposed a “core deterrence” capacity of a few hundred nuclear warheads.45
Both major nuclear powers are continuing to think about modernizing their nuclear arms, and Russia has also gone on a higher state of alert. For example, in 2008 patrol flights by Russian nuclear bombers were resumed, and in August 2009 two modern Russian nuclear submarines were sighted off the East Coast of the United States, after a fifteen-year absence. In the United States, the conversion—proposed during the George W. Bush administration—of strategic missiles, such as the seaborne Trident, into launchers bearing precision-guided munitions has been put on hold. With such a “Prompt Global Strike” program it might be possible to destroy at extreme ranges targets, including Russian missile silos, with pinpoint accuracy—with either conventional or nuclear weapons, at least in the perception of the Russian military.46 Russia and China are increasingly concerned about these developments, alongside the extensive U.S. use of space for reconnaissance and early warning purposes, because in a crisis they would create many uncertainties and problems of perception for other countries.
While the United States already has a modernized arsenal at its disposal on land and sea, as well as in the air, the Russian armed forces are working on new strategic carrier delivery systems, such as the intercontinental Topol-M missile, the destabilizing R-27 missile with multiple warheads, and the submarine-launched Bulava missile. The existing Russian missile arsenal is aging, so despite the planned modernization, Russia’s strategic arsenal will continue to shrink over the next few years.
From the Russian standpoint, the strategic stability of nuclear arsenals has at times been called into question by a number of developments in the United States. The multitiered global missile defense program announced by former president George W. Bush can, from the viewpoint of Russian planners, undermine the Russian arsenal’s second-strike capability over the long term. The strategic “balance of terror” between the United States and Russia rests on the mutual capability for a nuclear second strike. It is emphatically not based on a mutual capability for defense against a nuclear strike. Russian planners must assume, based on the limited functionality of the planned defense system, that the missile defense system in the United States, as well as the one that is now planned for Europe, will be spread widely and that the interceptor missiles will be continually updated. Other missile defense programs are under discussion: for example, a defense system in space. Two antisatellite tests by China (2007) and the United States (2008), in which missiles destroyed their own satellites, show that in a crisis military conflict in space is now possible.47
Experience shows that armament programs costing billions tend to expand over time, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Over the longer term, this casts the credibility of the currently shrinking Russian missile arsenal into doubt. Some U.S. experts have drawn attention to the fact that U.S. nuclear forces, due to their technological superiority, could wipe out the opposing arsenal in a first strike and establish a state of “nuclear primacy.”48 Even though this sounds sensational, the possibility may constrain other nuclear weapon states from reducing their own arsenals.49 In this way, fears concerning the feasibility or possibility of nuclear war re-enter the strategic planning of smaller nuclear weapon countries.
Great Britain, France, and the People’s Republic of China have much smaller strategic arsenals than the United States and Russia. France has 300 strategic warheads, and in March 2008, President Sarkozy announced that this number was to be reduced even further. Great Britain has 160 operational strategic warheads and China has around 180 nuclear warheads. The two Western European nuclear powers each have four nuclear submarines with seaborne missiles and maintain one submarine always at sea. France also has airborne standoff weapons. At the UN Security Council meeting on September 24, 2009, Prime Minister Brown stated that the UK government aimed “that, when the next class of nuclear submarines enters service in the mid-2020s, our fleet should be reduced from four boats to three.”50
China’s nuclear modernization program can be described as modest. The development of a U.S. seaborne missile defense in the Pacific, however, poses a problem for Chinese planners. China has around 20 ICBMs capable of reaching the United States. The United States would like to deploy around 150 seaborne defense missiles on Aegis class ships within five years. The development of the system’s interception capabilities against long-range missiles is very likely and could undermine the Chinese second strike potential.
