Generally speaking, Europe, in its pure European dimension—the European Union—could survive and retain its international position as an influential economic and political center of power without nuclear weapons. Having adopted its WMD Strategy in 2003, the European Union (EU) has taken steps to become a more effective and coherent actor in the policy fields of nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament. The EU recognizes that nonproliferation, disarmament, and arms control remain indispensable elements of cooperative security among states. Further, while acknowledging the considerable nuclear arms reductions that have taken place since the end of the Cold War, especially by two EU member states, the EU recognizes that there is a need for an overall reduction of the global stockpile of nuclear weapons in accordance with Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), in particular by those with the largest arsenals. The EU welcomes the reductions in deployed nuclear weapons brought about under START and the Moscow Treaty, and stresses the need for more progress in structurally reducing these nuclear arsenals through appropriate follow-on processes and the like.1
Though well known, these principles cannot be very useful in practical terms because Europe’s ability to influence nuclear disarmament is rather limited, while proliferation challenges have a strong impact on its nuclear posture and reliance on nuclear weapons. Herein lies a paradoxical linkage between Europe’s position on nuclear weapons, nuclear disarmament, and nuclear proliferation.
Europe, however, is not homogeneous. We can single out four groups of states with a different say and role in nuclear disarmament: the two nuclear haves (the UK and France); those European countries that host the U.S. tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) (Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, and Turkey); the group of NATO states without nuclear weapons; and the European neutral states (Sweden, Finland, Austria, Ireland, Malta, and Cyprus) that are EU members, and Switzerland, which is a nonaligned state.
The United Kingdom and France can be singled out as positive examples in certain aspects of nuclear disarmament. The UK has ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (the CTBT) and halted production of fissile materials for weapons purposes. It has announced that it will reduce its stockpile of operational nuclear warheads from 200 to 160 and the number of nuclear-armed submarines from four to three. Unlike all other nuclear-armed states, the UK bases its nuclear deterrent only at sea, and has no land- or air-based nuclear weapons.
France has also signed and ratified the CTBT, and shut down and dismantled its facilities for the production of fissile materials for explosive purposes and its nuclear testing facilities. The French president has asked China to sign and the United States to ratify the CTBT and asked for transparency measures among the five permanent Security Council members. He called for the abolition of short- and medium-range surface-to-surface missiles and strongly supported negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT).2 In March 2008, President Sarkozy announced that France was further reducing its nuclear arsenal so that it would be left with “fewer than 300 nuclear warheads.”3 The French nuclear reduction plans are partly driven by budgetary constraints, but also stem from a revaluation of what minimum capabilities France needs to uphold nuclear disarmament. Some political analysts believe that Sarkozy’s new reduction plans aim to create legitimacy for the unquestioned nuclear deterrence strategy and to defuse criticism of the French distaste for the idea of totally eliminating nuclear arsenals.
Certainly, there are differences between the two countries. In the UK the domestic political debate is very lively, while in France it does not exist at all. In 2006 the British government made a decision to extend the life cycle of the Trident system by twenty years into the 2040s. The government decided to up grade and renew the warheads and missiles, and to replace the submarines. The official budget estimate for the replacement is 30 billion GB pounds. Now this expensive decision needs to be implemented. Opponents of this decision debate the value of nuclear weapons in the twenty-first century, the opportunity costs of nuclear modernization, and the impact of the decision on arms control as a whole.4 Politicians from most of the parties represented at Westminster continue to ask questions on all aspects of British nuclear policy, from practical aspects of the Trident program such as costs, infrastructure, and deployment, to the government’s stance on arms control and disarmament. In response to the budget crisis facing the British government, prime minister Cameron announced in October 2010 that a decision on the start of construction of new submarines would be delayed to "about 2016."
Unlike France, the UK has in many ways taken the lead among the recognized nuclear weapons states in embracing the objective of a nuclear weapons–free world.5 But in practical terms there is no difference between the two European nuclear haves. The British position is, “Let us seek to create a world in which nuclear weapons do not need to play a role, but until then, sustain a deterrence force available for a second strike.” Nicola Butler wrote in her 1999 article “Nuclear Disarmament Issues in the UK Parliament: More Questions than Answers”: “Although at the time, the Labour Government’s Strategic Defence Review broke new ground in the disarmament process, especially in the area of transparency, some sections of it are now increasingly being used to justify a ‘business as usual’ approach to arms control and disarmament.”6 This is particularly clear in the UK’s rejection of a no-first-use policy and its reiteration of a nuclear posture based closely on an unchanging NATO nuclear doctrine. The UK’s own rejection of a no-first-use policy is also linked to NATO’s policy—as former defence secretary Geoff Hoon stated in 2005: “A policy of no first use of nuclear weapons would be incompatible with our and NATO’s deterrence.”7
The French position can be reduced to the formula that “we need nuclear weapons regardless of what other states do.” As President Sarkozy has pointed out in one of his interviews, “[T]he value of nuclear weapons is deterrence. As far as I know at the moment there’s no emergency, France’s nuclear strategy and nuclear doctrine are [based on the protection of France’s] vital interests. If France’s vital interests were threatened, then, at that point, like all the other French presidents who have preceded me, I would be able to consider the use of nuclear weapons.”8
With regard to nonproliferation the United Kingdom clearly holds a special position within the EU. Being “three in one”—a trustworthy partner of the U.S., a leading member of the EU, and an influential nuclear weapon state—the UK is doomed to play a contradictory role in the EU. Analyzing the British nonproliferation policy, Rebecca Johnson strikes a rather skeptical note on how well the UK government was able to reconcile these different roles. In her view, in 2005 London had only low expectations for a substantive outcome of the NPT Review Conference from the beginning: “Its principal objective was to avoid open and damaging conflict that would further weaken the regime or exacerbate U.S. isolation.”9
Like the other EU countries, France is very concerned about nuclear proliferation, and President Sarkozy has already singled out Iran as a threat, noting that Teheran “is increasing the range of its missiles while there are serious suspicions over its nuclear programme. European security is at stake.”10 But France’s aversion to the idea of eliminating all nuclear arsenals undermines the core bargain of the NPT, which makes the treaty a weaker basis for insisting that others not acquire these weapons.11 Furthermore, France played a negative role in the 2005 Review Conference (RevCon), where it sided with the United States and demanded removal of any reference to 13 Steps from the concluding conference documents.
