In his speech in Prague on April 5, 2009, President Obama asserted America’s commitment “to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.” “This goal will not be reached quickly,” he continued, “perhaps not in my lifetime. It will take patience and persistence.”1 He also listed, under three broad headings, a series of steps his administration would undertake. First, in order to begin movement toward a world free of nuclear weapons, he promised to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy, to negotiate a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) with Russia by the end of 2009, to pursue “immediately and aggressively” U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and to seek a verifiable Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). Second, in order to strengthen the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), he called for more resources and authority for international inspections, a new framework for civil nuclear cooperation, including an international fuel bank, and a structure that ensures that when any country breaks the rules it will suffer consequences. Third, in order to ensure that terrorists never acquire nuclear weapons, he proposed a new international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world and a Global Summit on Nuclear Security in 2010; he also called for turning the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism into “durable international institutions.”
On September 24, 2009, at the initiative of the Obama administration, the UN Security Council held a summit meeting devoted to nuclear disarmament and nuclear nonproliferation. This was intended to “draw attention at the high est levels of government to the nuclear dangers confronting the international community and the urgency of taking concrete steps to address them.”2 Obama presided at the meeting, at which fourteen heads of state and government unanimously adopted Resolution 1887 reiterating the Security Council’s support for nuclear disarmament and nuclear nonproliferation.3 The resolution reaffirms the Security Council’s commitment to a world without nuclear weapons and provides a framework for moving toward that goal. It is very largely a reaffirmation of commitments enshrined in treaties and other UN resolutions. It reflects the agenda Obama outlined in Prague, and aims to build on what he called “a consensus that all nations have the right to peaceful nuclear energy; that nations with nuclear weapons have the responsibility to move toward disarmament; and those without them have the responsibility to forsake them.”4
There is a considerable overlap between the list of steps to be undertaken by the Obama administration and the list of measures proposed by George Shultz and his colleagues in their Wall Street Journal articles.5 This is not coincidental: Obama has acknowledged the work of the four horsemen, whom he invited to be present in the Security Council for the summit. Nor is the overlap surprising. There is a well-established agenda of unfinished items in the area of arms control and disarmament. The Obama administration has already taken some of these in hand. Negotiations with Russia on a successor to START (signed in 1991) began in May 2009, and the New START Treaty was signed by presidents Medvedev and Obama in April 2010. Obama has entrusted Vice President Joseph Biden with the responsibility of steering the CTBT to ratification by the Senate, although that is not likely to happen before 2011. A new Nuclear Posture Review was published by the Department of Defense in April 2010, and this helps to define the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security policy. It was hoped that negotiations on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty would resume in January 2010 in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, but Pakistan has blocked the resumption of those negotiations. In April 2010 an international conference on nuclear materials was held in Washington, DC, and attended by forty-seven heads of state and government. Obama has launched an international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years.
The Prague speech set out an ambitious agenda. It is one thing to make proposals; it is another, to translate them into reality. Not even the initial steps could be taken for granted. The New START negotiations raised more issues than anticipated and took longer than expected to negotiate. Republican op position delayed the ratification of New START, which was only achieved in late December 2010. The Nuclear Posture Review became the focus of sharp debates within the administration, and its completion was postponed more than once. In spite of the difficulties, some of the crucial first steps outlined in the Prague speech have now been taken. Much more needs to be done, of course. Some of the obstacles to progress come from the difficulties of resolving disagreements with other states, but some are embedded in broader debates in the United States about the desirability and feasibility of a world without nuclear weapons. There is no consensus on these issues. The arguments against nuclear disarmament are not new, but they have reemerged with particular force in reaction to Obama’s call for a world free of nuclear weapons.