Then there are the three nuclear states that have not yet signed the NPT. So far, the international community has not been able to integrate these “nuclear outsiders” into a limitation regime or to extract a disarmament roadmap from them. India and Pakistan—both emerging nuclear states—have been engaged in a nuclear armament and missile race for years. They seem to be tied to each other and perhaps also include China in this analytic circle. But further progress in nuclear disarmament would increase the pressure on India and Pakistan to stop their nuclear race. According to Western estimates, the two states each have sixty warheads, are testing longer range missiles, and are building up their navies. In August 2009, India unveiled its first nuclear submarine and plans to build others. Pakistan regards the strategic balance as having been massively disturbed and has been increasing its defense budget for years. Both countries are developing cruise missiles that can be fitted with nuclear warheads and are interested in purchasing conventional, diesel-powered submarines from France and Germany. Since, according to some scientific experts, India’s nuclear tests were not entirely successful, a number of voices in India are advising against signing the CTBT so that further tests can be conducted.51
In early 2009 India and the United States finalized an agreement on civilian nuclear uses, which had been initiated four years earlier during the Bush administration. The boost given to India as a nuclear power by the U.S.-India deal is putting a strain on the calls for “universal proliferation norms.”52 After controversial debates, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) approved an exception for India from the group’s trade restrictions on September 6, 2008.53 In the end, only smaller countries criticized the trade of nuclear technologies to India and argued for reimposing sanctions if India resumed nuclear testing, but they could not withstand the political pressure from the Bush government.
There is a real danger that a distinction between “good” and “bad” nuclear powers will become established. The West has willingly acquiesced in Israel’s “opaque” nuclear arsenal without a serious attempt at an arms control solution.54 Israel as a small country would be confronted with a monstrous existential threat if some of its Arab neighbors were to go nuclear. Therefore in the longer run, a regional zone free from nuclear weapons (NWFZ) must be in the interest of Israel.
Other nondeclared nuclear states pose different problems, especially North Korea, which has withdrawn from the NPT and is subject to UN sanctions. In 2006 and 2009 it conducted underground nuclear tests, and it maintains an aggressive missile program. It is responsible, according to A. Q. Khan, the “father of the Pakistani nuclear program,” for the spread of missile and nuclear production technology, in particular to Libya, Iran, and Syria. The Khan Laboratories are accused of having established a network of intermediaries to transfer equipment and blueprints for producing weapon-grade nuclear material.55 Recently, North Korea announced that it is in the final stages of a uranium enrichment program. The six-party talks between North Korea, the United States, China, Japan, Russia, and South Korea have largely been put on ice.
As Jill Marie Lewis and Avner Cohen discuss in their chapters, the disagreement about the Iranian nuclear program has so far not been resolved, despite the Obama administration’s declared willingness to engage in dialogue. Uranium enrichment is continuing, UN sanctions seem to have had no effect, and the calls for a military solution are getting louder. A military solution to the conflict could destabilize the Middle East just as much as the unrestrained proliferation of nuclear technology in the region. Political solutions, backed by technical models for the disputed fuel production, are still possible, however, if there were the political will to bridge a thirty-year standstill between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Focusing on the reduction of strategic weapons tends to overshadow the problem of the security of the production, storage, and disposal of weapons-grade materials. These fissile materials—such as enriched uranium or plutonium—can be found in both the military and civil spheres of various states that engage in civil nuclear power generation. With regard to large-scale, partly unsecured stocks of fissile material, the question of how to secure the storage and production sites recurs constantly. Stocks of highly enriched uranium worldwide amount to around 1,670 tonnes and those of separated weapons-grade plutonium to 500 tonnes56 Half of the latter derives from the civil sphere, and the stock is growing at an alarming rate. Eight kilograms of plutonium are enough to build a nuclear bomb.
Former IAEA director-general El Baradei talks of thirty “virtual nuclear weapons states,” those states that have the knowledge and the means to enrich uranium or reprocess plutonium. These include not only the nuclear powers but also non–nuclear weapons states such as Brazil, Egypt, Turkey, and South Africa. The anticipated “renaissance of nuclear energy” will serve only to intensify the proliferation problem, especially because the non–nuclear weapons states—including, of course, Iran—are entitled to engage in civil nuclear energy generation. The International Atomic Energy Agency has come out in favor of 1,400 new nuclear reactors by 2050. It cannot be merely by chance that, besides Iran, thirteen other countries throughout the Middle Eastern states have declared a revived interest in civil nuclear power fuel cycle generation.57
Quite apart from the security of fissile materials, an end to the production of weapons-grade materials within the framework of an FMCT is a central aim of arms control efforts. An FMCT is called for in virtually all the op-eds. The established nuclear weapons states have ceased the production of fissile material for bomb production, since for the time being they have enough. De facto nuclear weapons states Israel and, especially, India and Pakistan, on the other hand, continue to produce fissile material for bomb production. Issues of definition, notification, and verification, as well as the inclusion of the civil nuclear fuel cycle, are important in this regard. The Geneva Conference on Disarmament (CD) has had a program of work in this area since May 2008, and in May 2009 it agreed that existing stocks must be included and inspected. Despite the tabling of specific proposals in May 2009, however, concrete work on the FMCT has not yet begun. Progress has been stymied by Pakistan, which argues that its security interests have not been respected. Looking toward India’s continuing fissile material production, which is bolstered by the U.S.-India deal, it called for a “holistic and non-selective approach.” There is some hope this stalemate can be overcome, but the key issue remains: how to integrate nuclear outsiders such as India and Pakistan in the arms control regime.