What is really worrisome is that with the removal of the fear that any nuclear weapon use would escalate to a global catastrophe, all nuclear weapon states have become much more arrogant, irresponsible, and “easygoing” in contemplating the initiation of actual combat employment of nuclear weapons to perform various military missions. Great Britain, France (and China) are declining to undertake any limitation of their nuclear forces through arms control treaties, alleging that they lag far behind the two major nuclear powers. They are implementing planned long-term modernization, and, in the case of China, a quantitative buildup of nuclear arsenals. Both France and Great Britain have in their official nuclear doctrines (and so, allegedly, in operational planning) selective options for nuclear strikes, which usually implies first or preemptive/ preventive attacks. The French position vis-à-vis nuclear weapons still builds upon the rather conservative nuclear doctrine presented by President Jacques Chirac in January 2006. Chirac understood deterrence as part of a preventive strategy: in his view, deterrence could also be used against state sponsors of terrorism.12 The UK admits nuclear deterrence against other threats, such as from biological or chemical weapons, and has declined to give promises of no first use. So, in addition to traditional perceptions of nuclear deterrence as a main security pillar, the nuclear weapons states (NWS), including the UK and France, have adopted new approaches to nuclear weapons that lower the threshold for potential use of their nuclear arsenals, blur the distinction between nuclear and conventional wars, and introduce new categories of potential enemies (including nonstate organizations).13
Under NATO nuclear-sharing arrangements, an estimated 170 to 450 tactical nuclear weapons remain deployed in five NATO non-nuclear-weapon states (Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey) and in the United Kingdom, which also possesses an independent nuclear arsenal. Canada and Greece have ended their participation in nuclear sharing. According to several sources, the United States has withdrawn its nuclear weapons from the RAF Lakenheath air base seventy miles northeast of London, and from Ramstein Air Base in Germany, but without making an official announcement.14 Why NATO and the United States chose to keep these major withdrawals secret is a big puzzle. As Hans M. Kristensen rightly pointed out, “[T]he explanation might simply be that ‘nuclear’ always means secret, that it was done to prevent a public debate about the future of the rest of the weapons, or that the Bush administration just doesn’t like arms control. Whatever the reason, it is troubling because the reductions have occurred around the same time that Russian officials repeatedly have pointed to the U.S. weapons in Europe as a justification to reject limitations on Russia’s own tactical nuclear weapons.”15
Though the predominant part of public opinion in the affected countries is in favor of the withdrawal of the U.S. tactical nuclear weapons from European soil,16 the official position, most vividly represented by Germany before its last election, is that Atlantic solidarity, as well as the fair sharing of burdens, requires European allies to make a contribution toward nuclear participation. NATO must reevaluate nuclear deterrence when the Allies negotiate a new strategic concept to adapt the alliance to a new security environment.17 By withdrawing from their nuclear sharing arrangements, countries hosting U.S. TNW would damage the mechanism of joint deterrence and cut an important link between the United States and European defense policies. The nuclear weapons are also viewed as a more credible deterrent toward a conventional opponent. Too, a complete withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe could weaken extended deterrence and possibly lead to further proliferation. In Europe, an end to the nuclear umbrella might cause Turkey to reconsider its status as a non nuclear-weapon state.18 This last argument does not hold water because the nuclear umbrella did not prevent the UK and, particularly, France from going nuclear. The presence of the U.S. TNW in Turkey would not contain Ankara’s decision to join the nuclear club, if such a decision were taken. It would mean radical changes in Turkey’s domestic political landscape, and in this case Turkey itself would try to get rid of the U.S. TNW. Before the release of NATO’s new Strategic Concept on November 18, 2010, there were expectations that considerable debate about the value of TNW to the alliance would somehow be reflected in the decisions of the Lisbon summit. The final document, however, did not call for withdrawal of the TNW, as some had urged, so the status quo remains unchanged.