The first question is whether it is in fact desirable to eliminate nuclear weapons. There are those who oppose nuclear disarmament on the grounds that nuclear weapons have helped to keep the peace by making it clear to the great powers that war among them would be so destructive that it could not serve any useful political purpose. In this view, a world without nuclear weapons would merely reopen the way to large-scale wars, unless the international system were so reorganized as to abolish war itself. The present situation, if it could be stabilized, would be better than the search for elimination. There are at least two responses to that argument. The first has already been mentioned in Chapter 1. The current situation is not likely to be stable in the long run, because a discriminatory nuclear order will not last; more states will want to acquire nuclear weapons, leading to recurrent crises as the nuclear weapon states seek to prevent others from going nuclear. The second is that the history of nuclear weapons does not provide reassurance that the world would be safer over the long term with more nuclear weapon states. It is true that nuclear weapons have not been used in war since 1945, but there have been crises in which the possibility that nuclear weapons might be used has appeared to be dangerously close. A world with more nuclear weapon states would offer more scope for nuclear crises.
The second issue is that of feasibility. Many critics of the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons claim that such a world is not feasible, and that it is therefore dishonest to hold out the hope that it can be achieved. Supporters of the vision do not claim to know exactly what a world without nuclear weapons would look like—except for the lack of nuclear weapons of course—and they recognize that many difficult problems will need to be answered before the final goal is reached; they argue nevertheless that it provides an essential compass point in the search for a safer and more secure nuclear order. The dialectic between the vision and the practical steps is central to this approach. “Without the bold vision, the actions will not be perceived as fair or urgent,” George Shultz and his colleagues wrote in their first Wall Street Journal article. “Without the actions, the vision will not be perceived as realistic or possible.”6
Disagreement on the feasibility of nuclear disarmament is very sharp. This is clearly shown by the Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States.7 Congress set up the commission in 2008 to help guide the next Nuclear Posture Review. The Democrats appointed six of the commission’s twelve members, the Republicans the other six. William Perry (one of the Four Horsemen) served as chairman, and James Schlesinger (a strong critic of the Four Horsemen) as vice-chairman. Among other things, Congress asked the commission to look to the long term in formulating its recommendations about the U.S. strategic posture. The commission found, however, that it had very different visions for the future: “As we have debated our findings and recommendations,” the Final Report of the commission states, “it has become clear that we have very different visions of what might be possible in the long term. Fundamentally, this reflects our differences over whether the conditions can ever be created that might enable the elimination of nuclear weapons.”8
The Congressional commission reached consensus on many near-term issues, with the notable exception of ratification of the CTBT, on which it was split. This consensus shows that disagreement about the possibility of eliminating nuclear weapons need not prevent agreement in many areas of nuclear policy. In spite of their differences over the elimination of nuclear weapons, the members of the commission shared a hopeful vision of the nearer term, “reject[ing] the notion that somehow it is inevitable that international nuclear order will collapse.”9 The commission report portrays the nuclear future as manageable from the point of view of the United States. It thereby rejects what was one of the basic motivations for the Hoover Initiative—namely, that the status quo was tending to a bad outcome. This view of a manageable nuclear future might lessen the pressure for far-reaching policy changes; the tenor of the commission’s Final Report is much less urgent than that of Obama’s Prague speech.
The United States and Russia between them have more than 90 percent of all nuclear warheads; their arsenals include thousands of warheads, while according to the best estimates no other country has more than about 300.10 The United States and Russia therefore need to take the lead in reducing nuclear forces. This should surely be possible. The Cold War is over, and, notwithstanding the worsening of relations between the two countries in the early years of this century, it is inconceivable that either country would now intentionally attack the other with nuclear weapons. Doctrinal statements by the United States and Russia suggest that it should be possible to make substantial reductions in strategic nuclear weapons. Neither country now regards the other as an imminent nuclear threat or as the main source of nuclear danger, though neither has been willing to dismiss entirely the danger of a nuclear threat arising from the other in the future. There is therefore scope for substantial reductions in strategic nuclear forces with each side retaining an effective nuclear deterrent, the more so since mutual deterrence between them now serves as a hedge against a possible future danger rather than as protection against an immediate and pressing threat.