The bilateral START I treaty of 1991 between the United States and Russia included an expiration date of December 5, 2009, when it was to be replaced by a successor agreement. A framework agreement was reached at the summit between presidents Medvedev and Obama in July 2009, according to which there would be a reduction to 1,500 to 1,675 warheads and 500 to 1,100 strategic launch systems, numbers that largely correspond to Russia’s programmed reduction targets. The final agreement, signed in April 2010, limits both sides to 1,550 deployed warheads and 700 deployed strategic vehicles. Given the unresolved disagreement about strategic missile defense, NATO’s conventional superiority, and the superior military technology capability of the United States, Russia, for the time being, is showing little interest in further rounds of cuts.
In Prague, President Obama declared: “To put an end to Cold War thinking, we will reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy.” The new administration must now make good on this promise. There are a number of proposals on the table.58
All of the op-eds we have mentioned are at one in calling for the rapid coming entry into force of the CTBT. U.S. President Obama has described the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty by the U.S. Congress as an important goal of his foreign and arms control policy. The Treaty, already ratified by 149 states, can come into force only if nine hold-out states—the United States, China, India, Pakistan, Iran, Israel, Egypt, Indonesia, and North Korea—also ratify it. The United States has the key role here. In the U.S. Senate, the majority of 67 Senators required for ratification is not ensured. Recently, the Perry/ Schlesinger Commission gave an account of the lack of unanimity in the Congress and the arguments of both advocates and opponents.59 There is a danger that ratification will be submerged in a confused tangle of technical and political counterarguments. The Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program, which was rejected by Congress in 2008, and barred in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, still garners support in some circles. However, the development of new nuclear warheads would be a fatal signal to the world: the United States could be reproached with seeking to keep on modernizing its arsenal indefinitely and making new technical developments for new nuclear weapon options more attractive to other countries.
The conclusion of a START successor treaty, the prospects of further deep cuts in the nuclear arsenals of the two major nuclear powers, and the initiation of CTBT ratification will surely be magnified by the successful results from the NPT Review Conference in May 2010. After the failure to implement the 13-Point Program set forth in 2000, and the lack of progress in 2005, failure in 2010 could not have escaped being seen by most analysts as a fatal blow for the NPT. Multilateral consensus, cooperation, and agreement are reinforced because the Conference in hindsight can be claimed as at least a partial success. For the longer term, however, the future of the nuclear world order is still up for debate. In George Perkovich’s words, “A nuclear order based on a double standard—a handful of states determined to keep nuclear weapons and also trying to prevent 185 from getting them—is inherently unstable.”60
The aims of the Obama administration are ambitious. They include the START successor agreement, negotiation of a FMCT, and the ratification of the CTBT, as well as other treaties by Congress. On 22 October 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton called for a strengthened IAEA regime with better resources and verification methods, the establishment of a new international framework for nuclear civil energy cooperation, and more efficient measures to prevent nuclear terrorism.61 She welcomed prompt negotiation of a FMCT and a quick entry into force of the CTBT.
The extent to which the Obama administration succeeds will depend on its ability to bring around the nuclear bureaucracy and create some measure of bipartisan support in Congress for a reduction in the role of nuclear weapons in the twenty-first century. The enormous cost of maintaining nuclear weapons, the threat of nuclear terrorism, and the fact that nuclear weapons are the only tools of war that, over the long term, can pose an annihilating danger to the United States should go a long way toward fostering the view that current arsenals must be drastically reduced and the international nonproliferation regime strengthened.