The question of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Europe will remain topical because the current Tornado fighters are to be replaced within the coming decade by Eurofighters, which are not yet capable of carrying nuclear bombs.19 Germany is in a unique position among NATO members in that it alone has a coalition agreement that asks to negotiate TNW withdrawal and is the sole state that has not taken a decision to procure a nuclear-capable replacement for its dual-capable aircraft. The German government has repeatedly stated that it has no intention to certify the Eurofighter in a nuclear-capable role. The main reason for this position is the wish to protect the interests of European industry. The Eurofighter consortium consists of Airbus, through its parent European Aeronautic Defense and Space Co. (EADS), which is dominated by France and Germany, BAE in Britain, and Finmeccanica in Italy. The Eurofighters are estimated to cost $131 million each, so the projected total cost of 236 fighters would be around $30.9 billion, and the entire program as it was originally envisaged would cost $81.2 billion. EADS fears the loss of commercial proprietary information, should U.S. technicians get access to the Eurofighter during certification procedures. Apparently, the German government has assured industry that no such access will be granted. The United States, on the other hand, has little interest in certifying the Eurofighter in a nuclear role because this would create a competitor to the Joint Strike Fighter as a dual-capable aircraft.20 Besides Germany, two other countries hosting TNW—the UK and Italy—and Spain have committed to buying the 236 combat aircraft between them. But some European defense analysts are now predicting that all four countries may agree to purchase only 112—less than half the number originally envisaged.21
In the absence of transparency about TNW, many European experts emphasize that NATO should begin discussions on a new Strategic Concept that will have to provide a rationale for maintaining nuclear deterrence and explain military requirements following from a new nuclear doctrine. Like the NWS nuclear postures, the rationale for the U.S. TNW in Europe remains as it has been for many years, in spite of all the radical changes in the international relations after the end of bipolarity. Domestic debate on the future of U.S. TNW involving parliamentarians, pressure groups, budgets, and public opinion in the host member states may provide an important catalyst for the United States and NATO members to discuss the future of U.S. nuclear sharing in Europe.
Part of the international strategic community believes that progress on Russian tactical nuclear weapons would be more likely if there were further reductions in U.S. tactical weapons in NATO countries, a change in NATO nuclear policy, or a change in plans for deployment of ballistic missile defenses (BMD) in Europe. Many European governments would support such a plan, even though some of the new Eastern European NATO members see Russian resurgence as a reason to continue the deployment. As Lukasz Kulesa, a Polish researcher, has pointed out, “The gravest danger of any move to eliminate U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe, from the perspective of Central Europe, would be to create the impression that NATO has gone ‘soft’ where its primary function of defending the territories of the member states is concerned. Therefore, such a move would probably need to be counteracted by a set of decisions giving credible reassurance on the value of NATO’s Article V. These should include first and foremost the affirmation of the function of the strategic nuclear forces as the supreme guarantee of security of the Allies.”22
The minority in the international strategic community emphasizes that unilateral measures are not sufficient, that they can represent only the first step and have to be replaced by a formal treaty. The treaty will have to include data exchange and verification provisions. It is a key lesson learned from the TNW reductions in 1991 under the informal Bush-Gorbachev agreement. As Nikolai Sokov has pointed out, “[U]nlike START I (which was signed only two months before the dramatic breakthrough on TNW), which includes elaborate provisions on data exchange and verification, the unilateral statements contained nothing in this regard. The numbers of TNW each side had in 1991 remained unknown; they were not even disclosed at confidential briefings the sides held in the aftermath of the parallel statements. The U.S. side apparently did not know that TNW had been already removed from the majority of republics. The share of warheads slated for elimination and those moved to storage remained unknown as well. The process of elimination of warheads is still completely closed.”23
This group of states is eclectic, since it includes countries like Greece, which has already got rid of U.S. nuclear tactical weapons, and those new member-states that might be willing to host the U.S. TNW. At present there is no indication of a plan to extend the deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe or to modify the present nuclear bases. Also there is no indication that the United States is engaging the new NATO members in drafting all the necessary bilateral agreements that would prepare for the peacetime deployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in host countries. Nevertheless, the NATO countries have refused to make any commitment that would exclude new nuclear weapons deployments and relieve legitimate Russian worries with regard to NATO’s extension. On the contrary, the new NATO members declared or implied that they could “only accept full membership” and would not take any commitment in advance that “some specific weapons on their soil” should be excluded.24
The supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance. Regarding NATO nuclear forces, the 1995 “Study on NATO’s Enlargement” emphasizes that “new members will share the benefits and responsibilities from this in the same way as all other Allies in accordance with the Strategic Concept. New members will be expected to support the concept of deterrence and the essential role nuclear weapons play in the Alliance’s strategy of war prevention as set forth in the Strategic Concept.”25 There are no zones of different nuclear security within the alliance, no different classes of membership. This applies despite the politically binding reassurance of NATO in the NATO-Russia Founding Charter of 1997 that no nuclear weapons will be deployed in the respective states, and that no infrastructure for the deployment of nuclear weapons will be maintained and no new infrastructure for such weapons will be constructed.