U.S.-Russian relations reached their nadir after the Georgian war of August 2008, with signs that a new round of nuclear arms competition might be beginning. Barack Obama came into office with the goal of “resetting” relations with Russia in order to secure Russian help in dealing with the nuclear danger, including the threat from Iran. On April 1, 2009, after their meeting in London, presidents Medvedev and Obama issued a Joint Statement setting out a substantive agenda for international security. “We committed our two countries to achieving a nuclear free world,” the Joint Statement says, “while recognizing that this long-term goal will require a new emphasis on arms control and conflict resolution measures, and their full implementation by all concerned nations.”11 Obama’s September 2009 decision not to go ahead with the planned deployment of the missile defense radar in the Czech Republic and the interceptor missiles in Poland has contributed to an improvement in relations. The New START is a reflection of the improved relationship.
The new treaty could provide the basis for more cuts in nuclear forces. It should be possible to make reductions beyond the 1,550 warhead ceiling enshrined in the new treaty. The next stage could be to aim for 1,000 strategic nuclear warheads apiece, and then proceed by stages with further reductions. It has become clear, however, that further reductions in strategic arms will be contingent on a number of issues, most notably on agreement to regulate ballistic missile defenses. It will be important for the two sides to maintain strategic stability as nuclear forces are reduced to lower levels. In other words, a balance should be maintained that is stable in terms of deterrence theory: lower levels should not create incentives for the use of nuclear weapons in a crisis; nor should they offer incentives to either side to acquire more nuclear weapons.12
Strategic stability is often analyzed in purely technical terms, but the political context is crucial. Policy-makers and military planners have to make political judgments as well as technical assessments. The level of destruction that a retaliatory strike needs to threaten, in order to deter a nuclear attack, will vary according to political as well as military circumstances. The forces needed to deter a mortal enemy from attacking will be different from those needed to deter a country with which one has less hostile relations. In the latter case the potential attacker is less likely to give his political goals a value that would outweigh the losses that even the smallest retaliatory nuclear strike would cause. This is an important point, because it means that mutual deterrence can exist at lower levels of forces. Mutual deterrence has its own requirements—the most important being that both sides have an assured retaliatory capability—but those requirements can be satisfied at ever lower levels of forces as long as the political relationship is right.
Ultimately, mutual deterrence need not exist at all in relations between two nuclear states. There is no deterrence if neither side contemplates attacking or being attacked. This means that further reductions in U.S. and Russian nuclear forces should be possible as long as the political relationship develops to the point where fears and suspicions diminish. Indeed, there is an argument to be made that deterrence can operate even when there are no nuclear weapons in the world. That is because we would be entering a post–nuclear weapons world in which the knowledge of how to make nuclear weapons would continue to exist, as well as fissile materials and the industrial technologies for producing them. That knowledge, it has been argued, could serve as a kind of “virtual deterrent” at zero nuclear forces.13 Nuclear weapons could thus be eliminated, leaving deterrence in place, like the Cheshire cat in Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, which disappears apart from its grin; “‘A grin without a cat!’ said Alice. ‘It’s the most curious thing I ever saw in all my life.’”
Nuclear disarmament will involve not only the United States and Russia; all the nuclear powers will have to give up their nuclear weapons. None of the other states has anything like the number of nuclear weapons possessed by the United States and Russia. They say, with justification, that it is up to those two countries to make deep reductions first, and then they will join in. Sooner rather than later, however, the other nuclear powers should be brought into the process of disarmament. There are ways in which they could make a contribu tion, for example, by not increasing their nuclear forces, by agreeing to greater transparency, and by not maintaining their nuclear forces in an operationally deployed status.
