INTRODUCTION
1 Quoted in Oliner (2003), 195.
2 Stefan Klein, The Science of Happiness (Cambridge: Da Capo Press, 2006).
3 Kessler; Murray & Lopez (1997b); Murray & Lopez (1997a); Seligman (1990); Seligman (1998).
PART I: YOU AND I
CHAPTER 1: THE UNEXPLAINED FRIENDLINESS OF THE WORLD
1 In a letter to the geologist Charles Lyell, 1860.
2 Based on a three-part video interview with Autrey, available at http://www. youtube.com/watch?v=bjjkbTcHnYg.
3 Despite what was said in the media, Autrey never served in the Army. See http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=29707.
4 Boyd and Richerson.
5 Organ donation to anonymous beneficiaries is illegal in Germany.
6 Hitchens.
7 Mother Teresa.
8 Ghiselin, 247.
9 Darwin (1888), 200.
10 Spencer, Herbert, Social Statistics (London: John Chapman, 1851), Chapter 28. Now available at: http://oll.libertyfund.org/?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3Ftitle=273&chapter=6417&layout=html&Itemid=27.
11 Quoted in Hofstadter, 45.
12 http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0094291/quotes.
13 Dawkins (1989).
14 Kropotkin.
15 Quoted in McElreath and Boyd, 82.
16 Hitchens; Hofstadter; Kropotkin; McLean.
17 Dawkins (1989), 2.
18 Clark, 303.
19 Darwin (1962), 496. Darwin also spoke out publicly against slavery. Might the experience in Brazil have been one of the keys that led to his theory of evolution? There is no doubt that his famous investigation of the beaks of finches on the Galapagos Islands was not what moved him to solve the riddle of the origin of species. According to the British historians of science Adrian Desmond and James Moore, the real catalyst for Darwin was this painful memory of the groaning Brazilian slave. Even if their thesis is somewhat too confidently expressed; even if there was not one single catalyst for one of the most significant achievements of the scientific method, Desmond and Moore have found solid evidence that Darwin was inspired by the idea of proving the common genealogy of all peoples. For as soon as all men and women can be shown to be siblings, the basis for racism would be destroyed once and for all. (Desmond and Moore).
20 Quoted in Wright, 211.
21 Darwin (1962), 205.
22 Ibid., 228.
23 Darwin (1888), Part I, Chapter 4.
CHAPTER 2: GIVE AND TAKE
1 Khalil Gibran, Jesus, the Son of Man (http://gutenberg.net.au/ebooks03/0301451h.html).
2 Rousseau (1995), 196.
3 Approximately a million new titles are published worldwide every year. We assume an average thickness of 0.8 inches and include only books published in the last twenty years.
4 Poundstone, 235.
5 A classic publication in this field is Maynard Smith and Price.
6 Blair.
7 Axelrod (1984); Axelrod (1997); Axelrod & Hamilton.
8 A player will frequently allow an opponent two attempts at cheating, but that is not always the best solution. The number of cooperative moves before the first retribution can be optimized. The best possible strategy depends on the various points awarded for cooperation or confrontation. Also, the number of cooperative moves before the first retribution should be constantly and randomly varied; otherwise, a cooperative strategy can be exploited by a malevolent player, who, for example, would always cheat for two moves and then return to cooperation. Nowak and Sigmund (1992).
9 Under certain circumstances, a somewhat more Machiavellian strategy can allow escape from this cycle. This strategy, called “Pavlov,” consists in offering the opponent cooperation if she herself cooperated on her last move or if both players have chosen conflict. On the other hand, if the opponent has good-naturedly allowed herself to be exploited on the last move, or has herself exploited Pavlov, then Pavlov opts for cooperation. This strategy is only successful, however, if both players make their moves simultaneously without knowing what the other will do. But in real life, both partners are more likely to react in turn to the last move of the other. See Nowak and Sigmund (1995), Wedekind, and Milinski.