This position is closely related to the debate on a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in Central and Eastern Europe, which might include three Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, former Yugoslav states, and three former Soviet Republics (Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine). Over the years there have been a number of proposals to establish nuclear weapon–free zones (NWFZs) in Europe. However, due to Cold War politics none of the proposals (Poland in 1958, Finland in 1963, Romania in the 1970s) were successful. The possibility of establishing a NWFZ in Europe opened up as the former Warsaw Pact and Soviet States collapsed. In July 1996 Belarus and Ukraine called for a Central and Eastern European NWFZ. But the idea gained little support from other states. Several countries in the area, notably those that aspired to join NATO, opposed the proposal. Poland at the 1998 NPT Preparatory Committee (PrepCom), in a letter addressed to the chairman of the PrepCom on behalf of nine of the key states (Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Slovenia) which would comprise such a zone, opposed the idea as “incompatible with our sovereign resolve to contribute to, and benefit from the new European security architecture.”26
At the same time it would be unfair to put the bulk of responsibility only on the new NATO members. Proposals for NWFZ in Europe are receiving increasing support from a range of sources, including governments, academic communities, NGOs, and parliaments in Europe. In April 2007 the European Parliament adopted “A Comprehensive Approach towards Nuclear Disarmament,” and called European governments to promote nuclear disarmament and to encourage the establishment of Nuclear Weapon Free Zones in Europe as a stepping stone toward global nuclear abolition. These could include a Central European NWFZ and a Northern Europe Arctic NWFZ. However, the main nuclear haves oppose the establishment of NWFZs in strategic regions in which they currently deploy or wish to retain the option to deploy nuclear weapons. In 1995, the U.S. government published its own criteria for the establishment of a NWFZ, highlighting the right of states parties to grant or deny the passage of nuclear-capable ships and aircraft of nonparty nations, and the validity of rights recognized under international law, such as the freedom of navigation and overflight, the right of innocent passage, and the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage.
The concept of NWFZs prohibits the use of nuclear weapons by NWS against any state of the zone. For this purpose, the existing treaties include protocols which obligate the nuclear-weapon states (China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, and the United States) to give negative security guarantees to states in the NWFZ. The United States is particularly reluctant when it comes to granting such guarantees to NWFZ. France, Russia, and the United Kingdom generally accept the UN principles for establishment of NWFZs. They make their decisions to support individual NWFZs on a case-by-case basis. China is the only NWS that has officially rejected the first use of nuclear weapons and has pledged not to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon states or member of a NWFZ.27
Summing up, despite all difficulties with regard to TNW and NWFZs, some steps can be taken by Russia and the United States if political relations are favorable. In the first stage, Russia and NATO could accept mutual obligations not to deploy TNW in Central and Eastern Europe. This zone would include the territory of the NATO member countries that came into this organization after the end of the Cold War, as well as Belarus and other post-Soviet states located in Europe, and Russia’s Kaliningrad region. Full absence of TNW is much easier to control than its quantitative limitation. The next step—and there is some progress in the area of reduction and limitation of general purpose conventional forces in Europe—could be an agreement about a complete relocation of Russian and American TNWs to their national territories and their placement exclusively at centralized storage facilities beyond the deployment areas of troops and arms.28
Ireland, Sweden, Finland, Austria, Malta, and Cyprus are strong proponents internationally for nuclear disarmament and nuclear weapon limitations. Throughout the years, they have advocated a nuclear test ban, nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, de-alerting of nuclear arsenals, and also a ban on nuclear weapons. All of them have ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Through the EU Common Security and Defense Policy, non-nuclear member states inevitably become involved in the nuclear debate, though their role remains very limited. Ireland and Sweden are part of the New Agenda Coalition (NAC), which was launched in Dublin in June 1998, with a Joint Declaration by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, Sweden, and Slovenia, the latter of which subsequently left the coalition. In 2000, NAC was instrumental in crafting a breakthrough in the NPT Review Conference. It put together a historic agreement outlined in the 13 Steps, in which the nuclear weapons states affirmed, in accordance with Article VI of the NPT, that nuclear disarmament can and should proceed independently of general disarmament, that the nuclear powers have a responsibility to work together on “an unequivocal undertaking” to eliminate their arsenals, and that thirteen relatively simple steps could help rid the world of nuclear weapons quickly, verifiably, and irreversibly.
Sharing a strong preference for linking nonproliferation issues to nuclear disarmament, the European neutral states identified the insertion of a clear reference to previous calls for nuclear disarmament by the NWS into the final document as its principal policy goal during the RevCon 2005 (it did not happen) and stressed the need for a “carefully crafted balance of the NPT’s three pillars: non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful use.” Not surprisingly, they see the rather modest ambitions of the EU on disarmament as one of the principal shortcomings of its common policy during the conference.