Strategic stability in the sense in which it has traditionally been applied in the context of the U.S.-Russian (and Soviet) relationship may become more complex as U.S. and Russian nuclear forces are reduced. More states—and more relationships—will have to be taken into account, and the requirements for verification and monitoring may become more demanding. Is strategic stability in the traditional sense the appropriate way to think about nuclear relationships under those circumstances? Confidence-building measures such as transparency and low states of combat readiness may assume greater importance. The definition of strategic stability may also have to be broadened to include political factors in a more explicit way. These are questions that would merit research and discussion among the nuclear powers.
There has been a shift in American thinking from an emphasis on stopping others from acquiring nuclear weapons to a focus on creating a new nuclear order in which obligations by the nuclear powers to move toward disarmament will play a key role. That of course is what the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty mandates: the non–nuclear weapons states that have signed the treaty (that is, almost all states) have made the commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons, while the nuclear weapons states have committed themselves to working toward nuclear disarmament.
The relationship between nuclear disarmament and nuclear nonproliferation is perhaps the central issue in Obama’s embrace of the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. In his Prague speech he described the “basic bargain” of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty as “sound”: “[C]ountries with nuclear weapons will move towards disarmament, countries without nuclear weapons will not acquire them, and all countries can access peaceful nuclear energy.”14 In order to realize the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons it is necessary not only to get rid of nuclear weapons through disarmament, but also to prevent new states or nonstate actors from acquiring nuclear weapons.
The view that disarmament will lead to a strengthening of the nonproliferation regime is by no means universally accepted in the United States. There are two main objections. The first is that during the Cold War the U.S. policy of extending deterrence to its allies in NATO and in East Asia dampened the spread of nuclear weapons. The United States was committed to responding, with nuclear weapons if necessary, to attacks on its allies. These commitments were intended not only to deter the enemy but also to reassure allies that they were secure and covered by the U.S. “nuclear umbrella.” If the United States were to move to deep reductions in its nuclear forces, and ultimately to the elimination of nuclear weapons, so the argument runs, some of the states that have benefited from the U.S. policy of extended deterrence might seek nuclear weapons of their own. This is, of course, a serious issue that would have to be addressed in moving toward elimination. It obviously would not be desirable if reductions in the existing nuclear arsenals were to encourage states that do not now have nuclear weapons to acquire them. Nevertheless, in the post–Cold War world it should be possible to find ways to deal with this problem. Japan is often pointed to as the most problematic case in this context, relying heavily on the U.S. nuclear guarantee for its security, yet the Japanese prime minister, Yukio Hatoyama, approved Resolution 1887 at the UN Security Council summit in September 2009. “Japan,” he said, “would engage in active diplomacy to lead international efforts on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.”15
The second objection is that states that are determined to acquire nuclear weapons have done so in the past, and will do so in the future, without any regard to the moves that the nuclear weapon states are making now, or might make in the future, toward nuclear disarmament. In other words, they acquire nuclear weapons for their own reasons—as Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea have done. This is a common argument against the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons, but it is beside the point. The key link between disarmament and nonproliferation, in the minds of those who advance the vision of a world without nuclear weapons, is that if the nuclear weapon states move in the direction of nuclear disarmament it will become easier to construct a nuclear order in which those who break the rules are sanctioned. As Obama said in Prague: “Rules must be binding. Violations must be punished. Words must mean something. The world must stand together to prevent the spread of these weapons.”16 At the UN summit he made the same point: “[We] must demonstrate that international law is not an empty promise, and that treaties will be enforced.”17
The question is how to do this. Obama seems to have in mind a new approach to international relations in general. The common challenges of the twenty-first century, he said at the UN Security Council summit, “can’t be met by any one leader or any one nation. And that’s why my administration has worked to establish a new era of engagement in which all nations must take responsibility for the world we seek.”18 Obama is aiming to construct a new nuclear order for which all nations—but especially the great powers—take responsibility. To act responsibly is to abide by commitments already made and to be ready to sanction those who do not live up to their commitments.19 This new order entails nuclear disarmament on the part of the nuclear powers, in accordance with the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, as well as a willingness to ensure that any country that breaks the rules will suffer consequences. The Obama vision is not that the nuclear powers should get rid of their weapons and in return expect to see a strengthening of the nonproliferation regime, but rather that these two developments should go hand in hand.