10 Ridley.
11 Trivers (1971).
12 Quoted in Hrdy (2009), 133.
CHAPTER 3: BUILDING TRUST
1 For the criticism of Turnbull, see Barth and Turnbull; Knight; and Heine.
2 Turnbull, 284.
3 Harford, 20.
4 Kiyonari et al.
5 Rilling et al.
6 I treat this topic at greater length in The Science of Happiness (Klein, 2006).
7 Behrens et al.
8 Singer, Kiebel et al. (2004).
9 Samuelson; Vega-Redondo.
10 Lieberman; Tabibnia and Lieberman.
11 Decety et al. (2004).
12 BBC News Online at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/1392791.stm.
13 McCabe et al. (1996); McCabe and Smith.
14 King-Casas (2005).
15 King-Casas et al. (2005).
16 Krueger.
17 Bartels and Zeki.
18 Kosfeld et al.
19 https://www.verolabs.com/Default.asp
20 Even the simplest scenarios of game theory—e.g., the repeated prisoner’s dilemma—depend on so-called “triggers” that decide whether cooperation will be continued or ended. The Folk theorem, one of the central theorems of game theory, can mathematically prove this proposition in a very general form. For a discussion of the Folk theorem, see Gintis (2009).
21 King-Casas (2008).
22 Goddard.
23 Knack and Keefer.
24 Zak and Knack. Beugelsdijk et al., however, dispute the universal validity of this estimate.
CHAPTER 4: FEELINGS WITHOUT BORDERS
1 Klein (2014).
2 Ibid.
3 Rizzolatti and Craighero; Fogassi et al.
4 Mukamel et al.
5 Ramachandran.
6 Wright, 205.
7 Christakis and Fowler, 2000.
8 Rizzolatti and Craighero.
9 Fadiga et al.; Prather et al.; Welberg.
10 The quotes come from Leonardo’s manuscripts TP 68 and BN 2038 20r. I have written at greater length about them in Leonardo’s Legacy (Klein, 2011). The passage recurs almost word for word in the book on the art of painting by the Renaissance theoretician of aesthetics Leon Battista Alberti: “We painters want to express the effects of the mind through the movement of the limbs.” Alberti, 272.
11 Leonardo.
12 I have written more extensively about how emotions are anchored in the body in The Science of Happiness (Klein, 2006).
13 The transference from physical gestures functions in a similar way (De Gelder).
14 de Waal (2009).
15 Keysers and Gazzola; Keysers and Perrett.
16 Damasio (1995).
17 Singer, Seymour et al. (2004).
18 Myers.
19 Singer et al. (2006).
20 Darley and Batson, 107. The parable is told in Luke 10:30–37.
21 Lessing et al., letter to Friedrich Nicolai of November 1756.
22 Tankersley et al.
23 Frith and Singer; Mitchell et al.
24 Bischof-Köhler.
25 Warneken and Tomasello (2006).
26 Tomasello (2003); Hare et al.
27 de Waal (2006).
28 Warneken and Tomasello (2007).
29 Klein (2014).
30 Lieberman (2006).
31 They were playing the game known as Battle of the Sexes. Adam and Eve have a joint problem. He suggests his solution and she hers. Both are equally good. Each has to choose which to follow without knowing what the other has chosen. If they choose different solutions, they both lose. Pure logic will obviously get them nowhere. While players in the trust game do better when they can accurately assess their partner, the Battle of the Sexes depends on how well you can predict the moves of the other (Kuo et al.).
CHAPTER 5: THERE IS ONLY ONE LOVE
1 Archer.
2 An American study found such emotional upset in approximately 18 percent of people whose dog had died (Katcher).
3 Companies selling pet food and other pet items in Germany have annual sales in the neighborhood of $4,678,000,000, while veterinarians estimate sales of $2,000,000,000 just for the care of dogs and cats (Ohr and Zeddies). The remarkable figure on Americans’ spending comes from market research by the American Pet Products Association. More information can be found at www.americanpetproducts.org/press_industrytrends.asp.
4 However, not all of the genes of the rescuer will survive, since part of the genome of the saved relatives is identical.
5 Neyer.
6 Bowles and Posel.
7 Schroeder.
8 Wilson, E. O. (1975).
9 Segal and Hershberger.
10 Gadagkar (2001); Gadagkar (1997).
11 Davies; Cockburn; Welty.
12 DeBruine (2002).
13 Panksepp.
14 See Donaldson and Young; Panksepp; and Lee. Many details still need to be worked out, however. See e.g. Bancroft; Carter (1992).