Switzerland’s position on nuclear disarmament and nuclear arms control is based on several principles. First, Switzerland is in favor of the complete elimination of all weapons of mass destruction and attaches great importance to protection based on international law. Consequently, it has adhered to all relevant treaties and is a member of all relevant organizations and institutions. Second, Switzerland supports all multilateral efforts for disarmament and arms control which aim at concrete results. Third, regardless of the specific substance of the various agreements, Switzerland holds the view that these agreements must meet several criteria. They should be universal, nondiscriminatory, verifiable, and legally binding.29
For Switzerland, the NPT represents the sole legally binding instrument of global scope intended to promote nonproliferation and nuclear disarmament and thus a key tool for international peace and stability. Switzerland emphasizes the NPT is based on three mutually reinforcing pillars (namely nonproliferation, disarmament, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy), and that the stress currently placed on nuclear proliferation should not lead to neglect of the other two pillars of the NPT, including nuclear disarmament. In its view the overwhelming majority of the non-nuclear-weapon states have fully respected their commitments, and the problems of our time are due to the nuclear-weapon states and to only a very small number of other states.
Switzerland was the last holdout against the U.S.-India nuclear deal. “The draft initiative for nuclear cooperation between India and the United States raises fundamental questions about the future of the nuclear non-proliferation system based on the NPT. This project of de-regulating nuclear cooperation contrasts with various proposals put forward recently to adopt even more restrictive measures formulated recently regarding access to sensitive technologies of the nuclear fuel cycle. It is Switzerland’s view that the right to cooperation and access to sensitive technologies remains dependent on adherence to the NPT and on strict application of all of the Treaty’s provisions.”30
Though the neutral states are limited in their potential to influence nuclear disarmament, which is closely related to the nuclear policies of NWS, they objectively create a favorable international environment for this process.
Three factors will be shaping Europe’s position on nuclear disarmament: first, Russia-West relations; second, proliferation risks; and third, the attitude of the Obama administration toward nuclear disarmament and nuclear weapons. Here are three scenarios to provoke thought.
The Caucasus crisis resulted in unprecedented flare-up of tensions in Russia-West relations. It has raised concerns about the repetition of this scenario in Ukraine. No doubt, a big conflict over Ukraine, which would involve Russia and NATO, would increase Europe’s reliance on nuclear weapons. It would result in a new Germany-like divide in Europe and a new confrontation. NATO would smoothly come back to its traditional missions. The neutral European states, at least Sweden and Finland, would cease to be neutral and join NATO. In that case, there would be further proliferation of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. The United States–Europe linkage would become stronger, and there would be a new nuclear burden-sharing arrangement within NATO. The latter would require integration of the British and French nuclear forces. Ukraine could become a new proliferation candidate in Europe and, unlike other cases, the West would support it.
If Russia-West relations improve but proliferation risks remain high, the question of the integration of European nuclear forces will remain topical for Europe, but it could be resolved outside NATO in the European security and defense policy (ESDP) context. The contrast to the first scenario is clear. In the absence of any threat from the East, the United States–Europe nuclear linkage will become irrelevant, and the U.S. tactical nuclear weapons will be withdrawn from Europe because currently they threaten only Russia. Under this scenario a need for European integrated nuclear forces (built upon the British and French nuclear arsenals, with the participation of other EU member-states in the nuclear decision-making process) could be justified with regard to new proliferation candidates. Europe would not be able to rely only on the U.S. commitments as it did in the times of bipolarity. Even in the Cold War, there was concern in Europe formulated by French president De Gaulle that “Americans would not trade New York for Paris.” It is all the more so now, since the USSR as a military opponent was a much more credible threat to U.S. and European interests than the new proliferation candidates.
U.S. officials have said a missile defense system on European soil is crucial for protecting both North America as well as the rest of NATO against a missile attack from Iran or North Korea. Depending on whether an enemy missile is aimed at Europe or the United States, different “rules of engagement” could govern the launch of NATO and U.S. missile defense interceptors, all under the auspices of the American commander. The concern of many European NATO nations about the initial U.S. plans was two-fold: They objected to the idea that a U.S. missile defense system could make some member countries more secure than others (an idea they believe would go against the very basis of the alliance); and they were keenly against the idea of the countries hosting U.S. missile defense assets developing a relationship with Washington that would transcend that of any other European NATO nation.31
Under the best scenario EU and Russia could cooperate on BMD in Europe and, what is more important, on air defense, because unlike the United States, the EU countries and Russia can be easily reached with air dynamic vehicles (cruise missiles, or civilian or military aircraft) from the territories of the so-called rogue or failed states.
The U.S. position on arms control under the Obama administration and the U.S. foreign policy at large will be crucial for Europe’s nuclear posture. The devil-may-care attitude of the Bush administration toward arms control dealt a heavy blow to nuclear disarmament. Nowadays there is a growing understanding that the United States and Europe will have to cooperate with Russia in areas where they have “common objectives and common ground,” especially on nonproliferation, to include reduction of the global nuclear arsenal, security of nuclear materials, and challenges such as North Korea and Iran.32 At the same time the Russian liberal political elite is fearful that under domestic pressures President Obama will put forward the worst possible combination of security initiatives—new proposals on arms control, which are badly needed to fill the security vacuum in the Russia-U.S. strategic relations, but also a renewal of the U.S. commitments to the previous policy of NATO’s enlargement. If this happens, the latter will discredit the former and remove all hopes for a breakthrough in the Russia-West relations and the nuclear disarmament process as well.