The United States and the other permanent members of the UN Security Council have recommitted themselves to the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. They have not provided a timetable for attaining that goal, though more than once Obama has said that the goal may not be reached in his lifetime.20 Nor has it been spelled out what a world free of nuclear weapons would look like. What would it really mean to be “free of nuclear weapons?” Would there be many states with the capacity to produce nuclear weapons in a short time? Would a nuclear weapons–free world require new kinds of intrusive inspection? Are the necessary means of verification available? Would there always be the danger of breakout? What could be done to mitigate that danger? What will the end state look like? These are extremely important questions, which have begun to receive the analysis they deserve.21
It would be a mistake, however, to make the initial steps on the journey contingent on agreement about the precise configuration of the end state. The important thing is to start on the journey and with each step to move closer to the goal. There is a great deal that can be done—and should be done—to move in the direction of reductions and elimination before the final destination is clear in all its details. There is a great deal that those who do not share the goal of elimination can agree to: the steps toward such a world would be of value in themselves, even short of the ultimate goal. Nevertheless, elimination should serve as the compass point for nuclear policy: in assessing any given policy one of the questions to ask is whether it moves us in the direction of nuclear disarmament. It is the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons that gives meaning to the specific steps and makes it possible to view them as part of a broader unfolding process.
The key elements of a world without nuclear weapons would be: (a) reduction of nuclear weapons to zero; (b) controlled and guaranteed access to nuclear fuel; and (c) international arrangements to prevent states from breaking out of the non-nuclear regime. These three elements will be central to any system of nuclear disarmament that has the peaceful uses of nuclear energy as one of its goals. All three were present in the Acheson-Lilienthal Report and the Baruch Plan. How does the Obama agenda differ from those early attempts at nuclear disarmament? First, there is now a decades-long experience of negotiations and agreements, which embody shared understandings of the nuclear danger and how to go about dealing with it. There are, of course, differences and disagreements among the nuclear powers in the way in which they see nuclear weapons, but there is also a considerable degree of common understanding, which did not exist in 1946. Second, the proposals put forward by Obama draw on that experience and seek to extend and build on it: by ratifying the CTBT, for example, or extending strategic arms reductions, or negotiating a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty. Third, Obama has not presented to the world a blueprint for the end state; rather he is trying to use what has already been agreed upon as the basis for drawing other states into the cooperative project of constructing a new nuclear order. This is, then, an open-ended agenda to be worked on by many different actors—including nonstate actors—although Obama has made it clear that he sees the United States playing a leading role.
Obama has laid out an ambitious vision and a full agenda. Many obstacles stand in the way. This chapter has pointed to some of them, especially the divisions inside the United States on the desirability of even the first steps. There are, however, many other obstacles, as the chapters in this book show. First, there is skepticism about American goals and interests: surely the United States wants nuclear disarmament because that would make the world safe for American conventional superiority? Would nuclear disarmament lead to greater U.S. dominance in the world—something that Americans might be happy with but other states could be expected to resist? Are nuclear weapons an essential means for other countries seeking to balance American power?
Second, not all the nuclear powers view nuclear weapons in the same way; nor do they all assign to nuclear weapons the same role in their defense policy. Russia, to take just one example, places heavy reliance on nuclear weapons in its doctrine and its policy because of the weakness of its conventional forces. It will not be interested in eliminating its nuclear weapons, or even in deep reductions in its nuclear forces, until it feels that there is a balance of conventional forces that guarantees its security.