15 Uvnäs-Moberg and Eriksson; Lee.
16 Leckman et al.; Panksepp.
17 Young et al.
18 Walum et al.
19 Prichard.
20 Kosfeld et al.
21 Petrovic.
22 Baumgartner.
23 Singer et al. (2008).
24 Domes; Guastella.
25 Israel et al.
26 Damasio (1995).
27 Moll et al.
28 Decety et al. (2009); Moll et al.
29 Harbaugh et al.
30 Hobbes, Leviathan, chapter 13.
31 Rousseau (2008); Rousseau (2005).
32 Eisenberger et al.
33 I have written at more length about this topic in Klein (2006). See also the literature cited therein.
34 Zorrilla et al.
35 Allman et al.
36 Berkman; Cacioppo; House; Reblin and Uchino.
37 Rodriguez-Laso; S. L. Brown et al. (2003); W. M. Brown et al.
38 Damasio (1995); Klein (2006).
39 Contrary to what many neo-Darwinists often suggest, e.g. Wright.
PART II: ALL OF US
CHAPTER 6: HUMANS SHARE, ANIMALS DON’T
1 Deacon; Wurz; Cremin, 72.
2 Milo.
3 Fehr, Bernhard, and Rockenbach (2008).
4 Hardin.
5 Trivers (1971); Dawkins (1989); Ridley; Wright.
6 Langford et al.; Dugatkin; Clutton-Brock.
7 Wilkinson.
8 Fehr, “The Economics of Impatience” (2002); Loewenstein et al.
9 Stevens and Hauser.
10 Shermer gives a good overview; see also the literature cited there.
11 Hammerstein; Morell.
12 Packer and Pusey.
13 Stiner et al.
14 Morell; Heinsohn and Packer; Packer and Pusey.
15 Boesch (2005); Mitani and Watts (2001); Gilby; Muller.
16 Ueno and Matsuzawa. This unwillingness of mothers to share food with their children is also present in other great apes, both in captivity and in the wild. See Nowell and Fletcher.
17 Tomasello et al. (2009).
18 Silk et al. (2005); Silk (2006).
19 Inoue and Matsuzawa; Herrmann et al. (2007).
20 Boesch and Boesch-Achermann (2000).
21 Boesch et al. (2010).
22 de Waal (2009).
23 Vrba; Schrenk.
24 McManus; Martrat; Johnsen et al.
25 Zhao et al.
26 Chen and Wen-Hsiung Li.
27 Hrdy.
28 Deacon.
29 Fehr et al., “Egalitarianism” (2008); Brownell et al.
CHAPTER 7: THERE MUST BE PUNISHMENT
1 Cameron; Güth et al; Nowack et al. (2000) give an overview of the literature on the usual game outcomes.
2 The American Nobel laureate Vernon L. Smith, a pioneer of empirical economics, argues that that’s why games like Ultimatum are unnatural. No one accepts as realistic the situation in which the players encounter each other anonymously and then never again. Even if participants knew that that was the situation, they would ignore the rules of the game and act as if there would be a second or third game. Smith (2007).
3 Bewley; Campbell and Kamlani. For experimental studies, see Fehr and Kirchsteiger (1994) and Fehr and Kirchsteiger (1997).
4 In Heinrich von Kleist’s 1811 novella Michael Kohlhaas, two horses belonging to the eponymous hero, a sixteenth-century horse trader, are illegally seized by an official. In his unsuccessful attempt to regain them and receive compensation for the expenses he has incurred, Kohlhaas gradually becomes a fanatical and violent opponent of the state. Although he finally gets his horses back, he is executed as a rebel. E. L. Doctorow retold the story—about a black revolutionary named Coalhouse Walker Jr.—in his 1975 novel Ragtime.
5 Lind; Tyler and Lind (2005).
6 Henrich (2004).
7 Frank et al. (1993); Frank et al. (1996); Selten and Ockenfels; Frey and Meier (2004a).
8 It is unlikely that a company that pays per delivery attracts more competitive characters, because the companies in the study were located in different cities (personal communication from Ernst Fehr). What bicycle courier would commute from Zurich to Bern to work for a company that pays in a different way? (Burks et al.).
9 Fehr and Gächter (2002).
10 De Quervain et al.
11 Sanfey (2003).
12 Rozin et al.
13 Knoch et al. (2006).
14 Damasio (1995).
15 Gächter et al. (2008).
16 Gürek et al.; Hauert et al.
17 Hauert et al.
18 Boyd et al. (2003).
19 Frey and Jegen (2001).
20 Frey and Meier (2004b).
21 Rees et al.
22 Fehr and Falk (2002).
23 Titmuss.
24 Gneezy and Rustichini (2000). Swiss scientists arrived at similar results: When volunteer work is remunerated, the supply of volunteers dwindles. Frey and Goette (1999).
