THE BIBLIOGRAPHY lists the works cited in this book, but a study of covert intelligence operations is incomplete without some additional explanation of sources used. This is particularly true if the book deals with Dwight D. Eisenhower. Ike was so circumspect when it came to discussing—or writing about—his involvement in deception and clandestine activities that the author must be both researcher and sleuth. To uncover a secret operation is one thing; to reveal Ike’s knowledge and participation is another.
Our investigation of Ike’s conduct as Supreme Commander during World War II was made much easier by the excellent work of others, particularly the British historians, who are justifiably proud of their intelligence services and have written extensively about the subject. The British Government commissioned scholars like Michael Foot to make public previously unknown but critically important facets of the war effort, and recently the first volume of F. W. Hinsley’s official history of British intelligence activities appeared. After F. W. Winterbotham broke the silence about ULTRA in 1974, R. V. Jones and Ronald Lewin brought to light a side of the war more intriguing than the most exciting and imaginative novel. These studies, along with the others included in the Bibliography, proved invaluable to our own work.
But learning of the United States’ involvement, and especially Ike’s still presented problems. There is no American official history, and almost all United States accounts of World War II intelligence are confined to the Office of Strategic Services. As explained in our book, the OSS was just one of several intelligence networks. Memoirs by Ike’s subordinates, including his G-2, General Kenneth Strong, filled in much of the story, and Sir Kenneth kindly consented to answer our questions by letter. We found out about the role of the SLUS through the Telford Taylor reports, deposited in the Modern Military Records branch of the National Archives, and helpful interviews with the participants listed in the Bibliography. Ike’s role emerged. The final ingredient was the Johns Hopkins University edition of Eisenhower’s papers, an exhaustive collection of Ike’s personal correspondence and memoranda, without which our task would have been virtually impossible.
Our task became more difficult when we began the presidential years. Fortunately our timing was opportune. After the Watergate break-in and the disclosure of CIA “dirty works,” there appeared a plethora of memoirs and scholarly investigations describing over two decades of intelligence operations. Interviews added to our knowledge, for an increasing number of former government officials welcomed an opportunity to set the record straight.
I want to express our thanks to all those who did cooperate so extensively, especially Richard M. Bissell, Jr., Howard Hunt, General Andrew Goodpaster, Milton Eisenhower, John Eisenhower, and Stuyvesant Wainwright III. These are all exceedingly busy men who took time out to spend hours discussing a myriad of subjects and often suggested additional avenues for us to pursue. Their collective memories comprise a great deal of our history, for they both described and explained what really went on.
We used our personal interviews in conjunction with the Columbia Oral History Collection and Princeton’s Dulles Oral History Project, essential source material for any scholar of the Eisenhower presidency. The post-Watergate period produced two other essential sources: the Pentagon Papers and the transcript of the Church Committee’s study of government operations. The value of these two publications to the student of the spies cannot be overemphasized.
The Johns Hopkins compilation of Eisenhower’s papers has not yet gone beyond the chief-of-staff period, and we still await the publication of the Foreign Relations volumes for Ike’s administration. To make matters worse from our standpoint, many of the documents relating to CIA activities were either never published or, as was more commonly the case, remained security-classified. Again we were helped by post-Watergate sentiment. By going through Record Group 59 of the National Archives Diplomatic Branch, we discovered numerous previously unused memoranda and dispatches and identified those still not released to the public. We obtained hundreds of these through the Freedom of Information Act.
For Ike himself, however, the main source was the Eisenhower Library in Abilene, Kansas. Director John Wickman, Dr. James Lyerzapf, and the rest of the library staff have expertly catalogued the thousands upon thousands of papers resulting from the Eisenhower White House, and assembled detailed finding guides as to their contents. The bulk of this collection—known as the Whitman File—provides insights into Ike’s administration and personality never before thought possible. Special mention should be made of Ike’s personal diary. Although obviously too busy to record a day-by-day account of his activities, Ike kept the diary periodically from the 1930s up until his death. Perhaps no other document reveals with such clarity the mind of this man who for so many years supervised our complex intelligence community.
One final note on the sources. We have attempted to obtain as much of the information as possible, but we will not pretend that the story is complete. The files from the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs and the National Security Council series are still primarily closed, as are many other documents in the Eisenhower Library’s holdings. It is unlikely, even with the newly instituted Executive Order 12065, that these documents will be declassified in the near future. Ike took many of his secrets with him to his grave. But he left enough for us to know that he believed in the intelligence community, that he used it to its fullest potential, and that it was never the same again after he retired.