Not only U.S. disregard for arms control during the George W. Bush administration has negatively affected nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation. The 1999 NATO military operation backed by the United States in Kosovo, the war in Iraq, the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and its first BMD plans in Europe strongly affected the international context of nonproliferation. The main lesson learned by the so-called rogue states from U.S./NATO military operations during the last decade is that only nuclear weapons would help them to avoid a repetition of the Yugoslav and Iraq experience. North Korea withdrew from NPT almost on the morrow of the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, which deprived the United States of any moral right to criticize Pyongyang’s decision. And if the United States had not withdrawn from the ABM Treaty and not blocked the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty, North Korea (and potentially Iran in the future) would have had not just one barrier to overcome, but three (the NPT, the CTBT, the FMCT) in trying to acquire nuclear weapons.33
The way the United States implemented its antiterrorist strategy after 9/11 and conducted its military operations brought about dissatisfaction among U.S. allies. After the September 11th terrorist attacks and the superbly executed operation in Afghanistan, the United States returned to unilateralism in an even more exacerbated form. The United States invaded Iraq (on an invented pretext and without UN authorization) and planned to go further by “reformatting” the entire Greater Middle East to fit its own economic, political, and military interests.34 Generally speaking, the Iraq controversy was about more than “just” Iraq. It was representative of the new crisis of traditional Atlanticism which made Europe a hostage to U.S. policy. Though the diplomatic damage of the Iraq controversy to the Euro-Atlantic relationship has been partly repaired, in Europe there remains a fear that for the United States NATO is just a means to influence and engage Europeans in its foreign policy preferences, first and foremost with regard to so-called states of concern.
The EU recognizes that the conflict with Iran is critical for the future of the NPT and for the EU’s ability to speak with one voice and act coherently in the area of nonproliferation policy. For many observers, the hope was that the initiative of three influential EU countries, backed by the community as a whole, could work as a model case for “effective multilateralism.” However, the key conclusion of the expert community is that the “EU-3” failed to play the role of a mediator between the United States and Iran “because both parties viewed the European Union as a buffer and a potential coalition partner vis-à-vis the other.”35
Furthermore, the EU countries were concerned that Russia’s dissatisfaction with the U.S. initial BMD program in Europe (which is regarded by Moscow as an open-ended process alongside the NATO enlargement process) reduced the chance for international cooperation, including Russia, on Iran. Just as bad, that BMD program sent a wrong signal to Iran, which interprets the U.S. BMD system as a de facto recognition of its nuclear status.
The role of President Barack Obama, with regard to the most urgent security challenges can be effective and positive only if he is ready to really change the substance of U.S. foreign policy, recognizing the mistakes of his predecessor and presenting a new foreign policy concept. It is very promising that President Obama has already singled out a “move toward a nuclear free world” as one of the administration’s key objectives. Strengthening the NPT regime is the second key objective for the new administration. Other encouraging news is the successful negotiation of the New START treaty, designed to further reduce and limit strategic weapons. At their April 2009 meeting, presidents Obama and Medvedev announced, “We committed our two countries to achieving a nuclear free world, while recognizing that this long-term goal will require a new emphasis on arms control and conflict resolution measures, and their full implementation by all concerned nations. We agreed to pursue new and verifiable reductions in our strategic offensive arsenals in a step-by-step process, beginning by replacing the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with a new, legally-binding treaty.”36 With all the importance of this statement, it is just the beginning of a truly amicable U.S.-Russia relationship, and there are still a number of serious disagreements between them which will be shaping their cooperation on arms control.
Nonetheless, nuclear security and nonproliferation are areas that the Obama and Medvedev administrations should find most amenable to pressing the reset button on. Central to this radical change was the growing recognition that attempts to pressure Russia into toeing the U.S. line had failed; a new tactic was needed. The U.S. decision to withdraw plans for the BMD system in Poland and the Czech Republic was met with optimism in the Kremlin, and the efforts of the Obama administration were not wasted. Russia and the United States reached a new agreement on Afghanistan. The previous agreement allowing for the transportation of nonlethal supplies to Afghanistan was supplanted by an agreement that allowed NATO forces to use Russian airspace to transport troops and arms. Echoing that decision President Bakiyev stated in his 9/11 memorial address that Kyrgyzstan would allow the United States to continue using Manas Air Force base for logistical operations in the fight against terror. Beyond this, Russia has showed that it will be inclined together with the United States to take a harder line on sanctions against Iran.