If the two major nuclear powers were each to achieve a target figure of 500 to 1,000 warheads, the three other established nuclear powers could be brought on board to make further reductions and disarm proportionately. Multilateral negotiations—which also settle such important issues as procedures for disposing of warheads, improved safeguards, and the inspection of treaty implementation—should be included. Finally, a third step would involve striving toward and working out an agreement among all nuclear weapons states aiming at nuclear zero—in other words, the complete renunciation of the production, possession, and deployment of nuclear weapons. The smaller arsenals become, the more urgently will important questions arise, questions that have to be worked out on the basis of international cooperation. Have all warheads really been eliminated? Has weapons-grade material been disposed of irreversibly? Is it certain that no state is conducting a secret production program? Can it be ascertained with sufficient surety that civil nuclear sites are not being used for weapons programs? Will it be possible for states to break ranks and engage in nuclear re-armament? What role will missile defense play in a nuclear zero world?
Certainly, many of these questions will be difficult to answer. However, the op-eds of the various four (or more) horsemen and President Obama’s Prague speech constitute a challenge to surmount the attitudes, instruments, and doctrines of the Cold War once and for all, and to proscribe the use of nuclear weapons. The United States, as still the strongest military power on earth, has taken the lead in setting out toward a nuclear weapons–free world. This cannot be done without the cooperation of friendly states, organizations, and experts, not to mention patience, time, and scientific and security-policy expertise. The overwhelming European public, while not yet captured by the debate, does not see a special role for nuclear weapons in Europe and largely wants to remove these weapons of mass destruction from their soil. Certainly, there is still a split between the remaining European nuclear weapon states, France and to a lesser extent Great Britain, as well as East-European countries which still see a threat from Russia. Were nuclear disarmament, including significant reduction or abolition of tactical nuclear weapons, to proceed, the voice for maintaining this capability would be marginalized.
A global effort is needed to overcome the hurdles, but if a beginning is now made in all earnestness, it can help to ensure that nuclear weapons will never be used again. In the twenty-first century new challenges, threats and problems for mankind are emerging where nuclear weapons do not play any role except to put states and people in gravest danger.
This is an updated and extended version of the article by Götz Neuneck, “Globalizing Nuclear Zero: Is a World without Nuclear Weapons Really Attainable?” in Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft, 4/2009, pp.46–64, at http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/ipg/ipg-2009-4/4-09_neuneck_us.pdf. This chapter profited greatly from the research done by Lynne Welton for her master’s thesis, “The Vision of a World Free of Nuclear Weapons: A Comparative Analysis of the Op-Eds of Elder Statesmen and Defense Experts” (University of Hamburg, 2009), published as Working Paper No. 14, IFSH/IFAR, February 2010.
1. The Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security (Palme Commission), Common Security: A Blueprint for Survival (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982); Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Report of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons (Canberra, Australia: Dept. of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1996); Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission (Blix Commission), Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Arms (Stockholm: WMD Commission, 2006); Gareth Evans and Yoriko Kawaguchi (Co-Chairs), “Eliminating Nuclear Threats: A Practical Agenda for Global Policymakers,” Report of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, Canberra 2009, at http://www.icnnd.org/reference/reports/ent/pdf/ICNND_Report-EliminatingNuclearThreats.pdf.
2. United Nations, “A More Secure World,” New York, 2005.
3. George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons,” Wall Street Journal, 4 January 2007, p. A15, and “Toward a Nuclear-Free World,” Wall Street Journal, 15 January 2008, p. A13.
4. See the comprehensive collection of opinion pieces for a nuclear weapons–free world at Pugwash Online at http://www.pugwash.org/reports/nw/nuclear-weaponsfree-statements/NWFW_statements.htm.
5. Evans and Kawaguchi, “Eliminating Nuclear Threats.
6. Shultz et al., “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons.”
7. Ibid.
8. Mikhail Gorbachev, “The Nuclear Threat,” Wall Street Journal, 31 January 2007, at http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2007/01/31_gorbachev_nuclearthreat.htm.
9. Shultz et al., “Toward a Nuclear-Free World.”
10. “2008 Presidential Q&A,” Arms Control Today, 24 September 2008.
11. See “McCain Remarks on Nuclear Security,” Washington Post, 24 May 2008.
12. “Global Public Opinion on Nuclear Weapons,” September 2007. Commissioned by The Simons Foundation and conducted in the US, Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Israel in July and August 2007 by the polling firm, Angus Reid Strategies. Available at http://thesimonsfoundation.ca/nuclear-disarmament/global-public- opinion-on-nuclear-weapons-2/.