Third, there are today two international crises caused by the efforts of states that signed the NPT to acquire nuclear weapons. North Korea has tested nuclear weapons and is apparently intent on producing more plutonium. Western governments believe that Iran, which is building the main elements of the nuclear fuel cycle and has conducted many of its nuclear activities in secret, is in the process of developing nuclear weapons of its own. If North Korea continues to add nuclear weapons to its arsenal and Iran proceeds to make the bomb, those will be serious setbacks to the effort to rid the world of nuclear weapons. It does not mean that the effort to rid the world of nuclear weapons should be abandoned, but it will make the task much more difficult and cast doubt on the ability of the international community to act together to carry it out.
It is appropriate therefore to quote the famous concluding paragraph of Max Weber’s 1919 lecture on “Politics as a Vocation,” in which he stresses how hard politics is and also how important it is to strive for what may seem to be impossible. “Politics,” writes Weber,
is a strong and slow drilling of hard boards. It takes both passion and perspective. Certainly, all historical experience confirms the truth—that man would not have attained the possible unless time and again he had reached out for the impossible.... Even those who are neither leaders nor heroes must arm themselves with that steadfastness of heart that can brave even the crumbling of all hopes. This is necessary right now, or else men will not be able to attain even that which is possible today.22
There is a great deal of “drilling of hard boards” to be done by policy-makers, by scholars, and by activists alike, to rid the world of nuclear weapons.
1. Remarks by President Barack Obama in Prague, April 5, 2009, at http://www. whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered/.
2. “Concept Paper for the Security Council Summit on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Disarmament,” annex to the letter dated September 15, 2009, from the president of the Security Council to the secretary general, at http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/ Disarm%20S2009463.pdf.
3. The text of the resolution can be found at http://www.un.org/News/Press/ docs/2009/sc9746.doc.htm.
4. Remarks by the president at the United Nations Security Council Summit, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-The-President-At-the-UN-Security-Council-Summit-On-Nuclear-Non-Proliferation-And-Nuclear-Disarmament/.
5. See Chapter 1, this volume.
6. George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons,” Wall Street Journal, January 4, 2007.
7. America’s Strategic Posture: The Final Report of the Congressional Committee on the Strategic Posture of the United States, William J. Perry, chairman, James R. Schlesinger, vice-chairman (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2009).
8. Ibid., p. xix.
9. Ibid., pp. xix–xx.
10. The most careful estimates are those provided by Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen published in the Nuclear Notebook in each issue of The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (http://www.thebulletin.org).
11. Joint Statement by President Obama and President Medvedev, April 1, 2009, at http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2009/April/20090401125216xjsnommis0.8078381. html&distid=ucs.
12. For further discussion, see David Holloway, “Further Reductions in Nuclear Forces,” in Reykjavik Revisited: Steps toward a World Free of Nuclear Weapons, ed. George P. Shultz, Steven P. Andreasen, Sidney D. Drell, and James E. Goodby (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2008), pp. 1–45.
13. See especially Jonathan Schell, The Abolition (New York: Knopf, 1984).
14. Remarks by President Barack Obama in Prague (cited in n. 1).
15. “Historic Summit of Security Council” (New York: UN Security Council Department of Public Information, September 24, 2009), at http://www.un.org/News/ Press/docs/2009/sc9746.doc.htm.
16. Remarks of President Barack Obama in Prague (cited in n. 1).
17. Remarks by the president at the United Nations Security Council Summit (cited in n. 5).
18. Ibid.
19. For a helpful discussion of responsible sovereignty that seems to jibe well with Obama’s remarks, see Bruce Jones, Carlos Pascual, and Stephen John Stedman, Power and Responsibility: Building International Order in an Era of Transnational Threats (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2009), ch. 1.
20. Remarks of President Barack Obama in Prague (cited in n. 1); remarks of the president to the United Nations Security Council Summit (cited in n. 4).
21. See, for example, Sidney D. Drell and James E. Goodby, A World without Nuclear Weapons: End-State Issues (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2009).
22. Max Weber, Politik als Beruf (München and Leipzig: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot, 1919), at http://de.wikisource.org/wiki/Politik_als_Beruf.