General and complete nuclear disarmament is a noble goal, though it seems at present very distant and unrealistic. However, this goal is crucial for creating a general framework for arms control negotiations. As mentioned above, at current force levels European nuclear weapons cannot be an obstacle to nuclear zero during the early stages of disarmament; no doubt, the primary responsibility here rests with Russia and the United States. Nevertheless, the fact that the European nuclear states hold the view that nuclear weapons are still indispensable, even as they support new disarmament and arms control negotiations, undercuts their credibility. From this point of view, there is little difference between the UK, which accepts the idea of nuclear disarmament as a final goal, and France, which avoids any explicit mention of abolition of nuclear weapons. The very fact that their disarmament credibility rests on their propensity to see the elimination of nuclear arms as a future option—one day, but not now—creates legitimacy for nuclear weapons expenditures to a domestic audience, which in turn creates an image of a “drug addict”-like nuclear weapons dependency to the outside world.
Certainly, it should be recognized that the future of NPT lies not only in the responsibility of the nuclear weapons states. Nuclear disarmament by the NWS, including the UK and France, will not lead a determined proliferation candidate to stop its programs. Iran’s or North Korea’s intentions are guided not by the lack of disarmament but by their regional strategic considerations, considerations of prestige, or those of regime survival. However, reliance on nuclear weapons is the soft spot of any NWS nonproliferation approach. Unless sincere efforts are made by the nuclear weapons states to eliminate their stockpiles under international agreement, other countries are also likely to acquire nuclear weapons, which means that it will more difficult to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to “rogue regimes” or nonstate actors.
Furthermore, one cannot ignore the fact that around forty new countries, including two of the declared nuclear powers, France and China, joined NPT at the same time as intensive nuclear disarmament talks and real reductions in stockpiles of nuclear weapons were taking place (INF Treaty, SALT-1, SALT-2, the START III Framework Treaty, the ABM limitation agreements, the CTBT, and unilateral reductions of tactical nuclear weapons by the United States and the USSR/Russia).37 Put simply, nuclear disarmament creates a favorable international context for nonproliferation.
Efforts by the great powers to maintain their nuclear arsenals are still largely based upon the strategy of mutual nuclear deterrence. Therefore, more attention and efforts should be devoted to reconsidering this strategy and the existing nuclear doctrines that allow very flexible approaches to using nuclear weapons.
Though in principle Europe cannot oppose nuclear disarmament within a reasonable time frame, there is a problem of asymmetry. Since the UK and France lag far behind the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, the European nuclear haves cannot issue demands of equal standing. From this point of view, radical reductions of the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals could upgrade Europe’s role in the process of nuclear disarmament. Another factor, which would increase Europe’s involvement in this process, would be the integration of European nuclear forces. Like it or not, European integration in this sphere is an objective process in Europe’s postbipolar evolution. It would provide ESDP with blood and flesh, and end Europe’s dichotomy in the security sector. In the absence of a well-founded and clear demarcation between the military components of the EU and NATO, this dichotomy will continue to be a major obstacle to creating a well-functioning ESDP.
European integration in the nuclear field is already going on, although it is not very visible. Since the early 1990s, bilateral dialogue and cooperation mechanisms have existed between the UK and France in the nuclear field, and in November 2010 they signed a treaty to share facilities for research on nuclear stewardship technologies. Since the early 1990s there has been a general consensus among politicians and commentators about “Europeanizing” (giving a European dimension to) the French nuclear deterrent, taking into account the collective interests of the EU members when making nuclear decisions.38 On several occasions (in 1995, 2006, and 2008) France invited Germany to participate in joint nuclear decision-making. The French efforts have been politely rejected by Berlin because in the eyes of the German political elite the idea of a concerted deterrence is not in accordance with Germany’s perceptions of ESDP, which should be directed primarily toward crisis management and the postconflict evolution of weak states. But the EU dichotomy embodied in the artificial division of labor between NATO and ESDP cannot last forever. As Bruno Tertrais argues, “In the short run nothing would preclude a solemn and explicit affirmation by London and Paris that their two nuclear forces protect the EU countries.”39
There is no clear position on whether a single European voice on the nuclear issues would be good. An integrated European nuclear force, however, would make Europe a more visible player in the nuclear debate. The EU parliamentarians and high-ranking officials have already pointed out that the issue of nuclear weapons and the future of the NPT could not be excluded from the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). In 2008 the EU foreign ministers endorsed new lines for EU action to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. The overriding goal of the plan is to achieve greater coordination within the EU.
Integration of the British and French nuclear forces in the EU context would be a crucial element in achieving consensus among the great powers on specific nonproliferation issues and cases, since the “threshold” countries are increasingly coordinating their policies and are playing on the divisions between the five NWS. For the time being, the EU context is very important for consultations on new verification instruments and confidence-building measures to be discussed in the UN Conference on Disarmament among the P5 or G8. A single European voice would be decisive for reconsidering the existing NATO strategy of nuclear deterrence (including the presence of U.S. TNW on European soil), which needs to be updated to postbipolar realities. And under the best scenario in the strategic relations between Russia and the United States, Europe at a certain stage can become part of arms control negotiations. One cannot but agree with Javier Solana, European Union High Representative for the CFSP, who said in his keynote speech in the European Parliament: “The world badly needs more progress on nuclear disarmament. With new thinking in the major countries and also in the countries which can experience the temptation of nuclear armament, progress is possible. The task of political leaders is to set a sense of direction and to build trust among the key players. That is a task for many people, including in the European Union.”40
1. See consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=1125&lang=en.
2. Bruno Tertrais, “France and Nuclear Disarmament: The Meaning of the Sarkozy Speech,” Proliferation Analysis, 1 May 2008, at www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=20090&prog=zgp&proj=znpp.