13. Letter of French president Nicolas Sarkozy to Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, made public on 8 December 2008, at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Sarkozy_UN_letter_20081208.pdf.
14. Pugwash Online: http://www.pugwash.org/reports/nw/nuclear-weapons-freestatements/NWFW_statements.htm.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Wolfgang Zellner, Hans-Joachim Schmidt, and Götz Neuneck (eds.), Die Zukunft der Konventionellen Rüstungskontrolle in Europa/The Future of Conventional Arms Control in Europe (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2009).
18. Resolution 17/1159 of the German Parliament “Der Bundestag” from March 24, 2010.
19. The CDU/CSU-FDP Coalition Treaty can be found in German at http://www. cdu.de/doc/pdfc/091024-koalitionsvertrag-cducsu-fdp.pdf.
20. See Martin Butcher, “The German Coalition and NATO Nuclear Policy Debate,” NATO Monitor Issue Brief, 8 January 2010; for the domestic discussions in Germany, see Oliver Meier, “German Nuclear Stance Stirs Debate,” Arms Control Today, December 2009, at http://www.armscontrol.org/print/3984.
21. Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs Guido Westerwelle, speech at the 46th Munich Security Conference, 6 February 2010, at http://www.securityconference.de/Westerwelle-Guido.451.0.html?&L=1.
22. Pugwash Online: http://www.pugwash.org/reports/nw/nuclear-weapons-freestatements/NWFW_statements.htm.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Speech by Nicolas Sarkozy, president of the French Republic, “Presentation of Le Terrible in Cherbourg,” 21 March 2008, at http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0803/doc09. htm; see also the chapter by Venance Journé in this volume.
26. Carl Bildt and Radek Sikorski, “Next, the Tactical Nukes,” op-ed, New York Times, 2 February 2010, at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/02/opinion/02iht-edbildt.html.
27. Pugwash Online: http://www.pugwash.org/reports/nw/nuclear-weapons-freestatements/NWFW_statements.htm.
28. “Communiqué de presse: un monde sans armes nucléaires est également l’objectif du gouvernement Leterme,” 19 February 2010. An unofficial translation is available at http://www.premier.fgov.be/fr/nieuws/communiqu%C3%A9-de-presse-un-monde-sans-armes-nucl%C3%A9aires-est-%C3%A9galement-l%E2%80%99objectif-du-gouvernement-.
29. Pugwash Online: http://www.pugwash.org/reports/nw/nuclear-weapons-freestatements/NWFW_statements.ht.
30. The Russian statement of October 14, 2010 is exceptional in its emphasis on the need for a “deep reorganization of the entire international system” as a necessary condition for nuclear disarmament. See Yevgeny Primakov, Igor Ivanov, Yevgeny Velikov, and Mikhail Moiseev, “Moving from Nuclear Deterrence to Mutual Security,” at http://www.pugwash.org/reports/nw/nuclear-weapons-free-statements/NWFW_statements_ Russia.htm.
31. See the chapter by Venance Journé in this volume.
32. Gordon Brown, speech at the Chamber of Commerce in New Delhi, 21 January 2008, at http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page14323; Cabinet Office, “The Road to 2010: Addressing the Nuclear Question in the Twenty First Century,” London, July 2009, at http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/224864/roadto2010.pdf.
33. Field Marshal Lord Bramall, General Lord Ramsbotham, and General Sir Hugh Beach, “UK Does Not Need a Nuclear Deterrent,” The Times, 16 January 2009, at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/letters/article5525682.ece.
34. Des Browne, “Laying the Foundations for Multilateral Disarmament,” speech before the UN Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, 5 February 2008, at http://www.mod.uk/defenceinternet/aboutdefence/people/speeches/sofs/20080205 layingthefoundationsformultilateraldisarmament.htm.
35. Gordon Brown, speech at the 6191st meeting of the UN Security Council on 24 September 2009 (S/PV.6191) in New York, at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/ PRO/N09/523/14/PDF/N0952314.pdf?OpenElement.
36. Manmohan Singh, “Inauguration of the International Conference ‘Towards a World Free of Nuclear Weapons,’” New Delhi, 9 June 2008, at http://pibhyd.ap.nic.in/ er09060804.pdf.
37. “No CTBT, India Needs More Nuclear Tests: Pokharan II Coordinator,” Times of India, 27 August 2009, at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/No-CTBT-Indianeeds-more-nuclear-tests-Pokhran-II-coordinator-/articleshow/4940502.cms.