CHAPTER 8: US AGAINST THEM
1 Hamilton (1964).
2 The Price equation (Price, 1970) describes how an arbitrary property z (e.g. denoting the frequency of a gene related to altruism) varies over generations. Provided that a population can be divided into k groups of ni individuals each (i=1 . . . k), a zi can be assigned to each group. Let wi= n’i/ni denote the fitness of group i, where n’i, ni are numbers of individuals in successive generations, and let w be the average fitness of the entire population. In the same way, define z and z' as the averages of zi and z'i, respectively, taken over groups, and further let Δz = z'–z. Then the Price equation holds: wΔz = cov(wi, zi) + E(wi Δzi), where (wi, zi) is the expectation and (wi, zi) is the covariance while taking averages over groups. Hence the equation links the increase or decrease of property z within the total population (left-hand side) to how this property is distributed over groups.
The larger the first summand on the right-hand side, the more distinct the groups are: It measures inter-group competition. The second summand is essentially determined by group fitnesses wi, therefore describing intra-group competitions. Suppose z measures altruism within a group, then for all i: ∆zi<0 and wi>0 holds. Consequently, the terms on the equation’s right-hand side will have opposite signs, and altruism thrives if the first summand’s absolute is bigger than the second summand’s absolute.
3 Frank, Steven (1995).
4 Schwarz, 127.
5 Price and Smith.
6 Schwarz, 130.
7 Ibid., 131.
8 Ibid.
9 Hamilton (1975).
10 Wilson, E. O. (1975).
11 Begley.
12 Even E. O. Wilson, the most prominent sociobiologist who had long rejected group selection, has now changed sides. David Wilson and E. O. Wilson (2008). The by now classic study of newer theories of group selection is D. S. Wilson and Sober (1998).
13 Hamilton (1975); West and Griffin (2007); Lehmann et al. (2007).
14 Assume 100 inhabitants of each village before the disaster. After the famine, twenty-five persons survive in the first village, of whom every fourth is an altruist. Seventy-five persons survive in the second village, and three-fourths of them are altruists. In the total surviving population of 100 persons, (.25 x 25) + (.75 x 75) = 62.5 (rounded up = 63) are altruists.
15 Bowles (2006); Bowles (2009). In the later publication, Bowles assumes that the group competition arises through war between peoples. But this assumption is unnecessary; the model is also valid when the competition comes about through natural disasters. To trace the development of altruism back to war is problematic because the earliest evidence of violence between peoples comes from the Neolithic, yet the essential character traits of modern humans had almost certainly been formed earlier. A thorough discussion of this question can be found in Hrdy.
16 Krueger et al; Wallace et al.; Cesarini (2009).
17 Horowitz.
18 Fessler (1999); Fessler (2004); Fessler and Haley; Haidt (2003).
19 Rakoczy et al.; Tomasello et al. (2009).
20 Piaget.
21 Another well-documented example of the significance of cultural norms in a conflict between genetically identical ethnic groups is the expansion of the Nuer in the Sudan at the expense of the Dinka (Kelly).
22 Black, 131.
CHAPTER 9: THE EVIL IN GOODNESS
1 Interallied Commission (1919); Buzanski and the literature quoted therein.
2 Grandberg and Sarup; Berreby; Trotter.
3 Sherif et al. (1961).
4 Ibid.
5 Sherif et al., 79.
6 Ibid. 108, 111.
7 Erev et al.; Bornstein et al.; Gunnthorsdottir and Rapoport (2006); Tan and Bolle.
8 Klinger and Rebien.
9 Bernhard et al.
10 Boehm (2000).
11 Takahashi et al. (2009).
12 Brown (1978).
13 William Shakespeare, Henry VI, Part 1, Act IV, scene 1.
14 Diamond.
15 Sosis (2000); Sosis and Bressler (2003).
16 Over time, prohibitions can even re-sort the genes of an entire population. For example, if the cultural differences between two neighboring peoples increase, more and more people will reproduce within their own community. After all, who wants to live with a mate whose daily diet they find repulsive? Thus the genotypes develop separately; in a few centuries, certain genes will occur more often among the members of one group than among those of the other, and that becomes a further factor favoring selflessness within the group. As has been described, altruism is more worthwhile the closer the genetic relationship. Such gene clustering has in fact been measured by anthropologists working with still-existing tribal societies; see Bowles (2009). Even neighboring peoples, for example in Papua New Guinea, differ more in their genetic makeup than Europeans from the most distant corners of the continent differ from one another. Only by closing themselves off from outsiders could each group preserve its genetic characteristics, and only where there was such divergence could genes for altruism survive. Obviously, the benefit of sticking together far outweighed the damage done by destructive rituals. See Boyd and Richerson; Henrich (2009); Richerson and Boyd.