3. George Perkovich and James M. Acton, “Abolishing Nuclear Weapons,” Adelphi Paper 396 (London: IISS, 2008), p. 20.
4. See www.atlcom.nl/site/english/nieuws/wp-content/AP%202008%20nr.%204%2 0Riecke.pdf.
5. Perkovich and Acton, “Abolishing Nuclear Weapons,” p. 21.
6. Nicola Butler, “Nuclear Disarmament Issues in the UK Parliament: More Questions than Answers,” Disarmament Diplomacy 38 (June 1999), at http://www.acronym. org.uk/dd/dd38/38ukparl.htm.
7. “Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament—No to NATO,” at www.cnduk.org/index. php/campaigns/no-to-nato/no-to-nato.html.
8. French president Nicholas Sarkozy on “Nuclear Weapons and Missile Defence” (7–8 June 2007) at www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0706/doc21.htm.
9. “The EU’s Emerging Role in Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy—Trends and Prospects” at www.euractiv.com/en/security/eu-emerging-role-nuclear-non-proliferationpolicy-trends-prospects/article-148386.
10. See www.thaindian.com/newsportal/world-news/irans-nuclear-pursuits-threatto-europe-sarkozy_10029973.html.
11. Perkovich and Acton, “Abolishing Nuclear Weapons,” p. 20.
12. “The EU’s Emerging Role in Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy—Trends and Prospects,” 15 November 2005, updated Thursday, 17 November 2005, at http://www. euractiv.com/en/security/eu-emerging-role-nuclear-non-proliferation-policy-trendsprospects/article-148386.
13. Alexei Arbatov, ed., At the Nuclear Threshold (Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, 2007), p. 94.
14. See www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2008/06/us-nuclear-weapons-withdrawn-from-theunited-kingdom.php.
15. Ibid.
16. Some 76 percent of the German population thinks that Germany should get rid of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Germany. Similar numbers were reflected in a 2006 Greenpeace poll, which found that 69 percent of the citizens in nuclear deployment states supported a nuclear weapons–free Europe. This included 88 percent in Turkey, 71 percent in Italy, 65 percent in Belgium, 63 percent in the Netherlands, and 56 percent in Britain. See www.gsinstitute.org/pnnd/pubs/Tactical_nukes.pdf.
17. White Paper 2006 on German Security policy and the future of the Bundeswehr, Federal Ministry of Defence.
18. Summary of interview with Karl Heinz Kamp, head of Unit Foreign Policy, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Berlin, 15 February 2007.
19. See Otfried Nassauer, “50 Jahre Nuklearwaften in Deutschland,” Aus Politik und Zeitgeschihte, no. 21 (2005).
20. See www.frstrategie.org/barreFRS/publications/rd/RD_20080129.pdf.
21. “Analysis: European Defence Contracts,” at www.breitbart.com/article. php?id=upiUPI-20090429-181803-2953&show_article=1.
22. Lukasz Kulesa, “Reduce US Nukes in Europe to Zero, and Keep NATO Strong (and Nuclear). A View from Poland,” at https://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/ 2009npc_kulesa.pdf.
23. See www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd21/21tactic.htm.
24. See www.uspid.org/sections/02_Books_Documents/Proceedings/none_cast97/ cotta.html.
25. See www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/enl-9505.htm.
26. See www.fas.org/nuke/control/cenwfz/index.html.
27. See cns.miis.edu/nwfz_clearinghouse/.
28. A. Arbatov and V. Dvorkin, Beyond Nuclear Deterrence: Transforming the U.S.- Russian Equation (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006), pp. 141–62.
29. See www.ippnw.ch/content/pdf/monte_veritas/friedrich.pdf.
30. See www.icanw.org/files/Switzerland.pdf.
31. See cndyorks.gn.apc.org/yspace/articles/bmd/nato_planning_europe_shield.htm.
32. See euobserver.com/9/26863.
33. Arbatov, At the Nuclear Threshold, p. 100.
34. Alexei Arbatov, “Moscow-Munich: A New Framework for Russian Domestic and Foreign Policies,” Moscow Carnegie Center Working Papers, no. 3 (2007), p. 14.
35. See www.euractiv.com/en/security/eu-emerging-role-nuclear-non-proliferationpolicy-trends-prospects/article-148386.
36. Statement from Obama, Medvedev, “Political Hotsheet—CBS News,” at www. cbsnews.com/blogs/2009/04/01/politics/politicalhotsheet/entry4909175.shtml.
37. Arbatov, At the Nuclear Threshold, pp. 98–99.
38. Bruno Tertrais, “The Last to Disarm? The Future of France’s Nuclear Forces,” p. 266, at cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/142tertrais.pdf.
39. Ibid.
40. “European Proposals for Strengthening Disarmament and the Non-Proliferation Regime,” speech by EUHR Solana at www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_ 8354_en.htm.