38. “Putin Could Imagine a Russia with No Nuclear Weapons,” Deutsche Welle, 10 June 2009, at http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,4315776,00.html.
39. Ban Ki-moon, “Five Steps to a Nuclear-Free World,” The Guardian, 23 November 2008, at http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/nov/23/nuclear-disarmament-united-nations.
40. Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, “Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs and the Middle Powers Initiative: Revitalizing Nuclear Disarmament,” Policy Recommendations of the Pugwash 50th Anniversary Workshop, Pugwash, Nova Scotia, 5–7 July 2007, at http://www.pugwash.org/reports/nw/pugwashmpi/Pugwash-MPI-Communique.htm.
41. Harold Brown and John Deutch, “The Nuclear Disarmament Fantasy,” Wall Street Journal, 19 November 2007.
42. Quoted in George Perkovich, “Rebuttal to Senator Kyl,” 3 July 2008, at http://www. carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=20275. See also Kyl’s op-ed, “Why We Need to Test Nuclear Weapons,” Wall Street Journal, 21 October 2009.
43. Hugh Beach, “The End of Nuclear Sharing? US Nuclear Weapons in Europe,” RUSI Journal 154, no. 6 (December 2009): 48–53.
44. Hans C. Kristensen, “U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe: A Review of Post-Cold War Policy, Force Levels, and War Planning,” Natural Resources Defense Council, 2005, at http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/euro/contents.asp.
45. Committee on International Security and Arms Control, National Academy of Sciences, The Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1997).
46. Elaine M. Grossman, “U.S. Military Eyes Fielding ‘Prompt Global Strike’ Weapon by 2015,” Global Security Newswire, Wednesday, 1 July 2009, at http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20090701_5635.php.
47. On this subject, see Subrata Ghoshroy and Götz Neuneck (eds.), South Asia at a Crossroads: Conflict or Cooperation in the Age of Nuclear Weapons, Missile Defense, and Space Rivalries (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2010).
48. Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy,” Foreign Affairs (March/April 2006), at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61508/keir-a-lieberand-daryl-g-press/the-rise-of-us-nuclear-primacy.
49. In the United States also, they are viewed as sensationalists. See Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “The Nukes We Need,” Foreign Affairs 88, no. 6 (November/December 2009): 31–51.
50. Gordon Brown, speech at the 6191st meeting of the UN Security Council.
51. “No CTBT, India Needs More Nuclear Tests.”
52. Oliver Meier, “The US-India Nuclear Deal: The End of Universal Non-Proliferation Efforts?” Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft (April 2006): 28–43, at http://www. fes.de/ipg/inhalt_d/pdf/Meier_GB.pdf.
53. Nuclear trade restrictions had been initially imposed in response to India’s first nuclear test in 1974 and reaffirmed after the Indian 1998 tests. The NSG now has forty-six members; see http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org.
54. See the chapter by Avner Cohen in this volume.
55. See William J. Broad, David E. Sanger, and Raymond Bonner, “A Tale of Nuclear Proliferation: How Pakistani Built His Network,” New York Times, 12 February 2004, A1. See also William Langewiesche, The Atomic Bazaar (London: Penguin Books, 2007).
56. International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM), “A Fissile Material (Cut-Off) Treaty: A Treaty Banning the Production of Fissile Materials for Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear Explosive Devices with Article-by-Article Explanation,” 16 March 2009, at http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/fmct-ipfm_mar2009draft.pdf.
57. In 2008 the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Strategic Dossier listed Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. See International Institute for Strategic Studies, Nuclear Programmes in the Middle East: In the Shadow of Iran, IISS Strategic Dossier (London: ISSS, May 2008).
58. Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. Norris, and Ivan Oelrich, From Counterforce to Minimal Deterrence: A New Nuclear Policy on the Path toward Eliminating Nuclear Weapons, Occasional Paper No. 7 (Washington, DC: Federation of American Scientists, 2009), at http://www.fas.org/pubs/_docs/OccasionalPaper7.pdf.
59. William J. Perry, James R. Schlesinger, et al., America’s Strategic Posture. Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2009), at http://www.usip.org/strategic_posture/final.html.
60. George Perkovich, Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: Why the United States Should Lead (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2008).
61. Remarks by Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton at the United States Institute of Peace, 21 October 2009, at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/10/130806. htm.