17 Kinzler et al.
18 Ferschtman et al.
19 TV documentary The Story of Ziad Jarrah. Canadian Broadcasting Company. October 10, 2001.
20 Atran.
21 Sageman.
22 Judges 16:30.
CHAPTER 10: THE GOLDEN RULE
1 Scheer.
2 How well such policies worked was manifest when the deportation of Jews began. Almost everyone in Germany looked the other way. A comparison with occupied Poland is especially informative. Poland had its own infamous history of anti-Semitism. Most Polish Jews were not nearly as assimilated into the majority population as were German Jews. The German occupiers executed any Pole caught harboring Jews, while Germans who did the same usually were punished with just a few months of so-called “protective custody” in a concentration camp. Yet despite all that, after the war ten times as many Poles as Germans received the title “Righteous among the Nations,” which the state of Israel awarded, according to specific criteria, to anyone who ran a personal risk to protect Jews in the Nazi imperium. This indifference among Germans cannot be explained by saying that there were more spies in Germany than elsewhere. Rather, the Nazi regime succeeded in turning Jews into outsiders, while the Germans themselves were outsiders in the countries they occupied. On the risks to Germans who harbored Jews, see Scheer; Kosmala.
3 Oliner (1988); Schroeder. For a similar study that avoids some methodological difficulties of Oliner’s pioneering work while coming to the same conclusion, see Midlarsky et al.; Fagin-Jones and Midlarsky.
4 Oliner (2003).
5 Dubs.
6 That is why Peter Bodberd, a pioneer American Orientalist, translated rén as “shared humanity.”
7 Confucius (1983), 109.
8 Black, 104–105.
9 Leviticus 19:34.
10 Psalm 72:11–12.
11 http://www.yoga-age.com/upanishads/isha.html
12 Babylonian Talmud, tractate Shabbat 31a. [quoted in Steinberg, Avraham, MD. Encyclopedia of Jewish Medical Ethics. (Nanuet, NY: Feldheim, 2003).]
13 Cicero (1888), 166.
14 Wilson, David Sloan (2002).
15 Matthew 5:17.
16 Matthew 21:31.
17 Jaspers (1953).
18 Eisenstadt; Roes and Raymond; Norenzayan and Shariff.
19 Henrich et al. (2010).
20 Roes and Raymond.
21 Proverbs 25: 21–22.
22 Second Kings 6:8–23.
23 Second Kings 6:23.
24 Phelps.
25 Lieberman (2005).
26 Confucius (1983), 109.
27 Udana Varga 5, 18. [quoted in Sharp, Michael.]
28http://www.mahabharataonline.com/translation/mahabharata_13b078.php.
29 Nawawi.
30 Kant, (Book I, Chapter I, § 70).
31 Donner.
32 Nowak and Sigmund (2005).
33 Shakespeare, Richard II, act I, scene 1.
34 Takahashi (2000).
35 Milinski et al; Wedekind (2000).
36 Ohtsuki and Iwasa.
37 Ensminger.
CHAPTER 11: THE TRIUMPH OF SELFLESSNESS
1 Stallmann.
2 Imhorst.
3 Tapscott and Williams.
4 The often-heard opinion that Wikipedia authors and developers of free software work mainly to attract attention to themselves and advance their careers is not true. In their very thorough analysis, the American economists Karim R. Lakhani and Robert Wolf were able to show that programmers of free software are intrinsically motivated. Like Stallman, they enjoy being technically creative. See Lakhani and Wolf. Studies of Wikipedia authors came to the same conclusion: Their motivation is mainly the joy of writing and their conviction that they are working for a good cause. See Nov (2007); Nov and Kuk (2008); and the literature cited therein.
5 Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (German Federal Center for Political Education), 2009.
6 Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations, Book I, Chapter 1.
7 Hodgson.
8 Mokyr; Posner.
9 Herrmann et al. (2008).
10 Putnam et al. (1993).
11 That is why the party of the media mogul and politician Silvio Berlusconi could never capture a majority in the Emilia Romagna.
12 For European countries, see Adam; for American states, see Putnam (2001).
13 This number comes from the US Agency for International Development. Full report at http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/rls/fs/2005/58392.htm.
14 Radtke.
15 Pérez.
16 Buchan et al.
17 Bullinger et al.
18 Tapscott and Williams.
19 Millward Brown.
EPILOGUE: THE JOY OF GIVING
1 Dunn et al.
2 See the literature cited in Chapter 15 of Klein (2006).
3 Frey and Stutzer (2007); Post; Meier and Stutzer.
4 Panksepp.